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ABSTRACT
There is significant motivation for a theory which states, in a
naturalistic idiom, conditions in virtue of which a symbol has a specific
meaning. My thesis is primarily concerned with the possibility of
satisfying two important constraints on any such theory. First, a theory
of meaning must not have as a consequence that symbol users can never be
mistaken in their use of symbols. Second, a naturalistic theory must
provide a response to an argument suggested by Kripke's discussion of rule
following: To have a meaning is to have a normative property; but if
meaning is normative, then it cannot be naturalistically characterized.
After an introductory chapter, I consider a cluster of initially attractive
naturalistic theories that apparent-ly meet these constraints. According to
"evolutionary semantics," the purpose of a symbol (e.g. a token belief,
assertion, etc.) determines its meaning; and explanations of why
capacities involving the manipulation of symbols have been selected for
will tell us what the purpose of a particular symbol is. A mistaken symbol
is said to be one which does not function in accordance with its
evolutionary purpose. I argue that all of these theories have similar
difficulties. They assign many implausible meanings to each symbol; and
attempts to remedy this difficulty either (i) rule out the possibility of
error or (ii) have as a consequence that every symbol is about the
biological fitness of symbol users. Moreover, such theories fail to
capture the connection between a system's discriminatory capacities and
plausible intentional explanations of the system's behavior. In chapter
three, I continue the criticism of evolutionary semantics, focusing on
empirical difficulties facing these theories.
I turn next to the issue of idealization in science, with an eye toward
defending the theory: P,-tokens have p as their meaning, if V-tokens covary
with p, ceteris paribus. In chapter four. I argue that we are committed to
'ceteris paribus" laws; but these are not merely shorthand for more
restricted exceptionless generalizations.. In chapter five, I argue that
failures of ceteris paribus laws to describe actual events can be explained
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by citing the 'interference" by independent factors. For example, the law
of gravity fails to describe the acceleration of many falling bodies,
because falling bodies are also affected by friction. I characterize the
truth conditions of lawlike sentences containing ceteris paribus clauses in
terms of there being interference explanations which are not defeasible.
If we allow for the use of ceteris paribus clauses, then naturalistic
meaning theories can account for the possibility of error. In chapter six,
I argue that false beliefs can be explained as token beliefs which f.ail to
covary with their represented because of independent interference; and I
argue that this strategy does not fail to be naturalistic by making illicit
appeal to intentional notions. An important part my argument here is the
discussion of how the simple meaning theory mentioned above avoids the
consequences of wild indeterminac., e:.d a strong version of meaning holism.
The normativity of meaning is explained in chapter seven by first
distinguishing normativity that is 'in*rinsic' to meaning from that which
is "extrinsic" to meaning. Such intri ,sic normativity as there is can be
accounted for in part by appealing to an 'ought' of idealization, such
appeals being common-place in paradigm naturalistic contexts. Note that we
say things like, 'The solution should have turned red; I wonder what went
wrong." This is, I claim, an appeal to the fact that ceteris was not
paribus in order to explain why some expected condition did not obtain.
There is also an epistemic sense in which one ought to token symbols as one
would token them, ceteris paribus. Given this explanation of the
normativity of meaning, the "meaning naturalist' can reply to the kind of
skepticism found in Kripke's Wittgenstein, by mirroring certain
"reliabilist' replies to epistemological skepticism.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Robert Stalnaker
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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Chap t er 1
Di soon ten t "i th Natural Con ten t
Concerning the Thoughts of man....they are every one a
Representation or Apparance, of some quality, or other
Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called
an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and
other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working,
produceth diversity of Apparences.
---Hobbes, Leviathan.
Mental states are about things. One of my current thoughts, for example,
is about the paper before me. One of your current thoughts, I hope, is
about the paper before you. It is a rather striking and puzzling fact
that thoughts exhibit 'aboutness,m or that thoughts have meanings, if you
will. The "problem of content" is to characterize and explain, in so far
as this is possible, the relation that holds between our mental states and
the various objects, properties, and states of affairs which our mental
states are about. We want to solve the problem of content, because in
doinq so, we hope to learn something about thought. Proposed solutions to
the problem of content will take the form of a theory of meaning. This
thesis is about naturalistic meaning theories, and I want to defend the
P Izimr *tk1 h z v a hg ^ mu ftir aAo% #%r>12 mP&l ,t rrt- i.a
I
at som suc V~l VL t eoIry ca b '11e co reCt.
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We have many different kinds of mental states: beliefs, desires,
fears, fantasies, supposings, etc. All these states have meanings. But
with respect to providing a theory of meaning, focusing on beliefs is a
natural way to begin. For when we have a belief, we have a thought which
says, in effect: This is how the world is. Such a thought is either
correct or not, true or false. This is not the case for other kinds of
thoughts. And meanings are intimately related to truth or "correctness"
conditions. I will be primarily concerned, then, with theories of meaning
as they apply to beliefs; though I am also interested in how well such
theories can be extended or modified to accommodate other meaningful
entities, like desires and declarative sentences.
While we may speak of the problem of content, there are at least two
distinct questions here. First, one can ask how it is possible that
beliefs represent at all. Rocks are not about anything, and one might
want to know how minds differ from collections of rocks in this respect.
An adequate answer to this question would tell us in virtue of what
something, say a belief, is a representation, i.e. the sort of thing which
is about something else. Second, given that beliefs are representations,
one might want to know in virtue of what a belief is about some specific
state of affairs (object or property) as opposed to some other, That is,
one can ask what makes a given belief the belief that p, as opposed to the
belief that q. I will simply take for granted that beliefs are
representations, and focus on this second question. This is not to say
that answering the first question is easy. But this thesis is about
Cotente
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certain difficulties-- in particular, difficulties arising from the
possibility of error-- thWt arise in trying to provide a naturalistic
account of what makes a belief the belief that p.
1 .1 A Natural VOi eA of Me an i ng
Theor i es
The claim that mental states have contents has been defended elsewhere,
and at length.1  I have nothing to add along these lines. Instead, I want
to move directly to discussion of the claim that a theory of content can
be naturalistic. I begin, though, with a methodological point which will
play an important role throughout the thesis.
1.1.1 A Methodological Maxim
It is sometimes tempting to think that mental states, e.g. Fred's belief
that the turkey is in the refrigerator, cannot figure in genuine causal
explanations of events, e.g. Fred's moving towards the fridge. For one
might think the "real" causation goes on at the neurological level, on
some other level on which the mental supervenes. 2 One might conclude from
1. See especially Fodor [1987] or Rey [forthcoming]. A brief summary of
what I take to be the main arguments in favor of the claim that mental
states have contents is provided in Appendix A.
2. See, e.g., Kim [1978] for a discussion of supervenience.
- 14 -
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such puzzles about causation that there is something odd about the mental,
or that the mental lies outside the causal order. From this, it is
tempting to conclude that mental properties are importantly different from
other properties we are familiar with. At a minimum, this last temptation
must be resisted.
Explanations which invoke mental states are macro-explanations; and
there is indeed a philosophical question concerning how (or if) any macro-
explanation can be genuine causal explanation, given an underlying causal
micro-explanation. But if the only philosophical problem concerning
mental states is the more general problem of macro-property causation,
then at least there is nothing especially problematic about the mental.
For worries about macro-explanations can be raised in non-mental domains
like neurology or biology. There might be a sense in which such worries
about causation would show explanation involving mental properties to be
"odd" or somehow peculiar. But this oddness would be common to most, if
not all, special science explanation. So it would not be odd that the
mental was odd in this way. I mention this point, not because I want to
take a stand here on the issue of supervenient causation; but because
there is a general methodological point to be made here with respect to
any inquiry concerning the mental, and by extension, to inquiries
concerning the intentional.
Chomsky is fond of saying, "If jt a problem for physics, then it's
,1
not a problem for linguistics.' That is, one can certainly raise
- 15 -
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interesting problems in the philosophy of science within the context of
linguistic theory. But general problems concerning the possibility of
doing science at all do not tell against the theories of particular
sciences. Suppose we have an argument, e, which purports to show that a
science of linguistics is impossible, or that present linguistics is
hopelessly flawed. Qua attack on linguistics, a would not be very
interesting, if it also showed (mutatis mutandis) that developing a
physics is impossible, or that present physics is hopelessly flawed.
Pointing out that linguistic theory is logically underdetermined by the
data, for example, would be no argument against linguistic theory.
Moreover, there may well be philosophical problems concerning the
possibility of doing special (as opposed to basic) science. That is,
there may be philosophical problems from which basic science is exempted,
but which are common to all the special sciences. It would not be odd or
surprising, then, to find that some particular special science had to face
a version of such a problem, even if (parts of) physics did not. So one
might strengthen "Chomsky's principle" and say, "If it's a problem for
biology, then it's not a problem for linguistics."
Similarly, it is important nriot to confuse problems about the mental
qua intentional entity with problems about the mental qua object of
inquiry in the (special) sciences. Worries peculiar to the philosophy of
psychology-- at least those dealt with here-- have to do largely with the
relation between the mental and the physical. They are primarily worries
about the nature of mind, and not primarily about the nature of science or
- 16 -
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scientific explanation in general. The mind-body problem arises,
presumably, because there are certain features of minds which make the
mental seem especially problematic, that is, problematic in ways that the
non-mental is not. If we are able to point out that some of these
problematic features are not peculiar to the mental, the problem does not
go away. But it is shown to be an instance of a more general problem in
the philosophy of (special) science. Such a recasting of a problem can, I
think, count as progress,
I propose, then, the following methodological maxim: If it's a
problem for biology, then it's not a problem for intentional psychology.
Or more precisely, if a problem can be raised in the context of biological
explanation, then the fact that the same problem can be raised (mutatis
mutandis) in the context of intentional explanation is not a problem for
intentional explanation. For all such a problem could show is that an
intentional psychology would have no advantage, qua science, in some
respect over biology. Hence, such a, problem could not show that there is
something especially problematic about the intentional.
One could describe my entire project in this thesis as a partial
defense of the claim that intentional properties are no more peculiar than
other naturalistic properties appealed to in the (special) sciences. Such
a project does not require a general defense of the special sciences. Nor
does it require a detailed account of the metaphysical relation that holds
between (i) properties appealed to in "basic science" and (ii) properties
- 17 -
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appealed to in the special sciences that may not be reducible to (1).
These issues raise important philosophical questions, but not questions
that the intentional psychologist should be burdened with solving. Thus,
when assessing difficulties for naturalistic meaning theories, we must be
careful to distinguish difficulties that arise because of features
peculiar to intentional states from difficulties that arise because
theorizing is difficult. I shall often have recourse to return to this
point. What I shall do below is (i) try to isolate some worries about the
intentional that do seem to be peculiar to the intentional, and (ii) argue
that the "meaning naturalist' can respond to these. Having used the term
'naturalistic' several times now, I should say something now about what it
means in this context.
1.1.2 Grades of Naturalism
I suspect that no satisfactory definition of the tern, 'naturalistic' can
be given. This is hardly surprising, since satisfactory definitions of
any term are hard to come by. There are, however, paradigm examples of
naturalistic properties, e.g. being an electron and other properties
appealed to in the "hard sciences" of physics, chemistry and biology. We
might imagine acontinuum of properties, ranging from those very like
paradigm naturalistic properties to those relatively unlike paradigm
naturalistic properties. The property of being game, for example, would
be towards the other end of the continuum. There is little to be gained
- 18 -
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by drawing a line and stipulating that all and only the properties 'to the
left' of the line are the naturalistic properties. Moreover, any such
line is sure to be arbitrary. But this does not mean that talk of
naturalistic properties or theories is empty, anymore than a similar
argLment would show that talk of bald men is empty. I think we can
legitimately call a theory of meaning naturalistic if: (i) the theory is
of the form, '"-tokens have p as their meaning, if ...f3...p," where what
appears on the right side of the conditional is a statement attributing to
the (belief) type (, or to tokens of 4, some complex of properties Q1, Q29
*.. & Qn; and (ii) each such property Qj is more like the paradigm
naturalistic properties than intentional properties are.3
On this construal of what a naturalistic theory of meaning is, the
most interesting question is not whether some such theory can be given,
but rather to what degree the phenomenon of meaning can be naturalized.
3. There is a hornet's nest of issues concerning the form of a meaning
theory that I must pass over here. I will take up the question of what
'15' and 'p' range over in 6.1, when I (briefly) take up the issue of
compositionality in the context of the particular theory I want to
defend. Very briefly: If 'A' ranges over beliefs, 'p' will range over
possible states of affairs; if '0' ranges over concepts, 'p' wilL
rang ove- proper ties. I have some preference for thinking primarily
in the latter terms. I a~so used the expression, '1-tokens have p as
their meaning,' instead of '3-tokens mean that p.' This is because
'means that" •ight be understood as a relation that holds between
expressions (one of which may be an expression in a meta-language).
But the theories I will be discussing attempt to characterize meaning
as a symbol-world relation, not a symbol-symbol relation. Thus, they
claim (controversially) that symbols have meanings, e.g. properties or
states of affairs. For ease of discourse, I will often use the
expression 'means that p' below. but I will always intend that this
expression be interchangeable for 'has p as a meaning"'
- 19 -
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Indeed, it might be better to talk of naturalizing theories and the
naturalization of meaning, rather than naturalistic theories of meaning.
Of course, naturalizing meaning to the degree that it can be naturalized
may involve a long process that requires the development of many different
theories. For, given any theory which satisfies (i) and (ii) above, we
can ask: How like the paradigm naturalistic properties are Q1, Q2, *** &
Qn? We might then go on to give a theory B which says in virtue of what
something has the property Qj, where 8 in turn appeals only to properties
still more like the paradigm naturalistic properties than Qj. This
process might continue until we are either unable to provide further
theories, or we provide theories which appeal only to the paradigm
naturalistic properties themselves. It is also possible that, in the
course of doing more science, we will come to recognize more properties
than we do now as paradigm naturalistic properties.
This 'criterion" for being a naturalistic theory of meaning relies
heavily on our intuitive judgments about relative similarity to paradigm
cases. But we know that we make such judgments, with a fair degree of
consensus, all the time. Moreover, even in the absence of explicit shared
conventions as to what counts as a naturalistic theory of meaning, we.seem
to know them when we see them. Philosophers have not doubted that Dretske
L1981), Millikan [1984]), or Fodor .[19871 provided naturalistic theories.4
4. To a first approximation, these theories are, respectively:
I-tokens have p as their meaning, if (i) r-tokens carried the information
that p in the learning period for t-tokens; (ii) p explains the
- 20 -
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What has been doubted is whether these theories, or any like them, can be
true. But if true, these theories would certainly serve to explain the
phenomenon of meaning in terms of properties that are significantly more
like paradigm naturalistic properties than intentional properties are.
An important mark of naturalistic meaning theories that has been
widely discussed is the (desired) absence of the intentional idiom on the
right side of the conditional. Indeed, the task of providing an adequate
naturalistic theory of meaning is sometimes taken to be identical to the
task of providing, in a non-intentional idiom, a statement of
nomologically sufficient conditions for having p as a meaning; where such
a statement explains how non-intentional properties give rise to
intentional properties. "Breaking out of the intentional circle" in this
way would indeed represent a real success for the meaning naturalist. But
this is because, I suggest, the paradigm naturalistic properties are non-
intentional. So providing a theory which explains how symbols can have
intentional properties in virtue of having certain non-intentional
properties would, ipso facto, be to make significant progress in
naturalizing meaning.
Critics of "meaning naturalism" should be understood, I think, as
being skeptical of the claim that there can be any significant
selection for the disposition to produce 3-tokens; and (iii) any non-p
causings of 1-tokens depend on the fact that p causes 1-tokens, but not
vice versa.
- 21 -
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naturalization of meaning. At least among the critics who thinks symbols
do have meanings, such philosophers think that symbols just have
intentional properties, and that's more or less the end of the story.
They are skeptical of the claim that there is any "deeper" explanation to
be given of why symbols have intentional properties. For such
philosophers typically think that intentional explanation takes place
within its own circle of concepts, a circle isolated in some way from
other explanatory circles of non-intentional concepts. This kind of
skepticism is prevalent; and at the very leastq breaking out of the
intentional circle has proved to be hard. As a result, I think most
philosophers would agree that satisfaction of the "non-intentional idiom
condition" would count as a significant naturalization of the phenomenon
of meaning. Thus, we can say that breaking out of the intentional circle
is a sufficient condition for being a naturalistic theory, without
defining naturalistic properties as non-intentional properties.
I think it is important, though, to leave open the possibility of
there being some degree of naturalization of meaning without breaking out
of the intentional circle completely. Suppose there is a kind of
intentionality associated with causation, counterfactuals, or explanation.
A theory of meaning which appealed to one or more of these notions might
still count as naturalistic. For, depending on the details of the theory,
the causal, counterfactual, or explanatory relations appealed to might
seem (or might come to seem in the course of giving the theory) more like
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paradigm naturalistic pro'erties than intentional properties, e.g. has p
as its meaning, are.
On this picture, whether or not a particular theory counts as
naturalistic will depend on the domain in question, not merely on whether
the theory appeals to properties (e.g., intentional properties) which
count as non-natural by some kind of stipulation. For example, a theory
which showed how certain moral properties arise from certain non-moral
(including intentional) properties might well count as naturalistic.
Questions about naturalism are domain specific; and they seem to be
questions about the kinds of connections that hold between properties in
the domain in question and other intuitively "more kosher" properties.
Such questions need not be hopelessly vague. For within a given domain,
one can formulate more specific questions like, "Can the intentional
circle be broken?" Within the domain of the semantic, one might ask this
specific question with the hope of shedding light on the question: What
is the relation that holds between intentional and paradigm naturalistic
properties?
This is as much as I'm going to say for now about what makes a theory
of the form, 'W-tokens have p as their meaning, if ..j&...p,' a
naturalistic theory. 5 What I have said would leave plenty of room for
debate over whether certain theories which we might imagine would count as
5. Though I'11 pick up this topic again, at least briefly, in the
concluding chapter.
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naturalistic. But all of theories I will discuss here are, I think,
intuitively clear cases. The question facing us will be whether these or
any similar theories can possibly be right in the face of certain
objections; though if the theory is modified in the face of objections,
we want to be sure that it remains naturalistic. And again, I think
questions about whether we should count a particular theory of meaning as
naturalistic are less interesting than questions about the degree to which
meaning can be naturalized. Providing a theory of meaning which appeals
only to non-intentional properties on the right side of the conditional is
an initial, widely recognized target for meaning naturalists (or perhaps
"meaning naturalizers'). This is the target I will be primarily concerned
with here; and we can agree, I think, that meeting the "non-intentional
idiom" condition is sufficient for counting a theory of meaning as
naturalistic.
I should say somethinq here about the 'if' which links '1-tokens have
p as their meaning,' with '...13 ... p'. Clearly, we want a theory which
asserts more than mere extensional equivalence between the truth of the
former and the latter. A theory of meaning has to cover possible as well
as actual tokenings of D. One way to ensure this is for the theory to
take the form of a reduction, i.e. a theory according to which the
property has as a meaning is identical to some property, or cluster of
properties, Q. Or perhaps the metaphysical relation between the property
has as a meaning and Q will be somewhat weaker, say supervenience,
according to some theories. But in any case, we want the metaphysical
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relation to be such that A's bearing Q to p can explain how it is possible
that I-tokens have p as their meaning. That is, we want it to be the case
not merely that if A-tokens bear Q to p, then f-tokens mean that p; we
want it also tr be the case that r$-tokens mean that p in virtue of bearing
Q to p.
One might worry about the vagueness of the expression 'in virtue of'.
For one might worry that until we know just how the intentional is related
to the physical, the problem of content remains alive and well. I agree
that even if a satisfactory naturalistic theory of content is provided,
questions may remain concerning the nature of the metaphysical relation
which holds between intentional properties and the non-intentional
properties which the theory appeals to. But I see no reason for thinking
these will not be instances of more general questions about the
metaphysical relations between properties. Objects having properties
which are not reducible to properties of physics can raise puzzles, but
such puzzles are hardly peculiar to the intentional. They arise in
biological contexts as well; so by the methodological principle just
discussed in 1.1.1, they are puzzles which we are not obliged to solve
here. Moreover, an answer to the "in virtue of what" question is hard
enough to come by. So I propose to leave open the question of whether a
naturalistic theory of meaning must take the form of a reduction, or
whether it might describe some weaker relation between intentional and
certain other properties. Of course, it may turn out that there is
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nothing in virtue of which beliefs have meanings. But discovering whether
this is the case is, in part, the point of our investigation here.
One last general point. Requiring that a theory of meaning state
necessary conditions for meaning that is too strong a constraint. What we
want is an explanation of how it is possible that our mental states have
contents. Once that explanation is given, the problem of (specific)
content is solved. It may be that other entities, about which we know
nothing, have meanings in virtue of facts other than those in virtue of
which mental states have contents. If we found out about such entities,
we might or might not want to know in virtue of what they had their
meanings. But it would be absurd to suggest that the existence of such
entities would somehow block the explanation provided by an otherwise
satisfactory meaning theory which, as things turned'out, failed to provide
a statement of necessary conditions for having a content. One doesn't
show an explanation E of how mercury thermometers work to be
unsatisfactory by pointing to a digital thermometer and noting that E
doesn't explain how it works.
On the other hand, a theory which says that a belief I3 means that p
in virtue of bearing some property (or cluster of properties) Q to p is
not a satisfactory solution to the problem of content, unless it is
plausible that our beliefs bear Q to their representeds. It is no good to
say the conditions given by some theory would suffice for having specific
contents, but as it turns out, our mental states have their contents in
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virtue of having some other unknown properties. For then our
philosophical problem would be unsolved. We would immediately ask what
these unknown properties are, and to what degree :5r tney be naturalized?
In recent wririn3s, Fodor ([1987, forthcolng]) suggests that a mere
statement of sufficient conditions for meaning is enough to solve
Brentano's problem, and hence, all that philosophers of psychology need to
worry about. Of course, if Brentano's problem is simply the question,
"How is it possible that one thing can be about another," then Fodor is
half right; but I think only half. For surely the problem of content is,
at least largely, a problem about the relation of our thoughts to our
environmei t.
1.1.3 Motivations
One set of reasons for wanting a naturalistic theory of intentionality
spring directly from the fact that we think there are intentional
properties.6 Suppose there is a property being about turkey which some of
Fred's mental states have. A question immediately arises as to what sort
of property this is. An obvious response-- or rather the beginning of a
response-- is to say that intentional properties are emergent properties,
i.e. the products of other properties had by minds. A mental state would
be said to have an intent ional property 3 in virtue of having certain
6. See Appendix A for a brief summary of such reasons.
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other properties Q. But one would want to know which properties
intentional properties emerged from. A very satisfying, and perhaps the
most satisfying, answer to such a question would be one which explained
how intentional properties emerged from paradigm naturalistic properties.
Of course, the world may not cooperate: what would be the most satisfying
kinds of explanation may turn out to be false. But trying to provide the
most satisfying explanations one can provide is stilt a reasonable task.
We might distinguish here (i) the desire to know whether meaning can
be naturalized to some significant degree, from (ii) the desire to
naturalize meaning. General curiosity could surely explain (i). It is an
interesting project in itself to explore to what degree meaning can be
naturalized. And it is interesting question whether or not the
intentional circle can be broken. For either way it turns out, we will
learn something interesting about the mental and its relation to the non-
intentional. But clearly, some philosophers have been motivated by (ii).
This is because at least some philosophers have a strong sense that, since
human beings are part of the natural order, human thoughts are to be
understood as a natural phenomena. Such philosophers (myself included)
would like to see this suggestion pressed as far as it will go.
General considerations about the "Unity of Science" also motivate the
claim that intentional properties are, in fact, naturalistic. If the
postulation of intentional properties has explanatory power, then in the
absence of reasons to the contrary, we ought to see intentional psychology
- 28 -
Content
Chapter One
as part of Science. If meaning cannot be naturalized significantly, then
there would appear to be an "explanatory gap" between our theories of
intentional and non-intentional phenomena. Admitting such a gap has been
seen by some to be unattractive, or even unacceptable. For claiming that
intentional properties are explanatorily isolated from non-intentional
properties is to replace dualism about the natures of mind and matter with
dualism about explanations which appeal to the mental as opposed to the
physical.7
To hold that this conclusion is unattractive is, of course, simply
the expression of a bias towards naturalism. But I think such a bias is
warranted. We certainly operate with such a bias in other domains. Prior
to Bohr's work, for example, the suggestion that the property of being
valence v was non-natural would surely have been met with great
skepticism. One would have wanted reasons for thinking this was not a
property atoms had in virtue of having some other natural properties. The
same would be true if someone suggested, prior to there being a well-
developed science of biology, that havinr cells, or bein a zebra was a
non-natural property. I do not see why the situation is any different
when it comes to contents. But in any case, such a general bias towards
naturalism car, at least motivate the attempt to naturalize meaning.
I. Cite Rey [forthcoming]. But cf. Davidson [1970a, etc.].
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1.2 Some Initial Skepti ci sm about
Mean i ng Natur al i sm
Naturalistic bias or not, one has to admit that minds do exhibit svme
peculiar properties; and reflection on these facts can lead one to think
that any attempt to naturalize meaning is doomed.
1.2.1 IntenSionality
One notable feature of intentional relations is that they are intensional.
I may believe that my upstairs neighbor is quite rude. The set with my
upstairs neighbor as its sole member may be identical to the set with Fred
as its sole member. But it doesn't follow that I believe Fred to be rude
(though I may believe of Fred that he is rude). I grant that
intensionality may be a puzzling thing in some respects; but the
intensionality of the intentional provides no reason for thinking that the
latter cannot be naturalized. 'It is a law that .b.,' is an intensional
context. Counterfactual relations are intensional relations, par
excellance. And surely explaining the intentionality of the mental in
terms of lawlike and/or counterfactual supporting relations in which the
mental figures could-- depending on the details, of course-- count as a
naturalization of meaning. Indeed, this is typically the strategy that
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meaning naturalists adoptt try to explain the intenTional in terms of the
intenSional.8
There is, however, a further worry here. Fred can believe that Twain
is the greatest American writer without believing that Clemens is. But
prima facie, any (natural) law that applies to Twain applies equally to
Clemens; the former will figure in all and only the relations that the
latter figures in. And on the assumption that 'Twain' and 'Clemens' are
rigid designators, whatever counterfactual claims are true of Twain will
be true of Clemens. Thus, believing seems to carve the world finer than
natural intensional relations do. I will have nothing substantive to say
about the "fineness of slice" problem in this thesis. But . do want to
say why I don't take this to be a fatal difficulty for meaning naturalism.
First, one might simply bite the bullet here: Perhaps if Fred
believes that Twain is the greatest American writer, then ipso facto Fred
believes that Clemens is the greatest American writer. Salmon [1986] has
argued that this option is at least no worse than others. Second, we can
distinguish (a) the problem of providing a satisfactory semantics for
natural language sentences like 'Fred believes that Clemens ... ,' from (b)
the problem of providing a satisfactory theory of meaning for beliefs. if
one holds that thought is "laid completely open to view" in language, or
if one believes that the semantic properties of thoughts are parasitic on
8. This is the case whether (like Fodor [1987]) one appeals to causal
laws, or (like Stalnaker [1984]) one appeals to counterfactuals.
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the semantic properties of the natural language sentences we typically use
to individuate them, then one will not want to put any weight on this
distinction. For one will think that (b) amounts to (a). But if one
rejects this picture of the relation between thought and language, then it
is at least possible that sentences with intentional verbs exhibit the
fineness of slice problem, while beliefs don't. Putting the point
slightly differently: Belief-sentences may not be about the relation our
thoughts bear to our environments. Third, there is reason to think that
the syntax of belief-sentences is relevant to the semantic properties of
such sentences. Indeed, it may be that solving the fineness of slice
problem requires paying close attention to details of the syntax
(including logical form) of belief-sentences.9 But we have no reason to
think linguistic syntax is relevant to the semantic properties of our
thoughts, as long as we reject the strict language/thought picture just
mentioned.
1.2.2 Intentional Circles
I said earlier that most philosophers would agree that providing a theory
which satisfied the "non-intentional idiom condition" (NIC) would count as
making significant progress with respect to naturalizing meaning. This is
because many think the NIC cannot be met; and herein lies another source
9. See, e.g. Higginbotham [1986] and Segal [1989b].
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of skepticism with respect to naturalistic theories of intentionalityl
the claim that one cannot capture what is peculiar to the intentional
without recourse to other intentional phenomena. We can understand the
aboutness of certain symbols, e.g. signs, printed words, and computer
outputs. But we understand them only in so far as we have recourse to our
own intentions that these symbols mean such and such. As the slogan goes,
"there is no breaking out of the intentional circle." This is not merely
a line drawn, coupled with a dare for the naturalist to try and cross it.
There are principled reasons which suggest that this challenge cannot be
met.
As we shall see, one is tempted to appeal to "ideal conditions" of
some kind in order to account for the possibility of false beliefs. But
in spe.ifyinq what counts as ideal, one must not appeal to any intentional
notions. Some have thought this task hopeless, because they say
conditions will be ideal for a thinker only if the beliefs which the
thinker uses in making inferences are true. And these are semantic
conditions.10  Of course, this is not a definitive argument. Fnr the
meaning naturalist can try to characterize these semantic conditions in a
non-intentional idiom. But this is no trivial task, so the meaning
naturalist cannot ignore the challenge. Much of the second half of the
10. Cummins [19891, for example, claims that given a computational theory
of mental processing, ideal conditions will have to be those in which
the tacit beliefs of the system are true. And, Cummins thinks, you
can't specify those in a non-intentional idiom,
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thesis will be devoted to arguing that one can account for the possibility
of false beliefs without violating the NIC. To give just a sketch: In
chapters four and five, I develop and defend an account of "ceteris
oaribus" generalizations that one can appeal to in a theory of meaning
without violating the NIC. Then in chapter six, I argue that a certain
theory which incorporates a ceteris oaribus clause allows for and explains
the possibility of error without violating the NIC either.
Worries about the "intentional circle" arise most sharply with
respect to the naturalist's attempt to provide an explanation of how false
beliefs are possible. So we should now turn to a discussion of error.
And independently of these worries, the fact that symbol users can make
mistakes provides the basis for several arguments against the possibility
of any significant naturalization of meaning.
1 .3 The Pr oblem( s) of Er r or
The claim that a theory of intentionality must account for cases of error
or misrepresentation has several justifications. First, there is the
common sense observation that we are often mistaken. ('I thought it was a
snake, but I guess I was wrong.") Second, we often explain behavior, our
own and that of others, by adverting to false beliefs. ("Fred went to the
kitchen, because he mistakenly thought there was some turkey in the
fridge.') Indeed, it seems that one can run a Cartesian argument here to
insure ourselves that we can be mistaken: I now think that I am sometimes
- 34 -
Content
Chapter One
mistaken; that is, I have a belief whose ceontent IS that some of my
beliefs are False; it follo4S, thea that at least one of my beliefs is
false. The notion of illusion becomes incomprehensible if there are no
false beliefs, as does much work in epistemology and cognitive science.
For the goal of such theorizing is often to explain how we manage to
represent the world correctly. Moreover, explaining the possibility of
•false opinion" has been an important part of the puzzle that
intentionality presents, at least since the Theaetetusl What kind of
relation can thoughts bear to states of affairs that do not obtain?
Therefore, an adequate theory of intentionality must allow for error and
render it explicable. The slogan, "No representation without
misrepresentation," has been advanced recently to emphasize this point. I
want to briefly sketch two ways in which the problem of error manifests
itself as a stumbling block for naturalistic theories of meaning. 1 1
1.3.1 The Disjunction Problem
In trying to provide a naturalistic theory of intentionality, some
philosophers have made use of the notion of causation. This is an obvious
choice for at least two reasons. First, it is uncontroversial that the
object of a belief type $ is often causally implicated in the production
11. This is not to say that these are the only two ways the problem of
error can manifest itself. See, e.g., Devitt [1981) and his
discussion of the "qua problem."
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of tokens of A. The warmth of my coffee cup is part of the (causal)
explanation of the fact that I now believe that my coffee cup is warm.
Second, causation is already appealed to in many non-intentional
explanations of natural phenomenon. While the notion of causation may
itself be problematic -- as Hume, Russell, and others have thought-- it
certainly seems less problematic than intentional notions. So an account
of intentional properties in terms of causation would certainly be
progress. But mere causation cannot explain intentionality. For false
beliefs are intentional entities; ipso facto, the object of a false
belief is not actual; hence, the object of a false belief can cause
nothing.
A natural response is to suggest that a belief type is about what
could cause its tokens, or alternatively, what its tokens covary with.
But the simplest formulation of the causal/covariation response to false
beliefs is notoriously unable to account for any cases of
misrepresentation.12 Consider the theory according to which, a belief
type t3, is a representation of cats if tokens of occur when, and only
when, there are cats. Suppose a token of AS would occur in the presence of
12. Covariation requires not (i) that tokens of the type represented cause
and be the only causes of the token representations, but rather (ii)
that the representation in question be tokened if and only if
(counterfactually supporting) the represented is present. The latter
requirement is satisfied if the former is, but not vice versa. I will
address this point again in chapter six. For present purposes,
however, I will make the distinction between causal and covariation
theories only if it is relevant.
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dogs when the lighting is strange and in the presence of cats regardless
of the lighting. Then according to the theory, A's truth conditions
include not only states of affairs in which cats are present, but states
of affairs in which a cat or dog-under-strange-lighting is present. And
if there were Martian robots cleverly disguised as cats, tokens of 4 would
presumably occur when these robots are present. Instead of counting
robot-caused or dog-caused 4-tokens as misrepresentations of cats, the
theory will count all A-tokens as correct representations of
cats or disguised-robots or ... or dogs-under-strange-lighting.
One might try to live with this consequence by holding that the
content of a representational type includes everything that could cause
tokens of the type. But then no token representations could ever be
erroneous. For every 4-token Oi will have some causally sufficient
condition Ci, If Ci does cause a 4-token, then ipso facto Ci could cause
a 4-token. Hence, the presence of Ci would have to be a truth condition
for 4. So no 4-token can be mistaken. Because the content of mental
state types threatens to be disjunctive in form (cat or dog or robot) on
causal/covariation theories, this is called the "disjunction problem."
But the problem has nothing to do with disjunctions essentially. The
problem is this: If any circumstances in which a belief is tokened counts
as a truth condition for the belief, then the belief is tokened only when
its truth conditions obtain; hence, false beliefs are impossible.
- 37 -
Content
Chapter One
The disjunction problem is intimately related to a problem which
manifests itself in Kripke's [1982] worries about rule following; and in
chapters six and seven, 1 will be addressing such Kripkean concerns at
some length.13 Recall that Kripke challenged us to say in virtue of what
the sentence '68 + 57 = 5' is a mistake. Why should we insist that the
symbol '+' means plus and not some other function, q (quus), which is just
like the addition function except that 1(68, 57) = 5? If '+" means guus,
then '68 + 57 = 5' is not a mistake. According to Kripke, although all
our evidence at a given time may be compatible with the hypothesis that
'+' means plus, it will also be compatible with the hypothesis that '+'
means some quus-like function Lg; where +(x,y) differs from j'(x,y) only
on ordered pairs which no one has ever tried or intended to add (or quad).
Intuitively, the meaning of '+' (viz. raus) together with arithmetical
facts determines the sum (and not the quum) of x and y for all values of x
and y; and hence, the meaning determines whether sentences of the form 'x
+ y = z' are correct or not. But Kripke poses his skeptical challenge by
asking in virtue of what a quus-like interpretation of our language is
wrong; and hence, he challenges us to say in virtue of what '68 + 57 =
13. Kripke himself spends. a great deal of time discussing (and rejecting)
"dispositional" or covariation theories. Loar [1985] points out the
relevance of the Kripke/Wittgenstein problem for naturalized theories
of intentionality. See also Millikan [forthcoming]. Fodor
[forthcoming) states his objections to Dretske's [1981, 1988] solution
to the disjunction problem in a way that reminds one of Kripke's
concerns.. But Fodor describes the problem as a manifestation of the
difference between meaning that p and carrying the information that p.
Boghossianr [1989] presents a very clear overview of the Kripke-
Wittgenstein problem and its implications.
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5'-- or rather, the numerically very large counterparts of this sentence--
are mistaken. Any theory of intentionality must respond to this skeptical
challenge.
Similarly, any theory of intentionality must meet the challenge of
the disjunction problem, It must say in virtue of what token mental
states count as mistaken representations of an intentional type T, if the
very same mental events can be redescribed as correct tokenings of some
other intentional type T'. If tokens of the type in question would occur
when cats or dogs-under-strange-lighting are present, why not say the
meaning of the type is guy, where 'quat' means
cat or doq-ujnder-s.tranqe-liqhtinS? But the problem is even worse than
this example suggests. Suppose we can rule out guat as the meaning of the
tokens. We must still consider schmat, where a schmat is anything which
is a cat and not atop the Eiffel Tower; and 9rat, where a grat is
anything which is a cat or a small dog on Mars; etc. If a cat atop the
Eiffel Tower or a small dog on Mars would cause a token of the type in
question, would such a token count as a mistake? Kripke reminds us that
no matter how much evidence we have with regard to the properties of
individual tokens, the evidence will be consistent with infinitely many
competing claims about the intentional type to which those tokens belong,
And he challenges us to. say in virtue of one of these claims is correct as
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opposed to some other. 1 4 This suggests that the disjunction problem is
not merely a technical difficulty for certain causal or "information-
based" theories of intentionality. For Kripke's skeptical question is a
deep one. As Fodor [forthcoming] puts it, 'Solving the disjunction
problem requires not a theory of error but a theory of meaning."
1.3.2 Hume's Problem
Accounting for error is not only a great challenge for naturalistic
theories. The fact that agents are sometimes mistaken suggests the
following argument: Meaning has an essentially normative component; but
one cannot capture that which is normative by appealing merely to
naturalistic conditions. Therefore, trying to provide a naturalistic
theory of meaning is a hopeless task.
I do not know of anyone who has put this argument so crudely or
directly. 1 5 But it is, I believe, the source of much skepticism with
respect to naturalistic theories of intentionality. Such considerations
are certainly advanced both by Kripke and Wittgenstein. Putnam ( [1985] and
14. Cf. Goodman's 1975 claims about grue-like hypotheses. If (part of)
the problem that Kripke raises is closely related to Goodman's
paradox, as Kripke himself seems to think (see his pp. 20 and 58),
then (part of) the problr~ may not be peculiar to intentional
properties. This point will figure again in chapter seven.
15. Though Boghossian [1989] discusses the general point.
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Peacocke [1986) both claim that normativity is part of "what makes thought
thought." And because of this, they suggest, notions appropriate for use
in the natural sciences cannot adequately capture the nature of thought.
Burge can also be seen as (i) arguing for the importance of social norms
with respect to our conceptions of thought and meaning and (ii) drawing
what he sees as the consequences for psychology. In any case, the
intuitions about meaning teflected in the argument above are clearly "in
the air," at least in some circles. I want to bring such intuitions out
into the open for closer examination. Moreover, the meaning naturalist
must respond to this argument, regardless of its source.
The claim that the intentional properties of mental states are
normative properties is, I think, quite correct. Given that the world is
a certain way, the meanings of one's thoughts determines whether those
thoughts are correct or mistaken. This is just to say that meanings are,
or at least can serve as determiners of, "correctness conditions" for the
use of symbols. Moreover, given that one wants to think true thoughts,
the meanings of one's thoughts determines which thoughts one should think.
Kripke points out that it is in virtue of the meaning of 'plus' that we
ought to respond in a certain way to addition problems that we have never
considered before. And in general, it is in virtue of knowing (or not
knowing) the meanings of terms that we are justified (or not) in speaking
as we do. It is also common to think of meanings as rules which determine
the proper us of terms.
_.__
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.,.the meaning I attach to the 'plus' sign ,.. instructs me
what I ought to do in all future cases. I do not predict what
I will do ... but instruct myself what I ought to do to
conform to the meaning (Kripke [19823, p. 22).
And the fact that we do think of meanings as rules-- or at least as
sharing important properties with rules-- suggests that the relation which
holds between an intentional state and its object is a normative relation.
There is, however, a philosophical tradition-- going back at least to
Hume-- of skepticism with respect to explaining that which is normative by
citing 'the relations of objects.' 1 6  If one holds, as the nmeaning
baturalist doe" -t (i) there are intentional facts, and (ii) the
intentional is ncot sui qeneris, then one faces the sermantic analogue of
the Hurrean challenge to bridge the 'is/ought" gap. On the other hand, if
one holds that the gap between naturalistic and normative relations cannot
be bridged, then one has an argument against the possibility of providing
a naturalistic theory of intentionality. If there is no breaking out of
the 'normative circle," there will be no breaking out of the intentional
circle in the wau, that naturalistically minded philosophers have tried to.
16. Hume [1739], p.470. One can get a sense for what I will call
'Kripkean skepticism" with respect to naturalistic theories of
intentionality by reading the famous paragraph at the end of Book III,
section one of Hume's Treatise (the "is/ought gap" passage),
substituting 'means that" for 'ought, or ought not." While I take
this passage to be an exemplar of skepticism about explaining the
normative by appeal to the naturalistic, I do not intend to be making
any historical claims about What Hume Really Meant. See, e.g., Brink
[1989] for a discussion of the relevance of the putative is/ought gap
to ethical naturalism.
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If one says, for example, that event El causes event E2, then one is
describing some aspect of the world. It doesn't matter whether E2 is the
moving of a billiard ball or the tokening of a symbol. To say that El
causes E2 is to make a descriptive, non-normative claim. In saying that R
carries the information that p, one describes a certain relation between R
and p. But this relation is, Rrima facie, not a normative one. And this
would seem to be the case for any relational property appealed to in any
naturalistic theory of meaning. But how could our serse of "getting it
wrong," "making mistakes," or "not following the (meaning) rules' be
captured by citing such descriptive facts? Relations that would count as.
naturalistic with respect to meaning theories just don't seem to be the
kinds of relations that could explain the normativity of meaning.
1.3.3 Ideal Circumstances
It might be thought that the problem of normativity just raised is, irn
practice, no worse than the disjunction problem. An obvious response to
this latter problem is to appeal to idealization: 3 is about cats (and
not dogs or robots) if tokens of 3 are formed when, and only when, cats
are present under ideal circumstances. The general idea is that if only
the lighting were better, one could get a closer look, etc., then there
would be covariation between tokens of D and cats. For if.conditions were
ideal, the thinker would not be fooled by weird lighting or disguises; or
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so the idea goes.. It might be thought that appeal to ideal conditions
would also provide a source of normativity in one's theory of content.
We can state a question begging version of ideal detection semantics
(QBVIDS), by saying that what makes conditions ideal for the production of
(S, is the following: all the system's beliefs (not counting itself) are
true, all the system's inferences are valid, and all observation
conditions are optimal. Of course, QBVIDS isn't much of a theory of
intentionality, because it appeals to intentional and semantic notions in
saying what makes conditions ideal. But QBUIDS does seem to capture at
least many of our pre-theoretic intuitions about the content of mental
states. The trick, as we noted earlier, is to specify ideal conditions in
a non-intentional idiom. If this could be done, one might hope to respond
to both the disjunction problem and "Hume's problem" at once. 1 7
Even putting aside worries about specifying ideal conditions in a
non-intentional idiom, it doesn't seem that appeals to ideal conditions
will help the meaning naturalist with respect to Hume's problem. One
might offer a theory of the form: I-tokens have p as their meaning, if
4-tokens bear R to p in conditions C, where C is a specification of some
17. It may be, though, that OBEIDS could get the wrong results in certain
cases if we allow that an observer might fail to recognize that p even
under optimal observation conditions. But cf. Fodor [1981]. If the
only way to guarantee that the observer will come to believe that p is
by ensuring that the observer performs the relevant valid inference on
set of premises which entail that p, then worries about the potential
circularity of appeals to ideal conditions arise with a vengeance.
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special conditions in which the (relational) property has as a meaning is
said to be necessarily coextensive with R. Erroneous symbol tokenings
would then be explained as cases in which n-tokens bear R to p, but
conditions C do not obtain. This might sclve the disjunction problem, but
one has the sense that the issue of norm'ativity has been ignored.
Assuming that C is simply a statement of certain naturalistic conditions,
then to say that AIRp in conditions C is just to say that $Qp for some
complex, naturalistic relation 0. The right side of the conditional in
the naturalist's theory is still descriptive, and so we still need reason
for thinking that the normativity of meaning has been captured by the
theory in question. On the other hand, if C appeals to proper or correct
conditions for the tokening of gA, then the right side of the conditional
is not naturalistic. So not only must the meaning naturalist capture the
intentional in a non-intentional idiom, it seems that he must also capture
the normative in a non-normative idiom. Coupled with the claim that this
latter task cannot be accomplished, we have a prima facie compelling
argument against the possibility of a naturalistic theory of content.
The possibility of error, then, poses at least two serious challenges
for the meaning naturalist: Avoid the disjunction problem, and account
for the normativity of meaning. I turn now to a family of theories
developed especially because of their apparent ability to do just this.
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Chap te r 2
I n ten tionali ty and EvolutionarY Error
Whose purpose was it? His or Hers or Its?
Let's leave that to the scientific wits.
Grant me intention, purpose, and design--
That's near enough for me to the Divine.
--- Frost, qAccidentally On Purpose."
Biology has become fashionable among contemporary philosophers, and the
trend has spread to theories of meaning. In this chapter, I examine
several naturalistic accounts of the intentional properties of mental
symbols, which focus on the selective history of mental state types.
Whether the idea is developed through a theory of "proper functions,t
"typicality," or "Nature's raison d'#tre," the underlying thesis is
essentially the same: 1  In virtue of having a particular kind of history,
tokens of a belief type are supposed to occur when a certain property is
instantiated; token desires are supposed to bring about certain states of
affairs; and the purpose of an intentional state determines its truth or
1. Millikan [1984, 1986, 1989a% forthcoming a], Papineau [1984, 1987], and
Dennett [1987], respectively. See also Matthens [1988], Israel [1987],
Tennant (1984], and Dretske [1988].
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satisfaction conditions. The notion of 'purpose" is then explicated by
appealing to selection explanations, with the result being some variant of
the following:
3-tokens have p as their meaning, if
the presence of p in certain historical cases explains the
selection for the disposition to produce 0-tokens.
I argu, that this theory is untenable, because there will be many
selection explanations for the disposition to produce 0-tokens; and each
of these explanations will appeal to different properties. A non-mental
example will serve to illustrate the qeneral problem. The fleetness of
antelope can be explained, in evolutionary terms, by citing past instances
of lion avoidance on the part of individual antelope who were faster than
their fellows. But in avoiding lions, the quicker antelope would, ipso
.facto, have avoided (a) some particular lions which are now dead, (b)
lions or other hunters, (c) antelope chasers, (d) antelope eaters, (e)
potential sources of danger to particular antelope, etc. While the
instantiation of lionhood may explain the selection for fleetness, it
turns out that the instantiation of properties picked out by (a-e) can
explain the selection for fleetness among antelope as well. I will argue
that if a disposition to produce mental states was selected for, then
alternative selection explanations are always available; and as a result,
the simple version of evolutionary semantics assigns many implausible
meanings to mental states.
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Ruth Millikan, who offers the most detailed evolutionary theory of
meaning, claims that E means that p, if the mechanisms that make use of E-
tokens need (in a sense to be defined) p in order to perform their
historically determined functions. 1 show that this theory has the
consequence that all beliefs are about increased fitness. Attempts to
correct this problem result in a theory which rules out the possibility of
error. Finally, I argue that even if these objections could be met, the
theories considered will still yield the wrong results about the truth
conditions of a belief across a broad range of cases. I conclude that
appeals to evolution will not provide an adequate naturalistic theory of
meaning.2
2 . 1 Some Pr el i mri n &r i es
Before discussing the details of particular evolutionary theories of
meaning, I want to discuss briefly the general motivations behind them. I
also want to make a few remarks about the structure of the explanations
offered by such theories. In particular, I want to be clear about how
intentional states figure in selection explanations.
2. Because the possibility of error arises only for beliefs, I will focus
on the consequences of evolutionary semantics for the truth conditions
of beliefs in this chapter. In chapter three, I discuss some,parallel
difficulties for evolutionary semantics with respect to the
satisfaction conditions of desires. But in any case, a theory of
intentionality which yields the wrong truth conditions for beliefs is
unacceptable.
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2.1.1 Motivating Evolutionary Semantics
Looking to evolutionary biology for the basis of a theory of
intentionality is not without motivation. The Putnam-Burge thought
experiments suggest, if one needs convincing, that the meanings of mental
states in an organism 0 depend on O's environment. The suggestion that
meanings depend on the purposes of meaningful states is at least
plausible.3 An obvious strategy for cashing out teleological notions in a
naturalistic framework is to appeal to natural selection. 4 We have good
reason to believe that selection explanations concerning our sensory
systems, which are the sources of many contentful mental states, are
correct. "Invisible hand" explanations of the sort given in evolutionary
biology present a very attractive paradigm of naturalistic explanation in
a domain which seems to demand appeal to designers and purposes. By
suggesting that the intentionality of the mental depends on the
"intentions of.Mother Nature," evolutionary semanticists hope to take
advantage of biology's success in capturing the purposive in a
naturalistic framework.
3. See, e.g., Stampe [1977) or Dretske [1988].
4. See, e.g., Millikan [forthcoming b], Dennett [1987], or Fodor [1981].
But cf. Cummins [1975] and Fodor [1987, forthcoming], who is now an
arch-critic of "Pop-Darwininsm."
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Another reason for finding evolutionary semantics attractive is its
apparent ability to avoid certain obstacles facing aturalistic theories
of intentionality. In chapter one, I discussed several challenges that
any "meaning naturalist" must face. The two most serious challenges
concerned erroneous beliefs. First, a theory of meaning must not rule out
the possibility of error; since mistakes are clearly possible. Second,
the very fact that beliefs can be mistaken suggests that a normative
notion t ISnvoloaed.
-E res;,•.e z tat evoluticn rary semanrtics. makes to the problem(s) of
error is clear. For the guidirg intuition of this approach is that any
token is a defective merrmber of its type in virtue of not doing what
members of its type are supposed to do. To have a meaning is indeed to
have a normative property; because if a symbol has a meaning, it has a
purpose.5  Evolutionary semanticists often propose an analogy between
intentional types and biological organs. Hearts are supposed to pump
blood, and particular hearts are counted as defective in virtue of not
doing so. Similarly, the purpose of a belief is to indicate the presence
of a certain property. Token beliefs are counted as mistaken if they
occur in the absence of this property. Suppose the purpose of an
intentional state type is to indicate the presence of cats. Tokens of the
5. See Forbes [1989] for an extended discussion of this point. Forbes
also offers some criticisms of evolutionary semantics that I will not
address here in detail,
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state type might, in fact, occur if a cleverly disguised robot or a dog
(under strange enough lighting) is present. These will be mistakes.
By itself, the theory:
A-tokens have p as their meaning, if
10-tokens are supposed to occur when p,
is inadequate. What evolutionary semantics must also provide is an
account of purposes that does not beg the question by invoking intentional
notions. Again, the analogy to biological organs is offered. Present
hearts are supposed to pump blood in virtue of former hearts having been
selectively advantageous because of their blood-pumping abilities.
Similarly, present tokens of A are supposed to be tokened in the presence
of p in virtue of former A-tokens having been selectively advantageous
because of their being tokened in the presence of p.
In what follows, I propose to grant (i) that all the cognitive
mechanisms in question are the product of natural selection, (ii) that our
best guesses about the relevant selection explanations are correct, and'
(iii) that one can provide a theory according to which the process of
learning, as well as natural selection, can result in symbols having
purposes. I discuss these assumptions in chapter three. In this chapter,
however, I want to argue that evolutionary semantics faces serious
difficulties even with respect to its own paradigm examples.
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2.1.2 The Structure of Evolutionary Semantics
So far I have spoken rather loosely about selection for a system's
disposition to form mental states under certain conditions. But a little
reflection will show that merely having representations, even true ones,
confers no survival advantage on a system. An organism does not become
more fit simply in virtue of gaining knowledge about its environment. The
organism must also be able to use this knowledge to its benefit. From
Nature's point of view, so to speak, knowledge is not intrinsically
valuable. Having true beliefs is selectively advantageous only in so far
as those beliefs lead to results which are selectively advantageous to the
system which has the beliefs. Intentional states, like hearts and lungs,
are simply means to an end from this perspective. As means, they are
valuable only to the extent that they help bring about the end. We need
to see how the ends and means fit together.
A perfectly general point about selection explanations needs emphasis
here, for it is easily forgotten. If a trait is to be selected for, it
must appear in an organism. And this first appearance will be due, more
or less, to chance. A common way of putting this point is to say that
variation and mutation provide the material that selection works on.
Selection can occur only among alternatives already present in the
population. It does not provide the alternatives. So if the disposition
to form tokens of an internal state type 13 under conditions C is to be
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selected for, that disposition must first be instantiated in some
organism. If the disposition is to be selected for because of the 3-
tokens produced, then 13-tokens must actually be produced on some
occasions. 6 And if $ is to be analyzed as the belief that p on
evolutionary grounds, then tokenings of 13 must have occurred at least once
when p was the case. That is, p must have obtained at least once when
conditions C obtained. Otherwise, the disposition to form 1-tokens when C
could not have been selected for because tokenings of P1 occurred when p
was the case. So if 13 is the belief that p, the selection explanation for
the disposition to form 1-tokens when C will be that (i) 1-tokens were
sometimes produced when p was the case, and (ii) on some of those
occasions, having a token of 1 was selectively advantageous.
For example, if an organism has the desire to avoid predators, then
the disposition to form the belief that predators are in the vicinity when
there are predator-looking things in the vicinity will be very.useful to
the organism. This disposition will be selected for because the behavior
caused by tokens of the belief, viz. avoiding predators, promotes the
fitness of the organism. Let us call the behavior "successful" in so far
as it promotes this end. For the behavior (running away, climbing trees,
6. This claim is necessary, because it is possible that an instantiated
disposition to form 13-tokens when C might be selected for because of
circumstances which have nothing at all to do with 13-tokens. For
example, the new instantiated disposition might add weight to the
organism's brain, such a change being useful for extraneous reasons.
The seemingly trivial points in this paragraph and the next will be
important when we turn to the shortcomings of evolutionary semantics.
- 53 -
I
Evolution
Chapter Two
or whatever the organism does to avoid predators) to be successful, there
must be predators in the vicinity. Running away from a predator that
isn't there will not promote the organism's fitness.7
2.1.3 A Possible Objection
If a disposition to form intentional states is selected for, it is because
the results those states (at least sometimes) bring about. But one
might think this shows evolutionary semantics to be hopeless, because most
of our intentional states were not selected for-- even allowing for
learning as a selective process. I can believe that there is no yogurt on
Pluto, but surely that token mental state has no selective history. Until
just now, I never formed a token of that type. So there could not have
been selection for the disposition to form tokens of that type. This is
not a fatal objection to evolutionary semantics, but it does point to a
salient fact about intentional states that such theories must account for.
One misses something important bt saying merely that the disposition
to form token beliefs and desires gets selected for. Many mental states
exhibit "systemrraticity." If you can form the belief that John sees Bill,
7. Strictly speaking, this last statement is false. Running might be
selectively advantageous for some extraneous reason, e.g. exercising
the heart. This Dos.sibility of an "extraneous advantage" provides the
basis for certain counterexamples to evolutionary semantics discussed
below in 2.4,
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you can also form the belief that Bill sees John. If you can further hope
that Mary finds the ball, you can also hope that Mary sees John and finds
Bill, etc. It is possible to form novel representations, like the thought
that the moon is a spy post for tall, orange aliens. Moreover, our
capacity for forming complex thoughts seems to be unbounded. Thus, at
least many intentional states seem to be structured entities which have a
compositional semantics, like sentences in natural languages. So it
appears that if anything is selected for, it is having a set of concepts
together with a capacity to form intentional states composed of these
concepts.8 But, of course, merely having concepts is no more selectively
advantageous than merely having beliefs. Having concepts will be
advantageous to a system in so far as the system can use these concepts to
form token intentional states which are themselves selectively
advantageous (via their results).
The basic picture underlyinq evolutionary semantics is that
everything goes "as it is supposed to" when the concepts occur as elements
of internal states which in turn produce successful effects. Particular
theories must account for what makes individual concepts meaningful, But
in so doing, an evolutionary theory of meaning will make use of something
8. I think this point holds independently of whet-er or not the objects of
intentional states are themselves structured entities. The claim here
is simply that many mental states seem to be composite. I use the term
'concept' to refer to the meaningful components of (mental)
representations. So (the mental analogues of) names, common nouns,
predicates, adjectives, quantifiers, etc. can all count as concepts in
this sense.
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analogous to Frege's context principle: The meaning of a concept consists
in its contribution to the meanings of sentences in which it occurst and
the meaning of a given belief A3 will depend on the meaning of its parts,
i.e. the concepts. 9 According to evolutionary semantics, the meaning of
the concepts depends on their evolutionary history. But selection for
having certain concepts requires that those concepts occur as elements of
more complex internal states which, in turn, have selectively advantageous
effects. The meaning of the concepts depends, in this sense, on their
contribution to structured intentional states which have truth (or
satisfaction) conditions. Nonetheless, selection for the disposition to
form token intentional states is selection for having the concepts
necessary to form those tokens, such selection taking place because having
the concepts makes it possible for the system to form the more complex
selectively advantageous mental states. 1 0
9. I return to this point in section 6.1.
10. It is worth remembering that the meaning of complex mental states will
depend on the rules for combining concepts as well as the concepts
themselves. If one accepts the hypothesis that intentional states are
sentences (in a language of thought) with certain computational
properties, this amounts to saying that the meaning of intentional
states is a function of the meaning of the concepts and the
compositional semantics for the lin ua mentis (which may or may not be
the speaker's natural language). Schiffer [1987] claims that one
cannot develop a compositional semantics for natural languages or,
presumably, for any linquag mentis. If he is right, then giving a
theory of meaning for concepts together with an I.O.U. for a
compositional semantics will not suffice for a theory of (mental)
sentence meaning. But, for well known reasons (e.g. those of Davidson
(1965]), I don't see how we could understand novel sentences without
having access to composition rules-- pace Schiffer's chapters seven
and eight.
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A consequence of "concept selection" is that a system may be able to
form many complex intentional states, the having of which is not
selectively advantageous. It may be useful for an organism to be able to
token the beliefs a is F_ and b is G. And so having the concepts necessary
to form these beliefs may be selected for. But an organism having those
concepts will also be Able to token the beliefs b is F and a is G. The
tokening of these latter beliefs may be selectively neutralq or perhaps
even mildly harmful. But this in itself does not tell against
evolutionary semantics. It is to be expected, given a compositional
semantics for intentional states like beliefs and desires.
2.2 T'wo Explanat i ons ar e no t Alsa.ays
Be tt er Than On e
The major problem facing evolutionary semantics is that appeal to natural
selection provides "too much of a good thing." If there is a selection
explanation that accounts for the meaning, p, of some intentional state,
4, there will be many other selection explanations as well, with the
result that evolutionary theories will assign many otther meanings to I as
well.
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2.2.1 Multiple Explanations
Evolutionary semantics appeals to selection explanations. Where mental
states are involved, the general form of such explanations will be as
follows:
(1) In the presence of p,
having r -tokens increases the fitness of an organism 0.
That is, given the presence of p,
O's chances of surviving long enough to reproduce (again)
are increased by having a A-token. Typically, a-tokens
will
increase the fitness of 0 by causing (in conjunction with
O's
other mental states) behaviors whose effects increase the
fitness of 0 if p is present. 1 1
(2) At least sometimes,
I-tokens are produced in 0 when p is present.
For example, rabbits are apparently disposed to form tokens of a certain
type, at least sometimes, when hawks are overhead. Rabbits are also
apparently disposed to "take cover," i.e. run under nearby brush or into
shadows, when they form such tokens. Let us suppose that this is a
correct description of how rabbits work. The obvious selection
explanation for the disposition to produce A-tokens in this case is that
11. This is a simplification, since what really matters for selection are
traits which increase the number of progeny that an organisms leaves
behind. Surviving long enough to reproduce is only half the battle of
fitness. The 'size of the litter" also matters; so an increase in
egg production or sperm count can increase fitness. But mental states
will typically increase fitness only by helping an organism stay alive
long enough to reproduce.
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certain former rabbits sometimes produced fl-tokens in the presenceof
hawks. And the practice of "taking cover' in such situations made it more
likely that these rabbits would survive long enough to reproduce (again).
Another popular example is the frog's "bug-detector." Frogs snap
their tongue if a certain neuron fires. And this neuron will usually fire
if a bug moves through the frog's visual field. The neuron will als6 fire
if an experimenter tosses a pellet through the frog's visual field. So
let us say that the frog is disposed to go into a certain neural state if
any black speck moves through its visual field. The selection explanation
for this disposition which immediately presents itself is the following:
The presence of a bug usually causes the neuron to fire; and because the
firing neuron causes the frog's tongue to snap, it often thereby causes
the frog to ingest a bug, thereby increasing the frog's fitness. Examples
like these suggest the following theory, "Evolutionary Semantics It'
ESI: f-tokens have p as their meaning.if
past instantiations of p explain the selection for
the disposition to produce fl-tokens.
The possibility of error is not ruled out by ES1. Rabbits might well
form f-tokens in the absence of hawks. Suppose many "hawk-shaped' things
can cause a fl-token. fl-tokens miQht then occur in rabbits when hawk-
shaped kites pass overhead. But these would be "false positives." The
presence of "bugness' in certain historical cases explains the selection
for the frog's disposition to have a certain neural firing when a black
speck moves through its visual field. So according to ESI, such firings
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in the absence of bugs count as erroneous. Let us ignore system internal
causes of 3-tokens (e.g. retinal patterns). For the task of a theory of
meaning will be to pick out some distal state of affairs as the truth
condition for a belief.12
In general, then, D3-tokens will be formed if and only if some
(typically very disjunctive) distal property D(A) is present. Suppose
f-tokens are formed when there are hawks in conditions C, kites in
conditions C', clouds in conditions C", etc. Then each of the following
things have the property D(D3): hawks when C obtains, kites when C'
obtains, clouds when C" obtains, etc. In short, 'has D(13)' is true of
anything (distal) that could cause a A3-token. So if past instantiations
of the property P explain the selection for the disposition to produce
f-tokens, there will be erroneous ID-token3 whenever D(A) is present but P
is not.
2.2.2 The Problem
The problem with ES1, however, is that past instantiations of many
properties can explain the selection for a disposition to produce
1-tokens. And ES1 does not tell us which property, or alternatively which
12. Alternatively, we could add the clause "p is a distal property" to all
the theories under consideration. Thoughts about one's own mental
states could be explained by appeal to the semantic properties of
reflexive symbols like 'my'.
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explanation, counts for the purposes of fixing the truth conditions of A.
Suppose that former rabbits avoided a particular hawk, Fred, when they
formed A5-tokens. While past instantiations of hawkness may explain the
selection for the disposition to produce i$-tokens, so do past
instantiations of "Fredness." By avoiding Fred, the rabbits avoided being
eaten. As a group, rabbits probably avoided many particular hawks. But
this doesn't change the general point. The presence of
"Fred or George or ... or Ziggy-ness" in certain historical cases could
explain the selection for the disposition to produce 5$-tokens. So any 5-
token not caused by Fred or George or ... or Ziggy would be erroneous.
Therefore, ES1 will yield different truth conditions for 5S, depending on
which explanation of the disposition to produce 5-tokens we pick. Given
one explanation, the rabbit's internal tokens indicate the presence of a
hawk. Given another explanation, they indicate the presence of Fred or
George or .. , or Zigg~. And on this latter explanation, current $-tokens
will all be false. Because unless selection has occurred very recently,
5l-tokens will be about hawks that are long dead. But the problem for ESI
is even worse than this.
I said above that the general form of selection explanations
involving a mental state, $, will be:
(1) In the presence of p,
having 5-tokens increases the fitness of an organism 0.
(2) At least sometimes,
13-tokens are produced in 0 when p is present.
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But consider the property "being such that, when present, g-tokens in 0
increase O's fitness." Call this the "fitness property' for 0-tokens.
Condition (1) above is (trivially) true of the fitness property for 0-
tokens. And if the disposition to produce 0-tokens was selected for, then
we know that the fitness property for 0-tokens was instantiated, at least
sometimes, when 0-tokens were produced. Thus, condition (2) above is true
of the fitness property for 0-tokens as well. And so according to ES1,
any 0-token in any organism means, "There is something present, such that
my fitness is increased by producing a 4-token in its presence."
One might argue that satisfaction of (1) and (2) is not sufficient
for a selection explanation. But then one would have to say something
about what else is required for a genuine selection explanation and show
why fitness property 'explanations' do not count. Moreover, appeals to
fitness are, in a sense, fundamental to selection explanations. If past
instantiations of hawkness explain the selection for the disposition to
produce 3-tokens, that is because avoiding hawks contributes to the
fitness of rabbits. 1 3
13. If fitness were defined in terms of selection, one might think that
fitness property "explanations' are mere tautologies. But see, e.g.,
Sober (1984a] who shows why fitness explanations do not embody
tautologies. I should note that I am making a point about selection
explanations only, and not explanation in general. Ned Block has
pointed out to me that it is at least unclear whether-the property
"will cause a sinking," which might be instantiated by the thin hull
of a ship, can explain the sinking of the ship. And in general, we
cannot assume that one explanation guarantees many explanations. The
point about selection explanations, however, is that they typically
take the formr of citing a property whose presence increases the chance
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Fodor [forthcoming] makes a similar point, focusing on a different
property. For any belief type A, 13-tokens will covary with the property I
called 'D(A),' viz. the property had by all the possible (distal) causes
of 1-tokens. And past instantiations of D(13) explain the selection for
the disposition to produce 1-tokens. If rabbits form O-tokens in the
presence of some hawks, then some hawks must be D(13)-ish. 1 4 So it is
selectively advantageous for rabbits to produce 1-tokens in the presence
of D(O). Because at least sometimes, when D(A) is present, a hawk is also
present. And by avoiding some hawks, rabbits sometimes avoid being eaten.
Of course, if 1-tokens in the absence of hawks decrease fitness (perhaps
rabbits waste a lot of energy hiding from hawk-shaped kites), then the
disposition to produce 1-tokens might not be selected for. But given that
the disposition was selected for, we can infer that the overall effect of
the disposition was to increase fitness. 1 5 And so the point applies:
of survival of some organism. And the presence of the fitness
property for 3-tokens does increase the chance of survival for 1-
tokeners. So the burden is on the evolutionary semanticist to find a
way to rule out fitness property explanations. I argue below that
other properties can also explain the selection for the disposition to
produce 1-tokens.
14. Or at least the presence of hawkness is positively correlated with the
presence of D(A). Perhaps hawks fly when skies are grey, and (1)-
tokens occur when skies are grey. In section five, I discuss further
difficulties for evolutionary semantics hauing to do with this
possibility. Of course, lots of things that aren't hawks (or grey
skies) may also be D(1)-ish.
15. There can be selection of a trait that does not increase the fitness
of its containinq system. Because some traits can be "free riders' on
traits that were selected for. But if a trait was selected for, then
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Past instantiations of D(A) explain the selection for the disposition to
produce 01-tokens. So according to ES1, the presence of D(A) is a truth
condition for a. And like the crude covariation theory, ES1 rules out the
possibility of error.
Adding extra clauses to ESI which rule out, by stipulation, D(A) and
the fitness property for 1-tokens as candidates for the meaning of 13-
tokens might be unobjectionable. For one might argue that explanations
involving these properties are simply degenerate cases, similar to
solutions of an equation that are ignored for any practical purposes.
This might not be an ad hoc maneuver if the only properties that figured
in selection explanations for the disposition to produce 1-tokens were
coextensive with one of the following: D(I),
x: 15-tokens in the presence of x increase fitness), or the property that
A represents. But this is not the case. We have already seen that
properties like "Fred )r George or ... or Ziggy-ness' can explain
selection. Moreover, there will be many properties whose extensions (i)
include more than the individual hawks that former rabbits avoided, but
(ii) are proper subsets of the extension of D(A). For any such property
Q, it will be the case that some Q-ish things are hawks. So avoiding Q-
ish things will increase a rabbit's chance-of survival. Sometimes A-
tokens will be produced in the presence of Q. And so past instantiations
it increased the fitness of its containing system. See Sober [1984a)
for discussion.
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of Q can explain the selection for the disposition to produce i-tokens.
Similarly, there will be many properties whose extensions (a) are not
equivalent to the fitness property for IS-tokens, (b) do not include all
the hawks, but (c) can still explain the selection for the disposition to
produce 1-tokens. Consider the property, "hawk which will try to eat the
rabbit." Hawks which fail to notice the rabbit below will not have this
property. And of course, avoiding hawks that will try to eat the rabbit
will increase the rabbit's chance of survival. Or in the frog's case,
consider the property "bug which is not poisonous." The strategy of
ruling out selection explanations by adding extra clauses to ES1 will
require ruling out every selection explanation except the one which gets
the right content for 1-tokens. And this is clearly too much
stipulation. 1 6
Of course, there may be some indeterminacy of meaning. We have no
reason to think that the content of a rabbit's thought must be exactly as
determinate as some word in English. So the fact that there is more than
one selection explanation is not in itself an objection. The problem is
that ESI aisigns D(A), the fitness property for 13-tokens, and many other
properties "in between" these two as the meaning of (. Th-is n.:rltclity
of selection explanations does not matter to the biologist. Her task is
16. One is tempted to appeal to ceteri.s paribus clauses here; since
ceteris paribus, ingesting bugs is good for frogs. But it seems that
ceteris paribus, having 13-tokens in the presence of D(I5) is
selectively advantageous as well.
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merely to give a naturalistic explanation of the "fit" between the traits
organisms possess and the demands of the niche in which those organisms
reside, which such fit appears to be the product of conscious design.
For this task, any true selection explanation will do. But the wild
indeterminacy of meaning that results from ES1 is an unacceptable
consequence fdr a theory of intentionality. To put it crudely,
intentionality makes distinctions that natural selection doesn't. 1 7
Perhaps, though, some theory like ES1 can be developed which does not fall
prey to this indeterminacy. One might hope to place some restrictions on
either the properties which can be candidates for the meaning of A, or the
corresponding selection explanations.
2.3 I n t en t i o n al Co n sume&r i sm
According to Millikan [1984, 1986, 1989a], it is crucial that a theory of
meaning focus on the relation between symbols and their consumers, i.e.
the mechanisms to which symbols serve as input. This is because she
thinks the purpose, and hence the meaning, of a symbol depends on the
purpose(s) of its consumer(s).
17. I suggest this as a source of difficulty for any theory like that of
Millikan [1984] in. Pietroski [1990].
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2.3.1 Of Furnaces and Rabbits
The easiest way to motivate Millikan's claim is by considering an
artifact. My furnace can be in one of two states, @on* or 'off,'
depending on its input. It is constructed so that (ceteris paribus) it is
"on' only when it receives a token of a certain type, say 1, from a
thermostat. So we can say the furnace is a consumer, and the thermostat a
producer, of A-tokens. Millikan's idea is that the meaning of 1-tokens
depends not on when the thermostat produces such tokens, but on the
conditions that must obtain if the furnace is to do its job when it
receives 1-tokens.
My furnace was manufactured because past furnaces were able to
perform a certain function: warming a space when the temperature fell
below a specified level. And in virtue of having such a history, the
"Proper Function' of my furnace is to warm a space when the temperature in
the space falls below a specified level, say 70O. In general, F is the
Proper Function of an item j, if tokens of i's type have historically been
replicated because of their ability to F. The furnace warms a space by
being in its 'on' state. But it is in this state only when it receives a
1-token as input. So the furnace will perform its Proper Function only if
the following condition holds: It receives 1$-tokens when the temperature
falls below 700. In general, given a certain input, a consumer will
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perform in accordance with its Proper Function only if some condition C
obtains. This suggests the following theorys
ES2: 13-tokens have p as their meaning if
the presence of p is a necessary condition for the
Proper Functioning of i-consumers when they consume
0-tokens.
According to ES2, the 13-tokens produced by my thermostat mean that
the temperature is below 700. Error is clearly possible, for I have said
nothing about how reliable my thermostat is with respect to producing 0-
tokens when the temperature falls below 700. In fact, it's not very
reliable. And the 1-tokens produced when the temperature is above 700
count as mistakes. Of course, biological systems wouldn't proliferate if
producers never met the needs of consumers. But according to the
evolutionary semanticist, this just shows that macro-systems won't survive
if their sub-systems never do what they are MEANt to do. To its credit,
ES2 has the right structure qua teleological theory. If intentional
states are means to an end, then we should expect the purposes of those
states to "filter down" in the way that ES2 suggests. Intentional
consumerism also captures our intuitions concerning the practice of human
engineers and the purposes of artifacts. A furnace will do what it was
designed to do only if it receives 13-tokens in conditions C. So an
engineer must design a device which meets this need. The engineer may
build a device which-- by and large-- gets the job done, but which
occasionally (i) fails to produce 13-tokens when C obtains or (ii) produces
13-tokens when C does not obtain. We would say that when the device
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produces such tokens, it fails to do what'it is supposed to do, For the
purpose of tokens that serve as input to the furnace is already determined
by the antecedent purpose of the furnace and its needs with respect to
maintaining room temperature.
ES2 cannot be right, however. There will be many necessary
conditions for the Proper Functioning of consumers which are irrelevant to
the meaning of the consumed tokens. For example, the furnace must have a
source of fuel. The pilot light must be lit. The house must not cave in,
etc. Grant, for the moment, that the presence of a hawk is a necessary
condition for the Proper Functioning of 13-consumers in rabbits. There
will be other necessary conditions as well, There must be oxygen for the
rabbit to breath; the rabbit's heart must be pumping; there must no
earthquake which destroys everything in the niche, etc, ES2 must be
modified to exclude necessary conditions for the Proper Functioning of
consumers which are "sereantically irrelevant." The natural response is
that the relevant conditions are those which have been selectively
important.
Consider (i) a rabbit, Roger, who was disposed to hide when a A3-token
was produced, and (ii) an historical competitor of Roger who, apart from
not having this disposition, was similar to Roger in all respects. The
presence of oxygen was never an important factor with respect to the
difference in fitness between these two rabbits. But the presence of
hawks was important. Had there been no hawks, these rabbits would not
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have differed in fitness. Let us say that if the presence of p is a
selectively important necessary condition for the Proper Functioning of 0-
consumers when they receive a-tokens, then the 1-consumer "Needs" p when
it consumes t-tokens. We can now state Millikan's theory rather simply:
ES3: fr-tokens have p as their meaning if
A-consumers Need p when they consume 3-tokens.
Let us suppose that the consumer of f-tokens in a given rabbit is the
rabbit's 'decision-theoretic" (henceforth, "d-t') system. The d-t system
will be a cognitive mechanism which (i) takes data from various sub-
systems-- notably perceptual modules-- as input, (ii) performs certain
computations over these input states (and possibly other representational
states as well), and (iii) issues motor commands as output.18  In our
example, the outcome of sending a A-token to the rabbit's d-t system will
be that the rabbit "takes cover." There will be many other input-output
pairs as well. Perhaps when a V-token is sent to the d-t system, the
rabbit nibbles at what is in front of it; when a 0-token is sent, the
rabbit hops quickly, etc. Cf course, all these claims will have
exceptions. The d-t system, might break down. More importantly, in the
case of complex systems (like us) other beliefs might interfere with the
Onormal," i.e. selzctively important, effects of a 13-token. But luckily,
we can hold such complications aside for present purposes. Selection
explanations d& not require exceptionless connections between input states
18. If rabbits do not actually work like this, we could easily change the
example. But this is the picture that Millikan seems to have in mind.
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and behaviors that increase fitness. All that is required is that the
'net effect" of input states on the d-t system is to increase the fitness
of the organism in question,
To determine what the rabbit's d-t system Needs when it consumes
I-tokens, we must first determine, the Proper Func-ion of the d-t system.
At this point, one might simply rehearse arguments given already, and try
to show that the rabbit's d-t system has many Proper Functions. One might
claim, for example, that one Proper Function of the d-.b system is wildly
disjunctive, with one of the disjuncts being: to make the rabbit avoid
instantiations of D(r), the (distal) property 'hat f-tokens covary with.
And then one could argue that the d-t system Needs the presence of D(A)
when it consumes j-tokens. One might then repeat this argument with
respect to other properties and conc. de that ES3 is no better than ES1.
But perhaps we can focus on a particular Proper Function of the rabbit's
d-t system.
It is plausible to think that at least part of the selective vaiue in
having a mind lies in being able to respond well to new situations, i.e.
situations never encountered by one's ancestors. Supposz this is correct.
Then at least a Proper Function of a current d-t system is, not merely to
reproduce behaviors of a type produced by former d-t systems, but mere
generally to make the organism behave in selectively advantageous ways.
The suggestion is that there may be no particular behaviors that a d-t
system is supposed to produce. Rather, its evolutionary purpose is to
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help its containing system get on in the world, by producing whatever
behaviors are selectively appropriate in the situation at hand. This
strikes ne as a plausible claim about the Proper Function of d-t systems.
And one might argue that producing behaviors selectively appropriate to
the situation at hand is the semantically relevant Proper Function of a
d-t system, because it takes account of the capacity of intentional
systems to respond appropriately to novel situations. In any case, let us
suppose this is the Proper Functior, of the rabbit's d-t system for the
purpose of assessing the Needs of the d-t system when it consumes mental
tokens. 19' 2 0
An initially plausible suggestion is that the rabbit's d-t system
Needs the presence of a hawk, or perhaps a hawk or similar predator, when
it consumes 4-tokens. For when the d-t system consumes a 4-token, it
19. It may be that Millikan hersclf would not defend ES3 in this way. But
for reasons that will become clear below (see page 78), i think this
is the most interesting defense of ES3.
20. Papineau [1984] recognizes that his version of evolutionary semantics
is in danger of assigning inclusive fitness as the content of all
mental states. He frames his response to this problem in terms of (i)
desires having a "concertina" of effects, and (ii) a notion of "being
sensitive to information," such that Nature and agents can be
sensitive to different bits of information. Papineau also appeals to
various holistic considerations. I find his appeals to concertinae
and information-sensitivity a little obscure. But if I understand the
gist of Papineau's proposal correctly, it amounts to an attempt to fix
a certain Proper Function of the system's d-t system that I describe
here. And unless Papineau's theory collapses into a version of
Conceptual Role Seamantics that make!, no substantive appeal to
evolutionary considerations (which it may do), I think the objections
presented here tell against.Papineau's theory as well.
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makes the rabbit "take cover," i.e. run into nearby brush or move into
shadows. This is a selectively appropriate response to the presence of a
predator. Hence, the rabbit'is 1-tokens would seem to be about hawks (or
perhaps predators) according to ES3. For intuitively, the rabbit's d-t
system could perform its Proper Function in the presence of a hawk which
happened not to be D(t)-ish. (Remember that which property 0-tokens
covary with is irrelevant to the meaning of 1$-tokens, according to this
theory.) So intuitively, the 1$-consumer does not Need D(A) when they
consume A-tokens. So it looks like the defender of ES3 is not open to the
c ~. .: that D(M) turns out to be the meaning of 1-%okens on her &-eory.
One has to be a little careful, though, in cashing out th;;
intuition. For unless the production of Fr-tokens in the presence of hawks
is causally overdeterrrined, the decision-theoretic system will not receive
a 0-token in the presence of a hawk that is not D(1)-ish.21  So D0() is a
necessary condition for the Proper Functioning of 1-consumers when they
consume 1-tokens. But the idea behind ES3 is that the effects of a symbol
on its consumer(s) exhaust the semantic importance of the symbol. So let
us (i) define a "pseudo-1$-token" as any token whici; would have all the
same effects on the Al-consumer as an actual 1-token, and (ii) say that a
0-consumer does not Need p, .if it could perform in accordance with its
Proper Function given a pseudo-1$-token in the absence of p. A hawk that
21. Here I am ignoring the possibility (considered in note 14 above) that
something merely correlated with the presence of hawks (e.g. a grey
sky) is what causes 1$-tokens.
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it not D(AI)-ish will not cause a a-token. But it could have caused a
pseudo-0-token. For the rabbit might have had pseudo-i-tokens that
covaried with some distal property D(B), which .s not coextensive with
D(I). Had a hawk which was D(B)-ish caused one of these pseudo-1-tokens,
the rabbit's d-t system would have produced a selectively appropriate
behavior, viz. taking cover from the hawk. And this might be said to show
that the d-t system does not Need D(A) when it consumes 1-tokens.
In this way, the defender of ES3 can rule out not only D(A), but many
other properties of hawks which could figure in selection explanations for
the rabbits disposition to produce A-tokens. Most hawks are hawk-shaped,
so at least sometimes, hawk-shaped things cause f3-tokens. Avoiding hawk-
shaped things increases the fitness of rabbits, and so the presence of
hawk-shaped things can explain the selection f'r the rabbit's disposition
to produce a-tokens. But the rabbit's d-t system does not Need the
presence of something hawk-shaped when it consumes fS-tokens. Because a
hawk which happened not to be hawk-shaped could cause a pseudo-0-token;
and if it did, the rabbit's d-t system would still perform its Proper
Function by making the rabbit avoid the non-hawk-shaped hawk. Since the
13-consumer system does.n't Need the presence of something hawk-shaped when
it consumes 13-tokens, 1-tokens caused by hawk-shaped kites will be
erroiieous (at least if there are no hawks around). The problem, however,
is that this reasoning rules out too many properties.
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2.3.2 Consumer Needs
The claim that a d-t system has the Proper Function of producing
selectively advantageous behaviors was motivated by the idea that a d-t
system is supposed to produce behaviors (selectively) appropriate to
whatever situation its containing system happens to be in. But once we
take this idea seriously, we realize that the rabbit's d-t system does not
Need the presence of hawkness when it consumes 1-tokens. For the behavior
caused by $-tokens might be (selectively) appropriate in the absence of
hawks. One way to see this point is by imagining possible scenarios in
which some D(M1)-ish things have a selectively important impact on rabbits,
but one which differs from the impact of hawks.
Suppose there were a flying creature which, far from being a predator
of rabbits, often deposited rabbit-vitamins into brush that it passed
over. And suppose that, at least sometimes, this creature's passing
overhead would cause a 1$-token in rabbits. I have been describing the
behavior caused by 1-tokens as 'taking cver.' But it is important not to
be misled by particular descriptions of the behavior. The rabbit will do
something like running under nearby brush; and this behavior might be
selectively appropriate for reasons having nothing to do with becoming
someone else's dinner. Running under brush might, for example, lead
rabbits to find rabbit-vitamins. So according to ES3, the presence of the
vitamin-dropping creature will be a truth condition for $-tokens in
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rabbits. For in the presence of such a creature, the d-t system's
response to 0-tokens is selectively appropriate.
According to ES3, the presence of any possible D(1)-ish thing will be
a truth condition for 3, if the following counterfactual is true: Had the
possible D(13)-ish thing existed, it would have been selectively useful for
rabbits to have states which covaried with its presence. The defender of
ES3 cannot, at this point in the argument, rule out outr6 possible causes
of 13-tokens on the grounds that they were never historically er juntered.
We are assuming that the Proper Function of the rabbit's d-t system is to
respond appropriately to novel situations. So according to ES3, the
semantic type for 1-tokens will amount to: thing such that, in its
presence, A-tokens cause a selectively appropriate behavior. Therefore,
any possible token which eventuates in a selectively advantageous behavior
will be true. But appeal to outrd examples is not necessary to make this
general point about ES3.
"Taking cover" from a hawk is a selectively advantageous behavior,
because hawks often eat rabbits. But a rabbit's fitness would not be
decreased if it failed to produce 1-tokens in the presence of hawks that
would ignore the rabbit, In fact, running into brush would probably be a
waste of energy in such cases. So even if we ignore 1-tokens that would
prove useful for reasons having nothing to do with predators, what a
rcbbit's d-t system Needs when it consumes 1-tokens is, not a predator,
but the presence of: a predator that would keep the rabbit from
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reproducing (again) if and only if the rabbit does not take cover. In
general, a necessary condition for a d-t system to produce a selectively
advantageous behavior will be the presence of a property, such that in its
presence, 13-tokens increase the fitness of the d-t system's containing
system. But this property is not anything like hawkness or bugness. It
is the fitness property for 1-tokens.
The evolutionary semanticist can rule out the presence of D(A) as a
Need of the rabbit's decision-theoretic system when it consumes f-tokens,
because (i) avoiding D(I)-ish things is selectivelV advantageous only
because some D(B)-ish things are also Q-ish (e.g. hawkish), and (ii) D(1)
and Q are not coextensive. If pseudo-S-tokens-- i.e. tokens just like A-
tokens with respect to their effects on the decision-theoretic system--
covaried with Q, that would serve the Needs of the decision-theoretic
system at least as well. But the same reasoning applies to hawkness.
Avoiding hawks it selectively advantageous only because some hawks would
eat rabbits. If pseudo-aI-tokens in a rabbit, Roger, covaried with the
presence of predators-that-would-eat-Roger-if-he-doesn't-hide, the Needs
of the Roger's decision-theoretic system would be served at least as well.
If organisms had "source of fitness detectors," that would be evolutionary
Nirvana. Of course, Nature satisfices. But even if we admit talk of
.satisficing, there is still no reason to focus on hawkness (or any other
property) in selection explanations regarding rabbits. Hiding from
anything D(B)-ish, for example, is a strategy that works well enough.
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At this point, the defender of ES3 may want to deny that the Proper
Function of the rabbit's I-consumer is to produce selectively advantageous
behaviors. Suppose one eliminates reference to a d-t system entirely, and
holds that the consumer of A-tokens in the rabbit is simply its
disposition to "take cover" given A-tokens. One might then try to argue
that the Proper Function of this disposition is to make rabbits avoid
hawks (or similar predators). It may be that this is the line Millikan
wants to take. The problem, of course, will lie in establishing9 the
Proper Function of the disposition t" "take cover" given 1-tokens. The
task of any theory of meaning is to establ.sh a semantic type to which
token mental states belong. Millikan's solution appeals to the Proper
Functions of mental state consumers. But .he must avoid the charge that
her theory simply exchanges (i) the problem of establishing a semantic
type for mental tokens for (ii) the problem of establishing the Proper
Function of consumers of such tokens. And all the objections that have
been raised so far against evolutionary semantics can be raised again in
the context of challenging the assumption that the Proper Function of the
disposition to 'take cover" given 0-tokens is to make rabbits avoid hawks.
Why not say the Proper Function of the disposition is to make rabbits:
avoid Fred or George or ... Ziggy; avoid D(4)-ish things; perform
selectively advantageous behaviors; avoid D(f$)-ish things or find rabbit-
vitamins; etc?
What the evolutionary semanticist really wants is some kind of
mediate Proper Function explanation which makes reference to (i) the fact
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that the organism 0 in question has a mental model, (ii) the fact that
parts of this model can be mapped onto properties sometimes instantiated
in O's environment, and (iii) that 0 succeeds in its niche because of (i)
and (ii). I have no doubt that some such explanation can be given. Being
able to represent the world is a very useful ability. But the
evolutionary semanticist must, in a non-intentional idiom, distinguish
this very special selection explanation from all the other selection
explanations that can be offered. We might step back from cases of
representation for a moment, and take one last look to see if a
characterization of mediate selection explanations can be given.
One might argue that the function of the heart is to pump blood-- and
not merely to contribute to the fitness of its containing system-- by
appealing to the following reasoning: A heart contributes to fitness by
pumping blood; but the heart does not pump blood by contributing to
fitness. Similarly, present rabbits' dispositions to "take cover" given
A-tokens contributes to their fitness by making them avoid hawks. But
these dispositions do not make present rabbits avoid hawks by contributing
to their fitness. Let us say' that if a disposition performs a function F
by performing some other function F', and it does not perform F' by
performing F, then F' is the more proximate function of the disposition.
The rabbit's disposition to "take cover" given 1-tokens might have the
Proper Function of increasing the rabbit's fitness and the Proper Function
of making the rabbit avoid hawks. But the latter is the more proximate
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Proper Function. One might try to avoid the conclusion that all belief
tokens are about fitness by offering the following theorys
ES4: 0-tokens have p as their meaning if
the instantiation of p is a selectively important
necessary
condition for 0-consumers to perform their most
proximate
Proper Function when they consume 0-tokens.
The problem with ES4 should be clear. The rabbit's disposition to
'take cover' given 0-tokens makes the rabbit avoid hawks by making it
avoid anything 0D()-ish. But the disposition does not make the rabbit
avoid.D(f)-ish things by making it avoid hawks. Thus, the most proximate
Proper Function of the 0-consumer when it consumes 0-tokens is to make the
rabbit avoid D(a)-ish things. The presence of D(4) is a selectively
important necessary condition for avoiding D(3), since the presence of
D(A) can explain differences in fitness between rabbits that consume
0-tokens and those that don't. (Compare the presence of oxygen.) So
according to ES4, the presence of D(0) is a truth condition for i. Hence,
ES4 rules out the possibility of error.
2.4 Selection arcd Discrrimination
Let us suppose that some theoretical apparatus can be developed for
picking out mediate Proper Function explanations. And let us grant that
the resulting theory would make plausible claims about the meaning of
mental states in cases like the rabbit's hawk-detector. Evolutionary
semantics will ttill deliver the wrong results if selection occurs for
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what are-- from the intentional psychologist's perspective-- extraneous
reasons. The mental capacities of an organism 0 can be selected for
because of a positive correlation between mental tokens and the presence
of p, without 0 having any discriminatory abilities with respect to the
presence of p. But in the absence of any such abilities, attributions of
the mental states which mean that p will yield very implausible
intentional explanations.
The following fictional example illustrates the point:
The kimus are color-blind animals that live in an area with a
large rocky hill. Their only predators are the snorfs,
carnivores who roam in packs through the kimus' home turf each
morning. In virtue of a genetic mutation, one particular kimu
develops a disposition to form tokens of a mental state type,
~, in the presence of certain wavelengths of light. Each
morning, something red on the hilltop causes a A-token in the
mutant-- call him Alfred - =. r, looks up at the hill. Along
with this ne.,' ti'., , Alfred also develops a "fondness" for
red things, i.e. a disposition to move towards the distal
causes of tA-tokens. So each morning he sperind a fair bit of
time trudging up the hill. Alfred thus avoids the snorfs who
are roaming while he is trudging. Selection for the mutant
genotype occurs, resulting in the eventual spread of the
dispositions throughout the species. There is no other reason
(e.g. detecting food) for the selection of the disposition to
produce I-tokens.
The problem for evolutionary semantics raised by this case is that
past instantiations of snorfness explain the selection for the disposition
to produce n-tokens. The only difference between this example and the
rabbit case would seem to be our supposition that (at least some) hawks
could cause t -tokens. But whether 1 f-tokens are caused by, or merely
correlated with, the presence of p is irrelevant to selection
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explanations. A, organism need not be able to distinguish p-ish states
from states that are not p-ish for the presence of p to be selectively
important for the organism. So even if some means for picking out
hawkness in the rabbit case could be developed, we have every reason to
believe that it would pick out snorfness in the kimu case. And biting the
bullet in "kimu-esque' examples, i.e. admitting that f-tokens may be about
snorfs, is not a viable option.
It is difficult to say just what the contnt of a kimu's 0-token is.
Perhaps it means something like, 'Lo, redness!' Or perhaps it means,
"Something nice is over there." Indeed, there may well be no determinate
meaning of Q-tokens in this case, One thing is clear, however. , -tokens
do not mean that snorfrness is instantiated. If they did, then the
following intentional explanation would be true of kimusy They climb the
hill, because (inter alia) they believe that snorfs are approaching; and
when kimus move towards red things on other occasions, they would be
acting on the (typically false) belief that a snorf is approaching. But
we have no reason to think kirnus have thoughts about snorfs. Indeed, we
have overwhelming reason to think they don't. We can suppose that no kimu
has ever gotten close to a snorf and lived to think about it. Kimus might
get eaten before they get a chance to see a snorf, even once. Put a snorf
in front of a kimu, and the kimu will not-- unless a certain wavelength of
light is also present-- run away. And if snorfs happen to be red, quite
the opposite will happen. Kimus can, at least under many circumstances,
reliably discriminate red things from blue things. But they can't
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reliably discriminate snorfs from non-snorfs. They quite literally would
not know a snorf from a hole in the wall. And we could collect a great
deal of evidence in support of this claim. Simply put, all the evidence
tells against kimus having the concept SMORF. And so all the evidence
tells against them having intentional states about snorfts.
Failure to deliver plausible intentional explanations of behavior
would seem to be endemic to evolutionary semantics. This is because
evolutionary theories do not capture the fact that there is a connection
between plausible intentional explanations and discriminatory capacities.
In my introduction, I said I would grant that all the cognitive mechanisms
in my examples were selected for. I would like to take back this promise
now to make one last point. Suppose a system has the disposition to
produce s-tokens when conditions C and D obtain, and s'-tokens when
conditions C and D0' obtain, If there is no history of selective advantage
in having the capacity to distinguish D from 0', evolutionary semantics
cannot explain any difference in the meaning of different tokens produced
by that capacity. And so s-tokens and s'-tokens will both mean that C
obtains. Recall our thermostat-furnace system. If the Proper Function of
the furnace is to maintain room temperature at 700, then tokens produced
by the thermostat mean that it is less than 700. This will be the case
even if the thermostat is sensitive to small changes in ambient
temperature; say it reliably produces tokens of different syntactic types
when the temperature is 390 as opposed to 39.1o . According to
evolutionary semantics (or at least the versions we have considered), the
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meaning of all such tokens will be the same, viz. less than 70*. One can
get into the mood of saying that, for the thermostat-furnace system, all
these tokens do mean the same thing. But in other cases, the situation is
different.
Humans surely have discriminatory capacities that h3ve never been
selectively advantageous. For example, I have a musician friend who can
discriminate a well-tuned A (440 cycles) from a sCightly flat one (439
cycles). Suppose my friend's capacity to make this kind of discrimination
has no selective history. This seems a rather plausible assumption. Such
a capacity does not contri ute to fitness. Nor does it seem to be
learned.22  In any case, such a capacity certainly could appear without it
having a selective history. But evolutionary %emantics cannot explain why
the different syntactic tckens produced my friend's auditory system seem
to differ in meanng., Hence, we are robbed of intentional explanations
like, 'Jerry winced because he noticed that the orchestra was flat." Such
examples can be multiplied once we realize that evolutionary semantics can
explain why mental tokens have different meanings only if the mental types
have different selective histories.23
22. For what it is worth, the anecdotal evidence is that Jerry claims to
have had the ability for as long as he can remember. And hhi
brothers, who are not musicians, have the same capacity to , only
slightly lesser extent.
23. Of course, the evolutionary semanticist can say that she has offered
only sufficient conditions for meaning that p, and that some other
explanation of intentionality must be provided in these cases. But
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Such considerations present a quite general difficulty for
evolutionary semantics. Good evolutionary explanations do not always have
good intentional counterparts. And there 's no reason to think they
should. Selection explanations involving p do not depend on the organism
in question being able to tell whether or not p is present. They depend
on correlations between p and fitness. This is a perfectly general
feature of selection explanations. Con.ider a non-mental example. There
is a famous species of moth, whose members-- ever many generations--
changed in color to matcei the rolor of soot-covered trees. Tree color is
obviously an important property with respect to the relevant selection
exolanations. in this case. Moths which match the color of trees in their
niche have a selective advantage (camouflage) over moths that don't. But
fitter moths don't detect tree colors, they just match them. We have good
reason to suppose, on the other hand, that thaving beliefs about p is
(somehow) intimately linkea with being able to tell whether or not p is
present when faced with p.24  But, as the kimu case illustrates, there can
be perfectly good selection explanations involving mental states and
properties in the absence of good intentional explanations involving the
same states and proi rties.
any theory which could u>plain intentionality in these cases would
p,. ba)ly9 render evolutiomrary semantics §u•perfluous.
24. Se'. Evan, r1582].
I
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I do not mean to be adopting verificationism with respect to the
meaning of intentional states here. My point is only that if an organism
repeatedly fails to respond appropriately to evidence that things are P-
ish or not, then we have good reason to withhold attributions of beliefs
about p to the organism. And this fact about plausible attributions of
intentional states provides reason for thinking that evolutionary
semantics is on the wrong track.
2. 5 A Su rri nrg Up
According to evolutionary semantics, the content of mental states depends
on what thEse states are for. Selection explanations offer an initially
attractive account of how to cash out this appeal to teleology in a non-
intentional idiom. And by appealing to the purpose of mental states,
evolutionary semantics apparently captures the normativity of meaning. In
its simplest version (ES1), however, this approach has the consequence
that the reaning of a mental state.is wildly indeterminate. This theory
cannot even rule out the property that n-tokens covary with or A's
"fitness property" as candidates for the meaning of D. Millikan's
"consumer-oriented" approach (ES3) in the natural form for a teleological
theory of content to take. But it fails, because the Needs of consumers
can be satisfied in many ways. And the result is that all beliefs are
about fitness. If the evolutionY v semanticist tries to avoid this
objection, the resulting theory (ES4) rules out the possibility of error.
Some non-intentional characterization of the appropriate mediate selection
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explanation must be provided. But even if this problem could be solved,
evolutionary semantics is still in danger of delivering implausible
intentional explanations in "kimu-esque" cases. Selection explanations
and intentional explanations are not relAted in the way they must bye if
evolutionary semantics is to be plausible.
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Chap tear 3
Evolu ti on andc Funcation
We may sometimes attribute importance to
characteristics ',hich are really of very
little importance, and which originated
from quite secondary causes, independent
of natural selection.
--- Dar'iin, The Origin of Species
This chapter continues the discussion and criticism f evolutionary
semantics (ES) begun in the last chapter. Here I want to put aside
worries about 'indeterminacy of function," and focus on the point that a
mechanism's function cat.not be Oread off" its evolutionary history.
3.1 Panglosso ti an Explanat i on
A serious difficulty facing any version of evolutionary semantics is that
evolution is a complex phenomenon, involving processes other than natural
selection. While many biologists have tried to disabuse us of the
"Panglossian" assumption that natural selection is the only significant
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force of biological evolutionA, Millikan [1984, etc.] seems to make just
this assumption. This is not surprising, since non-selective processes
cannot result in Proper Function acquisition according to her theory. But
such criticism is not specific to Millikan. In the absence of appropriate
selection explanations, ES cannot in general account for the aboutness of
mental states. It would be congenial to these semantic theories if one
could always infer from the presence of a useful capacity to a selective
history which favored having the capacity. But the fact that an organism
has a useful trait does not establish that the trait was selected for. To
the degree that there are non-selective mechanisms of evolution, we should
be wary of assumptions that the selection required to renaer ES
empirically plausible has, in fact, occurred.
3.1.1 Non-selective Mechanisms of Evolution
Millikan [1984] begins with the trivia!. non-creationist supposition that
homo sapiens' cognitive capacities awe products of evolution.2 But from
this, she erroneously concludes that our capacity to believe and know
things must have arisen because they, and the mechanisms responsible for
1. See especially Gould & Lewontin [1975].
2. In this section, i draw heavily upon the corresponding section of
Pietroski (1990].
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them, "historically performed a service that helped us to proliferate"
(p.7). She also claims that
During the evolutionary process Nature effectively experiments
by producing mutations affecting, at one time or another,
surely every character of a species...Moreover, economy
dictates that traits serving no purpose are highly likely to
disappear, not necessarily because they get in the way, but
because that section of the genetic code could serve a useful
function if coded otherwise and sooner or later Nature will
stumble on this discovery (p. 2 7).
And further on:
There must be a way of describing the inherited nervous
system...under which the nervous system has historically
operated such that a general explanation can be given of how
that system has Normally accomplished these ultimate fir.ctirc•
:nat have led t P. ;'- ;prliferaticon (p.46).
11illi " - [1986) claims that there must be general principles which
govern our use of cc, itive mechanisms and 'explanations of why these
principles have historically worked to aid our survival." Otherwise, we
must suppose that cogni'ýion. is an accidental epiphenomenon 'hovering over
mechanisms that evolution devised with other things in mind (p.55).' In
these passages, Millikan paints a far too simplistic picture of the actual
process of evolution. Her pan-selectionist view ignores other historical
processes by which evolution may occur. I list several such processes
below, the point being that the members of a species may come to have a
trait without that trait beinq selected for. But if a trait has no
selective history, it has no Proper Function.3
3. See also Appendix C, where I discuss the role of non-sJlective
evolutionary mechanisms and their implications for the status of the
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1. Random (Genetic) Drifts
There is always a statistical chance that a given trait will work its way
through a population for no reason other than a pattern of "sampling
error." Consider an example of non-biological selection first. If ten
balls are draw.n from a box containing fifty blue and fifty red balls,
there is a chance that more than five (and perhaps all ten) of the drawn
balls will be red. Similarly, the distribution of genes that come to
reside in zygotes may differ from the distribution of genes in the
(sexually reproducing) population at large. For each zygote will be
conmposed of one gamete from each parent, each gamete having only one of
the two parental chromctsomes at each locus. Just as it is possible to
dra-j all red balls from a box containing a mix of red and blue balls, it
is possible that a given gene (type) 'ind the trait it controls will M-eep
to fixation due to randcrom drift. That is, bec.ause of sampling error, the
genes responsible for a given trait might be the only genes passed on to
the new generation. Especially over a series of generations, there is a
chance that a given trait will appear in all members of a species without
there having been any selective pressure in favor of the trait. 4
principle of natural selection and the Hardy-Weinberg law as ceteris
paribus generalizat ions.
4. The chance of fixation of a gene (type) 6 in a given generation
increases as a function of the percentage of G in the parent
population. The effects of dominance are also relevant. A recessive
trait could not apDear in all members of the daughter generation if the
parent generation contained dominant homozygotes. But given some
heterozygotes, fixation could occur over a number of generations.
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2. Mass Extinction:
An entire population may be extinguished because of a catastrophic event.
Ice ages, volcanic eruptions, or earthquakes can cause the death of large
groups of organisms. Such events may bring about large changes in the
gene pool, but for reasons that are random with respect to evolution by
natural selection. That is, large portions of a species may be
extinguished for reasons that have nothing do with how well adapted to
their niche the individuals were. Such "historical accidents" may play a
significant role in the explanation of the genetic endowment of many
species, including homo sapiens.
3. Spandrels 5 :
Gould and Lewontin [1975] argue quite persuasively that selection for a
trait T could have widespread side effects in virtue of the 'architectural
constraints' relevant to the production, of T. Such side effects, although
they might be useful in some sense, need not have been selected for.
Having jaws, for example, results in having a chin. Chins are spandrels
of the bone ar:hitecture 'used by Nature" to build jaws. It is possible
that many of our higher cognitive capacities are spandrels of the 'brain
5. If you mount a dome on rounded arches, you are left with tapering
triangular spaces-- spandrels-- between the arches. One can make
creative use of such spaces. The artist responsible for the ceiling of
the San Marco cathedral did this so well, in fact, that it seems as
though the ceiling was designed with the spandrels in mind.
Nonetheless, the architect's intention-- the explanation for why the
cathedral's "blueprint" had a certain configuration-- was simply to
mount a dome on rounded arches,
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architecture" selected for because it made possible the instantiation of
important lower order cognitive functions. A natural selection
explanation for the increase in homo sapiens' brain size, for example, may
well be correct. But such an increase may have brought with it many new
and interesting capacities that were not selected for.
4. Neighbor Trairst
When a given gene is replicated, its neighbors are sometimes copied as
well. Thus, it is not always possible to replicate the bits of genetic
material responsible for useful phenotypic traits without also replicating
their useless neighbors. Which genes are spatially next to which has
nothing to do with the phenotypic traits they cause. So the right
explanation for the persistencr of a given trait T might be that the
relevant gene was a 'free rider' on some other gene. In such cases,
natural selection explanations for the proliferation of T will be
incorrect.
5. Organism Selection and Pleiotropy
Suppose a creature has two new traits: T which is highly adaptive, and T'
which is slightly maladaptive. If T is useful enough to offset the ill
effects of T', both traits will be passed on. For whole organisms are the
things that live and die in the niche, and the creature will pass genetic
information concerning all of its traits on to its progeny. 6 Of course,
6. This point holds regardless of one's position on the "unit of
selection" controversy. (See, e.g., Sober [1984a] for details or
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an organism with T and without T' will be even better adapted, but there
is no guarantee that such an organism will appear as a selective
competitor. ? Moreover, it may be that a single gene, or complex of genes,
controls both T and T'. So it might not be possible, given the particular
relation between genes and traits that has developeds for a member of the
species in question to have one trait without also having the other. A
similar point is that an organism doing well in its niche might produce
offspring with a new trait T". As long as T" is not deleterious, there
will be no selective pressure against it, unless some other organism uses
the same "genetic space' for a useful trait. But again there is no
guarantee that such a competitor will appear.
6. Exaptation
This point is somewhat different than the others. But it is especially
relevant to evolutionary semantics. A trait might be selected for its
ability to perform one function, but come to be used for another purpose.
There is some reason to think that bird wings, for example, were
originally used to gather insects and/or maintain body heat; only later
Sober's [1984b) anthology for a number of articles on the topic.) Even
if one thinks the gene is always the relevant unit (as in Dawkins
[1976]), one still admits tae importance of genomic selection because
of what happens at the organismic level. And the theories of
intentionality discussed here focus exclusively on factors appropriate
for the organismic level of explanation.
7. Contra Millikan's claims above. Darwin put the point concisely,
"Unless profitable variations do occur, natural selection can do
nothing ([1859], p. 82; see also pp. 108 and 113)."
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did they come to be used for flight. Indeed, this seems to be the only
way to explain the gradual development of complex mechanisms (like
decision-theoretic mechanisms, the capacity for language, etc.). But
there is a serious questioi about how to characterize the history and
function of such mechanisms. The purposes for which they were originally
selected are not the purposes they now serve.
In general, to say that homo sapiens evolved is to make a v~ry weak
claim that any non-creationist should accept. For any transition from on#
state of the gene r 1 to some different state will count as evolution.
But evolution bP natural selection is a very interesting , empirical
hypothesis about the history of traits and the "fit" between organisms and
their environments. The points above are not criticisms of that
hypothesis, but reminders that Panglossianism is empirically unsound.
Natural selection is not the only explanation for the presence of evolved
traits. There is little reason to think that our ability to solve
differential equations was selected for. Nonetheless, it is true that
evolution has provided us with this (useful) ability. Again, natural
selection is surely an evolutionary force; but it is not the only one.8
8. It is worth noting that Darwin himself never claimed that natural
selection was the sole explanation for the observed fact of species
evolution. Panglossianism is a more recent phenomena. See Gould
(1979] and Appendix 8 for liscussion of this point.
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3.1.2 A Counterfactual Intuition
To the degree that evolutionary semantics simply presupposes natural
selection explanations for certain cognitive capacities, we should be
wary; since we know that there are other possible causes of the evolution
of traits. It is an empirical question as to whether a given cognitive
capacity is the product of selection. And evolutionary considerations
will lead to a tenable theory of meaning only if the relevant (putative)
selection explanations are correct. But even if the relevant selection
has occurred in fact, there is still something unsatisfying about ES when
we consider counterfactual possibilities.
For any meaning naturalist, the content of mental states will depend
on certain empirical facts. But it matters to the plausibility of the
semantic theory which empirical facts these are. Rejecting Panglossianism
means recognizing the possibility that cognitive mechanisms relevant to
the semantic properties of mental states may have non-selective histories.
But it seems quite strange to say that the intentional properties of
current minds depend precariously on the putative fact that certain of our
cognitive capacities are the result of one, rather than another, cause of
evolution. I have no argument to offer here, just intuitions. But even
granting that the most plausible selection explarations of our cognitive
abilities are correct, it strikes me as implausible to say that my token
mental states could have had differsnt meanings-- and perhap? no meanings
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at al11-- if (i) they had been produced in the same way by the same kind of
mechanisms (synchronically described) that actually produce my mental
states, but (ii) the details of the natural history resulting in such
mechanisms had been different.
I don't know how much weight to place on these intuitions. They may
just reflect a desire for a theory according to which meaning that p is a
roughly "synchronic" property of mental states. But neither do I think
such intuitions should be ignored. Our (Putnam-Burge enhanced) intuitions
suggest that a physical duplicate of me in a different environment, would
have different thoughts than I have. But evolutionary history doesn't
seem to matter in the same way. There is little to no intuitive pull to
say that a molecule for molecule duplicate of me with a different
evolutionary history (but living in the same synchronic environment with
me) would have different thoughts than I have. In fact, the intuitive
pull seerrs to be towards saying that any intentional attributions would
apply to both of us equally well. Again, I don't tzke such intuitions to
be definitive, but they're not nothing either.
3. 2 Dennet t ' s" De f ense of Pan r loss
I have criticized evolutionary semanticists for making what I take to be
naive adaptationist assumptions about natural history. But Dennett (1987]
'-,.t adaptationism is simply the form of optimization and
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idealization that bologists use in explaining Nature's 'behavior," i.e.
the course of evolution over time.
3.2.1 Voltaire and Darwin
Panglossian biology, according to Dennett, simply makes the same
assumptions of rationality that we make in using belief-desire psychology
to explain the behavior of human (or human-like) agents. Inquiry into the
nature of both evolution and cognitive systems requires these assumptions;
because without them, we could nt. even begin to make sense of the
behavior in question.
We take on optimality assumptions not because we naively think
that evolution has maoe this the best of all possible worlds,
but becaus.e we must be interpreters, if we are to make any
progress at all, and interpretation requires the invocation of
optimality (pp.278-9).
There is no doubt that biologists, like other sci.ntists, make use of
idealizations. But is far from obvious that, qua biologists, they invoke
anything like rationality assumptions or a Davidsonian principle of
charity. It will be useful, though, to consider what leads Dennett to
take this position. For in so doing, we will be led to distinguish
functional explanations from selection explanations. And overlooking this
distinction has, I btelieve, made evolutionary scimantics seem more
plausible than it is.
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For the sake of argument, let us grant Dennett that, on pain of
incoherence, we cannot assume that a system's beliefs are false in the
mair. Nothing follows directly about methodology in biology. The six
points made above suggest that one can study possible causes of evolution
without studying natural selection.9 It would hardly be incoherent to
imagine a natural history in which natural selection was not the dominant
force of evolution. One can easily imagine a possible history in which
species evolved because of random drift, catastrophe, etc. Improbable
events would occur in such a history. But the improbable is not
conceptually impossible, just improbable. Indeed, on the assumption that
Darwin provided an empirical theory, it is an empirical claim (and hence a
claim which could have been false) that natural selection was the dominant
force of evolution. Perhaps, though, Dennett's remarks about optimality
will become more clear and plausible in the context of a specific example.
Dennett thinks that Marr's [1982] theory of vision relies on
optimization and idealization, which in turn depends on understanding
"Nature's intentions" in designing the components (f the visual system.
But, according to Dennett, to understand Nature's intentions, we must see
Nature as an intentional system; and this purportedly requires the
biological analog of the principle of charity, viz. Panglossianism. The
reasoning here goes roughly as follows: Marr's theory depends on
9. See, e.g., Fisher (1930], Mayr [1963], Crow and Kimura [1970], S.
Wright [1978].
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assigning a function to the visual system; to make sense of such
function-assigning, we must treat Nature as an agent, a thing with
purposes and intentions; understanding an agent's intentions requires
making certain optimality assumptions; hence, Marr's theory requires that
we make the relevant optimality assumptions in theorizing about Nature's
"behavior,' i.e. evolution; the relevant optimality assumptions are those
of adaptationism; hence, Marr's theory is committed to adaptationist
assumptions about the evolutionary history of the visual system. There
are several points at which one might object to this inference. But I
propose to ignore Dennett's remarks about the "Intentional Stance" here,
and focus instead on his claim that the function-assigning aspect of
Marr's theory implicitly depends on the assumption that the visual system
was selected for to perform the function in question.
3.2.2 Voltaire and Marr
Marr's theory operates at three levels: the computational, the
algorithmic, and the instantiation. At the computational level, the
iC-A PII & i I e r %&%L
v rua1s Ytl I•y U•.•5escrubed aS a mechanism wrhich~ transtorms, lnputS (retilal
stimulation patterns) into representations of distal geometry. Thus, the
computational level provides (i) the formulation of.a transformation
problem for which the visual system generates solutions, and (ii) a
tractable task for the theorist, viz. to determine how the visual system
transforms its inputs into representations of distal geometry. With the
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problem(s) thus established, Marr goes on to develop the algorithmic level
of the theory. At this second level, the visual system is described as
performing ordered series of computations and thereby solving the
transformation problerr. The instantiation level, which provides an
account of how the algorithms of the second level are instantiated in
neural wetware, need not concern us here. For Marr, the first two levels
of the theory correspond to two questions: What is being computed, and
how is it being computed? 10
Marr proceeds from the assumption that we see well; so he develops
algorithms which, by and large, generate correct solutions to the
transformation problem. That is, the algorithms are such that the
following holds: Given inputs that the visual system would typically
receive when distal geometry is 0-ish, the algorithms typically generate
representations which indicate that distal geometry is B-ish. In short,
part of Marr's theory is the claim that the visual system is good at
representing distal geometry. To this extent, Dennett is right to say
that Marr makes assumptions of optimality. But Marr's assumption that we
see well is an empirical claim based on observations of current visual
systems. For many of the mini-theories given in Marr [1982], preliminary
experiments were performed to see just how well the visual system performs
on certain tasks -in various conditions. And like most vision theorists,
10, See Marr [1977] for discussion of this methodological framework.
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Marr also made wide use of data collected under conditions in which the
visual system performs rather poorly as a distal geometry representer. 11
Marr's theory is, however, dependent on being able to give a
functional characterization of the visual system. In particular, Marr
claims that the visual system functions well as a distal geometry
representer. Dennett thinks this talk of functioning-as-an-x must be
cashed out in terms of what the visual system was designed for by Mother
Nature. 1 2  But, pace Dennett, Marr's talk of function does not commit us
to talk of selection. We can, and must, distinguish functional
explanations from selection explanations; and Marr is committed only to
the former. 1 3 In the present context, it will be especially important to
11. The theory of ster•opsis (fusing two retinal images into a single
representation) is a particularly good example.
12. Dennett tries to motivate this claim with his analysis of the
"two-bitser," a machine which delivers a coke given a US quarter. The
two-bitser will also deliver a coke given a Panamanian quarter-balboa,
a coin of the same shape and weight as a US quarter. Dennett claims
that the only way to maintain that the function of the two-bitser is
to collect Quarters is to appeal to the intentions of its designers.
(To my mind, Dennett fails to take adequate account of other relevant
factors, like the environment in which an American two-bitser would be
entrenched. But for present purposes, we can let this pass.) I will
argue below that Dennett conflates the notion of function that
concerns Marr with a more robust notion of function that could serve
to determine meaning. At most, the case of the two-bitser shows that
designers' intentions are relevant to this more robust notion. And
Dennett's analysis of the function of the two-bitser turns on what we
would say about the meaning of its internal states.
13. See, e.g., HeIrpel [1965], L. Wright [1975], and Cummrins (1977, 1983]
for discussion of philosophical questions concerning functional
explanations.
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be clear about the theoretical role Marr's (functional) characterization
of the visual system as a good distal geometry representer.
What Marr assumes is that the visual system is well-suited for some
purpose, i.e. for computing some function. He assumes this, because it
allows him to constrain the theoretical task at the algorithmic level.
Given that one can describe a system as performing some function well--
i.e. as generating, by and large, the correct outputs for that function
given certain inputs-- one can restrict attention to more or less truth-
preserving inferences at the algorithmic level. Thus, characterizing a
function f that some mechanism M performs well makes the task of providing
an algorithmic level of explanation for M more tractable. As it happens,
the visual system is good at delivering more or less accurate
representations of distal geometry. No doubt the visual system was
selected for because it is good at doing just that. But this is an
empirical fact about the particular history of the visual system. Nothing
about the evolutionary histc.ry of a mechanism follows from its description
at Marr's computational level.
Any input-output device can be described at the computational level,
regardless of its origin. Let (xYsy), (x2,y2), ... , (x ,yn) be the set
of ordered pairs of all the (possible) inputs and outputs for some
mechanism M. Let f be the function given by this (potentially infinite)
list of ordered pairs. Trivially, M computes f. There will also be
infinitely many functions for which M will, given an input, produce the
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correct output at least some of the time. At the computational level of
explanation, the job of the theorist is simply to characterize some
function which the mechanism in question computes well; where to compute
a function f "well" is to deliver f(y) when given f(x), at least by and
large, in what are intuitively "normal" conditions. So there will be many
functions which a mechanism computes well. In this sense, computing a
certain function well is an abstract property of a device. But this
property does not depend on the device's history. Two physically
identical mechanisms will compute the same functions equally well,
regardless of what made them or how they were made.
The theoretical usefulness of the computational level, again, is that
it constrains the theorist's task at the next level down. There are
infinitely many functions that a given device will compute poorly. But
knowing this is of little or no help to the theorist in trying to provide
an algorith-ric level explanation. On the other hand, if you know that a
mechanism computes function f well, you can go to work trying to construct
a program that (if instantiated) would compute f, given a stock of certain
primitive operations. If you succeed, then you have an hypothesis about
how the mechanism in questic workks. The justification for a given
functional characterization at the computational level of explanation will
be that the characterization leads to a good algoritmnic level
explanation. The plausibility of an associated adaptationist story is
irreleuant.
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Another way to make this point is by noting that there are functions
other than "distal-geometry-describer' that the visual system is well
suited to perform. For simplicity, let's consider only the 'edge
detectors' in the early visual system. The key to the theory of edge
detection is that certain neural complexes are capable, effectivelys of
computing second derivatives. Think of the retinal input as an array of
points, with each point having a relative "brightness' value on some
scale. Given certotr facts about reflectance and object surfaces,
establishing the points at twhich the second derivatives of the array are
equal to zero (the "zero-crossings") turE out to be a good method for
establishinq where the edges. are on external surfaces. The details are
not important. The point is that a mechanism which can determine the
zero-crossings of the array can solve the computational task of edge-
detection. But such a mechanism could solve lots of other problems as
well.
For example, points of diminishing return will correspond to the
points on an appropriate economics graph (plotting yield on cost) at which
the second derivative of the curve is equal to zero. Hence, it is
possible to encode information into an array of light points and use the
early visual system as a computer of points of diminishing return. One
could collect evidence that this is a computational task which the early
visual system would perform well, and then go on to ask how it managed to
compute the diminishing returns function well. That would lead one to the
algorithmic level. Again, one would have the constraint that the
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algorithms be more or less truth-preserving, since the computational task
in question is performed well. The hypothesis that the visual system
solved this computational task by computing second derivatives would be
plausible and correct. Of course, it probably wouldn't strike one to
collect evidence concerning the visual system's abilities with respect to
diminishing returns graphs. But that is not the point.
Theorist's might well think about evolutionary considerations when
generating hypotheses about what function(s) a given mechanism performs
well. For functional characterization and selection explanation are not
unrelated. If a mechanism M performs a function f well, and performing f
well contributes to fitness, then one would expect selection in favor of
having M. But the inference does not go the other way. From the claim
that M computes f well, it does not follow that M was selected for in
order to compute f. And all that a Marr-type theory requires at the
computational level is the characterization of a function which the
mechanism computes well.
3.2.3 Meaning and Function
It turns out that the notion of function which Marr needs is less "robust"
than the notion of function that a meaning theorist would need. Marr can
rest content with the claim that the visual system computes, in the sense
that it is well-suited to perform, many disparate functions. I am not in
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favor of trying to base a meaning theory on a more robust, but non-
semantic, notion of function; for I don't think one can characterize the
more robust sense in which symbols are "supposed to represent'
independently of giving an adequate theory of meaning. But suppose we
accept, along with the evolutionary semanticist, the idea that content
depends on what intentional states are for. We want, if at all possible,
to avoid the claim that the visual system is for performing all these
disparate functions. Otherwise, the content of visual representations
would turn out to be wildly indeterminate. Thus, one might characterize
the task of the meaning theorist as that of developing a more robust
notion of function which can serve as the basis of a semantic theory.
Evolutionary semanticists develop a proposal along these lines that
doesn't, in the end, seem to work. 1 4 , 1 5
One might hope to develop an alternative account of functions. But a
version of the Kripkenstein problemr is at hand: Given that there are many
functions which a mechanism M would (bk and large) compute correctly, what
14. Though the attraction to their suggestion is strong, which is why I am
belaboring-- perhaps for too long-- the difficulties facing such
theories. Even Fodor, now an arch-critic of 'Pop-Darwinism," had his
fling (in his unpublished but widely circulated 1981 manuscript) with
appeals to natural selection in order to establish what belief-
fixation mechanisms were for. An aside: Interestingly, Fodor's paper
is-- to my knowledge-- never cited by evolutionary semanticists; and
in recent writings ([1987, forthcoming]) Fodor seems to have forgotten
why he ever found the idea attractive.
15. See Macdonald [1989] who presents somewhat different difficulties for
ES having to do with appeals to functions.
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makes a particular function the function M computes for purposes of a
meaning theory? I am not suggesting that the hypothesis that the visual
system is for representing distal geometry enjoys no advantage over the
hypothesis that it is for computing diminishing returns.1 6  It may be
relevant to distinguishing these hypotheses that visual systems have,
historically, been used to represent distal geometry; and the history of
a mechanism may be relevant to the question of what it is for. But it
does not follow from the claim that history is relevant to function that
the relevant facts are those concerning the selective history of the
mechanism in question. Causal history, for example, may be what is
relevant. But as I said, I arr, skeptical of the idea that one can develop
a robust notion of function first, and then build a meaning theory on it.
It seems to me that we can talk of the visual system being for
representing distal geometry (and not for computing some other function),
largely because we have some grip on the content of representational
states in the visual system. So I suspect that an adequate theory of
meaning is more likely to deliver an adequate account of the more robust
notion of function than the other way round.
In any case, Dennett advocates the idea that meaning depends on
function. But I have tried to distinguish the notion of function that
Marr appeals to from the more robust notion of function required for a
16. But cf. Currmrins [1989] who does suggest this or something very like
it.
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plausible theory of meaning. I take it that Dennett recognizes that,
without the more robust notion, function-based semantic theories will have
wild indeterminacy as a consequence. So Dennett appeals to "Nature's
intentions' to help constrain the indeterminacy. But for reasons
discussed in the last chapter, appeals to natural selection have their own
problems with wild indeterminacy anyway. For given any one selection
explanation, there will be many others. Again, Nature's intentions just
don't carve functions finely enough for a meaning theory.
In fact, the same sorts of considerations advanced in the last
chapter might well apply here again. Given any function f which the
visual system computes well in the sense described above, it seems that we
could tell a selection stort' based on the claim that being able to compute
f was selectively advantageous. Why not say that having a mechanism
capable of computing points of diminishing returns was selectively
advantageous, because (given the peculiar environmental conditions faced
by our ancestors) such a mechani.rsm would produce representations that
would (at least sometimes) lead to selectively advantageous behaviors. In
general, if there is an adaptationist story which makes reference to the
fact that some mechanism M computes f well, and a mechanism that computes
f well would also compute f' pretty well, one would expect there to be an
adaptationist story which makes reference to the fact that M computes f'
well. So even if Marr's theory was committed to some adaptationist
account of the visual system's natural history, this fact might not help
the evolutionary semanticist. But I do not want to press this point.
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With respect to Dennett's defense of Pangloss, it is important to
remember that Marr is not trying to provide a semantic theory. For Marr's
purposes, it does not matter how many disparate functions the visual
system computes well. All that matters to Marr is that he be able to
characterize some function that the visual system computes well, and this
function need not be the function appealed to in the most plausible
adaptationist account of the evolution of visual systems. In fact,
assumptions about natural history would seem to add nothinq to the study
of cognitive systems. If one wants to make assumptions of optimality, one
can simply claim-- with justification-- that we are (now) successful in
our niche. Explaining wh_ we are successful as a species would seem to be
a separate enterprise, that of evolutionary biology.
3. 3 Funct i on , T u t h , and Learn i ng
I want to mention two last difficulties facing evolutionary theories of
meaning. These concern their unreasonably optimistic assumptions that
what is advantageous is true, and that learning will count as a selective
process for the purposes of semantics.
3.3.1 Useful Falsehoods
There is an assumption implicit in euolutionary semantics, similar-to an
assumption made by pragmatists: Truth is to be understood in terms of
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utility. But it seems that false beliefs can, at least on some occasions,
be just as useful as true ones. Every morning, Fred might token the
belief that God is watching him. This belief might cause certain patterns
of behavior in Fred, and repress others. In the right 'social niche,"
Fred's religious beliefs could have massive survival value for Fred, say
by fostering cooperation and self-enforcement of social rules. The
behaviors caused (or repressed) by these religious beliefs could well be
directly correlated with the continued survival or death of members of
Fred's comrnunity. I do not wish to dwell on spelling out details of the
example. For the point is simply this: Whatever the details, the
selective advantage in Fred's having the belief that God is watching him
is not explained by God's watching Fred.1 7
The evoluQconary semanticist is apparently corranitted to saying that
Fred's religious beliefs are about social norms, repression, etc. For
these are the factors that explain the selection for having such beliefs.
Moreover, if the beliefs are tokened when the appropriate social
conditions obtain, the beliefs would presumably be true. So according to
evolutionary semantics, Fred's thought, 'God is watching me', might be
true on some mornings. But surely this gets Fred's mental life all wrong,.
and implausible intentional explanations result. We may be able to offer
a certain kind of explanation of, say, Fred's praying behavior by noting
17. Becoming a theist will not help the evolutionary semanticist. We may
suppose that Fred believes in pagan gods.
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that Fred's beliefs are useful to him, given the prevailing social norms,
facts about rep' ession, etc. But we can't plausibly explain Fred's
behavior by saying that Fred has beliefs about social norms, repression,
etc. Fred prays, because he believes that God is watching him, not
because he believes that his society is ordered in a certain way.
In general, when there has been selection for the disposition to form
mental tokens, we can typically offer a kind of evolutionary explanation
of the behavior caused by such tokens. But there is nothing special about
behavior or dispositions here. We can explain the fact that (present)
fish have gills, for example, by noting that it was useful for former fish
to have gills. Similarly, we may be able to explain the fact that some
(present) organism has a given disposition, by noting that the disposition
was useful to its ancestors. But the properties appealed to in such
historical explanations of whl, a system behaves in a certain way need not
be the intentional objects of the mental states causing the behavior in
question. Plausible intentional explanations depend, in a way that is
admittedly not clear, on "how the world seemsn to the system with the
intentional states. The kimu example of the last chapter points to this
shortcoming of evolutionary semantics, and wee see it again here. The
properties which figure in selection explanations for the proliferation of
Fred's re)igious beliefs can differ from the properties that are the
intentional objects of those beliefs.
Function
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It may be objected that I have ignored a point made earlier in
2.1.*oncerning the compositionality of intentional states. Perhaps the
belief that God is watching Fred never functions Normally as a whole unit.
The evolutionary semanticist might hold that this belief derives its
Proper Function from the Proper Functions of its component concepts. But
this reply only pushes the objection down. In 2.1.3, I also noted that
some account of concept meaning had to be given for the concepts of which
mental states with derived proper functions were composed. But concepts
will acquire Proper Functions, according to ES, by occurring as parts of
token intentional states which lead to selectively advantageous results.
But any token belief in which the concept 'God' appears could not. have had
selectively advantageous results for reasons having to do with God. Those
beliefs will be advantageous for reasons having to with social norms,
desire-repression devices, etc.: These reasons will determine the Proper
Function, and hence the meaning, of 'God'-tokens.
If the difficulty here was simply that evolutionary semantics does
not adequately account for the meaning of terms like 'God' or 'unicorn',
then complaining loudly would be somewhat unfair. This is a hard problem
for any meaning theory. But the difficulty is not that evolutionary
theories of meaning have nothing to say about the content of God-beliefs.
It is that such theories seem doomed to say the wrong thing. And the more
general difficulty for ES that Fred's case points to is that false beliefs
can be useful. Recall the simplest version of evolutionary semantics:
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0-tokens have p as their meaning, if
the presence of p in certain historical cases explains the
selection for the disposition to produce 1-tokens.
If the presence of p is to do any explaining, p must be present. So the
truth conditions of a belief will always turn out to be a state of affairs
that actually obtained. (Or at least the component concepts will refer to
properties that have been instantiated.) But having tokens of a belief
type 13 can be selectively advantageous even if A's intentional object is
not actual. Nonetheless, an evolutionary theory of meaning will assign
some state of affairs that did obtain as A's truth condition, thus getting
the content of 13 wrong.
3.3.2 Ignorance of Learning
It might be thougrit that I have been unfair to evolutionary semantics in
that all my criticisms have involved cases in which natural selection was
the source of the relevant Proper Functions. But evolutionary
semanticists talk about learning too. So one might hold that I have
ignored virtues of evolutionary semantics by focusing only on natural
selection.
At a minimum, the theories I have discussed purport to provide a
statement of sufficient conditions for meaning that p. And while
evolutionary semanticists do claim that a learning history can result in
mental states that have specific contents, the paradigm cases to which
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they point are cases in which content is the result of natural selection.
So criticisms of the claim that appeals to natural selection can explain
the content of mental states are criticisms of any evolutionary theory's
ability to provide sufficient conditions for having a specific content.
Moreover, we really don't know what learning is, and we certainly do not
have an adequate theory of learning. What evolutionary semanticists offer
is a promissory note which says that, for the purposes of their semantic
theory, learning will turn out to be relevantly similar to natural
selection.18 We might be inclined to accept this promissory note, if
evolutionary semantics were successful in the paradigm cases involving
natural selection. But I have argued that this is not the case.
One might, I suppose, simply define 'learning' as. any process of
acquiring a Proper Function by means other than natural selection. But
then we would have every reason to think the difficulties that arise in
trying to explain the intentional by appealing to natural selection will
just be replicated in attempts to explain the intentional by appealing to
learning. I will offer a brief example of how this might go. One can
generate cases structurally similar to the kimu case of the last chapter
within the behaviorist learning paradignm; i.e. cases in which an organism
acquires (via learning) a certain capacity, and the (selective)
18. This is the claim of "evolutionary epistemologists." See Radnitzky
and Bartley [1987] for a collection of essays on this topic.
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explanation of this fact appeals to properties which could not be the
objects of the organism's intentional states.
An experimenter rewards a ra' when and only when
(counterfactual supportir)' the rat moves away from an object
0. But the experimenter is wily; she never lets the rat see
or come in contact with 0. Instead, she brings 0 closer to
the rat by bringing it closer to the walls of the rat's opaque
pen. The rat is rewarded when and only when it moves in the
appropriate direction within the pen, viz. away from 0. As it
happens, the front of the rat's pen is red; and on a few
occasions when the rat was moving toward the front of the pen,
the experimenter was moving 0 toward the back of the pen. The
rat was thus rewarded, for it moved away from 0; but the
movement toward red things was reinforced. As a result, the
rat acquires a disposition to move toward red things.
What explains the acquisition of the disposition, however, is the
fact that the rat moved away from 0; for it was this fact that explains
why the rat was rewarded. At a minimum, 0 figures. in an explanation of
why the rat acquired its disposition. So the, or at least a, Proper
Function of the disposition is to make the rat move away from 0. But the
rat does not have intentional states about 0, because intuitively, the rat
has no idea what 0 is. (Nor do you, and surely the rat is not in a better
epistemic position.) The implausibility of the intentional explanations
that would result from attribution of such states --e.g. the rat moved
because it wanted to avoid 0-- has already been discussed in 2.4jbove.
I am using an example involving learning by trial-and-error with
reinforcement, not because I think this is a plausible model of learning,
but because it is the model evolutionary semanticists appeal to when they
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talk about learning.19 My point is only that, even if learning is this
simplistic, appeals to learning are no better off than appeals to natural
selection as the basis of an evolutionary theory of meaning. This is not
surprising, since the evolutionary serranticists' claims about learning
really amount to a promissory note to the effect that learning is
relevantly similar to natural selection for the purposes of a meaning
theory. Moreover, appeals to learning can go only so far. Any learning
requires some innate mechanisms. If such mechanisms are to count as
devices for learning according to evolutionary semantics, they must have
the appropriate evolutionary history. So eventually, the evolutionary
semanticist must appeal to natural selection as the source of some proper
functions. 2 0  So far from making evolutionary semantics more plausible,
the issue of learning raises even more questions about the tenability of
such theories.
19. See, e.g. Papineau [1984). For Millikan, such behaviorist learning
paradigms can be sources of Proper Functions. It is not clear,
however, that more sophisticated and plausible models of learning will
be subsumed under Millikan's Proper Function analysis.
20. This point is, I think, especially important with respect to the
mechanisms responsible for our linguistic abilities. If Chomsky's
program is on the right track, then children do not learn much (if
any) syntax from their parents. But many features of the 'Universal
Grammar" are relevant to the semantic properties of sentences. Thus,
it seems that evolutionary theories are committed to saying that UG
was selected for as a means-of cormmunicating information, on pain of
being unable to explain semantic properties (of sentences) that depend
on the child's biological endowment. But this is Panglossianism
again. It is an open question as to whether our linguistic abilities
are, in fact, the product of natural selection. See Piatelli-
Palmarini [1989]; but cf. Pinker and Bloom [forthcoming].
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3.4 A Concluding Point
I have argued in this chapter and the last that, for several reasons,
selection explanations and intentional explanations don't correspond as
they must if evolutionary semantics is to be plausible. There is a
relation between these two types of explanation, however. According to
evolutionary semantics, minds have intentional properties in.virtue of
having selective histories. In short, the story is: First the selection,
then the meaning. But it would seem to be the other way around. Having
internal states that covary with external states of affairs will often be
selectively advantageous. And if causal/covariation accounts of meaning
are at all on the right track, then where there are states with
intentional properties, there may well be selection for the dispositions
to form those states.
This is not to say that mental states are selectively advantageous in
virtue of their intentional properties, as opposed to their effects on
behavior. Rather, token states which have intentional properties may also
have properties in virtue of which they cause selectively advantageous
behaviors. The connection between intentional and Darwinian explanation
is not accidental. But intentionality hardly depends on selection. It
seems far more plausible to say that being able to represent the world is
a property which contributes (enormously) to the fitness of many systems.
And thus, the ability tso represent may well be selected for. Much of the
initial plausibility of evolutionary semantics is due, I think, to the
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fact that where there is representation, there has often been selection.
But if evolutionary semantics effectively inverts the explanatory order
between representation and fitness, then the suggestion that meaning is to
be analyzed in terms of evolutionary history has very little to recommend
itself.
The conclusions of the last two chapters will leave the Kripkean
skeptic discussed at the end of chapter one smiling. First, an initially
plausible naturalistic theory has been shown to fail. And this is just
more grist for skeptic's inductive mill. Moreover, Hume's problem looms
all the larger now for the meaning naturalist. It might have been thought
that if any natural science could provide a route to of accounting for the
normativity of meair., it wol ,e evolutionary biology. For what other
science makes such open appeals to teleology, design, and purpose? If not
even Darwin can help the meaning naturalist in this respect, the
naturalist's task may seem hopeless. But despair is not yet in order. In
what follows, I shall try to argue that responding to the problem(s) of
error does not require appeal to any particular natural science. He will
do well, I suggest, to look generally at cases in which laws of the
natural sciences apparently fail to be describe the events they cover.
This will lead us to the notion of a "ceteris paribus generalization,O a
notion which the meaning naturalist may find quite useful.
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Chap ter 4
Anyone for " Ceter is Par i bus" Clauses?
We find that with reserect to more complex
biological systems, we can hardly ever make a
generalization that does not have exceptions.
---Mayr, "How Biology Differs from the Physical Sciences."
For the remainder of this thesis, 1 will be trying to defend a strikingly
simple naturalistic theory of intentionality from objections discussed in
chapter one. The theory I will be defending is not new. It says,
essentially, that covariation is sufficient for meaning after all. This
idea has been developed by marr~ theorists, including Locke, Skinner,
Quine, Stampe, Dretske, and Fodor. The specific version of "covariation
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semantics" that I will be considering is the following theory, which I
will call "cp-COV."
I-tokens have p as their meaning, if
ceteris paribus, ,3-tokens covary with p.
4 . 1 In t roductor y Remarks
As we shall see, cp-COV retains the spirit, if not the letter, of
ideal-detection theories of meaning. The appeal to a ceteris p.eribus
(henceforth, 'cp'" ro.difiey serves as the analogue of Stampe's [1977]
appeal to "fidelitty conditions." On reflection, modifying the crude
covariation account of meaning by adding a cp clause is an obvious move,
given that generalizations in the special sciences are typically not
exceptionless. I discuss this point below in some detail. Kripke [1982]
discusses and rejects cp-COV; but Horwich [1984] and Goldfarb [1985]
suggest that Kripke's rejection of it is too quick. Rey [forthcoming]
advocates ep-COU with some modifications and reservations. Nonetheless,
this theory has not received as much attention as one might expect.
Perhaps this is because cp-COU can appear to be either-(i) vacuous because
of its explicit appeal to a cp clause or (ii) obviously wrong because of
its similarity to the crude covariation theory. My task will be to show
that it is neither. In the end, we may be led to complicate or reject cp-
COV. But I think it is of interest, and rather surprisinq, to see just
how far this very simple theory can be defended. For if cp-COV provides a
satisfactory response to the problems discussed in chapter one, then these
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do not preclude the possibility of providing an adequate naturalistic
account of intentional properties.
4.1.1 A Brief Look Ahead
With the exception of these introductory remarks, I will focus in this
chapter and the next largely on general questions surrounding cp clauses
and the use of such clauses in non-intentional domains. The whole of
chapter six will then be devoted to arguing that cp-COV can account for
the possibility of error, and in chapter seven I argue that this theory
can account for the normativity of meaning. But I will present the main
claims of these chapters now, lest the reader think the project utterly
hopeless.
An intentional psychologqu can legitimately appeal to generalizations
of the form, "ceteris paribus, events of type E1 occur in the presence of,
and only in the presence of, events of type E2 ." Such a generalization
can be true even if some E1 events occur in the absence of E2 events or
vice versa. Thus, the relation "cp-covariation" might hold between two
event types, while the relation "covariation" does not. The meaning
naturalist can exploit this fact. For she can (i) hold that in virtue of
cp-covariation between tokenings of mental symbols and the presence of
some property, the former is about the latter, and (ii) explain erroneous
symbol tokenings as the result of conditions failing to be "normal" in
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that ceteris was not paribus. I discuss what I take to be the most
telling objections that might be raised against this strategy of
accounting for the possibility of error, and argue that the defender of
can reply to each of them.
The normativity of meaning is explained by appealing to cp-COV as an
idealization. Such appeals are standard in paradigm naturalistic
contexts. Note that we say things like, 'The solution should have turned
red; I wonder what went wrong." Or in a more mundane context, "The pie
crust didn't come out right; Perhaps the oven's thermostat isn't working
properly." These normative claims, I argue, appeal to the fact that
ceteris was not paribus to explain why some expected condition did not
obtain. Erroneous tokenin.s of a symbol type are to be explained in much
the same way. And the same kind of normative claims are appropriate with
respect to the tokening of symbols. Moreover, when one considers the
kinds of factors that a covariation theory of meaning will idealize away
from (e.g. unusual lighting, larqe distances, etc.), it becomes clear that
the normativity of meaning has an epistemic dimension as well. That is,
one ought to token symbols as one would if ceteris were paribus; because
that is when circumstances in one's environment are most felicitous with
respect to making a judqmrent concerning the presence of the property
represented.1  Having accounted for at least some normativity in this way,
1. I will not, however, be analyzing cp-generalizations in terms of what
would be the case if lighting were optimal, objects were close, etc.
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the meaning naturalist can reply to the Kripkean skeptic by mirroring
reliabilist replies to Cartesian skepticism.
There are possible objections to cp-COV, however, which are
antecedent to any objections concerning its adequacy as a theory of
meaning. Not surprisingly, these focus on the appeal to a cp clause. And
as it turns out, much of the work in defending cp-COV will take the form
of motivating and defending appeal to cp clauses in non-intentional
domains. Such is the task of this chapter.
4.1.2 Some Terminology and Constraints
Let us Suppose, for the moment, that one does not object to the use of cp
clauses in theories. One might still (rightly) point out that, in the
absence of a plausible antecedent account of what a cp-generalization is,
we have no idea what a theory like cp-COV says. We know what it is for
events to covary, but what is it for events to .e-covary? We must have
some idea of what a theory is cormiitted to in order to assess it. Thus,
the defense of cp-COV will require some antecedent account of what it is
for a cp-generalization to be true. I will assume that a statement of
truth conditions for cp-generalizations (which isn't viciously circular)
will suffice for these purposes.2
2. Like most writers, I will use the terms 'law' and 'generalization' to
refer to certain theoretical sentences, as well as certain "nomological
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An account of ep-generalizations should respect certain features of
laws. Laws, of which true cp-generalizations will be a sub-species, are
general. They apply to all events in a given domain, Typically, laws do
not assert anything unconditionally, nor do they assert that their
antecedent conditions obtain. Newton's laws, for example, apply to every
physical object. But they do not assume that there are objects. Rather,
they tell us what will be the case if certain antecedent conditions
obtain.3 Finally, I take as given that lawlike sentences are not true
merely in virtue of being extensionally correct. I will use the symbol
'-->' to indicate the material conditional and '--->>' to indicate
stronger intensional if-then relation that holds between the antecedent
and consequent of a law. So, at least for these purposes, I will assume
that a law has the form: A --- >> B; where substitution instances of this
schema are to be understood as universal generalization ranging over
events. Of course, a law may have complex antecedents and/or consequents,
and there may be some acceptable contextual restrictions on the domain
over which one quantifies. But these caveats do not affect the general
point. What we are looking for, then, is an account of the form:
'cp(A --- >> B)' is true if and only if ...
facts' (for lack of a better term). I will try to be unambiguous if
the difference is important but not clear from the context.
3. One might hold that laws cannot be satisfied vacuously, i.e. that it
must be possible for their antecedent conditions to obtain. But this
is a different point.
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A constraint on any account of ep-generalizations follows from the
eneralit of laws 
An ossible instance 
of (A & "B) shows that
(1) A --- )
is false. That is, laws must be exceptionless. But this seems to tell
against the use of ep clauses directly. For one often hears it said that
these clauses are used when (and only when) the laws in question have
exceptions. But a lawlike sentence with exceptions is false, and hence no
law at all. It is important, however, not to be misled by terminological
disputes here.
Let us say that a "strict" law is one which contains no cp clause,
even implicitly. One might offer certain laws of quantum mechanics or
Newton's 'F = MA' as examples. I do claim that there are laws which are
not strict in this sense.4 But I grant that if
(2) cp(A --->> B)
is a law, then there are no exceptions to (2). A plausible,.though not
the only, way to recast (2) is to hold that (2) is true if and only if
(3) C --- >> (A --- >> B),
where C is some condition yet to be given. Intuitively, (3) says, "If
ceteris is paribus, then A --->> B. If (3) is true, there will be a non-
accidental relation between the A and B; although there will be no law
4. Cf. Davidson (1970a, 1974a].
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A --- >> B.5  Let us say that conditions are '*normal' with respect to (3),
and hence (2), if and only if C obtains. Then we can say, given (2), that
*normally, A --- )) B.
One might call instances of (A & "B) 'exceptions" to (2), in that
they do not occur *normally. But possible instances of (A & "B) do not,
by themselves anyway, show (2) to be false. The absurd conclusion, "It is
possible that (A --- >> B) & A & "8," does not follow from the fact that
there are ep-generalizations. Possible instances of (C & A & "B) or
(A & B & "C) would show (3), and hence (2), to be false. Instead of
making the term 'exception' ambiguous in this way, I will say that laws
never have exceptions; but they can have *abnormal instances. Instances
of (A & "B) will be *abnormal instances of the law cp(A --- )> B); and I
will also say that instances of (A & ~B) constitute *abnormal instances of
the lawlike sentence '(A --- > B)'. 6
If one wishes to apply the term 'law' only to what I have called
strict laws, I have no real objection. But in that case, I am concerned
to argue that there can be true counterfactual supporting generalizations,
which appear in legitimate scientific theories, but which also have
5. Unless C happens to be logically or physically necessary. On tni;
view, strict laws are limiting cases of cp-generalizations.
6. The term '*normal' and its cognates should be understood as technical
terms, hence the '*'. There is a theoretical similarity to certain
notions used in evolutionary semantics, in that I think erroneous
beliefs are *abnormal. But any other resemblances are purely
or thogr aphic.
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*abnormal instances. Mayr [1985), for example, seems to accept the claim
that all laws are strict. He also thinks that, with respect to complex
systems anyway, generalizations in biology always have exceptions. Thus,
Mayr holds that biology has few laws. Nonetheless, he thinks that biology
is legitimate science, and therefore, that there can be legitimate
sciences which do not state laws. I prefer to say that biology does state
laws. But these are cp-generalizations which have *abnoymal instances;
and therefore, there can be legitimate sciences which state such cp-
generalizations. 7
Terminology aside, many philosophers still think that attaching cp
modifiers to lawlike sentences (in order to preserve them in the face of
*abnormal instances) is often just a sign of not knowing what the laws are
in a given domain. Cartwright [1983], for example, describes this
practice as "making a bet about what form the true law takes (p.49)."
Schiffer [1987] thinks cp clauses are nothing but "fudges when it is
unclear what the 'other things' are, or what it would be for them to be
'equal' (p.287, n.10)." Of course, many actual appeals to cp clauses may
be mere "fudqes." But criticism of such appeals does not show that there
WS = . .
7. A good deal more on this point in Appendix C, where I discuss the role
of cp clauses in evolutionary biology. See also Smart [1963] who
argues that biology, unlike physics and chemistry, has no true laws;
and Ruse [1970] who criticizes this position. It is worth noting that
Smart rules out the principle of natural selection as a law because he
thinks it embodies a tautology. This bugbear has, I hope, been put to
rest. (See, e.g., Sober [1984a, 1984b].) And Ruse makes a case that
the Hardy-Weinberg principle (discussed in Appendix C) is as much a
genuine law as the laws of physics and chemistry.
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are no true cp-generalizations. This criticism does, however, point to
another constraint on any account of cp-gener&linations: it must not be
viciously circular. Since cp clauses serve to insulate theories from
counterevidence, cp-generalizatiors are prima facie open to the charge of
being vacuous. So given a law of the form cp(A --- >> B), one must offer a
characterization of what it would be for ceteris to be paribus which does
not amount to: the conditions in which 'A --- )) B' has no *abnormal
instances. This turns out to be a non-trivial constraint. But it does
not follow, without additional argument, that no cp-generalizations are
laws.
In the rest of this chapter, I consider a series of objections to the
'cp' in cp-COV. Some of these are general objections to the use of any
cp-qeneralizations. Others couple a particular construal of cp clauses
with claims about intentional psychology or what a naturalistic theory of
intentionality must be like. I conclude that these objections do not tell
against cp-COV. What they show is that a more plausible account of cp-
generalizations is needed. I will pick up on this last point in chapter
five.
4 . 2 The Ar g-umen t f r om Ma t ur e Sc i en ce
One might claim that lawlike statements of mature sciences do not appeal
to cp clauses. Prima facie, this is not an implausible view. Newton did
not say, "Ceteris paribus, Force equals Mass times Acceleration." Laws in
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quantum mechanics may be statistical in nature, but (if true) they hold
all the time. Statements of these laws make no reference to "other
things." Nor do cp clauses figure in our best examples of bridge
principles. We do not claim merely that valence properties are electron
properties under certain circumstances. So one might argue that all real
laws are strict. Of course, it doesn't follow from the fact that laws in
physics have property P that all laws have P. But one might think the
success of physics with respect to avoiding cp clauses provides inductive
support for the claim that all lawlike statements should avoid appeal to
such clauses. In Appendix C, I argue that evolutionary biology makes
widespread appeal to ep-generalizations; hence, if the argument from
"mature sciences' rules out cp-COV, it also rules out the theory of
evolution. I do not wish to argue over use of the term 'mature'. Perhaps
biology and intentional psychology are both immature in some sense. But
again, problems for biology are not problems for intentional psychology.
It will be useful, however, to compare theories of meaning to
physical theories in this respect. For several important points about cp-
generalizations will emerge. The argument in the previous paragraph takes
as a premise that the laws of physics are free of appeal to cp clauses;
and this is thought to be reason for rejecting-- or at least for being
skeptical of-- theories like ep-CCV, which do appeal to such clauses. But
closer consideration calls this premise and the conclusion drawn from it
into question.
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4.2.1 CP Clauses and Physics
The law of gravity apparently tells us that the force exerted between two
objects varies directly as the products of their masses and inversely as
the square of the distance between them (F = Gmm'/d 2 ) . Together with a
law relating force to mass and acceleration, and a statement of initial
conditions, the law of gravity thus apparently yields a clAim about the
behavior (i.e., the motion) of bodies. Indeed, it is via such claims that
we test and confirm the law of gravity. But if objects have charge, the
force exerted between them will almost never be that given by the law of
gravity. 8 Describing the force between charged bodies requires the
calculation of a resultant, which in turn requires appeal to, inter alia,
Coulomb's Law. Moreover, if the objects are very small (e.g. protons and
electrons), the force exerted between them will not even be close to
Gmm'/d 2. Intuitively, the relatively weak gravitational force is swamped
by the electromagnetic force in such cases. So the law of gravity doesn't
tell us what the force between two objects is for every pair of objects.
Similarly, Coulomb's law apparently makes a claim about the "shape"
of the electromagnetic field, or the distributions of quanta trajectories,
associated with a charged body. But if there is a dense mass near the
8. I say "almost never," because it might happen that all the forces other
than gravity affecting some body might "cancel out." More about
"cancelling out" in 5.3.2 below.
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charged body, the quanta of the magnetic field will be affected by the
gravitational influence of the mass, resulting in a "distortion" of the
magnetic field. So Coulomb's law fails to describe the electromagnetic
field of a charged body if that body is in the vicinity of a dense mass.9
Physics is hardly alone with respect to the existence of apparent
counterinstances of its laws. It is not always the case that relatively
fitter traits increase their percentage share in populations. The
organisms with fitter traits might get struck by lighting; the genes
controlling fitter traits might mutate, etc. I take it there is a law
which governs the functioning of 'AND'-qates in my computer. But if I hit
my computer hard enough with a sledge hammer, the 'AND'-gates will not
deliver a '1' as an output, even if they just received inputs of '0' and
'0". But the important point, with respect to the argument from mature
science, is that the laws of physics don't seem to be strict
generalizations either.
A tempting, and I think ultimately correct, response to these
examples is to understand laws of physics as holding, cp. Charged bodies
and quanta that happen to be near dense masses do not provide
counterexamples to current formulations of physical law, so this
suggestion goes; since lawlike statements say only that such and such
will be the case, ceteris paribus. One can hold that ceteris just isn't
9. See, e.g., Joseph [1980] for further discussion.
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prtkus with respect to law of gravity and Coulomb's law in the cases
described above. Of course, in making this response one inherits the
burden of spelling out cp clauses in a way that renders cp-modified
lawlike statements non-vacuous. I will try to just this. The examples
discussed do not mandate appeal to cp clauses, however. There are two
other responses available in the logical space of alternatives. First,
one could hold that the statements of our best known laws are, for the
sorts of reasons described, obviously false. Second, one could hold that
the statements of our best known laws are (as far as we know) true, but
they must be interpreted differently.
4.2.2 An Acceptable Behavioristic Picture
Given other options, holding that statements of our best known laws are
false seems perverse. This is a conclusion one ought to be driven to, not
a position to adopt at the outset. 10  Contemporary physical theory may be
wrong. But one doesn t demonstrate this sort of thing in a paragraph.
Physicists are well aware that the field laws have what I would call
10. Cartwright [1983] concludes that, in the end, the best available
theoretical option is to hold that current statements of the
fundamental laws of physics are indeed false. While it it not my
purpose to argue against Cartwright here, her argument depends on the
claim that there is no satisfactory way to interpret the resulting
generalizations if we attach ep clauses to the fundamental laws of
physics. The next chapter is, effectively, an argument to the
contrary.
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*abnormal instances. But they don't hold statements of Coulomb's law and
the law of gravity statements to be false, and we certainly don't know
that these lawlike statements are false.
Furthermore, holding that the laws of physics are false threatens to
render the problems facing meaning naturalism raised in chapter one
thoroughly uninteresting. The challenge to the naturalist isn't merely to
provide a theory of meaning, but to provide a true one, or at least one
that we don't know to be false. But if theories in physics are obviously
false, then nothing interesting about the intentional would follow from
the fact that naturalistic theories of meaning were false. Problems for
physics are surely not problems for intentional psychology. And the claim
that you can't naturalize meaning can't be the claim that naturalistic
theories of meaning would be in the same boat as theories of physics.
The second option mentioned above, that of interpreting lawlike
sentences differently than I have done, has some independent plausibility.
I have been giving lawlike sentences what might be called a
"Behavioristic" reading. That is, I have been understanding them as
making claims about the "behavior" of objects in their domain (e.g. the
motion of objects or the distribution of trajectories of quanta). On such
a reading, the law of gravity is obviously false, unless something like a
cp modifier is attached. One might, however, offer an "Influential'
reading of the various field laws, according to which they describe
various influences on objects. On this reading, the law of gravity does
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not purport to describe the acceleration of objects in its domain.
Rather, it purports to describe the force due to gravity exerted between
any two bodies. The actual behavior of bodies would result from a
combination of influences; and the laws, to the degree there are any,
governing these "resultant" forces will be the vector addition principles.
Each individual field law would be interpreted not as a
statement linking the sources of the field to the behavior of
objects subject to the field, but instead as a physical entity
distinct from the objects upon which it acts (Joseph [1980],
p. 779).11
Such a reading makes it possible to maintain that the laws of physics
are true in the face of the examples above. I am actually very
sympathetic to Influential readings of lawlike statements in physics. But
recall that we are considering an argument against appeal to cp clauses in
the natural sciences generally. Adopting Influential readings of the laws
of physics will not, by itself anyway, yield a plausible argument of this
kind. For one thing, we typicall, don't have nice vector addition stories
in the special sciences. More importantly, the intuitive plausibility of
"force-due- to-x" talk wanes when we look outside of physics. We speak of
laws governing chemical processes, biological evolution, the functioning
of AND-gates in a computer, thermometers, etc. But it is far from
obvious, and probably false, that we can understand all these laws as
11. Joseph points out certain difficulties for this view in the absence of
a unified field theory. Cartwright [1980] objects on other grounds.
But see Creary [19813 who adopts the "Influential" position; cf.
Cartwright [1983] (pp. 62-67), where she responds to Creary.
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describing forces distinct Vrom the objects (or the behavior of the
objects) in the domain of the science in question. And even if one could
understand the lawlike statements of, say, evolutionary biology as
describing various influences on evolution, it still seems natural to
understand these laws as also making claims about the evolution of
populations. In short, there doesn't seem to be a prohibition against
giving lawlike sentences Behavioristic readings. But given such readings,
the need for appeal to cp clauses will hardly be unique to theories of
meaning.
There is also some reason to think that the laws of quantum mechanics
cannot be given Influential readings. These laws apparently make
statistical claims about what happens to certain-distributions of
particles. But it may not be possible to interpret them coherently as
describing influences on those particles. The so-called "engineering
laws' seem to fit the Behavioristic picture rather well. These equations,
usually involving differentials, give at least very good approximations of
certain "real world" physical phenomena. (There are obvious engineering
reasons for wanting r good approximations when one is dealing with
problems like water flow through a tube or stress on a certain piece of
concrete.) So if the argument from mature science depends on giving laws
Influential readings, this argument is going to have as a consequence that
there isn't very much mature science. And of course, the Behavioristic
and Influential pictures need not be mutually exclusive.
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Suppose 'F nGmm'/dt' is true on an Influential reading. This gives
us reason to think that 'cp(F a Gmm'/da)' is true on a Behavioristic
reading. I will refine the following account in the next chapter, but to
a first approximation, I will suggest that:
'cp(A --- )> B)' is true, if and only if and only if
A --- )) ("B --- )) the *abnormal instance can be
explained as the result of interfering factors).
If the force due to gravity between objects o and o' is Gmm'/d 2 , but the
behavior of o and o' is not described by the law of gravity, then we
should be able to explain the discrepancy. This explanation will take the
form of citing other influences, e.g. electromagnetism if the bodies are
charged. Similarly, if Coulomb's law fails to describe the magnetic field
of charged bodies in the presence of a dense mass, we can explain why such
instances are *abnormal by citing the gravitational influence on quanta.
Or again, Newton's laws of celestial mechanics can be construed as
describing the paths of planets. But when we construe them this way, we
must be prepared for *abnormal instances of the laws. To take a well
known example, the fact that Uranus' actual orbit was not what it "should
have been" led Adams and Leverrier (independently) to hypothesize that
there was a source of interference, viz. another planet, exerting force on
Uranus. And indeed, the existence of Neptune explained Uranus' *abnormal
orbit.
There is also something to be said for sticking to Behavioristic
construals of laws, especially when the theory in question is a theory of
meaning. First of all, Influential readings come with their own set of
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general theoretical difficulties. We take the behavior of physical
objects, e.g. the motions of planets, to be evidence for or against
hypotheses about what the laws of physics are. We also think that our
best theories serve to explain what happens in nature. But if statements
of physical law are not about the behavior of physical objects, then one
has to explain how the behavior of physical objects is relevant to
confirmation of laws. And if physical laws do not describe what happens
to physical objects, then one has to say something how laws figure in
explanations of what happens to such objects. Cartwright objects to
giving laws Influential readings in general, on the grounds that laws fail
to "describe the facts" on such readings; where she takes "the facts"
that a theory T must describe to be events consisting in objects within
T's domain behaving in some way. But, she says,
If laws of nature are presumed to describe the facts, then
there are familiar, detailed philosophic stories to be told
about why a sample of facts is relevant to their confirmation,
and how they help provide knowledge and understanding of what
happens in nature. Any alternative account of what laws of
nature do and what they say must serve as least a well; and
no story I know about causal powers makes a very good start
(p. 62).
I do not share Cartwright's skepticism; but neither do I wish to presume
against this position in the philosophy of science in the course of
defending meaning naturalism.
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It could also be argued that a theory of meaning must be about the
behavior of symbols, i.e. when symbols are tokened.12 One might hold that
it makes no sense to explain meaning in terms of influences on the use of
symbols, because meaning just is the proper use of symbols. Recall also
that I entered into this entire discussion of cp clauses, at least
largely, because the crudest dispositional or covariation theory of
meaning (0 has p as its meaning, if 0-tokens are produced if and only if.
p) rules out the possibility of error. I doubt that the opponent of
meaning naturalism will want to give up Behavioristic readings of lawlike
sentences; because it is very important to his argument that this crude
covariation theory be false. Consider the lawlike sentence:
(4) P --->> 0;
if p is the case, then a 0-token is formed. If we give (4) an Influential
reading, it need not describe the behavior of objects in its domain, viz.
0-tokens. Hence, instances of (p & "D) would not, by themselves anyway,
show (4) to be false. Instead, we would understand (4) as saying
something like "p is a (significant) causal influence on i0."
This is not a bizarre construal of lawlike sentences in special
sciences. Lakatos [1976] reminds us that science is concerned not merely
with establishing true universal generalizations, but with establishing
causal connections and counterfactual supporting generalizations. And
12. Interestingly, meaning theorists as different as Dummett and Fodor
would agree, I think, to some such version of "semantic behaviorism."
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given this commitment, one may have to accept laws that have *abnormal
instances.
'[S]wans are white', if true, would be a mere curiosity unless
it asserted that swanness causes whiteness. But then a black
swan would not refute this proposition, since it may only
indicate other causes operating simultaneously (p. 215).
But if we understand (4) so that it can be true given instances of
(p & "•), then it is no longer clear that error would be impossible on the
crude covariation theory. 1 3
I will, therefore, give a Behavioristic reading to any lawlike
sentence which is part of a meaning theory. But we should hardly be
surprised, then, if appeal to cp clauses turns out to be necessary in
giving a theory of meaning. For such clauses are required if we give the
laws of physics a Behavioristic reading. So again, the argument from
mature science provides no reason for rejecting cp-COV.
One might hope for a unified field theory that will eliminate any
talk of cp clauses in physics at all. A Great Field Law would have no
*abnormal instances, since there would be no other fields to distort its
effects. It might not even make sense to distinguish the Great Field from
the behavior of objects in its domain. So a distinction between
Behavioristic and Influential readings of a Great Field Law might not make
13. 1 will be discussing the converse of (4), 'p <<--- W', in chapter six,
when I discuss error. For now it will suffice to note that if p is a
causal influence on &, it is still possible that (4 & "p), since the
effect does not guarantee the cause.
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sense either. There is, however, no a priori reason for thinking that
physics must be unified. And physics would hardly cease to be mature
science if the various field laws resist unification. Moreover, present
physics is un-unified, and the "mature sciences" objection to the use of
cp clauses loses its force, if even present physics doesn't count as
mature science.
Let us assume, however, that a unified field theory is just around
the corner. It wouldn't follow from the unification of physics that all
laws are strict. But one might also hold that laws in the special-
sciences must ultimately reduce to laws of physics, and that only strict
laws can reduce to strict laws. I now turn to considering the crucial
premise in this argument against cp-generalizations.
4 . 3 The Ar gumen t from Reduclu:tion to
Fu tur e Phy si s
One might think that, since physics is basic science, all laws must
eventually reduce to laws of physics. Against this position, Fodor [1974]
argues that physics may be basic science, in that every token event may be
a physical event. So every token event may fall under the laws of
physics; whereas at least some token events, e.g. certain sub-atomic
events in outer space, will not fall under the laws of biology,
psychology, etc. But this "generality' of physics does not require that
laws of the special sciences be reducible to laws of physics.
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4.3.1 Special Sciences
Let us say that the predicates which appear in the laws of a science S are
the "kind predicates" of S; and events fall under the laws of S by being
events which consist in some individual instantiating a property expressed
by one of the kind predicates of S. Strict reduction-- the sort needed
for reduction from strict laws to strict laws-- requires that all kind
predicates of a special science be connected, via exceptionless bridge
principles, to kind predicates of some reducing science, and ultimately to
physics. There are weaker notions of reduction, and these may be
interesting for various reasons. But if the bridge principles in question
are not exceptionless, then reduction via such principles to strict laws
doesn't guarantee strict laws at the special science level.
The strict kind-kind connection is also required if laws are the
things to be reduced. For suppose we have a special science law of the
form:
(5) Slx --- >) S2u
'
i.e., given any event consisting in some object x instantiating the
property S1 there will be an event consisting in some object y
instantiating the property S2. To reduce this law to a physical law, it
is not enough that S1 and S2 be connected (via bridge principles) to
disjunctions, D1 and D2, of kind predicates of physics. D1 and D2 must
themselves be kind predicates of physics, i.e. there must be a physical
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law of the form: Dix --- )) D2y. Otherwise, (5) has not been reduced.
Fodor's point, then, is that the generality of physics does not require
that kind predicates of special sciences be coextensive with kind
predicates in physics. In fact, Fodor finds this latter thesis thoroughly
implausible. His reasons for thinking so are best conveyed with an
example.
Consider a true, counterfactual supporting generalization of (a
possibly future) special science. Fodor uses Gresham's law, which makes
claims about monetary exchanges.14 Fodor grants that all (token) events
consisting of monetary exchanges have true descriptions in the vocabulary
of physics. Hence, any (token)-event which falls under Gresham's law also
falls under some law of physics. But only a wildly disjunctive physical
description will cover all events that also fall under Gresham's law.
Some monetary exchanges involve strings of wampum. Some
involve dollar bills. And some involve signing one's name to
a check. What are the chances that a disjunction of physical
predicates which covers all these events (i.e., a disjunctive
predicate which can form the right hand side of a bridge law
of the form 'x is a monetary exchange ((---)) ... ') expressns
a physical kind (pp. 133-4)?
14. The slogan version of Gresham's law is, "Cheap money drives out good."
Suppose an economy is based on gold and silver, with a mint value
exchange rate of 1:16. If the market value of the metals deviates
from the mint value, coins made of one type of metal will (cp) be
hoarded, melted, and sold for their market value until the market and
mint values stabilize or coins of one type disappear from circulation.
Of course, ceteris might not always be paribus. For example, the
government might make melting coins a capital offense.
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That is, there will be a disjunction D of physical predicates, such
that D covers all the token events covered by Gresham's law. But it is
extremely unlikely that D will figure in the laws of physics. Each of its
disjuncts will. But, as Fodor notes, 'It is a law that..." is not a
truth-functional context. It doesn't follow from (i) the fact that
'A --- ) C' and 'B --- >) D' are laws that (ii) '(A v B) --- )) (C v D)' is
a law. To insist that it does follow is, inter alia, to give up on the
connection between kind terms and the predicates which appear in the
antecedents and consequents of laws. But this would be to give up much of
what little grip we have on laws and kinds. This is not to say there are
no true substitution instances of the schemata above, It is just to say
there is no a priori reason for insisting, e.g., that 'If x is an electron
or an insect, then x has negative charge or six legs,' is a lawlike
sentence. Indeedý it seems rather more plausible to say this sentence is
not lawlike; since the property having neqative charge or six legs is
rather unlike any familiar kind predicates.
Hence, a strict reduction of economic laws to physical laws is
extremely unlikely; This is because, to put it simply, the special
sciences attempt to find interesting generalizations over events which
need not have anything interesting in common at the level of physical
description. If Fodor is right, then a successful reduction should be a
rather surprising thing. But the chances for successful across-the-board
reduction to physics are even worse than this suggests. On the assumption
that bridge principles must be laws, and not mere empirical
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generalizations, the required coextension of reduced and reducing kinds
must be necessary. Thus, where there is a possibility of multiple
realizability at the special science level-- say because of functional
characterizations of certain properties-- a successful reduction would be
nothing short of miraculous. The biological property being more fit than
may be extensionally equivalent to some very long list of ordered pairs of
truth functions of physical kind predicates. But there is no reason for
thinking that this equivalence is counterfactual supporting. Given that
fitness can be realized in so many physically different ways, it would be
amazing if this coextension did support counterfactual claims.
Once we accept the possibility of non-reducible laws in the special
sciences, the possibility of laws which have *abnormal instances arises,
even if physics itself is unified; and hence, the argument from reduction
to future physics fails. Consider (5) above, repeated here.
(5) Slx --- ) S2Y.
Suppose that the disjunction of physical predicates corresponding to the
kind predicates S1 and S2 are: P#1 or P#2 or ... Pin, and
P!1 or P!2 or ... P!n, respectively. Call the (disjunctive) physical
properties thus picked out, 'D1' and 'D2 ' , respectively. There is no
reason to insist that events in which D1 is instantiated will always be
followed by events in which D2 is instantiated. After all, 'Di' and 'D2'
just stand for disjunctions of physical predicates. But if there is even
one event in which the property 01 is instantiated that is not followed by
an event in which the property D2 is instantiated, there will be an event
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in which the property S1 is instantiated that is not followed by an event
in which the property S2 is instantiated. That is, there will be
*abnormal instance of (5).
There is no pOriori reason for thinking there will be some other
kind predicate S3 which is just like Sl except that S3's corresponding
disjunctive physical predicate excludes the "troublesome" P# properties.
There will, of course, be some alternative extensionally equivalent
property that we could pick out by brute enumeration, i.e. by using the
preaicate -b except for (the troublesome) Pei, Plk, etc." But the
question is whether or not this property, or some property intensionally
coextensive with it, could figure in laws of S. And if the actual history
of special sciences is any indication, there typically are not such
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alternative kind oredicates available.
Of course, discrediting the arguments from mature science and
reduction to future physics doesn't show that their conclusion is false.
One might still hold that (i) there will be a unified field theory and
(ii) there will be no cp-generalizations in the special sciences either.
But without argument, (ii) is just an unmotivated empirical claim about
the special sciences. And appendix C is devoted to showing this claim is
false, by showing that the theory of evolutionary biology makes
ineliminable appeal to cp clauses. One can put the point this way: Even
if we grant that all physical laws are strict, taking the special sciences
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seriously requires taking seriously the idea that laws can have *abnormal
instances.
4.3.2 Reduction and the Intentional
One might wonder if these very considerations tell against the possibility
of developing a satisfactory naturalistic theory of intentionality. For
one might think that a plausible theory of this sort would have to take
the form of a reduction. Indeed, Fodor [1987] says, 'It's hard to
see...how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to
some extent or other, a Reductionist (p. 96)." But don't the Fodorian
arguments just discussed suggest that no such reduction will be
forthcoming? Don't they suggest, perhaps even entail, a view more like
that of Davidson's anomalous monism, according to which we have (i) strict
physical laws, (ii) intentional generalizations with *abnormal instances,
and hence (iii) no strict reduction of the psychological? On such a view,
intentional psychology would carve out an autonomous domain for itself.
But in so doing, its kind predicates would be 'theoretically isolated"
from thcse of other sciences.15 There are several points to make here.
I am not arguing a priori for the existence of a true naturalistic
theory of intentionality. 'ndeed, it seems to me a thoroughly empirical
15. In the concluding chapter, I very briefly discuss the relation between
cp-COV and anomalous monism.
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question as to whether one can naturalize the phenomenon of meaning.
Perhaps a satisfactory theory of this kind would take the form of a strict
reduction, and perhaps there are no strict reductions in this domain to be
had. But the arguments above do not even show that a significant
naturalization of meaning is unlikely. The meaning naturalist does not
suggest that the property means that . is necessarily coextensive with
some physical kind. That is, any reduction which may be associated with a
meaning theory need not be a reduction to physics. The arguments above do
show that a reduction of intentional kinds to physical kinds is extremely
unlikely. But a strict reduction of intentional properties to properties
appealed to in some other special science might not be so miraculous.
Suppose that, pre-theoretically, we had reason to believe that the
intentional properties of minds are non-accidentally related to the fact
that minds are information processors, or that minds are the result of
evolution by natural selection. Then it might not be terribly surprising
if there were an intimate relation between laws of intentional psychology
and the laws of information theory, or evolutionary biology. The relation
among these laws might even be as strong as that of strict reduction. We
must bear in mind that the arguments given above don't tell against the
possibility of reduction in general. They don't show, for example, that
reduction of valence theory to atomic theory (or the reduction of heat to
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mean molecular motion) is miraculous.16 For one thing, chemical theories
are like physical theories, in that functional characterization and
multiple realizability of properties are not involved. And it is not that
surprising, although it is far from trivial, that having certain valence
properties-- in effect, having certain properties of elemental
combination-- is identical to having certain structural properties at the
atomic level. Indeed, the nineteenth century "hook-and-eye" model of
valences provided a means of thinking about valences in a similar way.
Similarly, I don't think it would be miraculous-- thouc.h again,
neither would it be trivial-- if having intentional properties turned out
to be identical to having certain non-intentional properties which are
theoretically interesting at some other (non-intentional) level of
description, say that of information theory or evolutionary biology. Of
course, how surprising this would be depends on the non-intentional
properties in question. The brain is: a physical mass, composed of
chemicals, a network of neurons, the product of evolution, an information
processor, a sophisticated computer, part of an individual who is a member
of a society, etc. While it would be implausible to identify intentional
kinds with kinds in physics, nothing said above precludes identifying
intentional kinds with the kinds of any non-intentional science
whatsoever. With respect to a theory like Dretske [1981], for example, I
16. Although I think the arguments do show, if such showing is needed,
that one couldn't have known a priori that attempts to provide such
reductions would eventually be successful.,
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think the pre-theoretic intuition that beliefs carry information is
stronger than any pre-theoretic skepticism about the prospects of such a
reductive theory. The same could be true of other meaning theories. The
question is simply whether or not the theory is true.
Moreover, I was concerned above only with the notion of strict
reduction. But a satisfactory naturalization of meaning need not take the
form of a strict reduction. The most important feature of a naturalistic
theory, recall, is that the properties appealed to in such a theory be
intuitively more like paradigm naturalistic properties (i.e. those
properties appealed to in the "hard sciences') than intentional properties
are. And satisfying the "non-intentional idiom" condition, i.e. appealing
only to non-intentional properties on the right side of the conditional,
was taken to be a mark of "significant" progress in the process of
naturalizing meaning. Perhaps one can hold (i) that intentional
properties supervene on the non-intentional properties appealed to in such
a theory, and (ii) that mental states have their intentional properties in
virtue of having the non-intentional properties in question, without also
holding (iii) that the intentional and non-intentional properties in
question are identical.
Another possibility is that the non-intentional properties appealed
to in some naturalistic theory of meaning do not figure in the laws of any
reducing science. If this turned out to be the case, we would have a
redescription of intentional phenomena in a non-intentional idiom. One
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might well want to call a theory which licensed such redescription
"reductive." But iDso facto, the laws of an intentional psychology would
not be reduced to the laws of some non-intentional science via such a
theory. It seems to me quite possible that the property means that is
identical to some non-intentional property R that is itself theoretically
uninteresting, except for being identical to the property means that.
That is, the only generalizations in which R figures might be
"restatements" of intentional generalizations, e.g.: If an agent has a
desire state that bears R to the proposition that p, and the agent has a
belief sta'e that bears R to the proposition that action A will bring
about p, ther ceteris paribus, the agent will perform action A.17  In
short, we might identify intentional properties with certain non-
intentional (e.g., covariance) properties, thereby learning something
about what intentional properties are, without thereby reducing
intentional kinds to the kinds of some other special science.
To sum up: The intuitive force behind the Fodorian objections to
strict reduction is that the special sciences attempt to find interesting
generalizations over events which need not have anything theoretically
interesting in common at the level of physical description. But a meaning
theory, even if it is reductive, need not identify intentional and
17. Compare the reduction of valence properties to electron shell
properties. Appeal to electrons is theoretically interesting in many
contexts that are not also contexts of elemental combination, and
hence contexts covered by the generalizations of valence theory.
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physical kinds. Moreover, it may be plausible, or at least not very
implausible, to identify intentional kinds with the kinds of some other
special science. And finally, it may be that intentional kinds are
reducible to non-intentional properties that are theoretically
uninteresting, except in so far as they are identical to intentional
properties. Hence, the arguments in this section against strict reduction
do not tell against the possibility of naturalistic theories of meaning.
I want to turn now to somewhat different objections to the 'cp' in
cp-COV. One might admit that appeal to cp clauses in theories can be
legitimate. But one might think they are legitimate only if understood in
a particular way. Coupled with either (i) claims about how intentional
psychology works or (ii) the constraints on a naturalistic theory of
intentionality, the construal of cp clauses in question might tell against
cp-COU. Of course, even if these arguments are valid, there will be at
least two options open: reject cp-COV or reject the construal of cp
clauses.
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4.4 The Avrgumen t from the Completi on
Analysis
Since laws are of the form A --- )) B, a natural suggestion is that cp
clauses serve as placeholders for further antecedent or "boundary"
conditions that are left unstated in certain formulations of laws.18 Thus,
(6) cp(Fx --- )) Gy)
is to be understood as shorthand for
(7) (q & r & ... & u Fx) --- )> Gy;
where the antecedent can, at least in principle, be stated explicitly and
indepeidently of Fx and Gy. Since the idea is that cp clauses are to be
"spelled out," the completed antecedent must be finite, and the result (7)
must not appeal to a cp clause.
4.4.1 Motivations and the Argument
There are several motivations for the completion analysis of
cp-generalizations. One is that it makes clear which proposition cp-
generalizations (construed as sentences) expressv19 Another is the
account's simplicity. It is natural to think of cp clauses as setting
18. See, e.g., Hempel (1965]. But cf. Hempel (1988) who recognizes that
"provisoes" may not be eliminable in this way.
19. Schiffer [1987) sometimes presses this worry; though I don't see
what's wrong with saying that '(cp)(A --- )) B)' expresses the
proposition that cp(A --- )) B).
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forth disclaimers to the effect that a certain generalization holds true
generally, but not if such and such. The natural way of rendering
'Fx --- )) Gy, unless p', is as '"p C Fx --- )) Gy'. Thus, to "complete" a
ep-generalization is to state explicitly all the disclaimers. Putting the
point slightly differently, suppose we have an instance of Fx & "Gy. It
follows, then, that 'Fx --- )) Gy' is not a law. But perhaps the sentence
'Fx --- )) Gy' is true under certain restricted conditions-- e.g. when
velocities are low, the barometric pressure is within a certain range,
etc. In general, one might think that (6) is true only if there is some
specifiable set of circumstances (q & r & ... & u) in which 'Fx --- )) Gy'
is true. Then instances of (Fx & "Gy) would not really be *abnormal
instances of (6). For when (6) is spelled out as in (7), we would see
that the real antecedent of the law is not satisfied. Instances of
(Fx & "Gy) would show that either (6) is false or the boundary conditions
(q & r & ... 6 u) were not satisfied.
Another motivation for this account stems from concern that
cp-generalizations are vacuous, unless they can be "completed" as in (7).
I suggested earlier that we can understand (6) as, *If ceteris is paribus,
then Fx --- >) Gy." But given a generalization of the form
C --- )) (Fx --- >> Gy), there are many substitution instances for C such
that the whole will come out true, regardless of the properties F and G in
question. Let C be 'Fx --- >) Gy', for example; or substitute for C a
sentence from which Gy will follow. The worry is that, unless the
conditions that would count as those in which ceteris is paribus can (at
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least in principle) be stated explicitly, 'cp(Fx --- )) Gy)' means only
that there are no instances of Fx & "Gy in the circumstances in which
'Fx --- )) Gy' has no *abnormal instances. But of course, this is true for
any properties F and G whatsoever. So empirically interesting, i.e.
legitimate, cp-generalizations must be completnble as in (7).
If this last claim is correct, it bodes ill for cp-COV. For suppose
a theorist offers a statement of some non-intentional conditions C as a
candidate for a statement of conditions in which an agent will always
produce the belief that p if p. There will surely be a potentially
endless list of possible conditions C', such that given p & C & C', the
agent would not produce the belief that p. Let C' be, "The agent is
struck by lightning," or "The agent believes that q," where q is some
proposition from which the agent is disposed t^ infer that "p. In short,
there is no reason to think the 'cp' in cp-COV is completable. Schiffer
[1987] sayst
The thought that such completions are to be expected strikes
me as being as absurd as the thought that the ceteris paribus
generalizations of (what might be called) commonsense
physics-- such as, 'If a flying baseball strikes an ordinary
house window, then, ceteris paribus, the window will break'--
enjoy true completions that elevate them into seamless laws.
The interesting question is why anyone would ever have
expected a completion (p. 160).20
20. A lengthy aside: Schiffer raises a natural, though I think ultimately
misguided, worry; viz. that cp clauses are somehow suspect if they
are not merely shorthand devices for statable assumptions. But I am
not sure what to make of Schiffer's arguments when he draws
conclusions about theories of meaning from this worry. Much of the
problem, I suspect, is that Schiffer often discusses folk psychology
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4.4.2 The Response
I grant that if cp-generalizations must be cashed out as in (7), repeated
here,
(7) (q & r & ... & u Fx) --- >> Gy,
then cp-COV is hopeless. But this seems to be the wrong way to understand
cp-generalizations. Indeed, Schiffer's quote tells us why. We have
when the broader issue (which he wants to address as well) is the
possibility of a scientifically respectable intentional psychology.
Schiffer discusses cp clauses only in the context of folk theories of
belief. He does not mention them in his discussion of optimality
conditions as they might figure in a theory of truth conditions for a
Language of Thought (pp. 79-83). So either (i) he has ignored the
possibility of appealing to cp clauses here, or (ii) he thinks that
his objections to the use of cp clauses in folk theories apply equally
well. For example, Schiffer says in reference to a certain ep-
covariation claim, "It is not obvious to me that I could ever succeed
in completing this (generalization) in a way that would yield a truth,
nor, if I could, that it would not be of a complexity that defied its
being commonly believed and thus of the folk theory (p.31)." But even
if we grant that cp clauses require completion, it wouldn't matter
whether or not Schiffer was able to complete a given cp-
generalization, except for the generalization's status in some folk
theory that we are all supposed to share. Schiffer also thinks the
impossibility of defining (the folk notion of) a belief state without
appeal to completable cp clauses is important; because this
purportedly shows that beliefs cannot be realized at a functional (or
presumably any non-intentional) level (pp. 159-60). Even if his
argument shows something about folk notions, it doesn't generalize to
other properties, You can't define solubility without appealing to cp
clauses. It's just not the case that all sugar samples would dissolve
in water. The relevant cp clauses won't be "completable," because
there are too many possible ways to keep sugar from dissolving in
water. But this hardly shows that the property of being soluble can't
be realized at the level of crystalline structure. It is.
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excellent reason to believe that cp an ordinary window will break if a
flying baseball hits it. And this is not to believe merely that baseballs
break windows in the circumstances in which baseballs break windows.
Schiffer is probably quite right when he says this cp-generalization can't
be elevated into a strict law. So the right conclusion to draw, it seems,
is that legitimate use of cp clauses does not depend on meeting this very
onerous requirement.
This point needn't be confined to folk physics. No matter what
conditions C are offered as hypothesized antecedent conditions that make
some empirical "cp-less" generalization G exceptionless, we will probably
be able to come up with a counterexample to the resulting conditional
claim, 'C --- )) G. For example, there is no reason to believe there are
conditions, statable independently of Darwin's principle, in which every
trait that increases the fitness of an organism spreads throughout a
population. Or again, what are the conditions in which an "AND-gate"
alwaLs registers a '1' given inputs of '1' and '1'? Under what conditions
does an increase in supply quarantee a reduction of price? Sometimes the
fittest are struck by lightning, computers are struck by sledge hammers,
and demand increases along with supply. If one jerry-rigs antecedents to
account for these possibilities, there are others. A little imagination
is all that is required. The problem with the completion analysis of cp
clauses, is (i) that it requires an independent specification of
conditions in which a lawlike statement has no *abnormal instances; (ii)
the completed statement must be counterfactual supporting, else it is not
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a law; but (iii) we have every reason to think these dual requirements
cannot be met.
In 4.3.1, I said that for any non-reducible special science law of
the form
(8) (cp) Slx --- >> S2 y,
there would be disjunctions 01 and D2 of physical predicates extensionally
equivalent to S1 and S2*21 So an event in which the property S1 is
instantiated will be followed by an event in which the property S2 is
instantiated, if an event in which D1 is instantiated is followed by an
event in which D2 is instantiated, We can, therefore, characterize the
actual circumstances in which an S1 event is followed by an S2 event as
follows:
whenever an event in which D1 is nstantiated is followed by
an event in which D2 is instantiated.
The problem for the completion analysis is that this claim-- that S1
events are followed by S2 events whenever D1 events are followed by D2
events-- is only eytensionally correct. (And brute enumeration is
probably the only thing that would convince us of even the extensional
equivalence.) This is because the D1 events don't have anything
21. In the vocabulary of physics, these disjunctions would be
(P 1 v P# 2 v ... v Pm*) and (P! 1 v P! 2 v ... v P!n), respectively. If
there is an infinite amount of matter in the universe, these will
probably havle to be infinite disjunctions. But I'll ignore this
point; since as we'll see, the situation is even worse for the
completion analysis if these disjunctions are infinite.
- 158 -
a
i
5
Z
j
f
I
C
Chapter Four
interesting in common, other than the fact that they all happen to be S1
events. This point is not restricted to descriptions at the level of
physics. For the circumstances picked out by (8) are, in all likeli•lood,
theoretically uninteresting at any level of description other than that of
the special science S.22 This is hardly surprising; for the
circumstances in which D1 events are followed by D2 events are worth
noting at all, only because they are the circumstances in which (8) has no
*abnormal instances. But these are the very circumstances that must be
picked out if the cp clause in (8) is to be completed.
A set of conditions (q & r & ... & u) which is only extensionally
equivalent to the conditions in which (8) has no *abnormal instances
cannot serve as the antecedent of:
(9) (q & r & ... & u) --- )) (S 1 x --- )> S2y).
For if there is mere extensional equivalence between (q & r & ... & u) and
the circumstances in which (8) has no *abnormal instances, then (9) will
not support counterfactuals; and hence (9) will not be a law. A --- )> C
does not follow from (A --- > 8) & (8 (---) C).
So appealing to the language of physics will not yield a completion
of (8); similarly for appeal to the languages of other special sciences.
If one cannot pick out the circumstances in which (8) has no *abnormal
22. Unless S1 x > Sou is reducible to some other special science law.
But then the reduc'ng law must have *abnormal instances, just as the
reduced law did. So all the same questions arise with respect to the
reducing law.
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instances by using the vocabulary of sciences other than S, one might hope
to capture these conditions by appealing to kind predicates in S itself.
But this approach will not yield a statement of conditions in which
lawlike statements of S have no *abnormal instances. For some *abnormzl
instances will be the result of events that do not fall under any law of
S. An AND-gate might fail to register a '1' given 'l's as input, because
someone hit its containing system with a sledge-harmer. Prices might not
decline following an increase in supply, because the whole economic system
was destroyed by nuclear war. In fact, with one exception, any finitely
statable description of the conditions in which the (non-reducible) law
SIx --- >) S2p has no *abnormal instances will consist of an exhaustive
list of events, like the D1 events, which will not support the relevant
counterfactuals.23 The one exception is the description, Oconditions in
which Slx --- )> S2Y has no *abnormal instances."
23. And if the D1 and D2 disjunctions are infinite, the other descriptions
of these conditions won't be finitely statable. Hence, even if they
supported counterfactuals, they wouldn't do for the purposes of the
completion analysis.
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Let me emphasize this important point. Given a non-reducible law
like
(8) (cp) S1x -- >> S2Y.,
# we have no reason to suspect there is a set of conditions,
q & r & ... & u specifiable independently of the predicates S1 and S2 such
that
(9) (q r &r ... & u) --- »> (Slx --- > S 2 y).
is a law. That is, in addition to our intuitive sense that we could
always come up with cases that falsified a putatively completed cp-
generalization, we have a general reason for thinking that the conditions
in which a cp-generalization has no *abnormal instances cannot be
specified independently of the generalization itself.
The argument from the completion analysis against cp-COV depends on a
certain dichotomy: Either cp clauses can be completed or they are somehow
illegitimate. In particular, the worry is that uncompleted cp-
generalizations are vacuous. One then points out that cp clauses can't be
completed when intentionality is in question. But we have reason to think
that cp clauses in the special sciences are typically not completable;
and we also have reason to think they are not vacuous. Fodor [1987] notes
that, cp, a meandering river erodes its banks (p.5). This generalization
is not completable. Think of all the possible ways that one could keep a
river from eroding its banks. There is no reason to think that, even in
principle, all the circumstances in which a river does not erode its banks
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could be described explicitly in advance. For there is no reason to think
that any finitely statable description (other than "conditions in which
the geological law has an *abnormal instance') will capture all and only
these circumstances. It is still an open question as to what the truth
conditions of the geological cp-generalization are. But the
generalization does not say merely that a meandering river either erodes
its banks or it doesn't. One couldn't do science with generalizations
like that. Similarly, there are generalizaticns governing tht operation
of AND-gates more interesting than: Given a two 'l's as input, an AND-
gate produces a '1' in the conditions in which it produces a '1'.
A final point: We will find even this last generalization
interesting if we think of the expression, "conditiorns in which it
produces a '1'," as a rigid designator that picks out (in all possible
worlds) the *normal circumstances for the generalization governing AND-
gates. Finding a non-circular characterization of these conditions is the
task we are concerned with here. Of course, appeal to cp-generalizations
must not be viciously circulbr. But we have no reason to think that cp-
generalizations are viciously circular, trivial, or tautologous. The
successes of special sciences with respect to making the correct
predictions they do make would be inexplicable if their lawlike sentences
had these undesirable properties. The predictions of special sciences are
often very interesting, hardly the kinds of claims that would follow from
sentences that were true trivially. CP-generalizations may not be as
satisfying as strict laws. But neither are they vacuous. So we need an
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account of such generalizations which does not insist that they are strict
laws in disguise.
4. 5 The Ai gumen t from Cotere is
Absen t i bus Analyses
Cartwright (19833 says that the law of gravity, when modified by a cp
clause-- cp(F a Gmm'/r+[Z])-- amounts to the following claim:
if there are no forces other than gravitational forces at
work, then two bodies exert a force between each other which
varies inversely as the square of the distance between them,
and varies directly as the product of their masses (p. 58).
To understand cp clauses this way, we must not require that such clauses
be explicable independently of the lawlike sentences they modify. The cp-
modified law of gravity is characterized above by using the description
'forces other than gravitational'. As far as we know, there are only four
basic forces. So perhaps we could specify the "other factors' by
enumeration in at least some portions of physics. In the special
sciences, however, this will typically not be the case. "Other factors"
could be almost anything. But as we just saw, we should not require that
the content of each cp clause be specifiable independently of the lawlike
sentence to which it is attached.
Cartwright objects to use of cp-generalizations, however, on the
grounds that such generalizations can cover only a very limited, and
possibly null, range of cases. She points out that there are very few, if
any, cases in which gravity is the only force at work. Hence, the
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antecedent of the indicative conditional claim above will never, or almost
never, be satisfied. According to Cartwright, we want laws that apply
non-vacuously to the actual universe. If the law of gravity is understood
as above, it does not meet this requirement. I think Cartwright raises
two worries here, one easily responded to, another not so easily. The
deeper worry is that in understanding, "cp(A --- )) B)' as "If ceteris is
paribus, then (A --- )) B)," we seem to close off the possibility of
appealing to pj-generalizations when we are trying to explain actual
events that occur when ceteris is not paribus. This worry is made
sharpest if we think of explanations that take a D-N form: A sound
deduction of B from cp(A --- >> B) would require both A and the l1aim that
ceteris is paribus as true premises. But we often want to make use of cp-
generalizations in explaining events that occur when other things are not
equal. I shall return to this point about explanation in the next
chapter. The easier worry to deal with is the one concerning
applicability to actual objects; and dealing with it leads to an
initially attractive, though ultimately problematic, account of cp-
generalizations.
4.5.1 Counterfactuals and (More) Kripkean Worries
We could contrapose Cartwright's suggestion above about how to understand
the cp-modified law of gravity, and get:
- 164 -
CP-clauses
i1
;1
1
4
5
r
I
t
C
5
s
1
r
1
Chapter Four
If two bodies do rot exert a force between each other which
varies inversely as the square of the distance between them
and varies directly as the product of their masses, then there
are forces other than gravity at work.
This statement would tell us something, albeit not something earth-
shaking, about the many cases in which the law of gravity fails to
describe events in its non-contraposed form. It would tell us that some
other, i.e. non-gravitational, force was at work in such cases. But
perhaps a more natural suggestion is that the cp-modified law of gravity,
even in its non-contraposed form, makes true counterfactual claims about
actual objects. That is, one might hold that the law of gravity says what
would have happened to actual objects if gravity had been the only force
at work. So we can easily respond to the worry that a cp-modified law of
gravity, if stated in an indicative conditional form, makes no claims
about actual objects. For we can (try to) understand the cp-modified law
of gravity in terms of counterfactual conditional claims it makes ab,)ut
actual objects. Let me briefly motivate this appeal to counterfactual
conditionals concerning actual objects.
Reflection on Newtonian mechanics suggests what Joseph [1980] calls a
"ceteris absentibus" reading of cp clauses. Intuitively, a ball pushed
north, will move north, ceteris oaribus. If a force from the east is
exerted on the ball as well, the ball may in fact move northwest. But
intuitively, were it not for the force from the east, the ball would have
moved north. The claim that cp, a ball pushed north moves north appears
to be quite intimately linked to the counterfactual claim, 'If it hadn't
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been for other forces, the ball pushed north would have moved north.'
Joseph says that the field laws of physics, while false without a cp
modifier, would be true if stated in the following form:
Were it the case that all other factors were absent, then,
given certain initial conditions, certain resultant conditions
would obtain (p. 777).
The actual force exerted between two bodies may not be given by the
equation F = Gmm'/rt, But perhaps had gravity been the only effect on
masses m and m', and had any other bodies exerting gravitational force on
m and m' been absent, then the force exerted between the bodies would have
been Gmnm'/r . And perhaps in general:
'cp(A -.--> B)' is true if and only if
were all other factors absent, given A, B would obtain.
Again, because of the reference to "other" factors, the conditions in
which a cp-generalization has *abnormal instances will not be specifiable
independently of the generalization itself on this account. But this is
to be expected.
Speaking of factors being absent may be acceptable in physics, but it
is less satisfactory in other domains. An electrical surge may cause some
AND-gate in a computer to output a '0' given two 'l's as input. But we
don't want to cash out the relevant cp-generalization in terms of what
AND-gates would do in the absence of electricity. Memory limitations and
other limitations of finite capacity are relevant to the (non-intentional)
psychological generalizations. One would expect such limitations to be
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handled by appeal to something like a cp clause. 2 4 But there is no "other
factor" whose absence we can speak of here. These cp-generalizations
surely do not purport to say what would happen if agents had no memory.
Perhaps the natural thing to say is that cp-generalizations in psychology
are true (if they are) in virtue of what would be the case if memory posed
no limitations. And in general, perhaps the natural thing to say in
keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of ceteris absentibus
readings, is the following:
'cp(A --- >) B)' is true, if and only if
Had all the other factors which do interfere not interfered,
given A, 8 would obtain,
If we wanted to defend this theory in detail, we would have to say more
about the notion of interference. But for now, I think we can make use of
the intuitive idea that interfering factors are those factors which
somehow "prevent A from bringing about 8."
If this is how we are to understand cp-generalizations, cp-COV looks
problematic. Kripke [1982] tells us why when he considers cp notions of
disposition in the context of his plus/quus problem. (See 1.3 above and
7.3 below.) The meaning of a symbol determines its correct usage in
24. For example, human speakers do not usually recognize as sentences
complex center-embedded strings like:
'The rat the cat the dog chased chased ate the cheese,' or
'Bulldogs bulldogs bulldogs fight fight fight.' But according to
current linguistic theory, these strings are sentences; since they
satisfy certain syntactic criteria. The fact that most speakers fail
to understand these strings as sentences is the result of a limitation
on the number of embeddings (typically two) that ordinary speakers can
grasp at a time.
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infinitely many cases in which symbol users are not disposed to use
symbols at all. We would all die, for example, before we could solve
certain addition problems. Nonetheless, the meaning of the word 'plus'
(together with the arithmetical facts) determines the correct responses to
such problems. This is a fatal difficulty for crude covariation or
dispositional theories of meaning. Kripke considers the possibility of
appealing to ceteris paribus notions of dispositions. He then applies
essentially the account of cp-generalizations just offered, suggesting
that the relevant cp clause be flesýtd out as follows:
If my brain had been stuffed with sufficient extra gray matter
to grasp large numbers, and if it were given enough capacity
to perform such a large addition, and if my life (in a healthy
state) were prolonged enouqh, then given an addition problem
involving two large numbers, m and n, I would respond with
their sum, and not with the result according to some quus-like
rule (p.27).
Kripke goes on to claim, correctly I think, that we have no idea
whether this counterfactual is true.
But how can we have any confidence of this? How in the world
can I tell what would happen if my brain were stuffed with
extra brain matter, or if my life were prolonged by some magic
elixir? Surely such speculation should be left to science
fiction writers and futurologists. We have no idea what the
results of such experiments would be. They might lead me to
go insane, even to behave according to a quus-like rule
(ibid.).
But, Kripke says, if we can't assess this (or some similar)
counterfactual, the defender of cp-COV has no reason to believe that his
theory of meaning will yield the right results. For short cf invoking
some notion equivalent to that of "intending to go on in a certain way,"
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Kripke thinks this counterfactual reading is the only way to make sense of
the cp clause in cp-COV.
Kripke's argument is simple: Making sense of cp-COU's appeal to a cp
clause requires either (i) begging the question with respect to explaining
the intentional in a non-intentional idiom- or (ii) assessing crazy
counterfactuals, viz. those concerning what would happen if various
factors like memory limitations did not affect our dispositions, that we
can't assess, Either way, cp-COV won't do. But Kripke's observations
concerning "speculative" counterfactual claims do not show that cp-COU
depends on futurology. Rather, these observations (and others like them)
show either (a) that ceteris absentibus readings of ep clausEs are flat
out mistaken, or perhaps more weakly, (b) that Kripke is wror3 about the
kind of coupterfactual commiti.. t that is associated with cp-
generalizations. Either way, I'll argue, cp-COV is fine.
4.5.2 Counterfactuals and Nomological Impossibility
I take it that, cp, a thermometer regis.ters the arrmbient temperature. An
actual thermometer on the sun won't register the ambient temperature. Yet
we are not committed to saying anything about what would happen if a very
big thermometer on the sun were encased in some osuper-heat-protector,g if
it were equipped with enough circuits to register the relevant numbers,
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and so on.25 One obvious problem with assessing such a counterfactual is
th&t it is hard know what the effects of insulation would be on the
thermometer's sensitivity to temperature outside the insulation.
Moreover, who knows what the effects of adding all that circuitry would
be? As Kripke says in the psychological case, "The outcome really is
obviously indeterminate, failing further specification of these majic
mind-expanding (read thermometer-expanding') processes; and even with
such specifications, it is highly speculative (p. 27)., But we are not
committed to assessing such counterfactual claims when we say, cp, a
thermometer registers the ambient temperature." So why should cp-
generalizations about symbol-using capacities commit us to analogous
counterfactual claims about long-lived "super-enriched" minds?
One might claim that these two cases are not analogous. For one
might claim that the real generalization relating a particular thermometer
to ambient temperatures holds only relative to a certain range of
temperatures. We might have reason to believe this claim, if co-
generalizations had to be spelled out by specifying further antecedent
conditions, such that the resulting generalization would have no *abnormal
instances. But we have already rejected this view. In the absence of
argument to the contrary, I don't see anything wrong with saying that cp a
thermometer registers the ambient temperature: and then noting that
25. I'm indebted here, and below in 4.5.3, to Bob Stalnaker for a very
useful discussion.
- 170 -
CP-clauses
Chapter Four
ceteris is not paribus on the sun, because the excessive temperatures
would destroy the thermometer.
A thermometer doesn't register the ambient temperature if it is
beneath a sixteen ton weight, either; because the excessive weight would
destroy the thermometer. But we' can still say that cp, a thermometer
registers the ambient temperature. For intuitively, dropping a sixteen
ton weight on a thermonseter violates the ceteris paribus condition.
Again, if one insists that the real generalization governing thermometers
is restricted to a certain range of temperatures, then parity would seem
to require restricting the real generalization so that it covers only
cases in which heavy weights are not dropped on thermometers. But if one
keeps adding restrzctions in the face of *abnormal instances, it looks
like the "real" generalization spoken of is nothing other than the non-
existent completion of the generalization, "cp, a thermometer registers
the ambient temperature." My point, then, is that nothing seems to be
wrong with the relatively unrestricted generalizaticn, mcp, a thermometer
registers the ambient temperature." Thermometers on the sup will
constitute *abnormal instances of this qenetalization. Yet we are not
thereby committed to saying what would happen to a suitably souped-up
thermometer on the sun.
Similarly, I don't see anything wrong with saying that ceteris might
not be paribus with respect to my mathematical dispositions, because the
numbers in question are so big that I would die before adding them. Bit
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this claim needn't commit us to saying what suitably souped-up humans
would do if presented with such huge numbers. Or again, if I am about to
be crushed by a sixteen ton weight, then if queried about even very small
numbers, I am not disposed to respond with their sum. I am disposed to
just lie quietly. Nonetheless, it hardly seems contentious to say that
(cp) I am disposed to respond with '4' when queried, '2 + 2 * ?'. Ceteris
just isn't paribus with respect to my mathematical dispositions if a
sixteen ton weight is about to fall on me. So obviously I'm not always
disposed to respond with sums. In some cases, I would die of old age
before performing the computation in question. In other cases, I would
die from crushing before performing the computation. But there doesn't
seem to be any theoretical difference between the cases in so far as
appeal to cp clauses is in question.26 ,27
26. There are, however, other issues that the mathematical example raises,
e.g. the question of correctness conditions and the fact that the plus
function has an infinite domain. These issues will loom large in
chapter seven. I arn concerned here, however, only with the question
of making appeal to cp clauses at all. This section is not,
therefore, meant to be a definitive reply to Kripke on behalf of the
meaning naturalist, though it is part of such a reply.
27. One might wonder if dying before I get to token, either verbally or
mentally, a response to some mathematical question does in fact result
in a failure of the cp condition with respect to my mathematical
dispositions, For one might reject talk of my "bare" disposition to
respond in certain ways under certain conditions in favor of talking
about my dispositions in a more "full-blooded" way. (See Evans
[1981].) That is, one might identify my mathematical dispositions
with some internal mechanism that works how it works, regardless of
whether or not I die of old age. I have considerable sympathy with
this suggestion. (Indeed, I would hope that the account of cp-
generalizations I eventually give will shed some light on what a
"full-blooded* disposition ps.) But this seems to me just a special
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One might note that we can assess and readily assent to the
counterfactual, "If Paul hadn't been crushed, he would have said '4'."
But it is far from clear what I would say if in response to a query about
large numbers if I lived long enough, had a large enough brain, etc. This
is indeed a difference between the cases just described. But it is a
relevant difference, only if one insists that cp-generalizations have to
be cashed out in terms of such counterfactual claims. I will be
discussing other examples from non-intentional domains in which cp-
generalizations would, if understood in this way, commit us to assessing
counterfactuals at least as bizarre as those Kripke mentions. But I want
to discuss these examples in the context of a more general concern I have
about ceteris absentibus readings.
Joseph notes that on such readings of cp-generalizations, laws in
physics turn out to be true in virtue of what would be the case if
conditions were different. The law of gravity turns out to be true in
virtue of having no *abnormal instances in some non-actual world. But the
more intuitively attractive idtt is that laws are true in virtue of what
the actual world (and the modal space "around" the actual world) is like.
Moreover, we cannot understand counterfactuals of the form, "Had gravity
been the only force...," in terms of what happens in "nearby" possible
case of preferring a kind of Influential picture to a Behavioristic
one. And for reasons discussed above in 4.2.2, I will adopt the
Behavioristic picture with respect to cp-COU, at least for present
purposes.
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worlds, since there is no (physically) possible world in which gravity is
the only force. The possible worlds in which gravity is the only force at
work are very far away. But it is not the mere "distance" that is the
real source of worry here. Ceteris absentibus readings of cp-
generalizations are implausible, I suggest, because they try to explain
the lawlike in terms of the nomologically impossible. 28
We can ask, for example, what the law of gravity says about protons
and electrons. We wanted to say, recall, that the law of avity holds
generally, other things being equal; but other things aren't equal with
protons and electrons, since these bodies also have charge. But what
counterfactuals shall we consider here? Shall we say that had pv'tons and
electrons lacked charge, the force exerted between them would have been
equal to Gmrrn'/rz? I don't know what protons and electrons without charge
like. Nor do I have any idea how they would behave. Moreover, it's a
matter of physical law that protons and electrons have charge. So in
trying to understanding a ceteris paribus law in terms of counterfactual
claims about what would happen if protons and electrons didn't have
charge, we're trying to understanding one law by asking what would happen
if some other law was violated. And that just seems perverse.
Such examples can easily be multiplied. It turns out that there are
lots of reasons why actual gases don't obey the ideal gas law perfectly.
28. I should note that neither Joseph nor Kripke thinks such
counterfactual analyses are desirable.
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One reason is that gas molecules lose some kinetic energy when they bounce
off the walls of a container. Another is that gas molecules attract one
another slightly. But to suppose that gas molecules didn't lose kinetic
energy when they struck the container, or that molecules hadn't attracted
one another, is to suppose that natural laws are violated. But even if
this supposition is acceptable, how can we say what would happen once
natural laws were violated? What is a world in which molecules don't
attract one another like? Engaging in such speculation is just the sort
of thing that Kripke recommends leaving to the science fiction writers.
Consider one last example from astrophysics. Researchers Dicke,
Peebles, et.al. [1965] argued that a temperature in excess of (1010)0 K in
the very early stages of the universe would be detectable now in our local
region of the universe in the form of microwave radiation. On this basis,
they predicted that, at a certain wavelength, measurements of radiation
would reveal temperatures about 3.50 K higher than the temperature that
would be expected on the basis of known sources of radiation.
Independently (but reported along with Dicke et.al.), Penzias and Wilson
[1965]) found that their measurements of temperature were, indeed, about
3.50 K higher than expected. The experiments have beýn confirmed. There
is good reason to think that there is a small amount of radiation in our
local region of the universe, which is essentially residue from the Big
Bang. But consider the various lawlike sentences that (together with
statements of initial conditions) led Penzias and Wilson to expect a
temperature lower by 3.5* than the temperature they found. Taken in
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isolation or in combination, these sentences could hold only cp. But a
*ceteris absentibus" reading of the cp clauses will be senseless. For one
of the sources of interfervnce will be the Big Bang itself. And surely
cp-generalizations concerning the amount of radiation in our local region
of the utriverse are not to be understood as claims about how much
radiation there would be if the Big Bang had not occurred.
Before moving on, let me be clear about what the point of these
examples is. I am not clriming that counterfactual considerations are
irrelevant to assessing cp-generalizations. But the ceteris absentibus
account makes a specific proposal caout which counterfactuals are
relevant. According to this account, a cp-generalization is true just in
case a particular counterfactual claiu,, one concerning what would happen
if actual sources of interference failed to interfere, is true. It
Follows that if we cannot assess the truth of the relevant counterfactual,
we cannot assess the truth of the corresponding cp-ger.eralization. Kripke
uses this point against cp-COV. I want to point out that other cp-
generalizations in non-intentional domains are in the same boat with cp-
COV. Together with the fact that ceteris absentibus readings of cp
clauses commit us to nomologically impossible worlds, I think this
suggests that we look for an alternative to ceteris absentibns readings.
But even if we do not do so, such readings of cp-generalizations will not
provide the basis for an argument against CP-COU. For the "crazy"
counterfactuals that Kripke points to in intentional cases have even
crazier analogues in non-intentional cases.
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4.5.3 CP Clauses and Counterfactuals
I have been rather hard on ceteris absentibus readings of cp-
generalizations, perhaps too hard. For I grant that certain
counterfactuals are going to be relevant to assessing cp-generalizations.
Moreover, one might hold that ceteris absentibus readings, or something
much like them, can be salvaged if we understand the relevant
counterfactuals in the right way.
On such readings, the truth of a ep-generalization depends on what
would have happened had actual sources of interference not interfered; In
our thermometer on the sun example, the source of interference is the
excessive temperature that destroys the thermometer. A natural way to
imagine the excessive temperature not interfering is to imagine the
thermometer encased in a super heat protector. Similarly, a natural way
to imagine death (say death due to old age) not interfering with an
agent's performance of some computation is to imagine extending the life
of the agent. But another way to imagine excessive temperature not
interfering with the thermometer is to imagine the thermometer in a cooler
setting; and one can imagine death due to old age not interfering with
the performance of a computation by imagining a simpler computation
involving smaller numbers. There is, in other words, a question about
what to hold fixed and what to let vary when considering counterfactuals
relevant to ceteris absentibus readings of cp-generalizations. Do we hold
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the temperature (computation) fixed and let facts about the thermometer
(agent) vary; or do we hold the thermometer (agent) fixed and let the
temperature (computation) in question vary?
Thus, there may be a restricted sense ini which, holding lots of
present factors constant, we can sensibly talk about what would be the
case in a particular region of space-time if the Big Bang hadn't occurred.
For we migrt just stipulate that, with respect to certain counterfactual
claims, the possible absence of the Big Bang would not have the absence of
the known universe as a consequence. This fits with our intuitive sense
that, no matter how crazy counterfactuals of the form, "If the Big Bang
hadn't occurred, then ...,' we can still make sense of somehow 'factoring
out" the Big Bang's contribution to the amount of radiation in our local
region of the universe. Similarly, we might be able to make sense of
possible worlds in which molecules don't attract one another, in the sense
that we can intuitively factor out the contribution of molecular
attraction to some observed phenomenon, say the behavior of gases.29 Of
course, in the same restricted sense, we might also be able to talk about
what would be the case if we had larger memories, lived longer, etc. For
we might be able to factor out considerations of memory (and life)
limitations when considering mathematical dispositions. So if we
understand ceteris absentibus readings of cp-generalizations in this way,
29. We can also factor out the contribution of molecular attraction in
practice reasonably well. I'll discuss this example in more detail in
the next chapter.
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there is still no problem for cp-COV. And this was the main point of the
preceding discussion.
Still, this appeal to a different way of reading the relevant
counterfactuals doesn't solve all the difficulties facing the ceteris
absentibus account. We need to know more about this notion of "factoring
out' and the kind of counterfactual claims that accompany it. Moreover,
an actual thermometer in an environment as hot as the sun actually is will
not register the ambient temperature. This is an *abnormal instance of
the generalization, Ocp, a thermometer registers the ambient temperature."
We might understand the cp clause in terms of counterfactual claims about
what would happen if interfering conditions didn't interfere. But we need
to know why we should consider the readings of such counterfactuals more
hospitable to the ceteris absentibus account.30 Finally, worries about
nomologically impossible worlds still remain. For no matter how well one
can motivate certain readings of counterfactual claims, it is still
nomologically impossible for protons and electrons to lack charge, or for
molecules to fail to attract one another.
The conclusion I'm inclined to draw is that, while we should take our
counterfactual intuitions seriously, we s'ouldn't analyze cp-
generalizations in terms of what would happen if various factors were
either absent or failed to interfere. This isn't surprising, because it
30. See, e.g., Sosa [(975] for a collection of papers in which some of
these issues are addressed.
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is often nomologically impossible for interfering factors to either be
absent or fail to interfere. And the idea of explaining the lawlike in
terms of the nomologically impossible seems counter-intuitive at best. Of
course, if the best account of cp-generalizations we had appealed to
nomologically impossible worlds, then we would just be stuck with the
claim that the lawlike is to be characterized in terms of the
nomologically impossible. But I offer the following as a methodological
maxim: Other things being equal, accounts in the philosophy of science
that don't appeal to the nomologically impossible are preferable to those
that do. In the next chapter, I will offer an account of cp-
generalizations preferable to the ceteris absentibus account on these
grounds. This brings me to my last point in this chapter.
I have intermittently called accounts of the forms
'cp(A --- )> B)' as true if and only if ...
'analyses'. Perhaps defenders of such accounts would take them to be
analyses of the notion 'ceteris paribus' in terms of other metaphysically
or semantically simpler or more basic notions. But I do not offer the
account developed in the next chapter as an analysis of what 'ceteris
paribus' means, ot a theory of what makes a cp-generalization true. in any
reductive sense of 'makes'. I suspect there is nothing in virtue of which
a law is true. Nomological Telations among properties strike me as being
metaphysical bedrock if anything is. CP-generalizations are laws; and if
what I have argued so far is correct, they are not "second class" or
"pseudo" laws in virtue of having *abnormal instances. This is not to say
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that counterfactuals must be analyzed in terms of laws. Perhaps they can
be. But I'm more inclined to think the notions 'law', 'counterfactual',
'property', 'cause' and some others (e.g., '*abnormal instance',
'explanation', 'interfering factor', and in the next chapter I'l add
'defeasible') form a cluster of interrelated notions. One might hope (and
I do hope) to shed light on one of these notions, that of 'cp-
generalization', by exploring its connections to others of which we have
at least some antecedent understanding, but without claiming that analytic
or reductive truths are being discovered.
Personal metaphysical tastes aside, I certainly want to leave this
possibility open. So I intend simply to offer a characterization of the
truth conditions of cp-generalizations which does not appeal to a notion
of ceteris paribus. That characterization is roughly the following:
'cp(A --- >) B)' is true if and only if
(i) given an instance of A & "B, there is an explanation in
terms of some actual interfering condition to be given for why
8 failed to occur given A, and
(ii) claim (i) supports counterfactuals.
On the plausible view that understanding has something to do with
understanding truth conditions, the account above could be helpful, even
if it is a "mere" characterization of truth conditions. I want to turn
now to developing an account of cp-generalizations based on the idea of
explaining away *abnormal instances.
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Whien Other T hi ng-s ar-e Equal
By a serious law, I mean ... a law that,
while it may have provisos limiting its
application, allows us to determine in
advance whether or not the conditions
of application are satisfied.
--- Davidson, 'Psychology as Philosophy."
Perhaps we shouldn't take the term 'law' so seriously. The last chapter
was devoted to saying what cp-generalizations are not. In particular,
they are not completable; nor are they merely claims about what would
hapeen in the absence of interference. This chapter is devoted to saying
something about what cp-generalizations are. Section one is devoted to
rehearsing some familiar ground with an eye towards motivating a construal
of cp clauses based on explaining away *abnormal instances. There I
consider failures of predictions made on the basis of laws due to
unpredicted interference. For even the staunchest advor te of strict laws
must allow for this possibility. I turn next to developing an account of
cp-generalizations based on the notion of interference. Following Ray
[forthcoming), I argue that cp clauses express a theoretical commitment to
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explaining away *abnormal instances of the law in question as the result
of interference. Various considerations will drive us to say that *normal
instances carry an analogous committment. And I will introduce a
"defeasibility condition" to account for the possibility of multiple
interering factors that conflict. Along the way, I'll try to address
various objections to this characterization of the truth conditions of cp-
generalizations.
In appendix C, I go through arguments presented in this chapter
again, focusing in some detail tne theor$y of evolution. I argue that the
best known laws of evolutionary biology are cp-generalizations. There is
no reason to think the cp clauses are eliminable, even in principle. And
I claim that the account of these clauses developed in this chapter
captures the notion of ceteris paribus appealed to. I conclude, again
.nvoking the maxim (from A) that problems for biology are not problems for
intentional psychology, that the maning naturalist may appeal to the same
notion of ceteris paribus. 1
1. While the material in Appendix C is part of my larger argument to the
effect that appeal to cp clauses in an intentional psychology is
legitimate, it may be useful for the reader to consider this material
after chapth s six and seven, in which I make the notion of "ceteris
paribus" do theoretical work.
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5 . 1 Theor i e s and In t oerfer ence
In this tection, I want to motivate the idea that the truth conditions of
cp-generalizations can be characterized in terms of being able to explain
why *abnorral instances of such generalizations occur when they do occur.
Explaining away apparent counterexamples to a theory "after the fact"
initially appears to be the kind of ost hoc maneuvering that leads to
theories which are irrefutable. This initial appearance is correct. It
should, however, be neither surprising nor worrisome. InterestinS
theories typically are irrefLtable, if by a "refutable" theory we mean one
for which a body of evidence could, as a matter logic, show that the
theory was false. This is not to say that conjoining true claims of the
form (i) an instance of Fx & "•Gy occurred at time t, and (ii) ceteris was
paribus at t, does not coristitute a refutation of the claim that (iii)
cp(Fx --- >> Gy). But our evidence for claims like (i), and especially
(ii), will not typically, if ever, be entailing; hence, we will typically
not have evuidence that refutes (iii).
There is an analogous and familiar point concerning the relation
between theory arid observation. LUnless the properties F And G are
intuitively "observable," one needs observational reports and various
auxiliary hypotheses to deduce that a lawlike sentence of the form
'Fx --->> Gy' is false. Sirrlarly, one cannot conclude that a sentence of
the form 'cp(Fx --- >> Gy)' is false, solely on the basis of an instance of
Fx & "Gy. To (validly) conclude that 'cp(Fx ---)) Gy)' is false, one must
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also assume that the instance of Fx & "Gy occurred when ceteris was
paribus. Certain observations may provide Drima facie evidence that a
lawlike sentence L is false. But if such observations can-- after the
fact-- be reconciled with L, they may even turn out to confirm L.
Similarly, *abnormal instances of a cp-generalization are prima facie
evidence against it. But the theorist may be able reconcile the
generalization with its *abnormal instances by showing that ceteris was
not paribus when the *abnormal instances occurred; and this
reconciliation, I suggest, takes the form of citing interfering factors
that explain why the *abnormal instance occurred.
This analogy between (i) the relation a theory bears to anomalous
observations and (ii) the relation a cp-generalization bears to its
*abnormal instances, is not perfect. 2 But I think the similarities are
illustrative, especially in the context of assuaging worries that
explaining away *abnormal instances is a hopelessly ad hoc procedure that
threatens to render cp-generalizations empirically vacuous. Of course,
there will be questions concerning when a theorist should stop trying to
2. I do not intend to give criteria for determining which observations are
anomalous relative to a given theory T other than "observations which
count as prima facie evidence against T." But I take it that
practicing scientists know anomalies when they see them. There are,
however, interesting problems in the philosophy of science here. Does
any discrepancy count as *abnormal instance, or do we allow for a
"little slack?" See, e.g., Cartwright's [1983] discussion oA
measurement and the problems (independent of Heisenberg's principle)
associated with being precise. But these problems are not germane to
the present discussion,
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maintain a given lawlike statement in the face of *abnormal instances.
But these questions are neither new nor peculiar to cp-generalizations.
5.1.1 Troubles with Falsification
According to Popper (e.g. [1963]), we cannot prove that a theory is true.
Nor can we even collect evidence that supports a particular theory.
Popper's reason for holding this position was, roughly, his belief trht
the prior probability vf an hypothesized universal qeneralization is zero.
Given this assumption and a particular formulation of Bayes' theorem, it
can easily be shown that no amrount of evidence will serve to raise the
probability of a universal generalization. So no matter what the
evidence, the probability of such a generalization remains at zero. 3 But,
according to Popper, we can disprove false theories. If a theory T has
observational consequences which differ from observations made, then we
know that T is false. So we do what we can. We reject theories that we
know to be false.
On this view, it is crucial that theories be falsifiable. Otherwise,
there can be no progress in science at all. Hence, for Popper, the mark
3. See, e.g., Newton-Smith J1981] (p. 49 ff.) for further discussion. Of
course, the point ios not apply to generalizations whose truth can be
empirically demonstr&aed by brute enumeration.
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of a scientific theory-- as opposed to a mere pseudo-explanation-- is that
it makes clear what the theory forbids.
Criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand: it
must be agreed which observable situations, if actually
observed, mean that the theory is refuted ([1963], p.38).
A scientific theory "puts its cards on the table' ahead of time and sayst
You will not see A, ... , or 7. Scientists then go to work and check.
If the observations in question are not made, the theory is not thereby
confirmed. But if A, B, ... , or Z is observed, then we learn that the
theory is false by a simple application of modus tollenls.
The problem with Popper's view is that good theories, especially the
most mature and well-respected ones, do not forbid any particular
observations. The laws of Newtonian mechanics might be said to forbid
certain states of affairs. According to those laws, it can never be the
case that Force is not equal to Mass times Acceleration. Nor can it be
the case that the force due to gravity between two bodies is not inversely
proportional to the distance between them. But there is no particular
obseruatiort 0, such that it follows from Newton's laws that 0 will not be
made. One often hears this point made in the following way: A theory has
observational consequences only when conjoined with a statement of initial
conditions and a set of background assumptions or "auxiliary hypotheses."
So it doesn't follow from an anomalous observation that the theory in
question is false. At best, we can say that the conjunction of the
theory, th, statement of initial conditions, and the auxiliary hypotheses
is false.
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To take a trivial case, one might predict a certain meter reading,
say '0.5', in a given chemistry experiment. But if one's lab partner
tinkers with the equipment, adds sodium to the solution, or pulls the
plug, one might get a reading of '0.4' or no reading at all. The chemical
theory in question is not thereby falsified. To deduce claims about meter
readings from a chemical theory, one must add assumptions about (inter
alia) meters; and so anomalous meter readings cannot, by themselves, show
a chemical theory to be false. More interesting examples are easily found
in the history of science.
Seventeenth century astronomers observed that, at one time of year,
Jupiter's moons were apparently some eight minutes ahead of schedule
acco'rdin9 to Newton's theory. At another time of year, they apparently
lagged behind schedule. This cycle corresponded to the changing distance
between Jupiter and the earth, leading Olaus Roemer (1644-1710) to
hypothesize that the discrepancy between observation and prediction was
due to the time it took reflected light to travel from Jupiter's moons to
the earth. Performing the requisite computations, he simultaneously
explained the discrepancy and discovered the speed of light. Jupiter's
moons were, accorcing to the theory of the day, 'forbidden to disobey
Newton's laws;" but no observation of the form, 'light speck in position
x at time _', was ruled out by those laws. Only by adding a fairly rich
set of background assumptions, could one derive from Newton's laws a
statement concerning what an observer would see in earth's sky at a
certain time.
188 -
Other Thit.gs
Another well-known example from celestial mechanics concerns the
orbit of Uranus. The fact that its actual orbit differed fiom the
predicted orbit leo John Couch Adams (1819-92) and Urbain Leverrier
(1811-77) independently to hypothesize that there was a source of
interference, viz. another planet exerting force on Uranus. Their
suggestion led to the discovery of Neptune, not to a new theory of
mechanics. Newton's laws were not falsified even by a true sentence of
the form, 'Uranus is in position x at time 1', which was contrary to the
original prediction that Uranus would be in position y at t. So even
allowing for heavily theory-laden observations like that of "observing'
what the positi6n of Uranus' was some time in the past, Popper's model of
falsification via observations-plus-modus tollens is inadequate.
Observations may proviae prima facie evidence that a theory T is false.
Moreover, such observations mav require an ?xplanation which show, the
observation to be consistent with T. But a theory is not falsified by
anomalous observations. 4
4. It may be, however, that a given theory can provide no satisfactory
explanation of some particular anomalous observation. If some
alternative theory can explain the observation, we may (in retrospect)
refer to the experiment in which the observation was made as a
"crucial" experiment. And there may be a sense in which the anomalous
observation "showed the original theory to be false." But this is not
what Popper had in mind by 'falsification'. There is a clear analogue
with respect t *abnormal instances and cp-generalizations. We may
think there is an interfering factor explanation for some *abnormal
instance when there is not. Thus, there may be a sense in which a
given *abnormal instance "shows a putative cp-generalization to be
false,' without falsifying the cp-generalization as a matter of logic.
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None of this, of course, is news. Given the truth of the 'Duhem-
Quine" thesis, one cAnnot prove that any single theoretical sentence is
the source of discrepancy between prediction and observation. So no
theoretical sentence, or subset of all the sentences involved in making a
prediction, can be falsified solely on the basis of some observation
sentence. While Quine and Duhem made their point by discussing the
inferential links among sentences, one can make a similar point by
focusing on the causes of observed events. Lakatos [19763 says that
Popper's model is too crude in that:
[Slome scientific theories forbid an event occurring in some
specified finite spatio-temporal region...enly on the
condition that no other factor (possibly hadden in some
distant and unspecified spatio-temporal corner of the
universe) has any influence on it...Another way of putting
this is to say that some scientific theories are normally
interpreted as containing a ceteris paribus clause: in such
cases it is always a specific theory together with this clause
which may be refuted (p. 214).
Thus, if a predicted event E1 fails to occur, one can infer from the
theory T in question that the actual event E2 was influenced by some
"other factor" not accounted for by T.
It may be tempting to conclude that theories have 'ceteris paribus
observational consequences." The laws of a theory T have observational
consequences only if coupled with background assumptions B. So perhaps we
should say that cp, the laws of T have observational consequences ol, 02,
i.., on . We might then "complete" the c•p-generalizations conmprising T by
incorporating B into their antecedents. Another option is to say, with
Lakatos, that when ceteris is not paribus, some "other factor' influenced
I"
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the observed event, One might conclude from this fact that the cp-
generalizationr are to be analyzed in terms of what would be observed if
such influences were absent. But, as we have already seen, there is
reason not to adopt "completion" or "ceteris absentibus' analyses of cp-
generalizations,
What does seem to be the case, however, is that an explanation of
anomalous observations is needed to maintain a theory in the face of such
observations. Roemer explained why the observations of Jupiter's moons
were consistent with-- indeed confirmed-- Newton's theory, by citing the
time it takes light to travel across space. This was a factor influencing
observations (from earth) of the form: light speck in position p at time
t. Similarly, by citing the influence on Uranus of a planet unknown at
the time, Adams and Leverrier explained the discrepancy between (i) the
observations of Uranus' orbit and (ii) predictions made on the basis of
celestial mechanics. And the mischievous nature of a lab partner can be
an explanation of anomalous meter readings.
5.1.2 Explaining Observations and *Abnormal Instances
The two examples discussed, Roemer's explanation of the anomalous
observations of Jupiter's moons and Leverrier's explanation of Uranus'
anomalous orbit, are similar; but they differ in an important respect.
If celestial mechanics is a theory of planetary motion, and not a theory
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of what will be observed in earth's sky, then observations of Jupiter's
moons cannot (in themselves) coi-stitute *abnormal instances of the laws of
celestial mechanics. Making such observations might lead one to conclude
that Jupiter's moons are sometimes "eight minutes off schedule.' But this
conclusion would be mistaken. Bogen and Woodward (1988] argue at length
that claims about what we can observe typically serve merely as evidence
for claims about the unobservable phenomena which theories seek to predict
and explain. Thus, one mqght jrant that anomalous observations facing a
true lawlike sentence L are thinqs to be "explained away," without also
qrartinq that the truth conditions of cp-qeneralizations can be
characterized in terms of being able to 'explain away' the *abnormal
instances of such generalizations. For where L Is a cp-generalization,
certain observation reports may ,rrcvilde evidence that L has *abnormal
instances when, inr, fact, L does not ha,,e such *abnormal instances. One
will want to explain whyo such recorts are consistent with L after all,
perhaps bv modfuving backqround assurrptions acprcpriatelv. But this seems
quite different from the process of reconcilirq a cp-generalization with
its *abnormal instances.
Putting the Dol~t another way, theories typically do not make claims
about observations. But arny trecru which Includes the sentence
'c?(Fx --- ) Gy)' manifextl, rmafes claims about events of the form Fx and
Gy, at least onr Behavioristic readings of laws. So one might think that
drawirg anr aalogy between anomalous obseruations, and *abnormal instances
is misleading. But the claim th-t *abnormral instances of a cp-
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generalization are things to be explained away remains plausible, if we
consider why well-developed theories typically do not make claims about
observations. An example taken from Bogen and Woodward will serve to
illustrate the point.
Suppose a scientist wants to know the boiling point of lead. She
will not take a single thermometer reading, but a series of such
measurements. Regardless of how well the apparatus is working, no matter
how much effort she puts into controlling the setting, the readings will
differ sliqhty from ore another. Thus, the scientist will collect a
scatter of data points; and few, if any, readings will be exactly '3270
C'. As Bogen and Woodward note, our scientist will standardlv assume tha:
her data reflects not only the true melting point, but also "the operation
of numerous other small causes of variation or 'error,' causes which
cannot be controlled for and the details of which remain unknnwr (p.
308)." If various assumptions about these other causes are correct, the
distribution of data points will produce a roughly normal curve; so the
mean will be a qood estimate of lead's meltinq oint. But while it migrht
be possible to observe that a thermometer reads '327.014 C' at the moment
that a particular sample of lead is melting, our scientist cannot observe
the mean of a distribution of data points. Nor can she observe that lead
melts at 327 + 0.10 C. This latter croposition does not reflect mny
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particular observation or even a set of observations. It is inferred from
lots of observations and supporting theories.5
Nonetheless, the fact that lead melts at (approximately) 3270 C can
be the target explanandum for a theory T; while the particular
observation reports which serve as evidence for T will. in all likelihood,
not be target explananda for any theory. This is because particular
thermometer readings will depend on not only the melting point of lead,
but also properties of the thermometer, the purity of the particular lead
sample, interactiont of the sample and tie thermometer, and any number of
extraneous fLctors affecting the lead sample at the time of the
measurement (p. 309). And no single theory accounts for all these
factors. It is sometimes suqggested that "at the end of science' we will
unite all our mini-theories into a single grand theory, from which we will
be able to predict and explain observations. But we have no reason to
think this. will happen. Such a theory would be a theory of everythinq,
for anything can potentially affect observations; and we have no reason
to think there will ever be such a theory. Even if there were a theory
which accounted for everything, we have no reason to think that 'is
5. To say that 'lead melts at 327 + 0.10 C' is a very theory-laden
observation report is to 9givue up anything like ordinary usage of the
term 'observe'. One mnight as well say that Penzias and Wilson observed
the Big Bang by noting the readings of their radiation detecter. (See
175.) One can speak in this way, effectively making no distinction
between observing and detecting, if on~ wishes. But this guarantees
that theories predict and expiain observations only by counting
anything that a theory predicts or explains as an observation.
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humaaily observable" would be one of its kind predicates. Moreover, such a
theory would be of little use, since it would be as complicated as the
observable universe itself. 6
Suppose, therefore, that we give up the idea that there can be a
theory of everything, and satisfy ourselves with the piecemeal theories of
various domains that science actually provides. As long as no theory is a
theory of everything, it is plausible to think that true cp-
generalizations will have *abnormal instances, and that these can bh
explained by citing factors that the theory does not account for. For
example, a theory 9 may have as a consequence that lead melts at 3270 C;
and 8 may explain this fact. But 9 will have lots of *abnormal instances;
since not every lead sample will melt at exactly 327OC. In general, a
lawlike sentence might express a nomological relation between events of
the form Fx and Gu, without taking into account everything that might
affect particular events of the form Gy or "Gv. Recall the quote taken
from Lakatos [1976]:
'[S]wans are white', if true, would be a mere curiosity unless
it asserted that swanress causes whiteness. But then a black
swan would not refute this proposition, since it may only
indicate other causes operating simultaneously (p. 215).
6. It is worth noting, however, that a theory which actually had
observationAl consequences would have to include something like cp-COU.
If an observer-external state of affairs p occurs, than a true theory
of everything would have "p occurs" as a consequence. But to have "p
is observed' as a consequence as well, the theory would have to include
a law something like, "(cp) it will be observed that p, if p."
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We make use of cp-generalizations, because actual phenomenon are
typically the result of many interacting factors! and it is far too
difficult to study them all at once. Again, this is just to say that we
cannot have a theory of everything. So we idealize, ignoring some factors
in order to understand the contribution of a small set of other factors to
observed phenomena. Since the task is to understand the contribution of
some subset of all the factors responsible for a given phenomenon, we
should expect *gbrnormal instances of our lawlike statements. For (given a
Behavioristic readinr) a lawlike statement L makes claims about the
objects in its domain. But those objects might also be affected by
factors not accounted for bt, L or the (less than total) theory of which L
is a part. In such cases, it would be quite surprising if L accurately
described the ba•avior of objects in their domain. The high schcol
chemistrv teacher knows that her student has not truthfully reported the
results of an experiment, if the results are exactly those predicted. For
the teacher knows that events in ths lab are affected oy many factors
other than those accounted for in the particular laws the student is
learning about. 7
By 'carving phenomena" in this way and stating generalizations that
we hold t) be true, despite the fact that they ignore many factors, we are
comrrmitted to holding that *abnorrmal instances of our generalizations are
7. And as Lauymon [1985] notes, the cheating student justifia.bly fails for
not having learned this fact about the practice of scirnce.
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the result of the factors which have been ignored, but which nonetheless
affect objects in L's domain. If our theories focus on certain factors
and ignore others, then if our theories are correct, we should be able in
principle to explain why our theories misdescribe actual phenomena by
citing the factors ignored. This suggests the following proposal, offered
by Rey [forthcoming]: 8
'cp(A --- ) B)' is true, if and only if
every instance of A & ~B is the result of interference
by independent factors.
I will prefer to talk directly about explanations, and say:
'cp(A --- >> 8)' is true, if and only if
there is an explanation for every instance of A & "B
which cites interfering factors.
We may find no difference between these two accounts, if the notion
of explanation appealed to is a metaphysical one, and we are realists
about explanations. But in any case, te would need to modify either
account somewhat; so I will not dckell on either. More importantly, we
need to know more about the notion of interference and/or the kind of
explanation in question. One tth,ng we know already, though, from 'he
rejection of the completion analysis: We won't be able to characterize
what counts as interference independently of the generalization in
8. Though I should note that Rey was not, at least in this paper,
primarily concerned to provide a general account of cp-generalizations.
This proposal was offered, in the context of other concerns about
inr.entionality, as a sketch of what a satisfactory account of cp-
generalizations might look like.
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question. But this is hardly surprising, since which factors a theory
ignores will depend on the theory in question.
A clarificatory point: I have been speaking of factors being ignored
by generalizations and by theories. I think this is harmless, since for
present purposes, I am taking theories to be just sets of (related)
generalizations. So a theory ignores factors ignored by all its
generalizations. We do, however, expect mature sciences to provide sets
of related (cp-)generalizations, such that at least some of the factors
ignored by a given generalization are not ignored by all other
generalizations in the theory. The paradigm cases are 'theories of
forces," like those of physics and evolutionary biology, which lay down
'singleton laws" accounting for various single factors. 9 But again, short
of a theory of everything, there won't be a theory that accounts for all
the factors ignored by some cp-generalization or set of such
generalizations. It will be useful at this point to pause and consider
some examples in which twle know something about the effects of the 'other
factors" ignored byt the theory in question.
9. See Appendix C for further discussion.
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5.1.3 Examples and Discussion
It's pretty clear what we should say about *abnormal instances of the
field laws, on the picture of cp-generalizations under consideration.
Relative to the law of gravity, charge is a source of interference; and
the fact that protons and electrons are charged explains why the behavior
of such bodies constitute *abnormal instances of the law of gravity.
Since these *abnormal instances can be explained by citing interfering
factors, the *abnormal instances do not show the law of gravity to be
false. Similarly, Coulomb's law faces *abnormal instances if a charged
body is in the presence of a dense mass. But we can explain such
*abnormal instances by citing the interference-- in particular the
gravitational attraction-- of the nearby dense mass.
Returning to the billiard ball example that motivated the ceteris
absentibus proposal, a ball pushed north moves north, cp. But a ball that
is pushed north and moves northwest does not show this generalization to
be false, as long as we can explain why the ball failed to move north by
citing an interfering factor (e.g., a push from the east). Moving outside
of physics, we may be able to explain why a particular AND-gate registered
a 'O' given 'l's as input, by citing the fact that the computer containing
the AND-gate was hit by a sledge hammer. If such an explanation is
available, then the cp-generalization, "An AND-gate registers a '1' given
'l's as input," is not shown to be false.
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I will continue to give such examples throughout the chapter, and
Appendix C provides several more from evolutionary biology. It will be
useful, though, to discuss the ideal gas law in some detail. For while
cases in which forces impinge on a billiard ball may help us to grasp the
notion of an "interfering factor," this notion is meant to be more
inclusive than reflection on such cases alone might suggest. It may be
that the ideal gas law is false, even cp. But it can still be
illustrative.
The ideal gas law says that a certain relation holds among three
properties of gases: PU = nRT, where 'P', '.', and 'T' represent
pressure, velocity, and temperature. ('R' represents a constant, and "'n
the number of moles of the gas sample.) The ideal gas law has many
*abnormal instances, however; and the behavior of actual gases deviates
significartly at high pressures. So at best, the ideal gas law describes
the behavior of gases, ceteris paribus. It is standard to note that the
ideal gas law makes the following idealizing assumptions: First, the
space in a container taken up by molecules is negligible compared to the
empty space between molecules; second, the attractive forces between gas
molecules is insignificant; third, collisions between molecules and the
container or other molecules result in no net loss of kinetic energy.
While these are useful idealizing assumptions to make, they are false.
But we can explain at least many *abnormal instances of the ideal gas law,
by citing the effects (on the pressure of a gas sample) of: the space
taken up by molecules in a container, the attractive forces between
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molecules, and the less than perfect elasticity of actual containers and
other molecules.
While gas molecules take up relatively little space in a container,
they are not point masses. So the presence of a gas molecule decreases
the volume in the container available for other molecules to move in.
This decrease in "free volume" tends to increase the pressure in the
container. Unless some other factor "balances out" this increase in
pressure, the result will be an *abnormal instance of the ideal gas law.
Moreover, since actual molecules are not point masses, there is a chance
that they will collide as they travel within the container; and this
chance of collision is increased, because there are certain attractive
forces between gas molecules. Thus, molecules do not simply bounce off
the container wall and travel in straight lines.until they strike the
container again. A molecule may be attracted to and collide with another
molecule. Or again, the path of a molecule between strikes on the
container may be "bent" as the molecule is attracted towards other
molecules. But collisions and large numbers of "bent" paths will result
in fewer strikes by molecules on the container, and thus lower the
pressure inside the container. Finally, there will be a small net loss of
kinetic energy if molecules strike a container or another molecule which
is less than perfectly elastic; and this will tend to lower -the pressure
as well.
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It turns out that a better, though not perfect, description of the
behavior of gases is van der Waal's equation: (P + ant/vz)(V - nb) = nRT,
where 'a' and 'b' are constants characteristic of the gas in question. By
substituting '(V - nb)' for IV', van der Waal's equation accounts for the
fact that the presence of molecules reduces the "free volume" in a
container. And one can think of the term 'an /V2' as an adjustment for
the decrease in pressure due to attractive forces.10 ,11
In this case, we have a more complex law which takes account of some
factors ignored by the ideal gas law. But we cannot conclude from this
fact that cp-generalizations are true only in virtue of a more complex
lawlike statement (one which accounts for the factors ignored) being true.
For van der Waal's equation holds only cp as well. Given any container C
which is less than perfectly elastic, i.e. any actual container, the
behavior of gases in C may constitute *abnormal instances of both van der
Waal's equation and the simpler ideal qas law. Still other explanations
.10. The value of inb turns out to be about four times the actual space
taken up by molecules. So one cannot simply equate "free volume" with
"V - volume occupied by molecules.'
11. One might also want to include a term which accounts for the
inelasticity of containers. Some versions of van der Waal's equation
do just this. There are, of course, practical reasons for wanting to
know the effects of container inelasticity on the behavior of gases.
But there is at least some theoretical reason for not incorporating a
term accounting for container inelasticity into a law about gases.
For intuitively, if deviations from the ideal gas law or the version
of van der Waal's discussed in the text are due to the inelasticity of
the container, such deviations tell us more about the nature of
containers than about the nature of gases.
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are offered for kabnormal instances of van der Waal's equation that occur
when pressures are very high and temperatures very low. So holding that a
cp-generalization G is true only in virtue of a more complex lawlike
statement being true would commit us to the claim van der Waal's equation
is true cp, only in virtue of some yet more complex generalization G'
(which accounts for factors ignored by van der Waal's equation) being
true. But this G6' would, no doubt, be a cp-generalization as well. And
there is no reason to think there is a strict law governing the behavior
of gases, and in virtue of which van der Waal's equation and the ideal gas
law are true. To require that there be such a strict law is just to adopt
the completion analysis with respect to cp-generalizations.
One might note that van der Waal's equation,
(P + anZ/VZ)(V - nb) = nRT, bears a special relation to the ideal gas law,
PV = nRT: the former can be derived from the latter as a special or
limiting case, e.g. by letting a and b equal zero. In general, the two
laws will have the same consequences whenever Vna - PV b - abnt = 0. For
example, both laws make the same claims about temperature when just over a
mole of argon gas is placed in a half-liter container under one atmosphere
of pressure.12  Intuitively, these will be cases in which the increase in
pressure due to the reduction in free volume is "cancelled out" by the
decrease in pressure due to attractive forces between the molecules. But
in other cases, van der Waal's equation will yield different values than
12. For Argon, the values of a and b are 1.35 and 0.322, respectively.
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the ideal gas law for temperatures, given volumes and pressures.
Intuitively, these will be cases in which factors ignored by the ideal gas
law are responsible for *abnormal instances of that law. I mention this,
because it is especially satisfying when we have a generalization G' that
accounts for factors ignored by some other generalization G, and G can be
derived from G' as a special or limiting case. But we should not conclude
that derivability from more complex laws which account for factors ignored
is a requirement for cp-generalizations.
The fact that an AND-gate's containing system was struck with a
sledge hammer may explain why the AND-gate does not output a '1', given
'l's as input. But even if there is a law which tells us what happens
when containing systems get hit with sledge hammers, it is very unlikely
that such a law would also have the lawlike statement governing the
(*normal) operations of AND-gates as a special case. Similarly, we have
no reason to think there is a law which (i) says what happens if organisms
are in the vicinity of an earthquake and (ii) has Darwin's principle of
natural selection as a special or limiting case. Nonetheless, being in
the vicinity of an earthquake can explain why a group of fitter organisms
do not leave more progeny than their less fit competitors.
We do not reject the claim that _.(PV = nRT) solely on the basis of
instances in which PV • nRT. For the ideal gas law ignores various
factors that we know affect the pressure of gases. But in ignoring
certain factors, we need not assume, or even pretend, that those factors
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do not exist. (What would happen if molecules took up no space, failed to
affect one another, and were perfectly elastic?) If we fail to
distinguish ignoring x from pretending that x does not exist, we will be
led to ceteris absentibus analyses of cp-generalizations. But I suggest
that we make just this distinction. For we can then hold that in stating
cp-generalizations, we ignore factors and put off explaining the *abnormal
instances of such generalizations until later. And the cp-generalizations
are true, I suggest, just in case the requisite explanations can be given
by citing the factors ignored.
One might still ask, though: Which factors are ignored by a given
theory? The easy answer is: The factors which explain *abnormal
instances. And I doubt that there is any "deeper" answer to this
question. We often discover "interfering' factors only in the course of
trying to explain *abnormal instances of the laws comprising a theory;
and which factors have an effect on the objects in the domain of a theory
will depend, of course, on the particular theory in question. But one
thing we can say is that independent theorizing plays a crucial role here.
We have independent reason, i.e. reason not wholly dependent on our belief
that the ideal gas law describes the behavior of gases cp, for thinking
that gases are composed of molecules. There are laws governing the
attractive forces between molecules. And we have reason to believe that
attractive forces between molecules can explain *abnormal instances of the
ideal gas law.
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In general, given a lawlike sentence of the form
(10) cp(S1x --- )) S2Y),
we may have independent reason for thinking that some S1 events are
accompanied by R1 events; where R1 may or may not be a kind predicate of
the science S. We may have independent reason to believe that events of
the form R1 x sometimes bring about events of the form R2 z. And we may be
able to explain why some S2 event failed to occur given an S1 event, by
citing the fact that an R2 event occurred. If so, then R1 and/or R2
events may count as interference with respect to (10). To reiterate a
point from the last chapter, I arm not proposing an analysis of cp-
generalizations. But I do want suggest that the notions of. a cp-
generalization, an *abnormal instance, and an interfering factor hang
together in a certain way. Perhaps, then, whatever "makes" a cp-
generalization true (if anything) also determines which factors count as
interference relative to that qeneralization. And perhaps we can
legitimately use our hypotheses about cp-generalizations to shed light on
the interferina factors and vice versa.
5.1.4 A Few Remarks about Confirmation
I want to end this section by dispelling a worry that will surely have
occurred to the reader. The practice of ignoring factors, and then later
explaining *abnormal instances by citing the factors ignored does not
result in theories which never get rejected. The history of science is
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full of theory change. Kepler concluded that (cp) planets move in
elliptical orbits with the sun at a focus, only after rejecting the
initially plausible idea that planets move in circular orbits around the
sun. Kepler decided that certain *abnormal instances of the "circular
theory' (in particular, certain facts about the orbit of Mars) could not
be satisfactorily explained. And we now know, barring general skepticism,
that *abnormal instances of the lawlike sentence, 'Planets move about the
earth in circular orbits,' could not have been explained by citing the
effects of independent factors on planets.
It is crucial that we keep epistemology and metaphysics distinct
here, however. We might not be in a position at a given time (or perhaps
ever) to know whether or not a putative explanation of some *abnormal
instance is correct. Similarly, we might not be absolutely certain that
explanations of the *abnormal instances of some law would not be
forthcoming if only we tried a little harder. But this is just to say
that there is no hard and fast decision procedure which will tell us when
to reject one theory and adopt another. Confirming explanations of
*abnormal instances will typically require appeal to other theories and
further investigation that we might or might not be able to carry out.
This is not to say that nothinq can be said about the confirmation of
cp-generalizations. I cannot fully address this topic in here. But
especially where quantitative measurement is appropriate, one would expect
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that accounting for more factors would yield more accurate predictions. 13
Unfortunately, this claim itself holds only cp. For there might be a set
of factors ignored by a theory T such that accounting for all of them
would yieald more accurate predictions, out accounting for any one or tnem
might actually lead to less accurate predictions. Moreover, we may have
reason to believe that a factor f is at work without being able to make
exact predictions when we take f into account. The three body problem is
a case in point.14 But this only serves to remind us that confirming
theories is hard. And even if the n-body problem turned out to be
(provably) insolvable, we could still explain *abnormal instances of
Kepler's laws by citing interplanetary effects.
Another way that cp-qeneralizations might receive confirmation is
simply by leading us to look for interfering factors that we eventually
find. Feynman [1967] says, "If we have confidence in a law, then if
something appears to be wrong, it can suggest to us another phenomenon (p.
23)." I take it that if (i) a lawlike sentence L has *abnormal instances;
(ii) these instances would be explained if p were the case; (iii) because
13. See Laymon [1985, 1989), who argues that a set of laws receives
confirmation if the use of "more realistic specifications of initial
or boundary conditions in fact leads to more accurate predictions
([1989], p. 359)."
14. The three body problem is a relatively simple instance of the n-body
problem, that of determining the location of.n massive bodies at time
t', given initial conditions at t, where the distance between the
bodies is small enough so that each body exerts significant
gravitational force on the others.
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of (ii), we look to see if p is the case; and (iv) we discover to our
surprise that p obtains; then (v) L is confirmed. I have no model of
confirmation to offer to back up the inference from (i-iv) to (v). But I
think the intuition is quite clear. For in general, we take the discovery
of the surprising to be among the best sources of confirmation for a
theory. For example, it seems to me that the two-fold process of (a)
determining that one could explain why Uranus' orbit differed from the
orbit expected if there were another planet in a given position and (b)
discovering a new planet in that position provided excellent confirmation
of Newton's theory of mechanics.
5. 2 I n i t i al Ob e t i o n s
Having at least motivated, I hope, the "explaining away *abnormal
instances" approach to cp-generalizations, I want to turn now to
discussing two general objections to the approach. The first is a point
put aside in the last chapter, viz. Cartwright's worry that cp-
generalizations cannot figure in explanations in the many cases in which
ceteris is not paribus. The second has to do with inter-theoretic
considerations. The worry is most sharply formulated with respect to
quantuum mechanics: If a very improbable quantuum event occurs, there may
be an *abnormal instance of some special science law; but what
interfering factor can one point to that explains the *abnormal instance?
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5.2.1 Cartwright's Challenge
Cartwright [1983] poses a serious challenge for any account of cp-
generalizations. We use cp clauses, because without them, we could not
hold as true many lawlike sentences that are very useful in providing
explanations. Suppose 'cp(Fx --->> Gy)' means that if ceteris is paribus,
(Fx ---)) Gy)'; and suppose we want a Hempelian D-N explanation for some
event of the form Gy. We take as a premise
(11) 'if ceteris is paribus, then (Fx --- )) Gy).'
If wt, know that initial conditions of the form Fx have been met, we have
as a second premise,
(12) 'Fx.'
If we can also add
(13) 'ceteris is paribus,'
then our D-N explanation is complete. For '(Fx --- >> Gy)' follows from
(11) and (13); and (on the assumption that we have modus ponens for '--->)')
'Gy' follows, given (12). But suppose we want to explain some event e
such that, if e occurs, it follows (logically or nomologically) that an
event of the form ~Gv occurs. (A special case will arise if e itself is
of the form "Gy.) From Fx and the fact that e occurs, it follows that
Fx & "Gy, from which we can conclude that ceteris is not paribus with
respect to (11). Hence, the antecedent of (11) is not satisfied! and so
it appears that (11) cannot figure in a D-N explanation of the fact that e
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occurred. But we often want to make use of generalizations of the form
cp(Fx --- )) Gy) in explanations precisely when ceteris is not paribus--
when an event e occurs, such that it from the fact that e occurs it
follows that an event of the form (Fx & "Gy) occurs.
For example, thermometers don't always register the ambient
temperature. Suppose that the thermometer reads '72.10' when the
temperature is 720, say because the barometric pressure is very high.
Intuitively, at least part of the explanation of why the thermometer reads
'72.10' is that cp thermometers register the ambient temperature. But
since the thermometer is not registering the ambient temperature, ceteris
must not be paribus. But having concluded thisl it seems that our cp-
generalization is irrelevant to explaining the actual thermometer reading.
For it tells only how thermometers and temperatures are related when
ceteris is paribus. Of course, the D-N paradigm does not exhaust the
notion of explanation. And we might want to give up the idea that c_-
generaYizations should take the form of (11). But Cartwright's worry will
still remain: We want to know how it is possible that a cp-generalization
can figure in explanations when ceteris is not paribus.
The answer, I think, lies in the notion of an interfering factor and
the kind of explanation we give when we explain *abnormal instances by
citing such factors. I have repeatedly emphasized that, in rejecting the
completion analysis of cp-generalizations, we saw there was no reason to
think one could pick out the conditions in which a generalization has no
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*abnormal instances independently of the generalization itself. And in
the last section, I said that what counts as interference will depend on
the generalization in question. Well again, when we explain an *abnormal
instance of a cp-generalization, we make use of the generalization itself.
That is, when we explain why B failed to occur given A and cp(A --- >> B)
by citing interfering factors, the explanation itself makes reference to
the cp-generalization.
Keeping things at an intuitive level, a true ceteris paribus law
seems to give us a sense of what a "pure" case in some domain is like. We
then understand *abnormal cases in terms of additional factors somehow
altering, or "interfering with," the pure case. Kepler's law that planets
travel in elliptical orbits around the sun provides a wonderful example of
this. Mars' orbit, it turns out, is not elliptical. We can explain this
fact by citing, among other things, the fact that Jupiter exerts force on
Mars. Again intuitivelu, the way this explanation goes is that we imagine
Mars as a single planet orbiting the sun. Then, introducing Jupiter into
the picture distorts Mars' orbit slightly. Similarly for any other
factors that somehow affect disturb Mars' orbit. But we want to avoid a
slide into ceteris absentibus accounts of cp-generalizations here. The
picture of adding factors piecemeal to an otherwise "factorless situation
is attractive, and it provides a useful way of thinking about cp-
generalizations. But we might also think about cp-generalizations in a
slightly different way, focusing on the notion of a default.
- 212 -
9Ki, 3-P~L~~-YT~·i~U riL,~ii
Other Things
Suppose we say that planets (*normally) travel in elliptical orbits
around the sun. Then what requires explanation is not the
"ellipticalness" of planetary orbits, but deviations from a *normal
ellipse-shaped orbit. If we said, on the other hand, that planets
(*normally) travel in circular orbits, our default assumption would
differ; and different things, i.e. deviations from circular orbits, would
require explaining. A cp-generalization serves to establish our
explanatory commitments; and in the default case, when we have a *normal
instance of the generalization, this commitment is null. If we found a
solar system in which a lone planet did travel around its sun in an
elliptical path, we would simply cite Kepler's law as the explanation of
why the planet orbits as it does. 1 5
A cp-generalization "earns its keep" by providing a theoretically
useful division between default cases and cases that require further
explanation, i.e. explanation by citing interfering factors. But again,
15. Of course, if we measured carefully enough, we would no doubt find
some deviation from Kepler's law in any actual situation. But we
always idealize our data somewhat. If we say that Jupiter has mass m,
we don't mean that it has mass m and not a milligram more. (See
Laymon [1985] for an extended discussion of this point.) Such
idealization could, at least in principle, matter. For it might lead
us to "miss" an *abnormal instance of a generalization for which there
is no interfering factor explanation. How much we actually idealize
data is largely dependent on the interests at hand. But this does not
threaten a "realist" reading of cp-generalizations. For there have to
be explanations of all *abnormal instances of a generalization for thegeneralization to be true, including those *abnormal instances
corresponding to less idealized data. There may, however, be
interesting limitations here stemming from the theory of measurement.
See note 2, chapter four above.
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the ep-generalization is true, just in case the non-default cases can be.
so explained. We will need to complicate this account in two ways in the
next section. First, we will have to talk about defeasible interference
explanations, to account for cases in which multiple interfering factors
are at work. Second, not all *normal instances can be neatly classified
as default cases for purposes of explanatory commitment. Given that
cp(A --- >> B), some instances of A & B will carry an explanatory
commitment, viz. those instances that occur when multiple interfering
factors intuitively "cancel out." But this does not change the form of
the response to Cartwright's worry. Even when ceteris is not paribus, a
cp-generalization can figure as part of the explanation for some event;
because a cp-generalization establishes the "pure" or 'default" case, by
contrast to which we explain *abnormal events.
Given that a thermometer registers '72.10' when it is 720, the
generalization, "cp, a thermometer registers the ambient temperature,"
tells us what to explain. We have to explain why thermometer registered
'72.10' as opposed to '724'.16 The claim that thermometers *normally
register the ambient temperature will be part of this explanation; for we
will explain the tenth of a degree discrepancy by citing some factor that
counts as interference with respect to this generalization, e.g. the high
barometric pressure. Similarly, Kepler's law tells us what about Mars'
16. See Bromberger [1966] for discussion of some related points concerning
"Why Questions."
- 214 -
Other Things
Other Things
orbit we have to explain, viz. the fact that it deviates somewhat from an
ellipse. We can explain this by citing Jupiter's gravitational influence
on Mars. But this explanation works only against the background of
Kepler's law.17
The idea that a generalization establishes "default' cases which
require -Io further explanation beyond citing some initial conditions and
the generalization itself may strike the reader as odd. If so, it is
worth noting that when ceteris is paribus, we can generate what seem to be
paradigm D-N style explanations. Indeed, it was this fact that led to
worries about the role of cp-generalizations when ceteris is not paribus.
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that significant theory change does
involve a change with respect to what requires explanation. Consider a
widely discussed example. Aristotle thought that one had to explain why a
ball thrown at time t continued to move at t', in the absence of anything
obviously pushing the ball along. Newton, on the other hand, took this to
be the default case: A body in motion tends to stay in motion. The
problem for Newton, then, was to explain (inter alia) why things stopped
moving. We sometimes put this point by saying-that what requires
explanation is change of motion; and Aristotle thought motion was one
thing, while Newton thought it was something else. But the upshot is the
same. In switching from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics, we adopted a
17. Or perhaps we should say that the explanation works only against the
background of a theory of mechanics (say Newton's) from which Kepler's
law can be derived.
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new set of hypothesized generalizations; and as a result, different
events called for explanation.
This example also serves to remind us that the sheer number of
*abnormal instances faced by a op-generalization is not the most important
issue. There are lots of bodies that stop moving (i.e. lose
acceleration), but none that will actually keep moving (i.e. maintain
acceleration) forever. It can still be true, however, that cp a body in
motion stays in motion, as long as there is an explanation for every
instance in which a body stops. Similarly, it can be the case that cp a
body at rest stays at rest, even though lots of resting bodies come to
move. What is required is that there be an explanation for each such
instance. In short, it turns out on the account of cp-generalizations
under consideration that Newtonian mechanics is committed to there being
explanations (in terms of Newtonian forces) for every change in motion;
and this seems to be a plausible claim.
This is not to say that we have no reason to prefer generalizations
with fewer *abnormal instances to competing generalizations with more
*abnormal instances. It may be reasonable scientific practice to infer
that generalizations with fewer *abnormal instances are more likely to be
true. But the inference from "more *abnormal instances" to "false" is
itself defeasible. It is also important to remember here that "ceteris
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paribus reasoning" is non-monotonic. 1 8 Other things equal, a body falls
at a rate of 16 feet per second,. Bodies are also affected by friction.
But it doesn't follow that, other things equal, bodies affected by
friction fall at a rate of 16 feet per secondz. Similarly, planets
*normally travel in elliptical orbits. But planets affected by the
gravitational influence of other planets do not *normally travel in
elliptical orbits. Because of this non-monotonicity, it is not always
clear whether two generalizations are competitors. Suppose we introduce
the term '-F' to account for the effect of friction on falling bodies.
Then cp, a body falls at a rate of 16 feet per secondz - F; and cp, a body
falls at a rate of 16 feet per secondZ. Both generalizations can be true,
since the former accounts for a factor ignored by the latter. So despite
appearances, the two generalizations are not competitors. 1 9
5.2.2 The Coin Toss Problem
An adequacy condition on any account of ep-generalizations is that it not
have as a consequence that 'cp(A --- )) B)' is true for arbitrary A and B.
18. In non-monotonic systems, one cannot infer from 'if A then C' to 'if A
and B, then C'.
19. See the discussion of the ideal gas law and van der Waal's equation
above. Interestingly, default reasoning is also non-monotonic. From
the claim that Tweety is a bird, we make the (defeasible) inference
that Tweety can fly. But from the claim that Tweety is a bird and
Tweety's foot is in solid cement, we (again defeasibly) infer the
contrary,
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I call this the "coin-toss" problem, because a striking instantiation of
it is posed by the question: Why shouldn't we say that cp, coin tosses
come up heads? Suppose we had left the notion of an "interfering factor"
out of our account, and held simply that 'cp(A --->> B)' is true just in
case we can offer some explanation of every instance of A & "B. We can,
presumably, give some (causal) explanation of every particular instance in
which a coin is tossed and lands tails up. So it would follow from this
account of cp-generalizations that cp, coin tosses come up heads
(henceforth, 'cp, CTCUH'). An adequate account of cp-generalizations
should not only avoid this conclusion, it should also point the way
towards a general response to the coin-toss problem. That is, it should
help explain why 'cp(A --->> B)' is not true for arbitrary A and B.
Consider again the simple account of cp-generalizations just offered,
-from which it follows that cp, CTCUH. It would also follow from this
account that cp, coin tosses come up tails. For just as we could give a
(causal) explanation of every particular instance in which a coin toss
came up tails, similarly for every particular instance in which a coin
toss camne up heads. This seems especially bad. Although I'm not prepared
to argue for this, I don't see how there can be true generalizations of
the form "cp(Fy --->> Gy)" and "cp(Fx --- >> "Gy)." For I just don't think
it is possible for the property being F to bear the relevant nomic
relation to both the property being G and the property being not-G. These
considerations might yield a solution to the coin toss problem. For we
might introduce a constraint to the effect that any set of cp-
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generalizations not contain generalizations that are contrary in this way.
We might then refuse to admit the generalization 'cp, CTCUH'; because by
parity of reason, we would have to admit the generalization 'cpq coin
tosses come up tails'; from which 'cp, coin tosses don't come up heads'
would follow. As I say, there may be a solution to the coin toss problem
here. It may even be that we will be forced to adopt some such solution
in the end. But it would nice if we could avoid adding constraints and
talking about sets of cp-gensralizations. 2 0  And in any case, reflection
on the coin toss problem is of use, because it can help to clarify (by
contrast) the notion of an interfering factor explanation.
If a cp-generalization commits us not merely to there being
explanations for its *abnormal instances, but to there being interfering
factor explanations for these instances, then we can at least say
something about what is wrong with the claim that cp, CTCUH. For the
explanations we can give of cases in which coin tosses come up tails do
not involve the generalization cp, CTCUH as interfering factor
explanations do. Intuitivelu, when we explain why a thermometer registers
'72.10' when it is 720, we explain the tenth of a degree discrepancy
against a background in which w.e assume that (*norrmally) thermometers
register the ambient temperature. But this is not the case when we
20. This move would not, howeuer, be completely unmotivated. One might
try to argue from the holistic nature of theory confirmation to a
picture in which the truth of a cp-generalization could not be
determined in isolation from that of other cp-generalizations with
which it is interconnected.
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explain why a particular coin toss comes up tails. We certainly do not
think these explanations depend on the claim that cp, CTCUH; for we give
these explanations now without believing this claim. Moreover, given that
cp(A --- >> B), all interfering factor explanations of A & "B have
something in common (other than the fact that they are all explanations of
A & "B). They share a common structure, in that they all explain
deviation from some *norrA; and they all cite factors that are sources of
interference relative to the same generalization. But our sundry
explanations of particular coin tossings that result in tails-up do not
exhibit such commonalities. They are, intuitively, just an arbitrary
collection of token events, where the events just happen to have something
in common, viz. being 'tails-up events."
It may be useful here to compare the coin toss case with a real case
of a "bad" putative cp-generalization. Ptolemy had a theory about
planetary orbits: circular orbits around the earth, with various
epicycles introduced. We want to say that this theory was false. It's
not true, even cp, that the planets (and sun) travel around the earth in
circular orbits. The problem with Ptolemy's theory is not merely that it
is inferior to Newtonian mechanics as a predictor of planetary positions.
Astronomers had adopted the heliocentric hypothesis before any other
theory's predictive capability rivaled that of Ptolemy's geocentric
theory. Even today, navigators often use Ptolemaic theory to chart their
courses, because it is so much easier to use than Newtonian mechanics.
Nor is the problem that introducing epicylcles is an ad hoc maneuver
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designed to avoid *abnormal instances. Scientists introduce ad hoc
devices, like citing unobserved planets, to save their theories all the
time. What is wrong with saying that (cp) the planets travel the earth in
circular orbits is that the *abnormal instances of this theory can't be
explained by citing interfering factors.
Epicycles complicate the geocentric theory, and they have as a
consequence that the resulting theory has fewer actual *abnormal
instances. 2 1 But epicycles (as a theoretical device) do not reflect the
effects of interfering factors that somehow distort the *normally circular
and geocentric orbits of the planets. Appeal to epicycles in Ptolemaic
theory do not involve the claim that *normally planets orbit the earth;
nor do such appeals explain why an "epicycless" version of geocentric
theory has *abnormal instances.22  Similarly, I suggest, at least one
problem with the claim that cp, CTCUH is that explanations of cases in
which coin tosses come up tails will not take the form of citing
interfering factors that explain deviation from the *normal case. In
short, these explanations do not involve the putative cp-generalizations;
and correspondingly, the putative cp-generalization does not set up a
21. Fewer, that is, relative to some idealization of data that we hold
constant. We always allow that some discrepancies don't count as
*abnormal instances. Where quantitative measurement is appropriate,
we can cash this out in terms of approximations to certain values
derived from (inter alia) observations. See note 15 above.
22. One can, perhaps, imagine a possible scenario in which epicycles
correspond to such factors. But in such a scenario, I think the
geocentric theory would be true cp.
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"pure" or "default" case, by contrast to which *abnormal instances of the
generalization are explained.
This response to the coin toss problem is, admittedly, not completely
satisfactory. But in the end, I suspect that all we can say concerning
why 'cp, CTCUH' is false is that the right nomic relation does not hold
between coin tossings and events in which coins land heads up. The best
we can hope for is to find some features that distinguish 'cp, CTCUH' from
cp-generalizations that we take to be true. In any case, we will shall be
returning to this problem (in a slightly different context) ii the next
section, and again in the next chapter. Once we introduce the idea that
*normal instances of a cp-generalization carry an explanatory commitment,
we will have further reason for holding that 'cp, CTCUH' is false.
Moreover, I will be pressing the idea that the explanatory commitments of
a- cp-generalization can proliferate. And this, I think, will also
partially explain why the claim that cp, CTCUH seems so implausible. I
want to turn now to a somewhat different objection to the general account
of cp-generalizations I have been urging.
5.2.3 Inter-theoretic Considerations
Regardless of one's theory of cp-generalizations, one will have to allow
for "percolation" of *abnormal instances up from lower levels of
generalization to levels of generalization that reduce to or supervene on
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the lower levels. Presumably some *abnormal instances of intentional
generalizations can be the result of neural pathology, i.e. the *abnormal
functioning of those neural states on which the intentional states in
question supervene. But the intentional is hardly'alone in this respect.
Neurological generalizations can presumably fail as the result of
biochemical imbalances. Economic generalizations may fail because of
glitches in the computers regulating currency at the US Mint. The failure
of an AND-gate to register a '1' given '1's as input might be due to
*abnormal electrical activity. This is not to say that all *abnormal
instances of a generalization G' are the result of *abnormal instances of
some generalization at a level that G' supervenes on. But clearly at
least some *abnormal instances of a cp-generalization can be due to
failures of ceteris to be paribus with respect to a generalization at a
lower level of description; and the *abnormality can "percolate up."
There is nothing very surprising about this claim. Suppose some
generalization of the form, S1 --- >> S2y," strictly reduces to another
generalization of the form, R1  --- )) R2Y. Then any event which
constitutes an *abnormal instance of the latter generalization will ipso
facto constitute an *abnormal instance of the former. But even if the
relation between generalizations at the level of S and generalizations at
the level of R is weaker than that of strict reduction, events that
constitute *abnormal instances of generalizations at the level of R can be
token identical to events covered by generalizations at the level of S.
And depending on the relation between the sciences R and S, it might even
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be necessary in such cases that there be an *abnormal instance at the
level of S as well. In any case, *abnormality at the level of R can
explain *abnormality at the level of S. Putting the point another way,
the *normal conditions for the generalizations of one science may include
the *normal conditions for the generalizations in some other science. Or
again, ceteris may be parihus with respect to one generalization only if
ceteris is paribus with respect to certain other generalizations.
The idea that *abnormality can 'percolate up" does not seem
especially problematic. For whatever factors explain the relevant
*abnormal instance(s) at the lower level can be cited to explain the
*abnormal instance(s) at the higher level as well. But suppose, as seems
to be the case, that at least some parts of physics will turn out to be
"irredeemably" probabilistic.23  Presumably, there could be some
collection of events such that (i) according to the laws of physics, each
of the events is improbable, and (ii) this collection of events is
accompanied by, perhaps even identical to, an *abnormal instance of at
least one cp-generalization. For presumably, if enough .events are
improbable enough at the level of physical description, there will be
*abnormal instances at higher levels of description. But we would not
have an *abnormal instance of a physical generalization in such cases.
Improbable events (events that, under physical description, are
23. There are, presumably, many probabilistic facts that arise out of the
interaction of many causal factors. But these facts are not
irredeemably probabilistic.
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improbable) are not, or at least they need not be, *abnormal instances of
probabilistic generalizations of physics. But if we cannot point to
*abnormality at the physical level to explain *abnormal instances at
special science levels, what factors can we point to in order to explain
these *abnormal instances? For again, if the physical generalizations are
irredeemably probabilistic, then there is no interfering factor that
explains wh the improbable events occurred. (Indeed, this may be just
what it is to say that parts of physics are irredeemably probabilistic.)
So the possibility of improbable events accompanied by *abnormal instances
of cp-generalizations in the special sciences presents a worry for the
picture of ep-generalizations under consideration.
There are two things that one can say here. First, the objection
above is hypothetical at best. I do nut mean to trade on the fact the
requisite improbable events might not ever occur. My point is rather that
the objection above assumes that there can be improbable events
accompanied by *abnorrrmal instances of some generalization G in the special
sciences, and also that such events will not be accompanied by the
presence of some interfering factor that would explain the *abnormal
instance. There will be no factor that explains why the improbable event
occurred. But it doesn't follow that an event which is (i) token
identical to an event including an improbable event and (i i) token
identical to an event includinq an *abnormal instance of some
generalization will not also be (iii) token identical to an event
including an interfering factor that explains the *abnormal instance
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mentioned in (ii). The improbable event, *abnormal instance, and
interfering factor which explains the *abnormal instance might come
together as a kind of "package deal." Or again, there might be no
interfering factor explanation for why an event e occurred, where is
under a physical description according to which e is an "improbable
event." But it doesn't follow that there is no interfering factor
explanation for why e occurred, where e is under a special science
description according to which e is an *abnormal instance of a
generalization of the special science in question.
I don't have an argument which proves that for any improbable event
accompanied by an *abnormal instance of some generalization, the
improbable event will be accompanied by an appropriate interfering factor
as well. But I doubt that there is any argument to the contrary either.
Suppose that quantum mechanics is correct as currently formulated. We
just don't know enough about its implications, much less the inter-
theoretic relations between it and the special sciences, to make any
(justifiable) claims one way or the other here. But let's suppose that
the physical world conspires against us, and that as a matter of empirical
fact, there can be events such that they (i) include events that are
improbable at the physical level of description, (ii) are token identical
to *abnormal instances of some special science generalizations, and (iii)
are unaccompanied by interfering factors that explain the *abnormal
instances mentioned in (ii). If this is the way the world is, then it
would seem reasonable to adopt the following policy for each special
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science St If enough improbable (at the level of physical description)
events occur to make a difference with respect to the laws of S, then all
bets are off. That is, if the requisite improbable events occur, then
generalizations in the special sciences make no claims whatsoever.
This policy would weaken the claims of the special sciences; for it
would, in effect, restrict the domain of events over which generalizations
in the special sciences range. But if the only explanation of improbable
events that physics can offer is, "Well, the improbable happened," then
perhaps the special sciences need not be embarrassed by having nothing to
say about such events either. I should note that this policy differs from
that of adding an extra antecedent of the form, 'With probability of ...,
to all special science generalizations. For we don't want to
"probabilize" special science laws. We want keep special science laws
from applying to certain events, in particular, certain events that count
as improbable for basic science. It is also worth noting that a move like
this will be required if the possibility imagined arises, regardless of
one's views about cp-generalizations. For if improbable events are
accompanied by *abnormal instances of special science generalizations,
then either (i) the generalizations in question are false, or (ii) the
generalizations must be understood as somehow restricted so as not to
cover the improbable events in question. The move I am suggesting amounts
to removing certain events from the domain of events over which
generalizations in the special sciences quantify.
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Of course, there is nothing special about probabilistic physics here.
If the laws of some science S supervene on those of another science R, and
the laws of R are irredeemably probabilistic, then the same situation may
arise. I suppose it is an empirical possibility, that for some "high
level" special science S, all bets are off fairly often. The laws of S
might supervene on the laws of several different probabilistic sciences;
and the number of occasions on which the improbable happens at one of
these lower levels or other might be non-negligible. If this is the way
the world is, then ep-generalizations in some special sciences may be
relatively uninteresting. But to be uninteresting is not necessarily to
be false.
5.3 Accoun t i ng f or Cornpl i c at i o ns
So far, I've been defending the proposal:
'cp(A --- ) B)' is true, if and only if
for every instance of A & "8, there is an interfering factor
explanation which explains why B failed to occur given A.
I've also tried to develop this proposal, by saying more about the notion
of interference and the sense in which the cp-generalization itself
figures in the interfering factor explanation. But we need to complicate
this proposal in a couple of ways. It would also be nice if we could get
our final account to characterize cp-generalizations as being of the form:
If ... , then (A --- )) B). For then the account would provide a clear
answer to the question, "What is it for ceteris to be paribus?"
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5.3.1 Multiple Factors and *Normal Commitment
The account we have been considering tells us that, given a cp-
generalization and an *abnormal instance of that generalization, there is
an explanatory commitment. But there are similar explanatory commitments
given *normal instances. Suppose that on Monday we cite some interfering
factor Ij to explain an *abnormal instance of 'cp, (Fx --- >) Gy)'; and
suppose that on Tuesday, there is an instance of Fx & Gy in the presence
of Ij Something is amiss. For it can't be that Ij both does and doesn't
interfere with the nomological relation between the properties F and 6.
Of course, one can say that sometimes the presence of Ij interferes, and
sometimes it doesn't. But then the question becomes: When does I.
interfere? And we want an answer more substantive than: I. interferes
when there is an *abnormal instance for Ij to explain. What we want,
intuitively, is an explanation of why Gy didn't fail to occur on Tuesday
given the presence of 1j. Let's look at some examples.
Grant that (cp) bodies fall at a rate of 16 feet per second
Failures of this law to describe the path of actual falling bodies may be
explicable as the result of interference, e.g. friction. But if a
particular body accelerates at a rate of exactly 16 feet/secondk when
there is friction, something is amiss. We have already noted that one of
the interesting (and maddening) things about cp-generalizations is that,
since the world is so complex, one should not expect exactly what the cp-
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generalization alone would lead one to expect. Where precise quantitative
measurement is appropriate, given Fx and cp(Fx --- )) Gy), one should not
expect Gy; although one might expect something "close to' Gy. A
particular body might accelerate at a rate of 15.5 feet per second&, for
example. Given friction, the fact that this rate is less than the rate
mentioned by the law of free fall is unsurprising; since friction tends
to reduce acceleration. What would be surprising is a body affected by
friction that failed to fall at a rate slower than 16 feet/second 2 . Such
a case would call for explanation.
Or again, consider our simple billiard ball example. Other things
equal, a ball pushed north will continue to move nor'th. Suppose we push a
ball north, it moves north, but we discover that there was an extra force
from the east exerted on the ball. We expect an explanation of the fact
that the ball still moved north, despite the force from the east: perhaps
there was also a force from the west exerted on the ball. Thus, a
characterization of cp-generalizations must reflect the fact that *normal
instances of a law in the presence of interference require explanation.
And to reflect this fact, a characterization must also account for the
possibility of multiple sources of interference.
Intuitively, we explain why a *normal instance of a cp-generalization
occurred despite interference, by citing further interference which
somehow "cancels out" the original interference. Suppose a body affected
by friction does fall at exactly 16 feet/second2 . Given the law of free
- 230 -
Other T ings
Other Things
fall, we conclude that, in addition to the friction, there must have been
futcher interference that 'cancelled out' the effects of friction on the
falling body: perhaps there was a strong wind. But examples of such
cancelling need not be confined to hypothetical cases. Earlier in this
chapter, I said that the ideal gas law, 'PV = nRT', and van der Waal's
equation, '(P + ant VA)(V - nb) = nRT', yield the same results under
certain conditions, i.e. whenever Vna - PVtb - abnI = 0. The second
lawlike statement accounts for factors ignored by the first. In
particular, van der Waal's equation accounts for (i) the decrease in "free
volume" due to the fact that molecules take up space in a container, which
tends to increase in pressure, and (ii) attractive forces between
molecules, which tend to decrease pressure. So cases in which the two
lawlike statements yield equal values for pressure (given volume and
temperature) are, if the laws are correct, cases in which these factors
balance out with respect to the pressure of a gas sample. If we place
just over a mole of argon gas in a half-liter container under one
atmosphere of pressure, then we have a concrete example of this sort.
In many cases, we may be able to express the 'cancelling out"
numerically. Vector addition provides an especially satisfying means of
doing just this. What we need, however, is a more general idea of what it
is for interfering factors to cancel out, especially when precise
quantitative measurement is either not appropriate or not possible. And
we must also be able to account for arbitrarily many sources of
interference. It is probably a law, for example, that (cp) inflation will
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go down if the Federal Reserve Board raises the interest rate. But if,
concurrently with the Federal Reserve Board raising the interest rate, IBM
produces a new (very expensive) computer that everyone wants immediately,
inflation may not go down. If on the same day, however, the Wall Street
Journal preoicts a mild recession in the upcoming months, the net result
may be that inflation decreases after all. We can explain this *normal
instance of the "interest-inflation" law in the face of IBM's interference
(which will increase demand for credit) by citing a further source of
interference (viz., the introduction of fear about the future, which will
decrease spending). But we cannot, at least at present, quantify the
effect of IBM, the Fed, and the Wall Street Journal on the economy and add
them together. And if the interference is some *abnormality that
"percolates up" from lower level of description, any suggestion of
quantifying and "adding up" will be hopeless.
We might consider an example in which quantitative measurement of
interfering factors is clearly inappropriate. It usually takes me between
45 and 55 minutes to drive from my parents' house to the Philadelphia
airport. Urban traffic exhibits regularities, so there may well be laws
from which one could conclude that, cp, such a trip would take between 45
and 55 minutes. Suppose there are such laws. On some occasions, getting
a flat tire has explained why it took me over an hour to get to the
airport. But I might get a flat on a particular tripq yet still get to
the airport in 50 minutes. For i might be travelling on a day when
traffic is especially light (say because a local factory let out early,
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due to a minor fire), and which also happens to be the one day of the
decade when there is no bridge construction (say because the road crews
went on strike).
We have to be careful, however, not to be misled by cases of
potential overdetermination in which one of the potential causes is
interfered with. Suppose that both (i) cp(Fx --- )) Gy) and (ii)
cp(Hz --->)) Gy), where it is not the case that cp(Fx --- )) Hz); and
suppose also that Fx and Hz obtain. There may be interference with
respect to (i) that is not, intuitively, cancelled out by further
interference. For ceteris may be paribus with respect to (ii).
Nonetheless, we will have a *normal instance of (i). For example,
radiation (F) and smoking (H) both cause cancer (G). A smoker regularly
exposed to radiation may develop cancer, even if the protective clothing
he wears functions properly. But smoking does not cancel out the
interference of protective clothing with respect to the connection between
radiation and cancer. Having said this, I will henceforth ignore such
possibilities, which is not to say there may not be difficult problems
here. But we can think of factors that interfere with (i) above as
factors that prevent the nomic connection between the properties F and G
from "manifesting itself' in the behavior of objects in the domain of (i).
But in cases like the one described, this is exactly what the interference
(protective clothing) with respect to (i) does. As a result, the nomic
connection between F and 6 is not manifested. What is manifested is the
nomic connection between the properties H and G; although we may be
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misled by the fact that events of the form Fx and Gy both occur, if we do
not know about the event of the form Hz.
The important point I want to call attention to is the following: An
adequate characterization of truth conditions for cp-generalizations must
(i) account for the possibility of multiple sources of independent
interference, (ii) allow for the possibility that interfering factors can
effectively "cancel each other out," and (iii) reflect the fact that
*normal instances of a generalization in the presence of interference
require explanation, just as *abnormal instances of the generalization do.
5.3.2 Cancelling as Defeating
Suppose 1 . is an interfering factor (or group of such factors) with
respect to a generalization of the form: cp(Fx --- >> Gy). Then
intuitively, the presence of I. can explain why Gy fails to occur given
Fx, at least in some situations. But as we saw, there may be situations
in which Fx and Gp both obtain in the presence of I. For the
interference of 1j might be "cancelled out" by further interference. In
such a case, call the interfering factor explanation which cites Ij a
"quasi-explanation" ('quasi-', because it *explains" something is which is
not the case, vit. that Gy fails to obtain). Let us say that the quasi-
explanation which cites I is defeated, if there is a further interfering
factor (or combination of factors) Ik which explains why Gy occurs given
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Fx and 1j. Intuitively, the generalization, 'cp(Fx --- >>)) Gy)' tells us
that, given Fx, Gy is the *norm or default case. But this claim is
defeasible.24 Once we account for the interference cf I, we cannot say
that Gy is the *norm. On the contrary, given Fx and Gy and the presence
of Ij, we have the same kind of explanatory commitment we would have given
an instance of Fx & "Gy. So a *normal instance of a cp-generalization in
the presence of some interfering factor I. commits us to the claim that
the quasi-explanation which cites 1. is defeated.
One might wonder whether it is appropriate to speak of any
interference explanation, gquasio or not, citing I. that needs to be
defeated if Gy occurs. Perhaps knowing that Ij is present would cause
puzzlement, and perhaps the only wav to resolve this puzzlement would be
to discouer some other factor affecting Gy. But, one might think, these
are matters of epistemology; and I have been emphasizing that the notion
of explanation appealed to is a metaphysical one, or at least not a merely
epistemological one. I agree that we can understand claims about quasi-
explanationsc. that get defeated by further interference in epistemic terms.
Indeed, as we shall see, I have borrowed the notion.of "defeating" quite
self-consciously from the literature on knowledge and justification. And
appealing to epistemic considerations is certainly useful in trying to
understand these notions. But we can also give a metaphysical reading to
24. Or again, the inference from 'Fx' to 'Gy is the *norm' is non-
monotonic. See note 18 and the surrounding discussion above..
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claims about quasi-explanations beinq defeated. In particular, I thin
interfering factor %j car bear a metaphysical explanatory relation to
cp-generalization and instances of Fx & "Gy at time t, even if (in the
actual world) there is an instance of Fx & Gy at t; and we can talk o
this relation being 'disturbed' or defeated at t by some further
interfering factor I
It is important to bear in mind that (i) it is often sufficient t
cite a single factor in explaining some event, even if many factors we
at work, and (ii) the notions of explanation and possibility are
intimately linked.25 Fx and GBy may obtain in the actual world. But i
is an interfering factor, then presumably there is a possible world w
that Fx & "Gy obtain in w, and I explains why Gy failed to occur in w
In w, citing Ij might well be sufficient to explain the *abnormal inst
of Fx & "Gy. (Or leaving out talk of possible worlds, citing Ii could
haue explained an instance of Fx & "Gy, had there been such an instanc
But the background against which this Ij explanation (in w) takes plac
must differ from the corresponding background in the actual world. Fo
occurs in the actual world. And we can ask how the actual world diffe
from w with respect to j and Gy.
25. In fact, to explain B is often just to show how 0 is possible, i.e
locate £ In a space of (logical or nomological) possibility. See
Sober [1984a) on this point as it applies to the theory of evoluti
I suspect that (i) above is the case, because explanation also tak
place against a background of assumed *normal conditions.
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It is no good to say that Ij doesn't explain the *abnormal instance
Fx & "Gy in the actual world because Gy occurs in the actual world. For
what we want to know is why Gy occurs 'or perhaps why Gy doesn't fail to
occur), given that I is. present. e might think of Ij as having a
certain 'explanatory power," independently of whether or not Gy occurs;
so if we have an instance of Fx & "Gy in the presence of 1 , we are
committed to finding some further interference that explains why the
"explanatory power" of Ij was not manifested. But we need not appeal to
"explanatory powers' to make this point. There must be some metaphysical
difference between the actual world and the possible world w in which I.
explains why Gy failed to occur given Fx. Presumably this difference does
not consist merely in the fact that Gy failed to occur in w, while Gy does
occur in the actual world. So given that we have Fx and Gy and j in the
actual world, we are committed to saying how the actual world differs from
w. It will differ, I am suggesting, at least the following way: There is
a source of further interference in the actual world which "cancels out'
the interference of I. In w, this source of further interference is
either absent, or present but cancelled out by still further interference.
The last several paragraphs have been devoted to defending, qua
metaphysical notion, the notion of "defeating an interference
(quasi-)explanation.' The point of introducing this notion, however, is
that it gives us a general way of saying what it is for ceteris to be
paribus (with respect to a given cp-generaiization, of course):
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Ceteris is paribus, 3ust in case
every interfering factor quasi-explanation is defeated.
Ceteris is not paribus, just in case
some interfering factor explanation is not defeated.
Note that when ceteris is paribus, interfering factors will figure in
quasi-explanations; for when ceteris is paribus, instances of the
generalization will be *normal. What we need now are some examples to
flesh out the notion of cancelling, and what it is for an interfering
factor (quasi-) explanation to be defeated.
Let us return to our friction case. Other things equal, a body falls
at 16 feet/second2. So if a particular body falls at a slower rate, it
follows that ceteris is not paribus; and hence, some interference
explanation is not defeated. We might cite friction in explaining why the
body did not fall at 16 feet per secondz. But this does not settle the
matter completely. For there might be further interference which (unless
cancelled out itself) cancels out the effect of friction on the falling
bodu. If the cp-generalization is true, the following must also be the
case: For every interfering factor (or group of such factors), Ik, which
quasi-explain why the body affected by friction does not fall at a rate
slower than 16 feet per second 2 , there must be (in the actual world) still
further interference, 11 which explains why the body affected by friction
and Ik falls at the slower rate after all. Note that since the body does
not actually fall at the slower rate, any interference explanation citing
such an Ik will be a quasi-explanation. And in general, "alternate
defeaters" in a chain of defeaters will figure in quasi-explanations.
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For example, the presence of a strong magnet beneath a falling lump
of iron might explain (in some situations) why the lump of iron affected
by friction does not fall at a rate slower than 16 feet/secondZ. (Or if
we are realists about explanatory powers, we might say that a strong
magnet has the power to explain why a lump of iron affected by friction
does not fall at the slower rate, regardless of how fast the lump of iron
falls.) So if a lump of iron falls at the slower rate in the presence of
such a magnet, there must be further interference (e.g., heavy wind
resistance) which can explain why a lump of iron affected by friction and
the magnet falls at rate slower than 16 feet per second 2 after all. Of
course, there might be still further interference that "cancels out" the
wind resistance, If there is, then it follows from the cp-generalization
that there is yet even further interference, etc.26 The resulting
interference explanations could get very messy. But if the world gets
"very messy" in the sense that lots of factors interfere and cancel out,
"messy explanations" will be the right result.
Returninq to our billiard ball example: We push a ball north and it
moves north, so we have a *normal instance of our generalization. There
is an interfering factor, the force from the east, which quasi-explains
26. The further interfering factors need not be restricted to factors that
would count as interference with respect to the original cp-
generalization. For there might be laws governing the effects of some
factor f on events of the type in question; and the further
interfering factors might count as interference with respect to these
1 aws.
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why the ball fails to move north. This is a potential problem for the
generalization, because the ball does move north. But luckily, the quasi-
explanation which cites the force from the east is defeated. For there is
a further interfering factor, viz. the force from the west, which can
explain why the ball moves north given (a) that the ball was pushed north
and (b) that there was a force from the east exerted on the ball. Mutatis
mutandis, the corresponding quasi-explanation which cites the interfering
force from the west will also be defeated, because of the force from the
east.
The theory suggested, then, is the following:
'cp(A --->> B)' is true, if and only if
(i) for every instance of A & "B there is an undefeated
interfering factor explanation for the *abnormal instance, and
(ii) given an instance of A & B, all interfering factor
explanations are defeated.
But this theory isn't quite right either, at least not on the reading of
'every' in (i) which quantifies over only actual instances of A & ~8. We
don't want to count a cr-generalization as true if there happen to be
undefeated interfering factor explanations for all actual *abnormal
instances of the generalization, but there are possible *abnormal
instances for which there would be no u;.defeated interfering factor
explanations. Just as strict laws need to be more than extensionally
correct, so cpf-generalizations corfrnit us to the claim that had there been
an *abnormal instance, there would have been an interfering factor
explanation of it.
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It may be that a particular AND-gate always outputs a '1' given '1's
as input in the actual world, and so no actual *abnormal instance of the
relevant law is provided. But we want to say, I think, that ep-
generalizations should account for the possibility of *abnormality as
well. We want to say that for every possible *abnormal instance of a true
cp-generalization, there is an undefeated interference explanation (in the
possible world in which the *abnormal instance occurred) which reconciles
the ep-generalization with the *abnormal instance. This is not
surprising, since we often "mentally construct" non-actual scenarios by
imagining what the effect of adding or subtracting certain interfering
factors to or from the actual situation would be.
The obvious move here is to quantify over (nomologically) possible
worlds:
'cp(A --->> B)' is true, if and only if
in every nomologically possible world w,
(i) for every instance of A & ~" in w there is in w an
undefeated interfering factor explanation for the *abnormal
instance, and (ii) qiven an instance of A & 8 in w, all
interfering factor quasi-explanations of "B in w are defeated
(modulo considerations of overdetermination discussed above).
This account of cp-generalizations is considerably more complicated
than the one we began with. But luckily, we can now simplify things a bit
as well. For now that we have made the move to quantifying over possible
worlds, it is not clear that condition (ii) above is needed any longer.
For suppose that in the actual world, we have an instance of A & 8, but
also some interference j that quasi-explains why B failed to occur given
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A. Then presumably there is some nomologically possible world w in which
A & ~B, Ij explains why B failed to occur given A in w, and this
explanation is undefeated in w. What is the difference between the actual
world and w? Well, since B obtains in the actual world, there must be
some factor Ik (or collection of factors) in the actual world not in w,
such that Ik cancels out lj. And so, since (A & ~B & 1 ) holds in the
actual world, we seem to be committed to there being such an Ik in the
actual world as well.27  It turns out that if Ij is accompanied in every
nomologically possible world by further interference that cancels out its
effects, then I, does not do any quasi-explaining in the actual world.
But this consequence does not seem implausible.
Thus, we have the final (and official) account:
'cp(A --- > B)' is true, if and only if
in every nomologically possible world w,
for every instance bf A & "B in w, there is an undefeated
interfering factor explanation in w for the *abnormal
instance.
Ceteris is paribus (with respect to a gfneralization G) in a world w,
then, just in case every interfering factor quasi-explanation (with
respect to G) in w is defeated in w. So we can say that 'cp(A --- >> B)'
means that if ceteris is paribus, then (A --- >) B); and this is just to
say: (A --- >> 8) if every interfering factor quasi-explanation is
defeated.
27. This is why ouerdetermination is not a real concern for this account
of cp-generalizations.
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CP-generalizations are hardly vacuous on the account suggested.
Given instances of (A & "B), it follows that some interference explanation
is not defeated. If all sources of interference are intuitively
"cancelled out," then all interference explanations are defeated. From
this and the claim that A obtains, it would follow that B obtains. Note
that if it is possible for all interference to be absent, this is just a
special case in which every interfering factor explanation (i.e., all none
of them) is defeated. Moreover, I have argued that *normal instances of
cp-generalizations in the face of interference commit us to the claim that
there is further interference at work. The fact that these commitments
are conditional may make them difficult to verify, but they are empirical
-commitments nonetheless. So cp-generalizations carry lots of commitments;
so many in fact, that any event in which A obtains is relevant to the
truth of the generalization cp(A --->> 8). For given A, we have either a
*normal instance of A & B or an *abnormal instance of A & ~B; and their
are empirical commitments either way. If this is correct, then the
applicability of cp-generalizations is no more restricted than that of
strict laws. It's just that cp-generalizations cannot be rejected so
easily. This looks like the right sort of conclusion.
Let me make three last points about this account of cp-
generalizations. First, interference explanations are always defeasible,
in the sense that for any interfering factor 1j that is cited, there could
be some further interfering factor which would cancel out Ij', effects.
But not all interfering factor explanations will be defeated. The
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explanation which cites Ij is defeated, only if there is some further
interference that actually cancels out the effects of I.3.
Second, there might be different ways to explain an *abnormal
instance. Suppose there are one hundred interfering factors. An
interference explanation which cites factor number one might be
undefeated, since the other ninety-nine factors might work so as to cancel
out one another. At the same time, an interference explanation which
cites factor number fifty-four might also be undefeated, since the other
ninety-nine factors might work so as to cancel out one another. That's
all right. All that is required to reconcile a cp-generalization with an
*abnormal instance is an undefeated interference explanation. If there is
more than one, that's fine. We needn't even be cormmitted to saying there
is one best interfering factor explanation. Often there may be. But it
may be that the explanations which cite factors number one and number
fifty-four respectively are equally good.
Third, one might think that the account above licenses more ep-
generalizations than there are. For one might think it will be relatively
easy to satisfy the conditions on being a true cp-generalization. One
quick reply here is to ask why we should take pre-theoretic intuitions
about how many true ep-generalizations there are seriously. Moreover, the
conditions are not so easily satisfied. The fact that *normal instances
of a generalization carry an explanatory commitment puts a significant
restriction on would-be cp-generalizations. Again, a true generalization
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of the form, 'cp(A --- >> B)', will have a commitment with respect to
interfering factors corresponding to every possible instance of A.
Moreover, we want to distinguish here (a) true generalizations, from
the more restrictive (b) laws of well-developed sciences. To say that
there are cp-generalizations governing the production of symbol tokens is
not to say we are going to have a "hard science" of meaning, One of the
marks of well-developed sciences like physics is that sources of
interference with respect to one law are accounted for by other laws of
the same science. This is why it is plausible to think that the laws of
physics (or some future physics) are "homonomic," in Davidson's sense. If
what I have argued is correct, laws in the special science are probably
never perfectly homonomic. But still, some will be more so than others.
Some domains may just be very "messy," making it difficult, or even
impossible, to provide an even roughly homonomic set of generalizations.
This may preclude the possibility of doing "hard science" in such domains.
But this is not to say there cannot be true cp-generalizations in such
domains. I take it to be a real virtue of the account of cp-
generalizations provided that it allows for true "heteronomic" cp-
generalizations. And if no special science laws are perfectly homonomic,
then we have no reason to think that the difference between homonomic and
heteronomic generalizations is anything but one of degree..
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5.3.3 In Defense of Defeasibility
I want to conclude this discussion of cp-generalizations with some general
considerations in favor of explicating the notions of interference and
'cancelling out" in terms of defeasibility. The notion of defeasibility
is borrowed directly from a body of literature in epistemology concerning
the justification of belief. There are some analogies between
justifications and interference explanations, and these turn on their
defeasibility. Moreover, both knowledge and meaning (if cp-COV is
correct) are mind-world relations; and both are intimately linked to the
notion of belief.28  So a few words about how defeasibility figures in the
context of justification may serve to provide some independent motivation
for the notion of a defeasible interference explanation and its relevance
for Ca-generalizations in general, and theories of meaning in particular.
Well known counterexamples to the classical account of knowledge,
'true justified belief," led to a number of proposals of what it is for a
subject S to know that p. One family of such proposals is based on the
28. The connection between covariation semantics and (naturalized)
epistemology is made explicitly in Dretske [1981]. See Ginsberg
[1987] for a selection of readings concerning the relevance of
defeasible processes and non-monotonic logic for modeling reasoning in
AI.
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observation that justifications are defeasible.29 Suppose a body of
evidence e justifies S' belief that p. Like default reasoning,
justification is non-monotonic in its logic. It doesn't follow from the
fact that e justifies S' belief that (e&d) justifies S' belief for any
proposition d; d may "defeat' the justification. Sally may be justified
in believing that Jones owns a Ford: suppose Jones told her so, she saw a
valid-looking deed with Jones' name on it, etc. But Sally's justification
will be defeasible. Jones may be a clever car thief; and if we add the
proposition that Jones is a clever car thief to Sally's evidence, the
result will not justify her belief that Jones owns a Ford. Suppose we say
that if e is S' justification for believing that p, then S' justification
is defeated (in a possible world w) if there is a true proposition d (in
w) such that the conjunction of e and d does not justify S' belief that p
(in w). Then if Jones is a clever car thief (in w), Sally's justification
is not only defeasible, it is defeated (in w).
We can now expand the example to generate Gettier's famous case.
Being a person who likes to infer such things, Sally infers from her
belief that Jones owns a Ford, that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is
29. See Swain [1974] for a review and a discussion of most of the examples
I will use here. See Klein [1971, 1976, 1980] for an example of how a
defeasibility theorist might respond to various counterexamples. See
also Chisholm [1981] for a discussion of defeasibility and its
relation to knowledge. I should note that I neither intend nor want
to defend defeasibility theories of knowledge. But regardless of how
adequate such theories are, justifications are defeasible; and that
is an interesting fact.
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in Barcelona. Her belief in the disjunctive claim is justified, because
her belief that Jones owns a Ford is justified. But if Jones is a clever
car thief who fooled Sally, and Brown just happens to be in Barcelona,
Sally will have a true justified belief without having knowledge. Of
course, Sally's justification for her disjunctive belief has a defeater,
viz. that Jones is a Clever car thief. For the body of evidence
consisting of Jones' claim, Sally's seeing the deed (etc.), and the fact
that Jones is a clever car thief does not justify the claim that Jones
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. This suggests the following
proposal:
S knows that p if her justification for believing that p is
undefeated. Or again, S knows that p if S' evidence e for her
belief that p is such that there is no true proposition d,
such that (e & d) wcould not constitute a justification for S'
belief that p.
While all justifications may be defeasible, in that there might be true
propositions that defeat them; not all justifications will be defeated.
And one might hold that knowledge stems from having an undefeated
justification for one's true belief.
Not surprisingly, defeaters are often characterized epistemically.
But the notion of a justification's "being defeated' is a metaphysical one
in at least the following sense: The question of whether a justification
is defeated is independent of whether anyone comes to believe the
defeating proposition. If there is a true proposition d, such that (e&d)
fails to justify S' belief that p then S' justification based on e is
defeated. All that is required to defeat Sally's justification is the
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truth of the proposition that Jones is a clever car thief, not her belief
that this proposition is true. Just as factors can interfere and explain
*abnormal instances without us knowing it, defeaters can defeat without us
knowing it.
The simple defeasibility theory just mentioned is, I think, a
surprisingly good theory. Sally might truly and justifiably believe that
her gas tank is one-quarter full, because her normally reliable gas gauge
reads '1/4'. Her justification is, of course, defeasible; and on a
particular occasion, it might be defeated. Suppose Sally's gas gauge is
stuck at '1/4' just for today. She does not know that her tank is one-
quarter full in such a case. The defeasibility theorist explains this
fact by noting that there is a true proposition, viz. that Sally's gauge
is stuck, which defeats her justification. Or again, suppose Sally
apparently sees Tom in the library. In fact, she does see Tom; but Tom
has a twin, Harry. Unbeknownst to Sally, Tom's mother has reported
(falsely) that Tom is in Singapore, that Harry was in the library, and
that Sally met Harry. There is some intuitive pressure to say that Sally
doesn't know that she saw Tom; and indeed, there is a defeating
proposition, viz. that Tom's mother said Harry was in the library.
The simple defeasibility account of knowledge is too strong, however.
For just as the presence of an interfering factor does not ensure that
ceteris is not paribus, the existence of a defeating proposition (as that
notion was defined above) does not ensure that there is no knowledge.
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Suppose we modify the last example slightly. Sally saw Tom in the
Library; and unbeknownst to her, Tom's mother says, "It was Harry in the
library." But Tom has no twin. His mother has been institutionalized
because of her obsessive belief that she has other sons named 'Dick' and
'Harry'. Intuitively, Sally is not deprived of knowledge because of what
Tom's mother said in a far away hospital setting. But the defeasibility
tt -rist has to say something about the true proposition: Tom's mother
said, "It was Harry in the Library."
There are two possible responses, though they may turn out to be
equivalent. First, one might hold that there are two kinds of defeaters:
'misleading" defeaters that do not keep the agent from having knowledge,
and "genuine" defeaters that do keep the agent from having knowledge. The
task would then become that of characterizing the difference between
misleading and genuine defeater's. Second, one might revise the definition
of a defeater, while maintaining that knowledge stems from having an
undefeated justified true belief. The task would then become that of
coming up with a new characterization of what a defeater is. I mention
what might seem to be nothing but a terminological dispute; because if we
focus on the metaphysical reading of "being defeated," I think there is
actually reading to prefer the second option. (Hang on, the point of this
digression will soon be clear.)
It would seem misleading to call "misleading defeaters" defeaters at
all. In the last case mentioned, the intuition is that Sally is justified
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in believing she saw Tom despite Tom's mother's claim. Sally knows she
saw Tom. So it seems we shouldn't say that Sally's justification is
defeated.30 For Sally doesn't have to find a new justification or expand
her original body of evidence to have knowledge. As she stands, her
justification gives rise to knowledge; and it seems odd at best to say
that a defeated justification yields knowledge. (Analogously, it sounded
odd at best to say that an interfering factor explains what is not the
case; so I introduced the notion of a quasi-explanation.) It may appear
to Sally and others that her justification is defeated if they come to
find out what Tom's mother said, but remain ignorant of her delusions.
But appearances can be misleading. (Just like the "appearance" of
Fx & "Gy can be misleading.) Indeed, if we think of defeaters as factors
that defeat a justification or not, then the idea of a kind of defeater
that doesn't actually defeat seems incoherent. It may be important, for
theoretical reasons, to recognize that Tom's mother saying said what she
did could have defeated Sally's justification in different circumstances.
So perhaps we should say that even if justi'fications are not defeated in
fact, they can have "quasi-defeaters" or *prima facie defeaters." I will
opt for the former.
The various proposals that try to characterize the difference between
genuine defeaters and quasi-defeaters of justifications without appealing
to epistemic notions do not concern us here. I entered into this
30. Though as always, it remains defeasible.
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digression, because the general structure of defeasibility accounts is of
interest here. For quasi-defeaters of justifications are theoretically
similar to sources of interference that threaten to defeat interference
explanations, but are themselves cancelled out by still further
interference. Gettier-type cases suggest that some justifications are
"sound," while others are defective. The former yield knowledge, and the
latter do not. According to defeasibility theorists, a sound
justification will be undefeated; it will have only quasi-defeaters. A
defective justification, on the other hand, is a defeated justification.
Similarly, given an interference explanation of an *abnormal instance
of some cp-generalization, we can ask if the interference explanation is
sound or defective. That is, does it reconcile the *abnormal instance
A & "B with the cp-generalization, cp(A --- >> B),2 or not? A sound
interference explanation is one which: cites some interference I. that
explains the *abnormal instance, and for every further source of
interference Ik that quasi-explains why B occurs given A & Ij, there is
still further interference 11 which explains why B fails to occur given
A & Ij & If . If we call each such quasi-explaining factor Ik a "quasi-
defeater" of the interference explanation citing 14, the parallel between
defeasible justifications and defeasible interference explanations is
manifest. A sound interfererce explanation has only "quasi-defeaters,
and each of these is cancelled out by further interference. A defective
interference explanation is a defeated interference explanation.
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In both cases, to be defeated is to be defective and vice versa. In
both cases, quasi-defeaters "steal the appearance' of justification or
reconciliation of the *abnormal instance with the cp-generalization. In
the epistemological case, the appearance of justification can be restored
by finding out h the misleading defeater misled. In the nomological
case, the appearance of reconciliation can be restored by finding further
interference that cancels the quasi-defeater.
Since we are discussing epistemology, we might also note an analogy
between defeasible interference explanations and prima facie
considerations which can be "outweighed" by fiurther considerations. A
prima facie consideration c in favor of alternative A is outweiohed by
some further consideration c', if (roughly) the conjunction of (c & c') is
not a consideration in favor of A. This again is reminiscent of default
reasoning. For the inference from c to A in this case is defeasible and
non-monotonic,
One might think it odd that I have focused on defeasibility accounts
of knowledge, since covariation semantics seems to fit more naturally with
causal/reliabilist accounts of evidence and knowledge. But accepti;,g cp-
COV doesn't rule out adopting defeasibility accounts of knowledso. More
importantly, any theory of knowledqe must yield some explanation of the
fact that justifications are defeasible. And I have merely been pointing
to this feature of justifications by way trying to say more about the
notion of interference. If one adopts a causal account of evidence and
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knowledge, however, connections to the defeasibility of justification and
the notion of interference will not be hard to make. For causal relations
and processes can be interfered with. Generalizations governing processes
will typically have *1)inormal instances, and the explanations of these
*abnormal instances will be defeasible. S' belief that p may stand in an
"appropriate" causal relation to p, and hence count as knowledge according
to some causal theory, But if we introduce interfering factors, or
factors that might have interfered had circumstances been only slightly
different, then S' belief will no longer stand in an "appropriate" causal
relation to p.31
Consider the gas gauge case cited earlier. Sally has a method for
checking the content of her gas tank which is generally reliable: the gas
in the tank causes the gauge reading which causes her belief. But if we
introduce interfering factors, say some factor that interferes with the
*normal operation of the gauge, then the gauge reading is no longer
reliable evidence for the status of the gas tank. Hence, Sally's belief
based on the gauge reading is not justified. Even if the gauge is working
*normally, Sally's justification is defeasible. There are any number of
possible interfering factors which would break the reliable connection
between Sally's belief and the content of her gas tank without actually
31. Indeed, where a good causal theory cites some "deviance" of the causal
chain between a belief and the proposition believed, one expects a
good defeasibility theory to cite a corresponding defeating
proposition. Causal and defeasibility theories may in the end
collapse. I
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making her belief false. So conjoining a causal/reliabilist theory of
knowledge with the account of cp-generalizations offered in this chapter
provides a very natural account of the defeasibility of justification.
This is hardly surprising if (i) knowledge requires justification, (ii)
knowledge is the result of having beliefs that bear reliable causal
connections to one's environment, (iii) causal processes Can be interfered
with, and (iv) interference and defeasibility are related as I have
suggested. A natural step at this point would be to defend the idea that
the content of beliefs also depends on *normal covariance with the
environment. In the next chapter, I (re)turn to this project.
5. 4 A Summi ng Up
At the beginning of the last chapter, I said that I would be defending the
following simple theory of meaning, cp-COV:
A-tokens have p as their meaning, if
n-tokens covary with p, ceteris paribus.
I said that much of the defense of this theory would consist in defending
its appeal to a cp clause. In the last two chapters, I have tried to do
just this.
First, I have argued that non-intentional sciences make widespread
use of cp-generalizations. And second, I have suggested a
characterization of the truth conditions of such generalizations that
would not render cp-COU vacuous or senseless.
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'cp(A --->) B)' is true, if and only if
in every nomologically possible world w,
for every instance of A & "B in w, there is an undefeated
interfering factor explanation in w for the *abnormal
instance.
CP-generalizations will be the norm in the sciences, because we attempt to
describe and explain phenomena which arise from the interaction of
multiple factors. In stating the generalizations that govern such
phenomena, the scientist must ignore some factors to describe others.
Thus, the generalizations stated will describe the actual complex
phenomena only cp. We should understand cp clauses, then, as expressing
commitments to explain *abnormal instances of the generalization in
question by citing factors ignored. As we have seen, there is a similar
corrnitment concerning *normal instances of generalizations in the face of
interfering factors. If cp-generalizations are the norm in the natural
sciences, then the fact that appeals to cp clauses will be needed in a
theory of meaning hardly shows that "meaning naturalism" is not possible.
I also said in the last chapter that cp-COV retained the spirit, but
not the letter, of ideal detection semantics. We can now see in what the
difference consists. Stampe [1977] spoke of forming
...a conditional hypothesis: that if certain conditions hold,
then somrething's having such and such properties would cause
the representation to have such and such properties (p.49).
Dretske [1981] suggested that fl-tokens are about p, if f0-tokens carried
the information that p in the "learning period." Fodor (1981] spoke of
"optimality conditions." I suggest that the meaning naturalist should
exchange talk of ideal, or fidelity, conditions obtaining for talk of
- 256 -
Other Things
Other Things
ceteris being patibus. We have no reason to think that we could ever
specify an exhaustive list if non-intentional conditions C in which a
system would token only true beliefs. For if there are laws governing tCe
tokening of symbols, then the conditions in which these laws have
*abnormal instances will probably be wildly disjunctive and theoretically
uninteresting at any non-intentional level of description. On the other
hand, we have every reason to think that ceteris paribus generalizations
are legitimate. The special sciences are rife with them. In short, the
idea is to exchange (i) specific questions about ideal conditions for the
tokening of representations for (ii) general questions about idealizations
in the (special) sciences. Hopefully, this chapter represents progress
with respect to (ii). We now need to see if the resulting semantic theory
is plausible.
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Chap t er 6
Making Mi stakes
Soc: Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not
speak of false opinion, and say that one man
holds a false and another a true opinion, as
though there were some natural distinction
between them?
Theaet: We certainly say so...
Soc: What shall we say then? When a man has a false
opinion does he think that which he knows to be
some other thing which he knows, and knowing
both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?
Theaet: That, Socrates, is impossible...
Soc: Where, then, is false opinion?
The main purpose of this thesis, recall, is to argue that a naturalistic
theo:y of meaning can allow for the possibility of error and account for
the normativity of meaning. In chapter one, I discussed some reasons for
thinking this could not be done. Chapters two and three were devoted to
criticizing "evolutionary semantics," an initially attractive attempt to
respond to these dual challenges. The discussion of ceteris paribus
clauses that formed chapters four and five was in the service of defending
cp-COV. If the arguments in the last two chapters were successful, then
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at least we should admit cp-COU as a legitimate candidate for a theory of
meaning. But the question still remains: Can this theory meet the
constraints on naturalistic theories discussed in chapter one?
In this chapter, I argue that cp-COV allows for the possibility of
error. In the next chapter, 1 will argue that cp-COV accounts for the
normativity of meaning. It turns out, not surprisingly, that appeals to
e. clauses figure crucially in these arguments. If correct, these
arguments may show that error and the normativity of meaning are
consistent not only with cp-COV, but more generally with theories of the
form
I-tokens have p as their meaning if
A-tokens bear the relation R to p, ceteris pDribus.
But even if theories which substitute some naturalistic relation for R are
not ruled out by considerations of error and normativity, it is still an
open question as to whether any such a theory can be made plausible.
A second purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to defend cp-COV as a
plausible naturalistic theorys from which satisfactory accounts of error
and normativity flow. My arguments in support of this more ambitious
conclusion will, no doubt, be somewhat incomplete. But I hope to show
that "covariation semantics' has considerably more going for it than some
recent authors have allowed. 1
1. See especially Cumrmins (1989 or Millikan [1989a]) see also Churchland
(1981] and Schiffer [1987].
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6.1 Some Presupposit ions of cp--COY
Before returning to the defense of cp-COV, I want to be clear about
several important assumptions that are being made, without being argued
for.
6.1.1 Restricting the Domain of a Meaning Theory
Many symbols are used metaphorically, jokingly, ironically, etc. It is
common practice to restrict a theory of meaning for expressions in a
language, at least in the first instance, to sincere assertions. A
parallel constraint is needed for mental symbols, which can be tokened for
many different reasons and in many different contexts. My mental symbol
for cats-- supposing that I have one-- might be tokened in dreams,
spontaneous imagery, when I sit my armchair and entertain cat-thoughts,
immediately after my symbol for dogs is tokened, etc. The natural
suggestion is to restrict a theory of meaning for mental states, in the
first instance, to beliefs. For what is a sincere assertion, except one
made when the asserter belietes the proposition asserted? If a theory of
meaning for expressions in a public language presupposes a notion of
sincere assertion, and if that notion presupposes the intentional notion
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of a belief, then we want a theory of meaning for beliefs which does not
presuppose the meaning of expressions in a public language.2
Fodor often speaks of providing a theory of meaning in the first
instance only for token symbols that occur 'in the belief boxt' where to
be in the belief box is to be a mental state, or part of a mental state,
which has the functional characterization of a belief. The assumption
being made, therefore, is that beliefs can be characterized in terms of
the normal (*normal?) role they play in the mediation of sensory inputs,
behavioral outputs, and other mental states.3  Stalnaker [1984] makes a
similar assumption when he characterizes the bearers of contents in terms
of their tendencies to produce action. The hope is that some non-
question-begging characterization of what it is to be a belief (as opposed
to a desire, fear, etc.) can be offered, since such a characterization
would also tell us which mental symbols our theory of meaning applies to
in the first instance. We then hope to account for the meaning of
secondary instances of symbol tokenings, i.e. those token symbols that do
not have the functional characterization of belief, by appealing to a
theory which accounts for the meaning of beliefs. We might say, for
2. Though, of courses many philosophers think the explanation should go
the other way; i.e., the ,eaning of expressions in a public language
is fundamental, so it must not presuppose a notion of belief. Other
philosophers (e.g., Schiffer) would agree that if we're going to have a
good theory of meaning, then we need a theory of mental meaning which
doesn't presuppose public Language meaning; but they think the
consequent of this conditional can't be satisfied,
3, See especially Fodor [1981].
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example, that tokens of my mental symbol for cats always mean cat-- even
when tokened in dreams or spontaneous imagery-- in virtue of bearing some
relationship to cats (e.g. cp-covariation) when such tokens figure in
states that have the functional characterization of belief.
Many questions might be raised about the feasibility of restricting a
theory of (mental) meaning, at least in the first instance, to beliefs.
One might question the assumption that a purely functional, or any non-
semantic, characterization of belief states can be given. Or again, one
might argue that functional characterizations presuppose rationality
assumptions. For in characterizing mental states functionally, we will be
taking account of the role such states play in various inferences; and in
so doing, we have to idealize to a rational agent. But one might think
that idealizing to rationality is importantly unlike other idealizations
in naturalistic contexts. These are important questions, but questions I
must set aside here. My goal in this chapter is to argue that cp-COU can
account for the possibility of false belief. To do so, I assume that we
can say which mental states are the belief states, and that the problem
lies in accounting for the (sometimes false) content of these states.
6.1.2 Frege's Principle
1 will talk about beliefs having truth conditions or states of affairs,
e.g. that cats are foul beasts, as their meanings; and I will also talk
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of mental symbols having properties, e.g. being a_ cat, as their meanings.
Similarly, I will sometimes talk of belief tokens covarying (cp) with
their truth conditions; while other times I will talk of mental symbols
covarying (cp) with properties. This does not mean that I am talking
about two distinct theories of meaning. But I am assuming that
considerations of compositionality and productivity force us to conclude
that beliefs are structured states composed of meaningful entities.
It is no accident, for example, that if Fred can form the thoughts
that cats are foul beasts and that dogs are great pets, then Fred can form
the (eminently false) thoughts that dogs are foul beasts and that cats are
great pets. Nor is it an accident that these thoughts have, intuitively,
similar structure. I will assume that the best explanation of these facts
appeals to the claim that thoughts exhibit compositional structure. So
when Fred represents to himself the proposition that cats are foul beasts,
he somehow (i) represents the property of being foul and being a beast,
(ii) tonjoins these to form a representation of the property being a foul
beast, and (iii) ascribes this complex property to cats in the
representation which is his thought. Thus, I will assume that we can talk
about the meaning of the belief that cats are foul beasts, but also the
meaning of the mental symbols-- "concepts," if you like-- which combine to
form this belief. For lack of a better convention, I will refer to
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concepts by using capital letters; and I will talk of, for example, the
meaning of 'CAT'-tokens.4
The relation between belief meaning and concept meaning is captured,
I think, by something like Frege's principle: 5 The meaning of a word
(concept) depends on its contribution to the meanings of sentences
(beliefs) of which the word (concept) is a part; and the meaning of a
sentence (belief) depends on the meanings of the words (concepts) of which
it is composed. This is an important claim; since we are talking, in the
first instance, only about beliefs. 'CAT'-tokens will appear in belief
boiv , i.so facto, only as part of some belief. Hence, which property
'CAT'-tokens cp-covarky with will depend on which belief states they can be
part of, On the other hand, the meaning of a given belief state will
depend on the meaning of symbols, like 'CAT'-tokens, which combine to form
the belief. We can understand cp-COV
[-tokens have p as their meaning, if [-tokens cp-covury with p,
as a theory of concept meaning, then, as long as we recognize that symbols
like 'CAT'-tokens can cp-covarv with properties like being a cat, or any
property for that matter, only by being "belief parts." We can also
understand cp-CO) as a theory of belief meaning, as long as we recognize
4. A reminder: It may be a trivial fact that 'cat' means cat. But,
unless their is a "Language of Thought," and it is English, to say that
'CAT' means cat is to make a non-trivial empirical claim about the
semantics of some concept.
5. Although Frege certainly wouldn't have used the term 'concept' in the
psychologically loaded way that I do.
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that which states of affairs beliefs cp-covary with will depend on their
component concepts. If we understand 1 as ranging over concepts, p ranges
over properties; if we understand 0 as ranging over beliefs, p ranges
over states of affairs; and in either case, we must understand the theory
with Frege's Principle in the background.6'7
The claim that concepts combine to form beliefs has consequences. In
particular, if Quinre and Davidson are right, there will be some
indeterminacy concerning which properties concepts express. For there
will be alternative assignments of concept meaning, each of which yields
different assignments of truth conditions to the set of beliefs formed
from the concepts. But there will be no fact of the matter concerning
which assignment of concept meaning is The Best One. I will have a bit
more to say about other possible sources indeterminacy relating to cp-COV
below in (6.2.5). But the indeterminacy that results from being able to
6. There is, of course, a further twist. The meaning of beliefs will
depend not only on the meaninqs of the concepts, but on the rules
governing comPosition. If there is a language of thought (LOT),
natural language semantics qives us every reason to believe that we
will need to know a great deal about the syntax of LOT before we can
state the appropriate semantic composition rules.
7. If you don't think that beliefs are composed of meaningful mental
symbols, you can ignore claims about 'CAT'-tokens and the like. Just
assume that cp-COV provides only an account of the truth conditions for
beliefs, viz. the states of affairs that tokens of the belief type cp-
covaries with. Though, regardless of what mental symbols are like, one
has to eventually account for word meaning. Moreover, I am inclined to
account for at least the possibility that beliefs are structured
semantic states. If they are not, the worst that has happened is that
some unnecessary complications have been added to cp-COU,
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assign slightly different meanings to words or concepts, while still
retaining plausibility at the level of sentence or belief meaning$ seems
to me something that any meaning theorist must live with. For we have
good reason to suppose there is some indeterminacy of this kind. But this
consequence may be relatively innocent, reflecting only the possibility of
making systematic alterations to a translation manual, while preserving
overall plausibility. In such cases, the alternatives may be notational
variants of one another.
6.1.3 What Covaries with What
I will often speak loosely of symbols covarying with properties, or even
more loosely, of symbols covarying with cats and dogs. Properly speaking,
however, events covary with events. So productions of symbols may covary
with instantiations of properties or with states of affairs obtaining.
That said, I will often slip and speak of 'CAT'-tokens covarying with the
property being a cat or with cats themselves.
One last point of clarification: A standard objection to causal
theories of meaning is that they "obviously" cannot account for the
meaning of mathematical expressions. Even if this is obvious, it might
show only that causal theories can't account for the meaning of eer
expression. This would be a serious objection only given a successful
theory that accounted for the meaning of every expression. (And what hope
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is there of explaining the meaning of 'cat', 'the', and 'Hamlet' all in
the same way?) But in any case, I want to note that cp-COV is officially
a covariation theory, not a causal theory. Causal relations can support
covariotion relations. But it doesn't follow that where there is
covariation there is causation.
I don't think we should rule out a priori the possibility of there
beinq true counterfaetual relations that hold in the absence of causal
relations that support or explain those counterfactuals. So the defender
of .p-CO• can hold that our mathematical beliefs-- or at least those of
nMathematicians-- cp-covary with the 'mathematical facts,' while remaining
agnostic about what tupports the covariation. Explaining how we stand in
a non-causal knowledge relation to mathematical facts is certainly a hard
task, but one that need not be the burr' n of a semantic theory. This is
not to deny that there are difficult questions concerning the sermantics of
mathematical expressions, notably the question of how more than two
destinct mathematical beliefs are possible, given that the relevant
propositions are all necessarily true or false.8  This topic obviously
deserves sustained attention. But mv point here is only the folluo;ing:
Even if one could dismiss causal theories of meaning simply by noting that
mathematical expressions have meaning, one can't do the same with cp-COU.
8. See Stalnaker [1984].
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6. 2 Mak i ng Mi stakes Possible
The main claim of this chapter is that the defender of cp-COV can account
for the possibility false beliefs, because there are belief tokens
produced when ceteris is not paribus with respect to the production of
those tokens. This sugqestion is not without difficulties. Some reason
must be given for rejecting the hypothesis that cp, symbols covary with
the properties or states of affairs that they actually covary with.
Otherwise, cp-COV is no improvement or. the crude covariation theory of
meaning. Putting this worry aside, one might think that meaning will turn
out to be hopelessly indeterminate according to cp-COV. For why should we
think that symbols in fact cp-covary with properties like being a cat, as
opposed to being a cat or doQ-under-stranqe-lighting or any of the many
other properties hlat might be suggested? I address such concerns in this
section. It may also appear that the suqqested response to the
disjunction problemr fails to be naturalistic; since ceteris may not be
paribus for the tokening of a belief if the system has false collateral
beliefs. I respond to this concern separately in the following section
and conclude that cp-COV can indeed account for the possibility of error
in a satisfactory manner.
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6.2.1 Error as the Result of Interference
It will be best to begin by motivating the idea that errors occur when
ceteris is not paribus. In the last chapter, I argued that the truth
conditions of ep-generalizations can be characterized in terms of there
being (or not being) undefeated interference explanations for the
*abnormal instances of such generalizations. Now suppose that false
beliefs are *abnormal instances of generalizations governing the tokening
of symbols. Then false beliefs call for explanation. This squares with
our pre-theoretic intuition that explanation is usually in order if
someone ma!.es a mistake. Illusions, for example, are typically explained
in terms of conditions being somehow infelicitous for observation. On the
other hand, we typically do not explain correct visual perceptions as the
result of unusually good observation conditions. Intuitively, what
requires explanation is the failure to represent the world accurately, not
the failure to make mistakes in representing the world. The same is true
for "full-fledged" beliefs as well as perceptual reports. If Fred
mistakenly believes that the store is open until 10 PM, his believing this
requires some explanation. Was the misinformation transferred to him by
someone else? Did Fred mistemember? Did he misread a sign? On the other
hand, we typically do not require such explanation if the store is in fact
open until 10 PM.
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Of course, at another level, we also want an explanation of how we
manage to represent the world correctly, to the degree we do so. Much of
cognitive science is devoted to providing such explanation. But even in
explaining why we (fnormally) represent the world correctly, we thereby
emphasize the explanatory urgency of accounting for false beliefs. There
are also cases when someone has information that we don't expect them to
have. In such cases we might ask, "How did you know that?" Usually this
is a demand for a different sort of explanation, e.g. an explanation of
how the agent "came in contact with" the information in question. But if
an agent forms a true belief in the face of interference that could
explain why she would form a false belief (e.g., if thei• were illusion-
provoking factors), then some explanation is called for (perhaps the agent
was wearing special glasses that compensated for the illusion). The
characterization of cp-generalizations offered in the last chapter allows
us to account for this fact too. *Normal instances of a generalization
call for explanation if they occur in the face of interfering factors that
could explain *abnormal instances of the 9eneralization. Such explanation
usually takes the form of citing the presence of further interfering or
compensating factors.
Stalnaker [1984] thinks it 'intuitively clear" that there is a
"presumption that people's beliefs will correlate .with, and be caused by,
their environments." Moreover,
Where beliefs are false, or only accidentally true, we also
expect some explanation for the deviation from the norms
either an abnormality in the environment, as in optical
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illusions or other kinds of misleading evidence, or an
abnormality in the internal belief-forming mechanisms, as in
wishful thinking or misremembering (p.19).
The defender of cp-COV will hold that the presumption in favor of
correlation of belief with the environment is justified, because there is
a cp-generalization (viz. cp-COV) governing the relation between beliefs
and the environment. There may be *abnormal instances of this
generalization. When there are,.we expect to find interfering factors;
and Stalnaker has cited some common ones.
A strong reading of the "principle of charity" has it that an agent's
beliefs must, by and large, be true. Whatever the merits of arguments in
favor of this strong conclusion, a somewhat weaker reading is at least
intuitively very compelling. That is, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we typically presume that what people say and believe ;- true.
This weaker claim is very similar to, and perhaps it is identical to, the
claim that we presume that cp people have true beliefs. If this correct,
then the suggestion that error is the result of ceteris not being paribus
enjoys a fair amount of intuitive plausibility.
A related consideration in favor of this idea stems from our sense
that something has "gone wrong" in cases of error. If Fred forms a false
belief, then either something either in Fred's environment or something in
Fred is somehow not as it should be. I will discuss this intuition in
more detail in the next chapter, within the context of normativity. For
now, however, it will suffice to note that we often speak of something
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being amiss when ceteris is not paribus in non-intentional contexts. If a
scientist gets results that deviate significantly from a theory she has
confidence in, she will look to see "what went wrong" with her experiment.
The cook whose meal is overdone may claim that the oven's thermostat is
malfunctionin9. In general, we speak of thermometers and the like being
"in error" only when other things are not equal. This is at least part of
what motivated Stampe [1977] to say that error should be explained in
terms of 'fidelity conditions' failing to obtain. And since we ofte
speak of something having gone wrong in non-intentional cases when ceteris
is not paribus, our intuition that something has gone wrong in cases of
false belief might be explained, if cases of false belief are cases in
which ceteris is not paribus.
One last motivation for the claim that errors occur when ceteris is
not paribus sterns from the (ancient) observation that there is an
asymmetry between true and false beliefs. One way of expressing this
asymmetry, Plato's, is to say that one can have false beliefs only about
those things about which one can also have true beliefs: To have a false
belief about the moon requires, inter alia, knowing what the moon is; but
knowing what the moon is requires some true moon-beliefs. There is
something right about this, though I am not convinced this is the best way
to put the point. Perhaps it is possible for all my beliefs in some
domain to be false. No doubt it would require a great deal of independent
evidence and theory to justify the claimr that $-tokens have p as their
mearning, if I-tokens are always produced when p is not the case. In fact,
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we might never gather enough evidence to make us prefer such a claim to
some other alternative. But I am unwilling to rule out the possibility
that all my beliefs in some domain are false a priori. 9 Facts concerning
(a) our belief-fixation devices and (b) how our sundry beliefs hang
together-- facts about which we currently know little-- will surely be
relevant to this question.
Nonetheless, while it is very difficult to say just how the false
depends on the true, the possibility of getting things wrong seems to
depend somehow on the possibility of getting things right.10 It seems
that we understand the false in terms of the true, but not vice versa.
And we say, after all, that meanings are truth (not falsity) conditions.
I am not sure how much to make of this intuition. But perhaps we can say
something like: True beliefs are prior in understanding or explanation to
false beliefs.
9. Familiar skeptical scenarios require that such possibilities are
coherent. Cf. "reference-based' replies to skepticism, e.g. Putnam
(19753. But I am dubious. that such replies can survive a semantically
sophisticated skeptic who "time-indexes" his skeptical scenario,. making
sure to allow that the relevant semantic states get grounded in the
"normal" way first. (Maybe if I were always a brain in a vat, I would
have true vat-thoughts. But if I just became a brain in a vat an hour
ago.. ).
10. Fodor's theory of content [1987, forthcoming] embodies just this
intuition. This raises the question of what the relation is between
cp-COV and Fodor's theory. I will only note here that, in replying to
an objection from Ned Block, Fodor claims that his asymmetric
counterfactual is to be understood as containing an implicit cp
clause.
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If error occurs when ceteris is not paribus, then we have at least a
partial explanation of this asmmnetry between true and false beliefs. For
a similar kind of asymmetry holds between ceteris being paribus and
ceteris not being paribus. The former is prior in explanation to the
latter, in that we understand failures of ceteris to be paribus in terms
of interference being somehow "added" to a *normal or "pure" case. Recall
an example from the last chapter. We seem to understand and explain
*abnormal instances of Kepler'." laws in terms of interfering factors
affecting a "pure" case, i.e. a single planet travel'ing around the sun.
In certain domains, like celestial mechanics, *normal cases will be rare,
perhaps even non-existent. But unless we adopt ceteris absentibus
readings of cp-generalizations, we will not understand the possibility of
a "pure" case in terms of the interfering factors which are present in
some "noisyv case (e.g. the actual case) failing to interfere. Or to use
somewhat different larqguage, tre •nnormal case is the default case, by
contrast to which we characterize *abnormal or non-default cases. In
short, *normal cases seem to be prior in explanation or understanding to
*abnormal cases. If ceteris is never peribus. with respect to some
ger.eralization, the claim that the cp-generalization is nonetheless true
will require a great deal of independent justification. But as we saw,
this will also be the case for claims that all tokens of a given belief
type are false.
I do not expect that merely appealing to such intuitions will
convince anyone that cases of error coincide with cases of ceteris not
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being paribus. Defending this claim will consist, in the short run, f4n
considering how it fares with the disjunction problem. in the long run,
when we know more about how beliefs are actually formed, we may be able to
apply this account of error to a lot of cases. But for now, I think our
intuitions about false beliefs can serve to motivate, or at least render
not completely implausible, the proposal that error sterns from ceteris
failing to be paribus. I turn now to a discussion of how the defender of
cp-COV can respond to the disjunction problem.
6.2.2 Avoiding the Disjunction Problem: A First Pass
Let us remind ourselves why the crude covariation theory of meaning,
I'-tokens have p as their meaning, if
IS-tokens covary with p,
rules out the possibilitv, of error. Every I-token will have some (causal)
sufficient condition (type) C, with tokens C1 , C2, ... , & Cn. If some 0-
token is produced in the presence of C., it follows that ýi-tokens can be
prodcced in the presence of C,. Therefore, 1I-tokens cannot covary with
any property whose extension fails to include the presence of C. But
then, according to the crude co-ariation theory, I-tokens produced in the
presence of C. are not mistakes. Thus, error will be impossible. To
recall our example from chapter one: Suppose we want to say that IS-tokens
have the property bein9 a cat as their meaning. If IS-tokens are ever
produced in the presence of dogs when the lighting is strange and no cat
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is around, then ipso facto f-tokens do not covary with cats. But given
this fact, it follows from the crude covariation theory that l-tokens do
not have being a cat as their meaning. Instead, they have some more
inclusive property (e.g., beinq a cat-or-doq-under-strange-lighting) as
their meaning, such that f3-tokens produced in the presence of dogs under
strange lighting are correct,
The response that cp-COV makes to the disjunction problem is quite
simple, although defending this response is a rather more complex task
which will require the rest of this chapter. The basic idea is the
following: If f-tokens "cp-covary with the property p, it may well happen
that fl-tokens are produced in the absence of p (and hence the presence of
some other property q); for there may well be interference. But it does
not follow that f-tokens have the property p-or-* as their meaning.
According to cp-COV, the meaning of tokens depends on what they cp-covary
with, not on what tokens actually covary with. Doq-caused f-tokens would
constitute *abnormal instances of the generalization, "cp, f-tokens covary
with cats." Of course, as *abnormal instances, dog-caused l-tokens will
require explanation. Perhaps the light was strange; perhaps the dog was
wearing a cat costume; etc. But as long as such *abnormal instances can
be given interfering factor explanations, they are consistent with the
claim that f-tokens cp-covavy with the property being a cat. It cannot be
that f-tokens couary with p, and yet some f-tokens occur in the absence of
p; but i-tokes can cp-covary with p, even if some f-tokens occur in the
absence of p.
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Note that cp-COV does not provide any statement of conditions in
which tokened symbols are said to be necessarily correct, and then go on
to explain mistakes as symbols tokened when these conditions do not
obtain. We expect theories of this form to meet with little success,
because there is no reason to think that one can specify (in non-semantic
terms) conditions in which the tokening of a symbol must be correct. The
number of unspecified things that could "go wrong" seems to be endless.
We saw that cp-generalizations typically cannot be completed. So we know
that cp-COV will not provide a statement of conditions in which a tokened
symbol must be correct. But suppose we have a mistaken symbol token. We
do expect to find that some condition "FC obtained, such that "FC's
obtaining would intuitively be a violation of the "fidelity conditions'
for the tokening of the symbol in question. That is, we expect to find a
condition such that, had we thought of it in advance, we would have
counted the condition as one in which symbol tokens need not be correct.
But this is just to say that we expect to find interference when there is
error. Thus, it seems that cp-COV captures what is right about "fidelity
condition' responses to the disjunction problem, without claiming either
(i) that there are conditions, specifiable i- non-semantic terms, in which
symbol tokens must be correct, or (ii) that the fidelity conditions can be
spelled out in advance.
There are, however, at least two major objections that can be raised
against this proposed solution to the disjunction problem. The first is
that appealing to cp-clauses in this way makes an implicit appeal to
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intentional notions, since often what explains the tokeniag of one false
belief is another false belief. Fred might mistakenly believe that the
store is open until 10 PM, because he believes that it is Monday; when in
fact, it is Sunday. Thus, one might argue that cp-COV does not provide a
naturalistic response to the disjunction problem after all; since it
explains intentionality by appealing to intentional notions. I will
discuss and reply to this argument in section 6.3 below. For now, though,
I will simply assume that the meaning naturalist can reply to this first
objection.
The second objection that can be raised against using cp clauses in
responding to the disjunction problem Is more straightforward. One might
claim that cp-COV doesn't avoid the disjunction problemr at all. For if
0-tokens occur in the presence of cats or dogs under strange lighting, why
shouldn't we say that fl-tokens cp-covary with the property being a
cat-or-dog-under-strange-lighting? Moreover, why shouldn't we say that
f-tokens cp-covary with the property that they actually covary with? Call
this propert, 'D(fl)'. There are no *abnormal instances of the
generalization, "cp, fS-tokens covary with D(3)." One might hold that the
fewer *abnorinal instances a generalization has, the better, and thus hold
that we should prefer the hypothesis that f-tokens cp-covary with the
property D(0) to any competing hypothesis. So why doesn't cp-CCO have as
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a consequence that A-tokens mean that D(A) is instantiated?11 If the
defender of cp-COW cannot respond to these quesions, then cp-COU is no
better than the crude covariation theory with respect to the disjunction
problem.
The property D(i) is just a limiting case, though. The more general
worry is that a representation tokened in the absence of its meaning could
count as a *normal tokening. The parallel worry is that a representation
tokened in the presence of its meaning could count as *abnormal. Suppose
that 13-tokens are sometimes produced when a cat is present under lighting
conditions L. Pre-theoreticallv, we might count conditions L as falling
in the "normal" range. But what keeps us from saying that L's obtaining
is a source of interference with respect to the production of f-tokens?
If this is the case (and given that L's interference is not cnncelled out
on some occasions), then at least some f-tokens in the presence of cats
would be *abnormal. Hence, f-tokens could not mean cat according to cp-
COV.
Of course, the defender of cp-CO) isn't in the hopeless position that
the defender of the crude covariation theory is, since it doesn't follow
from his theory a priori that error is impossible. It is also important
to remember that the meaning theorist is not obliged to derive from his
theory the claim that there are false beliefs, What the theorist must
1. There is a structural similarity of this objection to an objection I
raised against evolutionary semantics in chapter two above.
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show, is that his theory does not have as a consequence that any arbitrary
belief is true, On the other hand, less extreme consequences can also
tell against a meaning theory. In general, we will be skeptical of any
theory which has as a consequence that many intuitively mistaken symbol
tokenings turn out to be correct, or vice versa. So the defender of cp-
COV must respond not only to worries that S-tokens will cp-covary with the
property D(s), but worries that s-tokens will cp-covary with properties
that would result in cp-COV assigning "too much or too little truth."
6.2.3 Defending the Account
I'll focus first on the worry that cp, (-tokens covary with D((3) or some
similar property. Then I'll turn to the worry that, while S may have p as
its meaning, some (-tokens produced in the presence of p may be *abnormal.
In the last chapter, I emphasized the poirht that *normal instances of
a cp-generalization carry theoretical corrinitments. In short, given a
*normal instance of a generalization, it follows that either (i) there is
no interference, or (ii) all the interference works so as to cancel out.
I also noted that, in a complex world, *normal instances of cp-
generalizations may not be the norm. Experiments almost never come out
exactly as predicted; and if they do, the most likely hypothesis is that
someone has cheated. Simple lbJs are almost never obeyed. So
immediately, we should be quite suspicious of cp-generalizations for which
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there are no *abnormal instances. It will, I submit, be very implausible
to say that all interference with respect to symbol tokenings is always
cancelled out bj further interference. Hence, tt will be very implausible
to say that all instances of symbol tokenings are *normal. But this is
exactly what one must say if one asserts that cp, 13-tokens covary with the
property D(1). Indeed, to say this for an arbitrary representation A is
to say that, unlike all the other sciences, intentional psychology has no
need of cp clauses; and this is a zert implausible claim.12
'f the hypothesis that 1-tokens cp-couary with the property D(3) is
extremely implausible, we should rxpect that many similar hypotheses which
allow for only a few cases of error will still be pretty implausible. Of
course, it's hard to establish these plausibility claims in the aLsenc2 of
detailed knowledge concerning how our symbol-producin3 mechanisms respond
to the world. On the other hand, it's also hard to show that cp-COU runs
afoul of the disjunction problem in the absence of such knowledge. And
again, what is most important is that it na.t fnlllow from cp-COU that error
is impossible or extremely rare.
Moreover, in the one case where we know sou, ething about how symbol-
producers respond to the world, viz. vision, theorists talk about "error"
12. The defender of cp-COV cnuld also respond that the property D(D) may
not be projectible, and hence may not figure In legitimate cp-
generalizationI,. It may. be that th's is the appropriate response for
certain cases. But I do not think the defender of cp-COV sheuld rely
on it as a general vesponse to the d.sjurction problem.
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and "illusion' all the time, We are even starting to learn something
substantive about what it is for ceteris to be paribus with respect to the
production of representations in the early visual system. We can now say
something about what kinds of factors will, for example, cause 'edge-
detectors' to fire in the absence of edges.13 An adequate discussion of
this research and its importance for theories of intentionality would take
us far afield. But I suspect that such a digression would not be helpful;
because I suspect that at least part of the worry that 13-tokens will turn
out to cp-covary with the property D(r,) or similar properties is a
lingering worry about cp-generalizations, rather than a concern about
intentionality per se. It will, therefore, be useful to consider an
example from a non-semantic context here. I'll stick with Kepler's law.
Planets move in an elliptical orbit around the sun, with the sun at a
focus. But this claim describes, the motions of planets o'nly cp.
Planetary orbits may be affected by, inter alia, the gravitational
influence of other nearby planets. Thus, Kepler's law faces many
*abnorrrnal instances which must be explained away. Suppose that an
astronomer, Schm.epler, said that Mars moves around the sun in a
"schmelliptxcal" orbit; where "Schmnepler's law" describes the actual
13. See Mart [1982].
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orbit of Mars perfectly. 14 We want to know: Why should we prefer
Kepler's to Schmepler's law?
In saying that Mars has a schmelliptical orbit, we miss the fact that
Mars' orbit is the product of many factors other than Mars and the sun.
The way to capture this fact is to say that (i) cp, Mars orbits the sun in
an elliptical path, and (ii) deviations from an elliptical orbit-- i.e.,
the difference between ellipticalness and sctmfellipticalness-- are to be
explained by citing other factors which affect the actual path of Mars'
orbit about the sun. Loss of information aside, however, isn't it true
that ep, Mars travels in a schmelliptical path? Here is where the point
about *normal instances of a generalization carrying theoretical
comrnitments becomes important. By hypothesis, Mars' orbit does not
provide an *abnormal instance of Schmepler's law. So Schmepler would have
to say that either (i) there are no interfering factors affecting Mars'
orbit, or (ii) all such factors cancel out. But counterfactual
considerations seem to tell against both claims. The presence of Jupiter.
for example, is an interfering factor with respect to Mars' orbit. We
know this, because we know (inter alia) that if Jupiter were not there,
Mars' orbit would be different. And we know, modulo general skepticism in
this domain, that there are not other factors.which cancel out Jupiter's
effect on the orbit of Mars.
14. The example of "Schrnepler's Law" is borrowed from Rey (forthcoming],
with slight modification.
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Of course, Schmepler might say that the absence of Jupiter would be
interference, or what amounts to the same thing, that the presence of
Jupiter is part of the 'normal' or "pure" case with respect to Mars'
orbit. I do not pretend to have a "methodologist's stone' that will tell
us what the real interfering factors are, or (what amounts to the same
thing) when we should reject cp-modified hypotheses. I certainly cannot
prove that the presence, and not the absence, of Jupiter is what counts as
interference with respect to Mars' orbit. But clearly we do make such
decisions in the natural sciences, and we should expect the need for such
choices to arise in an intentional psychology. The fact that I cannot lay
down non-question-begging sufficient conditions for making the right
choice does not show that these choices in psychology (or astronomy) will
be arbitrary, hopelessly ad hoc, unscientific, or unconstrained by the
evidence. There is, however, a general point to be made here with respect
to assessing competing hypotheses about cp-yeneralizatiors.
Parity of reasoning suggests that if the effect of Jupiter on Mars
does not count as Interference, then since the effect of Jupiter on Mars
is a lot like the effect of Saturn on Jupiter, the effect of Saturn on
Jupiter should not count as interference either. Similarly for many other
factors that would count as interference with respect to Kepler's, but not
Schmepler's, law. When we couple such parity of reason considerations
with the fact that *normal instances t a generalization carry
commitments, Schnepler's law is going to seem very implausible. Perhaps
even more importantly, adopting Schnepler's law is going to result in
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missing generalizations. There is a generalization which captures what is
similar between the interfering effect of Jupiter on Mars' orbit and the
interfering effect of Saturn on Jupiter's orbit. If Kepler's law leads us
to find this generalization (by citing the effects of each planet as a
source of interference with respect to the orbit of another planet), and
if Schmepler's law "disguises" thit generalization (by taking interfering
factors to be part of the *norm already stated by Schmepler's law), then
that is reason to prefer Kepler's law. Recall the quote from Feynman
cited earlier, "lf we have confidence in a law, then if something appears
to be wrong, it can suggest to us another phenomenon." But similarlyg if
a law doesn't lead us to look for other pheromena, we should lose
confidence in it.
Returning to psychology, if ý-tokens have the property being a cat as
;1heir meaning, the availability of alternative hypotheses concerning what
s-tokens cp-covary with-- e.q., the property being a cat-or-dog or the
property D(1)-- is not in itself a worry for cp-COU. On reflection, it
may not be plausible to sac that all the *normal instances of alternative
cp-generalizations are *normal. I suspect, for example, that other things
will not be equal if a dog under strange lighting causes a 'CAT'-token.
Of course, one might say that the light really isn't strange after all,
and that other things are equal. But one can say anything. The question
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is whether this claim is remotely plausible, given our other beliefs about
the world. 1 5
Moreover, if we do revise our beliefs about when other things are
equal, we may also end up revising our beliefs about what s-tokens mean.
Perhaps they do mean that a cat-or-dog is present, or even that D(O) is
instantiated, after all. But cp-COV does not by itself force this
conclusion. It is important that objections to cp-COV not take the form:
But the theory hasn't provided a methodologist's stone that tells us when
to reject an hypothesis. it is also important not to place as a condition
on adequate meaning theories that symbols never have meanings that we
express (in Englis.h) with disjunctive predicates. It certainly seems
possible, for example, that children who have not yet made a distinction
between two types of thing have thoughts with contents best expressed with
disjunctive predicates.16 Nor can we require that meaning theories
establish that there are false beliefs. The important constraint is that
the theory not rule out the possitbility of error, and cp-CCOV does not.
15. I will often talk of what such and such would lead us to say, or the
relative plausibility of adopting one cp-generalization given that we
hold some other one to be true. But I hope it is clear from the
previous chapter that I want to give a metaphysical, and not
epistemological, reading to ep clauses. Moreover, many of the
concerns related to cC,-CK) stemrn from worries that we will have no
reason to prefer one cp-generalizaticn over another. These seem to me
legitimate concerns that ought to be addressed.
16. It won't always be plausible to insist that the child's thoughts are
individuated by appeal to social standards.
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What now of the parallel worry, viz. that certain 'CAT'-tokens
produced in the presence of cats might be said to be *abnornual, since
intuitively "normal' lighting conditions might be said to be a disturbing
factor with respect to the production of 'CAT'-tokens? Again, parity of
reasoning will demand (in the absence of argument to the contrary) that
the lighting conditions will also be a disturbing factor with respect to
the production of 'DOG' or 'RABBIT'-tokens. Thus, the explanatory burden
will extend beyond that of finding interfering factors for a few 'CAT'-
tokens. Of course, we may conclude after investigation that the lighting
conditions in question are a disturbing factor after all. But this
possibility does not constitute an obje:tion to cp-COV. For after
investigation, we may also revise our opinions about the meaning of 'CAT'
('DOG' and 'RABBIT') tokens.
What these considerations may show, however, is that choosing between
competing co-generalizations isi sometimes interest relative. But even if
this is correct, objections to cp-COXU will have to take the form of urging
that choosing t•btweer corrpetinrq cp-covariation hypotheses is especially
interest relative or especially problenatic. But there may indeed be a
problem here. For analogies, between cp-COU and Kepler's law may only go
so far. One might grant that there is a fact of the matter concerning
what counts as interference and what doesn't with respect to planetary
orbits; although perhaps there is some interest relativity even here.
But, one might think, this problem threatens to explode in the case of
meaning.
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In disputing the claim that n-tokens will turn out to cp-covary with
D(I)-- the property I-tokens actually covary with-- or similar properties,
I essentially rteminded the imagined critic that cp-generalizations cannot
be considered in isolation. An hypothesized cp-generalization will carry
consequences for what we count as interference, and this can have
ramifications for what we say in other domains. If we count dog-caused
C-tokens as *normal instances of 0-tokenings, we may have to say that the
lighting conditions that obtain when dogs cause j0-tokens is not strange.
This may fit ill with what we say about other observation conditions, or
even what we say about optics. To the degree that the defender of cp-COy
can point to "agent-external" interfering factors (lighting conditions,
costumes, etc,), one might qrant that certain hypotheses about what mental
symbols cp-covary with will be implausible. But often the sources of
interference with respect to symbol tokenings, i.e. the factors that
explain *abrnorrmal tokenings, are 'agent-internal." Our imagined critic
might hold that there are no facts trat determine which agent-internal
factors are interfering, as opposed to *normal, factors with respect to
the production of symbols. So one rmight hold that, with the exception of
hypotheses that can be ruled out because of implausible corrmitments
concerning agent-external interfering factors, there is no fact of the
matter concerning which properties or states of affairs cp-covary with.
The defender of cp-COV can gain a little ground by classifying
different sorts of agent-internal factors. Fred may form a false belief,
say some a-token Sb
, because of a neurological glitch. An hypothesized
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cp-generalization according to which Fred's tokening of i is *normal, may
carry a commitment to an implausible claim about the *normal functioning
of Fred's neurophysiology. But not all mistakes are the result of such
"machine malfunctions," i.e. *abnormalities that "percolate up" from
neurological or computational levels. So there would seem to be plenty of
room left for plenty of indeterminacy concerning which properties or
states of affairs a given mental symbol cp-covaries with.
If one thinks that meaning is wildly indeterminate, then this is the
right consequence. But supposing that meaning is not wildly
indeterminate, why should we think that the indeterminacy can be limited,
even a little, given cp-COV? Or to put the point slightly differently,
what facts constrain what we can properly say about cp-covariation between
(mental) symbols and properties? This seems to me a question that the
defender of cp-COV must address. For the worry is that hypotheses
concerning what a given state cp-covaries. with are unconstrained by
anything, with the exception of those that can be. ruled out because of
implausible corromitments concernina agent-external factors and the few
agent-internal factors just mentioned. At this point, I need to back up a
little and make some familiar points in a perhaps unfamiliar way. But, I
promise, this is in the service of answering the question just posed; and
an interesting feature of cp-COV will emerge in the process.
- 289 -
Mi stakes
Laaawen
Chapter Six Mistakes
6.2.4 The Meaning Dependence of Mental States
Let's adopt a rather popular conception of what a belief fixation system
is like: Beliefs bear various inferential relations to one another, and
thus form a complex interconnected system-- a web, if you will-- which
greets inputs from the sensory systems. Some beliefs, "perceptual
reports,* are quite closely tied to individual sensory inputs; other
beliefs, "deep theoretical opinions,' are the result of many complex
inferences and are extremely insensitive to individual bits of sensory
information; and there are a host of beliefs less sensitive to sensory
inputs than the former kind of belief, but more so than the latter. A
belief is "near to" some other belief in the web in so far as the agent
whose web it is takes the truth of the former belief to be evidence for
the truth of the latter.
AI least for many beliefs., the mearirn of a given state 3 seems to
depend on the belief states more or less "near to" ! in the following
sense. If the inferential confections between a and these other belief
states were different (enough), then the meaning of 4 would be different.
Different philosophers may have different opinions about how much of a
change in the inferential relations that 13 bears to other belief states is
needed before the meaning of f3 chan3es. But surely enough of a change in
the "functional role" of a given mental stre can result in a mental state
with a different meaning: Change enough of the beliefs to which A is
- 290 -
agog
I
I
:hapter Six
nferentially related, and the meaning of A will change. I will refer to
his consequence of the inter-connectedness of beliefs as the "meaning
lependence of beliefs," or just *meaning dependence" for short. 1 7
It is sometimes thought that granting what I just granted is to adopt
eaning holism. If this is a doctrine identical to, or entailed by,
eaning dependence, then meaning holism doesn't seem to be a terribly
ontroversial doctrine. Saying just what meaning holism is not my project
ere. I suspect, however, th meanin9 holists intend to assert more than
ero meaning dependence. Perhaps they intend to assert that any change in
he inferential connections of a belief state G results in a change of
eaning for a. Call this "strong holism." More importantly for my
urposes, however, holists sometimes deny that a representation has its
eaning in virtue of bearing a naturalistic relation to its represer.ted,
n the grounds that meaning is essentially P "package deal" involving lots
f meaningful states. It is sometimes said that meanings supervene on the
hole of a large number of inter-connected intentional states. In any
ase, theories like cp-COV are typically taken to be "atomistic," or at
7. One might think that a large enough change in functional role results
in a different mental state rather than a change of meaning for the
same state. This is correct, of course, if by 'mertal state' we mean
states which are individuated solely by their contents. But in
pickin 3 out the token beliefs that p, we might thereby (rigidly)
designate some physical objects, e.g. patterns of neural activity:. I
take it that objects of this type can also be mental states, mean that
p, and can come to have a meaning other than p if their relationship
to other mental states changes appropriately. See Stalnaker (1989)
for a discussion of how contents might be used to rigidly designate
physical objects inside the head.
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least non-holistic. But meaning dependence actually follows from cp-COV
and our popular conception of belief fixation. This is a lucky thing for
the defender of %p-COV; because meaning dependence seems to me quite
important with respect to responding to worries about indeterminacy.
Let's be a.little leisurely here, so as to be clear about what
meaning dependerice is, and &why it doesn't degenerate into strong holism.
We might begin by recalling 4why strong holism is often taken to be a Very
Bad Thing. If any change in any of my collaterm_ beliefs changes the
meaning of some particular belief D~, then since I often revise my beliefs,
it would follow that my beliefs are often changing in meaning. If we
individuate beliefs by their contents, then whenever I change one belief,
I change all my beliefs. At a minimum, this is an unintuitive conclusion.
Moreover, wihat is true of the intra-personal case is true of the inter-
personal case. If inferential role affects content in the was, that strorg
holism suqqests, then it is eytreruely urilikely that any two agents share a
belief. For it is extremrel unlikely that any two agents will be disposed
to draw the sarrme inferences from any particular belief. This is because
which inferences one is disposed to drea depends on, inter alia, one's
collateral beliefs; and no two agents ~re likely to share all the sae
collateral beliefs. So from strong holism, it seems to follow that if we
don't .hare all out beliefs, we don't share any. But if you and I don't
share any beliefs, what reason do we have to think we have beliefs about
the same things? Worse, if we don't have any thoughts with the same
contern t, how do we communicate?
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One might appeal to a metric of similarity hero. 1 8 Then one could
hold that, strictly speaking, agents almost never have beliefs with the
same content; but they can have beliefs with similar contents. And one
might hold that similarity of content is enough for communication. In the
intra-personal case, one could hold that the contents of an agent's
beliefs are indeed always changing a iittle. But there can be continuity,
since an agent typically changes beliefs in small doses; and so the
content of the agent's beliefs will be very similar across short intervals
of time. In making this move, one of course incurs the burden of saying
more about the relevant metric of similarity. And in any case, one might
still object to the idea that different agents, or different time slices
of the sam&e agent, neter really share thoughts. So it would be at least
interesting, and possibly very desirable (depending on how attractiv. one
finds the simrilarity, mrove), to have a theory which avoids strong holism.
I said that mearnirz dependence follows from cp-CO); so we need to
see how this doctrine differs from strong holism. The easy reply here is,
I thin', the right repl': Gi,,enr rearning dependence, if tre functional
role of I changes enough, the meaning of b will chanqe: but not just any
change is enough. How much is ernough' Well, cp-COU says that content of
a belief is the state of affairs with which tokens of the belief cp-
coiVnryV So according to cp-C•', a change in the functional role of a
belief I will be enough of a change to change the meaning of ý, just in
18. See Block [1986] for discussion.
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case the change in functional role is enough of a change to change the
state of affairs with which A-tokens cp-covary. Some, but not all,
changes in the functional role of 14 will make it the case that fr-tokens
come to cp-covary with a diffcrent state of affairs. Hence, cp-COV is
corrrnitted to meaning dependence, but not strong holism. Let's continue to
move leisurely here.
The reasoning that leads from cp-COV to meaning dependence is rather
simple. Consider a system's beliefs and the states of affairs they covary
or cp-covary with. We can think of a *ystern's beliefs as light bulbs
which "light up" or not at time t, depending on (i) how the world is at t,
and (ii) what the svstmAr's other beliefs are at t. If you change the
relative position of a given belief in the web, i.e. if you change its
functional role, then the belief will 'light up" at different times. That
is, the belief will covary with a different state of affairs. And if you
change the relative position of a given belief in the web enough, the
belief will cp-covary w1ith a different state of affairs. (I'll say more
abou•it why this is the case in just a bit.) Put another way, if the
"collateral beliefs" of a given belief 1 change, then the state of affairs
that 1-tokens cp-covary with will change. If the collateral beliefs
change a great deal, 13 will occupy a very different position an the web;
and so 13 may well cp-covary with a different state of affairs than it did
before the change. Hence, according to cp-COV, changing the coll~a:eral
beliefs of 1 (enough) can change the meaning of 13-tokens. And sinc:e the
meaning of concepts depends on the beliefs of which they are parts, we can
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also speak of changing the inferential role of some concept, and thereby
changing the property with which it cp-covaries.
Suppose that at time t, Fred means cat by his word 'cat'; and
suppose Fred has (more or less) the same cat-beliefs that we have.
Similarly for Fred's word 'dog' and his dog-beliefs. Now suppose that
Fred goes away for several years and returns in a state in which: He
sincerely says, 'Cats bark;" he throws frisbees to the animals he calls
'cats'; he buys dog food when he "cat-sits" (as he puts it) for friends;
etc. In the absence of compelling reason to the contrary, I think we
would say that Fred no longer means cat by his word 'cat'. Similarly, in
the absence of compelling evidence concerning interfering factors, we
would not say that Fred's 'cat'-tokens cp-covary with cats. I suppose it
is possible that Fred's semantics remained constant, while he acquired a
great many false cat-beliefs. But if this is the case, we expect there to
be major sources of interference that explain why Fred acquired all these
false cat-beliefs. Was he brainwashed by Moonies? Did he swallow funny
pills? Is he suffering from a severe neurological disorder? If we found
out there was such interference, then perhaps we would be inclined to say
that Fred does still mean cat by 'cat'. But given such interference, it
might also be plausible to maintain that Fred's 'cat'-tokens still cp-
covary with. cats. So let us ignore this possibility and assume that Fred
no longer means cat by his word 'cat'.
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What is true of Fred's verbalized 'cat'-tokens, I take it, can be
true of his mental 'CAT'-tokens. My point, then, is the following: As
the beliefs incorpcrating Fred's 'CAT'-tokens change their position in
Fred's web of belief, there will come a point at which the hypothesis that
Fred's 'CAT'-tokens cp-covary with cats will become less plausible than
the hypothesis that his 'CAT'-tokens cp-couary with dogs. Of course,
there will be vagueness, and perhaps some indeterminacy, concerning just
when this point is. But enough of a change in the inferential role
properties of 'CAT'-tokens will result in a change in the cp-covariation
properties of 'CAT'-tokens.
It might be useful here to contrast cp-COV with the crude covariation
theory with respect to strong holism. Which state of affairs a belief
covaries with depends very tightly on the other beliefs to which it is
inferentially related. Indeed, given any change in collateral belief,
that state of affairs that I-tokens actually covary with will change. For
given a change in collateral belief, there will presumably be at least one
possible situation in which either the system is disposed to infer that p
when it wouldn't have before, or vice versa. But then what f-tokens
covar!y with has changed. So the crude covariation theory does degenerate
into strong holism. The fact that cp-COV appeals to a cp clause is
therefore crucial in avoiding the slide from meaning dependence to strong
holi sin.
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The appeal to cp clause creates some "slack" with respect to meaning
change that is not available to the crude covariation theory. And this
slack allows for meaning stability. Suppose 3-tokens ep-covary with p.
Depending on how 13-tokens are positioned in the web of belief, how many
inferential "routes" to forming P-tokens the agent has available, etc., it
may take a significant amount of change in collateral belief before 1-
tokens would come to cp-covary with anything other than p. I suspect that
the functional role of Fred's 'CAT'-tokens, for example, will have to
change quite a lot before they stop op-covarying with cats. Think of all
the routes Fred has available for getting to the conclusion, "That's a
cat.' For Fred's 'CAT'-tokens to op-covary with dogs, all such tokens in
the presence of dogs have to be *normal; and no small change in
functional role is going to make this be the case. In general, small
changes in belief will probably have no effect on what mental symbols cp-
covary with, at least for agents with fairly robust mental lives. Large
changes in belief probably will have some effect on the contents of
beliefs. And there will be difficult cases in between. These seem to be
the right sorts of conclusions.
Again, what is true of the intra-personal case seems to be true of
the inter-personal case as well. I will briefly discuss how cp-COV can
accommodate certain social aspects of meaning, and how these can increase
meaning stability, in the next chapter. But we can see how it is possible
for agents share thoughts without sharing all the same beliefs. Just as
15-tokens in different time slices of the same agents can each cp-covary
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with p, similarly for 1$-tokens in different agents. Of courseq if two
agents differ enough in their collateral beliefs, then their respective 1-
tokens will not have the same content; for they will not cp-covary with
the same state of affairs.
Let me make this point one last time in a more general way with
respect to the intra-personal case. We can see how changing a system's
collateral beliefs can change which state of affairs a given belief state
cp-covaries with, if we assume that (i) that the belief tokens in question
are inferred from lots of other beliefs, and (ii) that inference is, or at
least supervenes on, the causal processing of symbol tokens. Let's take a
very simple hypothetical case. Suppose a system is causally disposed to
form a 1$-token, cp, if the system tokens beliefs 1, 2, and 3. And suppose
the system is causally disposed, cp, to token beliefs 1, 2, and 3 when
certain properties, call them the '8-properties', are instantiated.19
Then there is a causal connection between the #-properties and 1-tokens,
albeit a connection mediated by the beliefs 1, 2, and 3. Given this
connection, it may be that cp, 1$-tokens covary with the 0-properties. I
19. It may be that beliefs 1, 2, and 3 are caused "directly" by
instantiations of 0-properties, or it may be that still other
collateral beliefs are involved. I'll address the possibility that
the "circle" of collateral beliefs may come back around to 1 in 6.3
below. We can make the example more realistic if we suppose that '1',
'2', and '3' stand for disjunctions of complex clusters of beliefs,
and that the connections between the beliefs in these clusters are
given values corresponding to the "inferential weight" the system
gives to various connections between beliefs. But for our example,
simplicity will be a virtue.
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do not want to insist that cp-generalizations preserve transitivity. But
at least often, when cp(A ---)) B) and cp(B --->> C), it will be the case
that cp(A --->> C). If, however, the system undergoes a change such that
it becomes disposed to form I-tokens when it tokens beliefs 4, 5, and 6
and not when it tokens beliefs 1, 2, and 3, then we have no reason for
thinking that the cp-generalization linking 0-properties to 13-tokens still
holds.20 Thus, if the position occupied by A in the web of belief changes
(enough)-- i.e. if the inferential connections between 13 and other
beliefs change (enough)-- the state of affairs that 1-tokens ecp-covary
with can change.
I should emphasize: This is NOT an attempt to define the truth
conditions of "deep theoretical opinions" in terms of the truth conditions
of "perceptual reports." The claim is that symbol tokens have p as their
meaning if those tokens covary with p, ceteris paribus. But obviously
connections between properties or states of affairs in the environment and
"deep theoretical opinions" are going to be mediated by representations,
i.e. other beliefs including "perceptual reports."21 A related point:
Whenever a philosopher tries to mark some distinction between change in
meaning and change in belief, charges of drawing an (illicit)
analytic/synthetic distinction usually follow. I will simply remind the
20. Of course, there might be independent reason for thinking the cp-
generalization still holds. There might be other inferential "routes"
from 13-tokens to the 0-properties independent of beliefs 1, 2, and 3.
21. Cite Fodor [1987].
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reader that whether the content of 1 changes as a result of a change in
4's functional role is a thoroughly empirical question: Is the change in
functional role enough to change what 4 cp-covaries with? There will be
no extra-theoretic rules, no a Priori method, for determining when this
happens. Indeed, it seems to follow from the account of cp-
generalizations offered in the last chapter, that one has a great deal of
epistemic leeway with respect to rejecting an hypothesized cp-
generalization. And one is never logicallyv compelled to do so on the
basis of available evidence. So I don't think I'm drawing a distinction
that can't be drawn.
I spoke above of cp-COV's appeal to a cp clause providing some
"slack" that allowed for stability of meaning across belief change.
Another way of puttinq this is to say that we can attribute a fair number
of false beliefs to an agent before the supposition that his
representations cp-covary with what they used to becomes intolerable.
Still, there will be a point at which this supposition does become
intolerable. Thus, a limited version of the "principle of charity"
follows from cp-COV: How many false beliefs we can attribute to an agent
is constrained by the need for plausible hypotheses concerning the cp-
generalizations that govern the production of the agent's mental symbols.
If our hypotheses concerning what an agent's symbols cp-covary with face
very many *abnormal symbol tokenings, we must consider the possibility
that an alternative set of cp-generalizations would be more plausible,
But it is important to remember that what we say about cp-generalizations
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governing the production of an agent's symbols can have consequences for
what we say about agent-external interfering factors. So it does not
follow that the set of hypothesized cp-generalizations concerning symbol
tokenings which has the fewest number of *abnormal instances will be the
most plausible hypothesis overall. That is, there may come a point at
which re-interpreting the agent as having more true beliefs would conflict
with what we know about the agent's environment. 22
To surrmmarize: cp-COV can, and does, recognize a certain holistic
feature of beliefs, viz. meaning dependence among beliefs. But this is
consistent with the claim that a representation has its meaning in virtue
of cp-covarying with its represented. And meaning dependence need not
degenerate into strong holism; because cp-COV's appeal to a cp clause
provides for a certain amount of slack which allows for stability of
meaning across belief change. I think it is in cp-COU's favor that it
captures and offers some explanation of the meaning dependence of beliefs.
22. According to cp-COU, Davidson is right to insist that developing a
theory of belief and a theory of meaning for an agent will be
concurrent tasks. But Davidson seems.to think that any set of
hypotheses which accounts for the agent's behavior is as good as any
other; whereas I have also emphasized the need for the relevant cp-
generalizations to have plausible consequences with respect to agent-
external factors. Since the meaning naturalist sees meaning and
behavior as natural phenomena, his theories of meaning and behavior
must be. compatible with theories of other naturalistic phenomena.
This will, no doubt, lead the meaning naturalist to be relatively
liberal with respect to what he counts as evidence for or against
particular hypotheses. I simply take for granted that when
constructing theories, anything is potentially relevant evidence.
(This point emnerged in a discussion with Jim Higginbotham.)
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And in so far as strong holism is a Very Bad Thing, the fact that cp-COV
avoids it is at least a Pretty Good Thing. The impatient reader, however,
may be thinking:
Perhaps this shows something about the relative plausibility
of cp-COV and versions of functional role semantics that (i)
do not introduce constraints to stabilize meanings, and (ii)
operate with a relatively fine-orained notion of functional
role. Perhaps it even shows that ep-COV has some intuitively
plausible consequences. But we entered into this digression
because we were worried about indeterminacy. That is, we were
worried that there will be no facts that determine which
properties symbols cp-covary with; and hence, the "solution'
to the disjunction problem that was offered is unhelpful. How
does talking about meaning dependence help?
6.2.5 Avoiding the Disjunction Problem: A Second Pass
When assessing the plausibility of two competing cp-generalizations, e.g.
Kepler's vs. Schtepler's laws, we must consider the relative "fit" of'the
generalizations with other lawlike statements that we hold true, e.g.
Newton's laws. Moreover, each generalization will count different factors
as sources of interference. Such differences, coupled with what we know
about other domains, may affect the relative plausibility of the
competitors. So we cannot assess cp-generalizations in isolation. I have
already noted that what we say about op-generalizations governing the
production of symbol tokenings has to fit with what we say about agent-
external sources of interference with respect to symbol production (e.g.
lighting conditions). But similarly, we must consider the relative fit of
competing hypotheses with other cp-generalizations governing the
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production of other symbols. The familiar point that content attribution
is holistic in character follows from: cp-COV, the meaning dependence of
beliefs, and the need for a plausible (large) set of ecp-generalizations
corresponding to a (large) set of mental symbols.
Suppose a given belief token Bi is inferred from other belief tokens;
e.g. belief tokens ii, 2 i, and 7i". If we say that . -tokens cp-covary with
some state of affairs q, then any interference with respect to the
production of 13-tokens produced when q obtains (i.e. any factors that
could explain why 13-tokens are/aren't produced when "q/q obtains) must be
cancelled out by further interference. This claim about interference will
have consequences that we might find very implausible. We know that false
collateral beliefs are possible sources of interference. 23 For false
collateral beliefs can explain why a belief is tokened in the absence of
its truth conditions. So if the token belief 7. is false, that may commit
us to the existence of further sources of interference with respect to the
production of C-tokens. If we cannot find these further sources of
interference, we may be forceo to re-evaluate our claim that the belief
token 7i is false. But it may be implausible to hold that this token
belief is true, i.e. that its being tokened at the time in question
constitutes a *norrnal instance of the cp-generalization governing its
production. But if it is implausible to hold that 7i is true, then we
23. Remember, I'm assuming that the meaning naturalist can legitimately
appeal to false beliefs as interfering factors. The argument that
this is OK is coming shortly.
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will be forced to re-evaluate our original claim that A-tokens are *normal
if produced when the state of affairs q obtains.
Given the complexities of an actual human belief system, there is a
staggering potential for ramifications of any particular hypothesized cp-
generalization. Because of the meaning dependence of beliefs, one cannot
offer hypotheses about which properties or states of affairs particular
mental symbols cp-covary with in isolation from either (i) what we know
about agent-external sources of interference, or (ii) hypotheses about
which properties or states of affairs other mental symbols cp-covary with.
This fact will constrain the number of plausible hypotheses concerning
what any particular symbol cp-covaries with considerably.
It will also follow from cp-COU that, other things being equal, the
meaning of a symbol will be relatively more determinate if the symbol has
relativel" more inferential connections to other symbols. So we should
expect that symbols housed in s.:s..terrms capable of forming lots of
interconnected beliefs will have meanings more determinate than symbols
housed in systems capable of forming relatively few beliefs. If you are
inclined to think (i) that dogs, and maybe even frogs, have mental states,
but (ii) the content of their mental states is much less determinate than
the content of our mental states, then you will think this is the right
consequence. 2 4
24. Cf. Fodor who evidently thinks that even frog-content is perfectly
determinate.
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One might grant that meaning dependence results in a reduction of
indeterminacy, but still hold (i) that there are still equally good
competing hypotheses concerning which properties a given symbol cp-
covaries with, and (ii) that there are no facts which determine which
hypothesis is correct. One might imagine various sets of ordered
properties and a single set of ordered symbols. Each mapping of
properties onto symbols might be an equally plausible overall hypothesis
concerning the cp-covariation relations that hold between symbols and
properties. One might think, for various reasons, that this is not mere
underdetermination, but genuine indeterminacy. Let us grant that such a
problem would not be merely one of underdetermination. Moreover, let us
grant that the different mappings are not mere notational variants of one.
another. For such a situation to count against cp-COV, however, we must
assume that the meaning of the.symbols in question is more determinate
than this imagined situation suggests.
First, it is worth remembering that the natural sciences appeal to cp
clauses. So if there is a certain amount of "interest relativity" in
choosing a particular set of cp-generalizations, this feature may not be
peculiar to semantic theories. It is at least logically possible that two
competing sets of cp-gerneralizations will be equally plausible in
evolutionary biology, for example. We might have reason to think this was
not mere underdetermination. '(Both hypotheses might still be equally
plausible, for example, after we Tfix" the physical theory.) It would be
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premature, in any case, to assume that interest relativity relating to cp-
generalizations is an issue only when mental states are involved.
Second, it is important to distinguish between what we might call
"annoying" and 'frightening" indeterminacy. Suppose it turned out that
there is no fact of the matter concerning whether certain utterances and
thoughts of ours were about, say, rabbit or undetached rabbit parts. It
might be annoying or slightly disturbing to find out such things about our
own thoughts, but it would hardly be disastrous. On the other hand,
suppose it turned out that there was no fact of the matter concerning
whether certain utterances and thoughts of ours were about rabbit or
typewriter. That would be a frightening discovery, for it would call our
entire conception of our mental lives into question. If such
indeterminacy were pervasive, it would make meanings theoretically useless
entities, if we could even say there were meanings at all. Any theory 8
which has such radical indeterminacy as a consequence is either right or
wrong. If the latter, we should reject 9. If the former, there is no
reason to want a theory of meaning; for meanings look to be theoretically
uninteresting. Either way it looks bad for 9. But I see no reason to
think that cp-COV has frightening indeterminacy as a consequence. I see,
for example, no reason to think the hypothesis "cp, 'RABBIT'-tokens covary
with typewriters, remotely plausible; just as I see no reason to think
the hypothesis "cp, Mars travels around the sun in a square orbit"
remotely plausible.
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Having as a consequence that meaning is somewhat indeterminate (but
not frighteningly so) is evidence against a theory only if we have reason
to believe that meaning is, in fact, perfectly determinate. But at this
point, we just don't know how determinate meaning is; though it seems to
me we have good reason to expect at least some 'slack" in translation.
Neither do we know how determinate the relevant cp-generalizations will
turn out to be, And I think the defender of cp-COV can hold out hope that
the indeterminacy of cp-generalizations may capture such indeterminacy of
translation as there is. This. is, admittedly, conjecture. But one reason
for thinking that such a hope is not completely unreasonable is that
arguments for the indeterminacy of translation often go hand-in-hand with
arguments for the relativity of ontology. If two ontological pictures are
"equally good," one might well expect two 'equally good" sets of cp-
generalizations, since these generalizations will appeal to properties in
our environment,
My treatment of indeterminacy here has been quick and somewhat dirty.
But my intention has not been to resolve substantive questions about
indeterminacy. On the contrary, I want to leave such ques.tions open.2 5
My main goal in this section was to show that we have at least some reason
25. I suppose one might want a theory of meaning itself to resolve various
hard questions about meaning. But my prejudice is in favor of
theories which are relatively "unambitious" in such respects; though
cp-COU ought to earn its keep by providing at least part of the
explanation of various features of meaning, e.g. that communication is
possible,
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to reject cp-generalizations which, together with cp-COV, would have as a
consequence that there is little or no error. The worry might arise,
however, that the task of determining which property a particular symbol
cp-covaries with is hopelessly interest relative. This might lead one to
think that meaning will be wildly indeterminate according to cp-COV, and I
have tried to quell this worry without entering into detailed discussion
of various arguments for indeterminacy. I turn now to defending the claim
that the meaning naturalist can legitimately appeal to false beliefs in
explaining away *abnormal instances of cp-generalizations governing the
production of symbols,
6 . 3 Collater-al Bel i efs as
I n t er f er en e
The presence of a cat might cause Fred to believe that there is a dog
before him, not because observation conditions are unfavorable, but
because Fred believes that Martians have cleverly disguised all the dogs
in the area as cats (and vice versa). It is certainly possible to have
some false beliefs about particular cats, e.g. that they are dogs in
disguise, but still mean cat by 'cat' and dog by 'dog'. The same must
hold for mental symbols, else false beliefs would be impossible. Let us
assume, then, that (i) Fred's mental symbols 'CAT' and 'DOG' mean cat and
dog respectively, but (ii) Fred sometimes misapplies these symbols as a
result of his belief about the Martian intervention, If cp-COV is to
explain these facts, it must be the case that Fred's 'CAT'-tokens cp-
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covary with the property being a cat, although sometimes ceteris is not
paribus; similarly for Fred's 'DOG'-tokens. But then ceteris must not be
paribus when, together with Fred's belief about the Martian intervention,
the presence of a cat causes Fred to believe that a dog is before him.
Moreover, what explains such *abnormal instances of the generalizations
"cp('CAT'-tokens covary with cats)," and
"cp('DOG'-tokens covary with dogs)," is Fred's mistaken belief about the
Martian intervention.
This extreme case is, of course, only illustrative of a more general
phenomena: The explanation of why an agent forms one false belief is
often that the agent has some other false belief. Given our account of
cp-generalizations, it may be plausible to say that ceteris is not paribus
with respect to Fred's cat-beliefs, if Fred has a false belief that
"interferes with" his judgments about what are and are not cats.
Similarly, in any case in which an agent forms one false belief because he
has some other false collateral belief, we might well say that ceteris is
not oaribus; because the false belief is interfering with the *normal
production of beliefs. Indeed, the defender of cp-COV must say something
like this. For one can go only so far in explaining cases of error by
citing "machine failure" or conditions in the agent's external environment
that are infelicitous for belief formation. Often what is infelicitous
with respect to belief formation is internal, viz. the agent's own set of
collateral beliefs.
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There is, however, a significant difficulty involved in explaining
error in this way. It was agreed in chapter one that the mark of
significant progress towards naturalizing meaning would be providing a
theory of meaning which does not appeal to intentional notions. But we
just saw that the defender of cp-COV will, at least sometimes, appeal to
false beliefs in the course of explaining away *abnormal instances of cp-
generalizations governing the production of symbols. But if the cp clause
in cp-CRO licenses appeal to intentional states, then cp-COV is apparently
not a naturalistic theory of meaning after all. At best, it can explain
the intentionality of one mental state in terms of the intentionality of
other mental states. This is a daunting problem which has led many to
reject the whole covariation approach to meaning.26 But I think part of
the reason why the "collateral information" problem seems so daunting, is
that there are several specific objections one might raise against cp-COV
here, If we take the arguments one at a time, we will see that the
defender of cp-CCtV can reply to each of thesm.
6.3.1 Some Initial Worries about Collateral Information
If one wanted to specify fidelity conditions for the production of some
belief state W-in a certain system, one would have to talk of the system's
collateral beliefs. For we have seen that given the "wrong" collateral
26. See, e.g. Cummins [1989).
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beliefs, the system might produce a false 13-token, even under optimal
observation conditions. Moreover, one could not specify in advance all
the false collateral beliefs that might lead to false 0-tokens. So one
would have to talk about the system's collateral beliefs, whatever they
are, being "right." We have exchanged talk of fidelity condition failure
for talk of ceteris failing to be paribus. But the assumption that, for
any particular belief t3, the system's collateral beliefs are "right'
remains as part of the conception of what it is for ceteris to be paribus,
or so one'might argue. It seems fair to say that, with respect to a given
belief token Ai, an agent's collateral beliefs are "right," if the
collateral beliefs relevant to the production of 13i are true.
From this, one might conclude that cp-COU is really of the form;
13-tokens have p as their meaning if
1-tokens covary with p, ceteris paribus,
when the relevant collater-al beliefs are true.
This theory is clearly unsatisfactory qua naturalistic theory, for it
appeals to the semantic notions of belief and truth. But this theory is
not cp-COV. Adding the restriction, "when the relevant .collateral beliefs
are true," results in a plausible theory. Indeed, if cp-COV.is true, the
theory above is no doubt true as well. Perhaps the theory above is even
more plausible than cp-COV. But the fact that R is a plausible
restriction on some cp-generalization G does not show that the "real" cp-
generalization is a conditional of the form (R --- >) 6). To insist that
. cp-generalizations be stated in this way is to fall into the trap of
thinking that cp-generalizations require completion. The objection to cp-
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COV can be formulated differently, however. One might put it as follows:
We have seen that ceteris will be paribus for the tokening of symbols only
if the system has the right collateral information; and this shows that
cp-COV is not a naturalistic theory.
We should be suspicious of this argument at the outset. There may be
lawlike statements of the natural sciences that will have *normal
instances only if some intentional condition obtains. It may be that the
law of free falling bodies has *normal instances only if some agent in the
vicinity does not want to deflect the body in question.27 I do not want
to expound on this line of response, however. For it is important to see
that "only-if" claims of the kind offered show nothing about a theory's
status as a naturalistic theory, or even as a successful reductive
account.
Again, let us consider a non-intentional example first. An atom has
one electron in its outer shell only if (a) it has a valence of +1, (b) it
combines, (cp), in a 2:1 ratio with elements having valence -2, (c) it has
the same valence as typical Hydrogen atoms, etc. Let's focus on (b). One
cannot legitimately object to explaining Sodium's valence properties in
terms of its electron properties, on the grounds that an atom has one
electron in its outer shell only if it combines (cp) in a 2:1 ratio with
27. This condition would reouire sharpening. We will have to add clauses
the effect that the agent is capable of deflecting the object, wants
to badly enough, etc.
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elements having valence -2. Such claims would not show that the
explanation of valence properties was viciously circular, or that it was
question-begging, or that reduction of valence properties to electron
properties is impossible. Nor would such "only-if" claims show that
valence properties can only be explained in terms of other valence
properties. On the contrary, successful reduction of valence properties
to electron properties guarantees that an atom has one electron in its
outer shell only if it combines (cp) in a 2:1 ratio with elements having
valence -2.
In general, where we have a reduction which shows reduced properties
S1 and S2 to be identical to reducing properties P1 and P2 respectively,
we know that P1 will bear a relation R to P2 only if P bears R to S2; for
P2 and S2 are identical. Since to have a valence property is identical to
having certain electron properties, we should expect cases in which
molecules have certain electron properties only if they have certain
valence properties. And we should expect certain generalizations at the
lower level of description to hold only if certain "cross-level"
generalizations and generalizations at the higher level of description
hold. But such conditional facts hardly show that the reduction is
unsuccessful or circular. Again, a successful reduction guarantees the
truth of some such "only-if" claims.
Similarly, the claim that ceteris will be paribus for the tokening of
many beliefs only if the system has the right collateral beliefs does not
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show that cp-COV is circular. Nor does it show that cp-COV presupposes
intentionality in explaining intentionality. Consider a state of Fred's
mind/brain, Si, that obtains when ceteris is not paribus for the
proauction of Fred's symbol token Ai. The state Si will have many
descriptions, including a description at the atomic level. We may be able
to partially describe Si by saying that Fred has a false collateral belief
with respect to li. But this fact does not tell against the claim that
cp-COV is a naturalistic theory. We know that false beliefs can sometimes
explain why, for example, 'CAT'-tokens do not covary with cats. So we
know that cp-COV will have as a consequence that states in which ceteris
is not paribus will sometimes have an intentional description. By
hypothesis, *normal instances of cp-generalizations occur only if ceteris
is paribus. Hence, we know that ceteris will be paribus with respect to
the production of mental symbols only if some intentional condition
obtains, viz. that the syster in question not have false collateral
beliefs that interfere with the *normal production of symbols. But this
"only-if" claim no more tells against cp-COV's status as a naturalistic
theory than the parallel claim tells against explanation of valence
properties in terms of electron properties.28
28. We need not be committed to reduction here. For as long as
instantiation of the lower level property is sufficient for
instantiation of the higher level property, these cross-level "only-
if" claims can hold,
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6.3.2 The "Real" Problem of Collateral Information
One might argue, however, that the real force of the "collateral
information" objection with respect to cp-COV is the following: Error is
explained, according to cp-COV, as the result of interfering factors.
When the interfering factors are false beliefs,.error is explained by
appealing to intentional states; and this, one might thinkq shows that
cp-COV is not a naturalistic theory. But the question here is one of
characterization. Since false beliefs do sometimes explain *abnormal
instances of cp-generalizations, the defender of cp-COV will indeed appeal
to false beliefs (de re) when he cites the factors that explain *abnormal
instances of the cp-generalizetions in question. If cp-COV is to be a
satisfactory naturalistic theory of meaning, it must be possible to
provide a non-intentional characterization of the interfering factors
appealed to. But if those factors-also happen to have an intentional
characterization, e.g. being a false belief, we can't hold that against
the meaning naturalist. Again, since we know that false beliefs can
explain failures of covariation, it follows from cp-COV that some
interfering factors will have intentional characterizat.ions.
The question, then, is whether the defender of cp-COV can provide a
satisfactory non-intentional characterization of each false belief he
appeals to in the course of explaining away *abnormal instances of cp-
generalizations. But it looks like such a characterization will be
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available. Suppose the false collateral belief appealed to in some
explanation is a token of the belief that p. The defender of cp-COV will
hold that this belief (type) is the one whose tokens cp-covary with p. Of
course, since the token belief that p in question is false, the defender
of cp-COW will have to say that ceteris was not paribus with respect to
the production of the belief that p. But this is just what you would
expect the defender of cp-COV to say given any false token belief, and we
are assuming that the token collateral belief in question is false. In
explaining why ceteris is not paribus with respect to the production of
the belief that p, the defender of cp-COV may well appeal to the system's
collateral -beliefs again; although this time he will be concerned with
beliefs that are collateral with respect to the belief that p. As a
result, explanations of false beliefs are going to get complicated,
especially when "deep theoretical opinions" are in question. But this is
hardly surprising.
,
We often explain failures of covariation with respect to one belief
type by appealing to other false beliefs the systems has. This
explanation is given in intentional terms. But this is compatible with
there being an explanation that does not make use of the intentional
idiom. Again, compare our chemistry case: Explanations given in terms of
valence properties and explanations given in terms of electron properties
are both true. The theory cp-COV tells us what collateral beliefs are in
a non-intentional idiom: they are mental states which cp-covary with
certain states of affairs, It seems perfectly acceptable for the meaning
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naturalist to appeal to such states under their non-intentional
descriptions. The theory may, of course, be false. Maybe symbols that
cp-covary with p do not mean that p. But that is a different concern. It
is not the concern that cp-COV somehow fails to be naturalistic.
When we explain why an agent forms a false belief by citing some
false collateral belief the agent has, we explain why ceteris is not
paribus for the production of one belief by citing the fact that ceteris
is not paribus for the production of some other belief. This makes
perfect sense, since the former belief is inferred from the latter
collateral belief. If tokens of the belief that p (i.e., the belief
tokens that cp-covary with p) figure in the production of tokens of the
belief that Q, then the failure of ceteris to be paribus for the tokening
of the belief that p can explain whyj ceteris fails to be paribus for the
tokening of the belief that q.
This dependence of one cp-generalization on another is hardly
peculiar to the intentional. We saw earlier that *abnormality can
"percolate up" from one level of description to another. But it may be
useful here to compare cognitive and non-cognitive mechanisms. Other
things being equal, my car starts when I turn the ignition; and cp, my
battery provides the energy for my starter. But if this latter
generalization has an *abnormal. instance, say because my wires are fouled,
the former generalization will have an *abnormal instance as well. And
the failure of my battery to provide energy to the starter can explain why
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my car fails to start when I turn the ignition. Or consider another case.
Certain pieces of apparatus used by physicists have the following
property: their positive outputs (e.g., a streak on a plate) covary,
roughly, with the presence of certain sub-atomic particles. Let us assume
that there is a cp-generalization to this effect. The final output of the
physicist's apparatus (streak or no streak) will be the product of many
subprocesses, and malfunction might occur at any stage. Many of these
subprocesses will be governed by cp-generalizations as well. These cp-
generalizations will have *abnormal instances, and such instances might
lead to a streak in the absence of a particle or vice versa. So there
can be cases in which we explain *abnormal instances of the "particle-
streak" generalization by citing failures of other ep-generalizations
which govern subprocesses in the physicist's apparatus.
This example is especially nice, because it reminds us that the
connection between instantiations of a property in the environment and
tokens of a symbol type in some system can be mediated by a very complex
device. When this is the case, the relation between the property and the
symbols will be relatively tenuous, in that lots of things that can go
wrong. In general, the more complex the mediating device, the more things
that can go wrong. Nonetheless, a cp-generalization may still govern the
relation between the symbols and the prooerty, albeit a generalization
susceptible to *abnormal instances for many different reasons. The
analogy between the physicist's apparatus and collateral beliefs is, I
hope, clear. We might think of the system's collateral beliefs with
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respect to a belief type A as constituting a "detection mechanism" for the
property that 15-tokens ep-covary with. Depending on how reliable this
mechanism is, the ep-covariation between 1-tokens and this property will
be more or less tenuous, and so the relevant cp-generalization will have
more or fewer *abnormal instances.29
Let me make a very brief aside which may help to make the point I am
driving toward. I want to note here, though I will return to this point
in the next chapter, that cp-COCV is consistent with the claim that
linguistic communities play a non-trivial role in determining the meaning
of words used in the community, or even the thoughts of community members.
For just as a complex mechanism can mediate the relation between a
property in the environment and symbols within a system, it seems to me
that the practices and institutions of a linguistic community can play a
role in mediating the relation between properties in the environment and
symbols used by commurnity members. But symbols still have their meaning,
according to cp-COV, in virtue of cp-covaryinq with properties and states
of affairs; although such covariation can be mediated by many things,
including complex mechanisms and linguistic policies. To take a very
simple example, if I am disposed (cp) to let dictionary entries affect my
use of symbols, this fact is relevant to determining which property my
symbols cp-covary with.
29. Fodor [1987] develops this strategy, and the example of physicist's
apparatus, in more detail in his chapter four. In what follows, I
more or less parallel Fodor's moves there.
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Fodor [forthcoming] makes the same point in the context of his causal
theory:
Linguistic policies don't make semantic relations; but maybe
they make causal relations, and maybe causal relations make
semantic relations. This, anyhow, is a hope by which
informational semantics lives. I pursue a policy according to
which I use "is a slab' to speak of slabs...My pursuing these
policies is my being in a certain complex mental state, and my
being in that mental state has causal consequences: in
particular, it has the consequence that there is a certain
pattern of causal relations between slabs and my tokenings of
"is a slab";...And now, maybe we can kick away the ladder.
Perhaps the policies per se aren't what matters for semantics;
maybe all that matters is the patterns of causal relations
that the pursuit of the policies gives rise to (pp.35-6).
To return to collateral beliefs: If what matters to meaning is
cp-covariation, then for any given belief 1, perhaps we can treat the
system's other beliefs as comprising a 'piece of machinery" which mediates
the cp-covariation relation between 1-tokens and some state of affairs.
This "machine" will have a rich intentional structure. But perhaps all
that matters with respect to the meaning of 13-tokens is that the "machine"
is able to mediate the ep-covariation relation. Ceteris may not be
paribus with respect to the production of 1-tokens, if subparts, in this
'machine" do not function *normally; just as there may be *abnormal
instances of the "particle-streak" generalization, if subparts of the
physicist's apparatus do not function *normally. The subparts of the
"collateral information machine" can be characterized non-intentionally as
the belief states that cp-covary with p, q9 ... , and z. And to say that
one of the subparts of the "collateral information machine" is not
functioning *normally, is to say that there is an *abnormal instance of
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one of the cp-generalizations governing the production of symbols which
comprise the "collateral information machine."
Of course, the belief that q will have its own collateral beliefs
(which probably include 1), and hence its own "machine" mediating its cp-
covariation relation to q. If a given token of the belief that q is
false, then ceteris must not be paribus with respect to the production of
such belief tokens. The explanation of this fact may well lie in the
"collateral information machine" that mediates the cp-covariation relation
between q and tokens of the belief that q. -But since the defender of cp-
COV has a non-intentional characterization for any false collateral belief
that be appealed to, no intentional notions are presupposed in explaining
*abnormal instances of cp-generalizations governing the production of
symbols.30
6.3.3 Defending the Account (Again)
One objection to handling the collateral information problem in this way
concerns the holistic character of belief systems. The worry is the
following: Failures of the belief that p to covary with p will be
30. If what a system desires (wants true) significantly affects what it
believes (holds true), then it will be necessary to add desires to the
"machinery." This may create difficulties for the assumption made
earlier that we can restrict a theory of meaning, in the first
instance, to symbols tokened in the belief box,
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explained by citing the system's (false) belief that q; the failure of
the belief that q to covary with q will be explained by citing the
system's (false) belief that r; and so on, until the failure of the
belief that o to covary with o will be explained by citing the system's
(false) belief that p. One might think that cp-COV thus "moves the
intentionality" from one belief to the next, but never explains
intentionality in a naturalistic fashion; for it eventually moves the
intentionality back to the belief we started with. Moreover, if it turns
out that the failure of the belief that p to covary with p is ultimately
explained by appealing to the system's false belief that p, then one might
complain that the "explanations" given are viciously circular.
Let's consider the circularity worry first. No doubt explanations
are holistic in the following sense: If you-ask me to explain why A is
(not) the case; and for every answer I give, you ask another question,
then I will either (i) just stop explaining at some point, or (ii) keep
going until I happen to mention A again. If (ii) occurs, it is hardly
fair to chime in at that moment and sayk, "Ah-Hah! No explanation has been
given! As I suspected, you were begging the question all the time!"
With respect to tre production of symbols, the explanation of why a
P-token was produced in the absence of p may be that a t'-token was
produced in the absence of q. One can, of course, go on to ask why the
V-'-token was produced in the absence of q. And perhaps, if one asked
questions long enough, one would find that part of the explanation of why
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a 0h''"*-token was produced in the absence of o will appeal to I-tokens
and/or p. But that would hardly show that no explanation was given of why
some a-token was produced in the absence of p in the first place. By
hypothesis, the explanation of why a i-token was produced in the absence
of p was that a ('-token was produced in the absence of q. As long as
such an explanation can be given, such an explanation can be given.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this is a worry about a
potential circularity of explanations that invoke cp-generalizations
governing covariation. We may begin by wanting to explain why certain t-
tokens occur in the absence of p, go through a long chain of explanation,
and ultimately find ourselves facing l-tokens and p again. But this is
not a problem about intentionality per se. If the states appealed to in
the chain of explanation lacked non-intentional descriptions, the matter
might be different. But the concern as presented here applies to
covariation claims independently of what we say about meaning. Regardless
of what we say about meaning, I take it that symbols often do cp-covary
with properties. If the explanations of *abnormal instances in this
domain are hopelessly circular, that would seem to be a fact we have to
live with. And it would hardly be fair to say that intentionalitp was the
culprit. 3 1
31. Indeed, if you are convinced that (i) explanations of the *abnormal
instances of the cp-generalizations in question are hopelessly
circular, and that (ii) the corresponding intentional explanations in
terms of (false) collateral beliefs are circular in the same way, then
you have reason to think that cp-CCV is good naturalistic theory of
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The worry will remain, however, that if interference explanations are
not eventually cashed out in terms of *abnormality in the environment,
then intentionality has not been explained naturalistically. This
objection presupposes that the source of at least some *abnormal instances
of cp-generalizations governing the production of beliefs cannot
eventually be traced to some *abnormality other than a false belief. This
is important and controversial. It is important to bear in mind here that
the inferential chain connecting one belief to the next is not going to
form a circle in any case. The belief that r will typically not be the
only reason for the system's believing that q, for example. At every
stage in the inference, connections will branch out to other beliefs,
including perceptual reports; and as they do, there will be more
potential sources of *abnormality. In particular, there will be more
chances to trace the failure of the original cp-generalization (the one
governing the production of the belief that p) back to some *abnormality
in the environment. But might there be cases in which the *abnormality is
the result of agent-internal factors alone?
One such possibility that the defender of cp-COV can accornodate is a
case involving *abnormal inference patterns. I cannot argue here that
rationality is reducible to, or supervenes. on, *norrnal inference patterns;
though perhaps it does. But I do claim that the following could happen:
meaning. For then cp,-COU captures what you take to be an important
feature of intentionality.
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(I) we discover certain cp-generalizations governing certain inferences;
(ii) we note that *abnormal instances of these generalizations correspond
to what we intuitively call 'bad inferences;" (iii) we can explain these
*abnormal instances by citing interfering factors; and so (iv) when a
false belief is the result of one of these inferences, we cite the factor
that explains the *abnormal inference to explain the false belief. This
might be a completely agent-internal explanation of the production of some
false belief. Moreover, I have already mentioned cases of "machine
failure" in which the tokening of a false belief is the result of
*abnormal functioning at the computational or neurological level.
So op-COV can account for purely agent-internal *abnormality.
Moreover, the "objection from holism" seems to miss the point of the
earlier discussion. If we treat the system's beliefs o.ther than as
parts of a "detection machine," the question is simply whether or not
ceteris is paribus with respect to the functioning this 'machine." If the
machine has parts that we can also describe as intentional states, fine.
But if 1 is the belief that p, the non-intentional characterization of a
remains the same, regardless of what 'Vs *detection machine' is made oft
f3 is the belief type whose tokens cp-covary with p. I don't see how this
characterization fails to be naturalistic just because the detection
machine in question includes intentional states, given that these
intentional states can also be characterized in terms of what they cp-
couary with. If there is an objection to cp-COV here, it seems to depend
on the possibility of a number of false beliefs hanging together in a
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coherent way, such that (a) each figures in the explanation of why other
false beliefs were tokened, and (b) there is no *abnormality from
"outside" the set of beliefs that explains why they were tokened.
Certainly not all beliefs will fit this mold, but perhaps some do.
I confess to feeling there may be a problem here, without being able
to say precisely what it is. We do think that, at least sometimes, our
justifications have a coherentist characterz I may believe that p,
because I believe that q, r, s,..., m, n, and o; I may believe that q,
because I believe that p, r, s, etc.; I may believe that r, because I
believe that p, q, s, etc.; and so on. In such a case, there is a
certain sense-- one which is very hard to characterize-- in which we might
say that my believing that p is "part of my reason' for believing that p.
It's hard to know what to say about such cases in general; so it's not
surprising that it is hard to know what to say about them given cp-COV.
It would, admittedly, be viciously circular to say that ceteris was not
paribus with respect to the production of my belief that p because I had
the belief that p when "p. Similarly, it would be viciously circular to
say that my justification for believing that p was my belief that p. But
if we are willing to say that 'in a certain sense," my belief that p can
be "part of my reason' for believing that p, then perhaps we should also
be willing to say (in the same sense) that my beli'eving that p when "p an
be "part of the explanation" of why ceteris is not paribus with respect to
the production of my belief that p.
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There is indeed something troubling here. But cp-COV is not the
source of the trouble, coherentist justification is. And if we allow
coherentist explanation where there has been coherentist justification,
then I think cp-COV will be untouched by this worry. Let me again
emphasize that cp-COV characterizes my belief that p as the belief whose
tokens cp-covary with p; and hence believing that p when "p calls for
explanation. Perhaps what the imagined case suggests is that we should
leave open what the details of the explanation will look like in
particular cases.
One might worry about the fact that I have endorsed explaining the
failures of one cp-generalization by appealing to other cp-
generalizations. But this practice seems completely unobjectionable. I
take it that, other things being equal, sugar dissolves in water. But
suppose a given sugar sample is covered with a coating that, other things
being equal, keeps water out. *Abnormal instances of the first cp-
generalization can be explained by citing the second generalization. 3 2
Finally, one might wonder about the very idea of counting a false
belief as an interfering factor. After all, a belief's falsity can't do.
anything, can it? .I don't want to take a stand here on the question of
whether or not contents are causally efficacious. And I don't think I
32. Note, in fact, that in giving such an explanation, wo've already gone
back to talking about water. But the explanation isn't viciously
circular.
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have to, It's not hard to understand how token mental states (including
false ones) can be causally efficacious. They may be identical to token
neurological states, for example. This is consistent with our
individuating mental states (including false ones) by appeal to the states
of affairs that *normally cause them.33 If such states are produced at
the 'wrong" time, i.e. false beliefs are produced, such token mental
states can interfere with other causal processes. This can be true,
regardless of whether or not contents are involved in mental causation.
6 . 4 A Qu i ck Summ i ng Up
That concludes what I have to sap about false beliefs. The theory cp-COV
allows for the possibility of error. It does not have the consequence
that meaning is hopelessly indeterminate, mainly because cp-COV has the
meaning dependence of belief as a consequence. The defender of ep-COV can
avoid the charge that his theory solves the disjunction problem only by
making hidden appeals to intentionality; for intentional states can be
characterized (non-intentionally) in terms of what they cp-covary with,
What remains, then, is to see if cp-COV can account for the normativity of
meaning.
33. See Stalnaker [1989) on this point.
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Chap ter 7
In tent i onal Norms
Can there be a collision between picture
and application? There can, in as much as
the picture makes us expect a different use,
because people in general apply this picture
like this. I want to say: We have here a
normal case, and abnormal cases.
---Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
Back in Chapter One, I discussed what I called "Hume's Problem:" A true
naturalistic theory wi-ll sa', presumably, how some part of the world is;
but meanings determine how some part of the world, viz. symbol use, ought
to be; so how can any naturalistic theory of meaning be correct? In this
chapter, I argue that the "is/ought gap" of semantics is not as wide as
some critics of naturalistic theories may think. The "normativity of
meaning" is neither a unitary nor especially well-defined phenomenon; and
it turns out that the meaning naturalist can actually account for several
senses in which meaning is a normative notion.
My strategy in this chapter will be twofold. First, I will try to
6pare down" the normativity of meaning by arguing that certain normative
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facts associated with meaning do not show 'means that" itself to be a
normative relation. These normative facts can be explained independently
of one's meaning theory. Second, I will argue that cp-COV can account for
the normativity 'left over;" because there is (i) an "ought' of
idealization, (ii) a sense in which we ought to use symbols as we have in
the past, and (iii) a sense in which we ought to use symbols as we would
in ideal conditions. In short: Some of the normative facts associated
with meaning are "extrinsic" to meaning, and it is not the job of any
meaning theory to explain such facts; but cp-COV can explain those
normative facts which are "intrinsic" to meaning, and thus facts that an
adequate meaning theory should explain. The conclusion of this chapter,
not surprisingly, is that as long as cp-COU correctly describes how
symbols are used, cp-COV can also provide the basis of a satisfactory
account of how symbols ought to be used.
7. 1. Li ngu i st i c Nor ms
We sap that terms are applied correctly or incorrectly. Speakers can
mis-speak. We sometimes say that children have not yet learned the proper
use of many words. In general, when we talk of symbol use, the normative
idiom comes quite naturally; and we have no reason to think our use of
the normative idiom in this context is inappropriate. The meanings of
symbols seem to determine not what we do say (or think)-- for we often
make mistakes-- but what we should say (or think) in certain situations or
in response to certain queries, Given a brown table, we ought to say,
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"There's a brown table," and not 'There's a green cow.' If someone asks
what color the table is, we ought to say, 'Brown." When instructing
children, we sometimes tell them which words they ought to use in certain
circumstances. And speakers of a language ought to use expressions in
certain circumstances, but not in others, because expressions have
meanings. There are many such normative facts associated with meaning
facts (assuming there are examples of the latter). Such normative facts
may provide prima facie evidence against any naturalistic meaning theory.
But on reflection, they are consistent with cp-COV; or so I shall argue.
7.1.1 Multiple 'Ought's and the Facile Argument
We should first remind ourselves of the familiar point that the word
'ought' has many' uses, and intuitively, many senses: You ought not
torture babies for fun; You ought to pay your taxes; You ought to vote;
You ought to eliminate inconsistencies in you beliefs when you notice
thetn; You ought to take care of your car, if you want it to last; You
ought to brush your teeth; You ought to put the smallest spoon on the
outside; You ought to believe that the earth revolves about the sun; You
ought (not) to be in pictures; The water ought to be bluer; The book
ought to be.on my desk; The Big Dipper ought to be right over there; If
there was an electron in the chamber, there ought to be a streak on the
photographic plate; etc.
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Whether the word 'ought' is many-ways ambiguous, or whether all the
uses of 'ought' have something (beyond orthography) in common is a
question that need not concern us here. The first point I want to make is
simply the following: The mere fact that there is a sense in which
meaning is normative would show cp-COV to be false only if cp-COV was
inconsistent with there being any sense in which symbol users ought to use
symbols in a certain way. One might be tempted to argue directly from the
kinds of normative facts cited two paragraphs above to the denial of all
naturalistic theories, on the grounds that no such theory would allow for
any normative facts about meaning. But this facile argument is unsound,
as we shall see. It will be useful here to distinguish (i) normative
facts that are intrinsic to meaning, i.e. normative facts that depend
solely on the nature of meaning itself, from (ii) normative facts that are
extrinsic to meaning, i.e. normative facts that depend on the relation
between meaninqs and other ends. Let's consider some non-semantic cases
first to motivate this intrinsic-extrinsic distinction.
There are lots of normative facts concerning har•ners: If you want a
hammer to drive nails well, you ought not store it in acid; you ought not
hit your boss on the head with a harrnmmer for no good reason; you ought not
hit your thumb when hanmmering; etc. But none of these normative facts
are intrinsic to harrroers. Intuitively, these normative facts have to doi
not with intrinsic properties of hammers, but with certain reasons for
action (e.g. practical, prudential, or moral). Such facts can bear on
hammers, with the consequence that there are normative facts concerning
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hammers. But these "normative hammer facts,' at least those just
mentioned, do not hold independently of other ends (e.g. practical,
prudential, or moral). That is, such normative facts are not intrinsic to
hammers.
Or consider another non-semantic example. We might ask, as Kant did,
if there are reasons for action which are independent of our desires. If
'there are, we might conclude that there are moral facts intrinsic to
rationality, viz. categorical imperatives. On the other hand, we might
deny that rationality itself is a source of moral facts, if we held that
all reasons for action are dependent on our contingent desires. If we do
so, we might conclude that moral facts are always extrinsic to
rationality. This would not be to deny that there could be (non-moral)
normative facts intrinsic to rationality. There might well be a special
sense of 'ought' (the rational sense) from which it would follow, more or
less trivially, that one ought to do the rational thing in particular
cases. For example, if one believes that p and that if p. then q, then one
ought not deny that q. This normative fact maytbe intrinsic to
rationality, even if no moral facts are.
What we need to ask, then, is whether the various normative facts
associated with meaning are intrinsic or extrinsic to meaning. The
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction may not be perfectly sharp, but we do not
need it to be. For there are clear cases of normative facts concerning
meaning that are extrinsic to meaning itself. And since extrinsic facts
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concerning harmmers do not show hammers to be normative, we cannot coAclude
that meaning is normative solely on the basis of extrinsic normative facts
concerning meaning or the use of symbols. Let be back up a little here,
and return to a semantic example.
Kripke says that the meaning of 'plus' ('+'), together with the
arithmetical facts, determines how I ought to respond to the query,
'67 + 58 = ?'.1 According to Kripke, I ought to respond by saying '125';
and I ought not respond (in a quus-like way) by saying '5'. But whether
this is so depends crucially on the circumstances and the sense of 'ought'
in question. Ought I respond '125' if I know that thousands of babies
will be slaughtered painfully, unless I respond by saying '5'? What if I
will win a million dollars by responding with '5'? What if I want to play
a practical joke on the person asking me the question? Kripke says, "one
and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to '68 + 57' (pp.
17-18)." But there are countless situations in which '5' is a perfectly
appropriate response to the query, '67 + 58 = ?'. This is just to say
that incorrect answers to a Question can, in certain circumstances, be
appropriate answers.
Of course, if I want to be correct, then I ought to respond with
'125' to the Query, '67 + 58 = ?'. Or again, with respect to truth-
telling, '5' would be an inappropriate response to this query. For it is
1. See Coates (1986] who, in a short discussion piece, suggests this kind
of reply to Kripke on behalf of the Gricean.
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not true that 67 + 58 a 5. Kripke may have something like this sense of
'appropriate' in mind. But the conditional claim-- given the goal of
correctness or truth-telling, symbol users ought to use symbols in such
and such a way-- presents no difficulty for cp-COV. The intimate link
between truth (correctness) conditions and meaning guarantees that such a
conditional will hold, regardless of the theory of meaning in question.
If meaning is cp-covariation, then the truth conditions of a sentence or
thought are the states of affairs with whi.ch the sentence or thought cp-
covaries. So given the goal of uttering true sentences (or thinking true
thoughts), one ought to token sentences (thoughts) only when the
appropriate states of affairs-- i.e., those states of affairs with which
the sentence (thought) in question cp-covaries-- obtain.
There is, in other words, a "practical ought" associated with symbol
use. 'One ought to use symbols in a certain way, since that is the only
way to achieve the goal of speaking (or thinking) the truth. The
importance of this normative conditional claim can, perhaps, be
strengthened by further arguing that. one ought to have the goal of
speaking and thinking the truth. There might, for example, be moral or
similar other-regarding reasons for having such a goal. But such
normative facts would be extrinsic to meaning. And in the absence of
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argument to the contrary, I see no reason for thinking that a conclusion
about which ends one ought to have would be inconsistent with cp-COV. 2
One might hold that there is also a special non-moral sense of
'ought', the semantic sense, according to which one ought to speak (or
think) the truth regardless of one's ends. That is, one might hold that
there is a normative fact intrinsic to meaning here. Given such a sense
of 'oughtf, then trivially, one ought (in the semantic sense) to token
symbols correctly. But even if there is such a sense of 'ought', the
facile argument against cp-COU is shown to be inadequate. For at a
minimum, there will be normative facts about meaning that are compatible
with cp-COV, viz. those which are extrinsic to meaning. Given the goal of
truth-telling, for example, one ought to respond to certain queries in
certain ways. No doubt we often have-- and perhaps in some sense we ought
to have-- the end of truth-telling. It may well be that these meaning-
extrinsic normative facts drive our intuitions that meaning is normative.
Moreover, it is not obvious that there is a semantic sense of 'ought' from
which it follows trivially that symbol users ought to token symbols
correctly. There may be such a sense. But merely to insist (a) that
there is a special semantic sense of 'ought', and (b) that it cannot be
2. It is worth noting that, in the moral sense, one ought to speak the
truth only ceteris paribus. I suspect there may also be interesting
connections, whicer I cannot explore here, among (i) the sense in which
one ought to have truth-telling as -n end, (xi) the principle of
charity, and (iil) cp-COV. See for some brief remarks about
the connection between (ii) and (iii).
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captured by any naturalistic theory is to beg the question against the
meaning naturalist. One needs independent argument in favor of (a) and
(b).
One might argue for (a) based on considerations of error; for'
"error" is a normative notion. But I have already argued that the
defender of cp-COV can account for error. So given only this reason for
holding (a), an argument for (b) will not be forthcoming, as long as the
arguments in the last chapter are correct. Nonetheless, it feels
intuitively right to say that there is a semantic sense of 'ought', a
sense in which one ought to use symbols thusly, more or less independently
of one's ends.3 And general skepticism about bridging the is/ought gap
can provide at least some reason to be skeptical of naturalistic meaning
theories. It will be useful at this point to consider in more detail the
kind of normativity that goes along with the account of error provided in
the last chapter, For there is indeed a kind of normativity captured by a
theory which appeals to cp clauses; and this may capture our intuitions
concerning the existence of a semantic sense of 'ought'. At the very
least, it will provide another reason for rejecting the facile normativity
argument against cp-COV,.
3. I say "more or less" here to leave open the possibility that if one's
ends were very different, one's terms might have different meanings.
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7.1.2 Norms and Idealizations
The theory cp-COV captures a sense of normativity that corresponds to what
we might call the "ought of idealization., Given Fx and a generalization
of the form 22(Fx --- »> Gy), we often say that Gy ought to obtain. Other
things being equai, copper conducts electricity. So a given copper sample
ought to conduct electricity, although it might not do so if other factors
interfere. Goldfarb [1985) suggests something like this kind of response
to Kripke on behalf of the meaning naturalist.
If we do find ,ph-isical states that can, on internal grounds,.
be distinguished as competency states, as well as other states
that are interferinq mechanisms., then clearly that will be
enough to ground the notion of how the person would ideally
respond, as different from how the person actually responds.
In the difference, the normative force of meaning can be
lodged (p.478).
On the account of cp-generalizations offered in chapter five, if ceteris
fails to be paribus with respect to the tokening of symbols, there will be
interfering factors which explain why actual symbol use differs from the
ideal. IDEALizations provide a kind of norm. And at-least on one reading
of 'normal', what it is for a system to function "normally" is for it to
function as it functions, ceteris paribus. That is, on at least one
reading: 'normal' means *normal.
There are many contexts in which cD events of type E do obtain, and
we also say that a token event E ought to obtain. A cook might say, "The
turkey ought to be done by six;" and if the bird is not cooked until
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seven, he might blame the faulty thermostat. That is, he might cite an
interfering factor. Use of the normative idiom also comes quite naturally
in paradigm naturalistic contexts, like that of experimentation and
prediction in the "hard sciences." Suppose a scientist runs an experiment
in which she expects to get a reading of '5' on some meter, but actually
gets some other reading. It would be.perfectly natural for her to say:
"I should have got a reading of '5', something must have gone wrong with
the experiment." The scientist will then begin looking for sources of
interference that explain the discrepancy between what did happen and what
"ought to have happened."
One might put this point by saving there is a sense in which events
ought to be *normal, even though events often turn out to be *abnormal,
It seems oi.rfectly acceptable to say, for example, that a solution ought
to turn red, even while noting that the solution will not turn red if some
interfering factor affects the result. Indeed, it would be odd to say
that event E ought to occur if it was certain that E would occur. It
seems that we use the "ought of idealization' only when there is a
possibility that some claim would be false, if made as a descriptive claim
about what will happen. But this is hardly surprising, since we make use
of cp-generalizations only given the possibility of *abnormal instances.
The use of normative language when cp-generalizations face *abnormal
instances is ubiquitous. We say that the planetary orbits are "distorted"
from elliptical paths by the gravitational influences of other planets.
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On a much smaller scale, electromagnetic fields can be distorted (from the
ideal described by Coulomb's law) by the gravitational influence of a
nearby dense mass, Biology provides perhaps the best example of hnw
normativity-laden language can become when describing *abnormal instances
of cp-generalizations. Other things being equal, genes replicate'so that
daughter genes have the same (type of) effects on the traits of daughter
organisms that the parent genes had with respect to the traits of parent
organisms. But sometimes, the relevant bits of DNA are "miscopied.' In
such cases, we call the daughter organism a mutant. The connotation of
this term is clear: Something has to go wrong for a mutant to be
produced. But what has "gone wrong" is that the gene in question did not
replicate *normally. And this is just to say that ceteris was not paribus
with respect to the copying of some DNA.4
So again, the mere fact that there is a sense in which meaning is
normative does not tell against cp-COV. Moreover, if meaning' just is
cp-covariation, then the 'ouqht' of idealization corresponds to certain
normative facts that are intrinsic to meaning, There will indeed be a
semantic sense of 'ought', a sense in which (trivially) one ought to use
symbols correctly, i.e. in accordance with their meanings. For, given the
'ought' of idealization, one ought to token symbols as one would cp.
Hence, the fact that one ought (in the semantic sense) to token symbols in
4. Mutants sometimes are sometimes "disfigured" as well. That is, they do
not have the phenotype that members of their species have ep.
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accordance with their meanings will follow directly from cp-COV. The
semantic sense of "ought' will not be peculiar to the semantic on this
view, For this 'ought' will be cormon to many naturalistic contexts. But
this is just what the meaning naturalist hopes to show.
The worry will remain, however, that the senses of 'ought' discussed
are not the right or important senses in which meaning is normative.5  Or
.again, one might hold that (i) the 'ought' of idealization does not
capture the real intrinsic normativity of meaning, and (ii) that there is
a peculiar semantic sense of 'ought' which cannot be captured by a
naturalistic theory. But without supporting argument, this is just to beg
the question against the naturalist. In any case, the argument against
meaning naturalism must be made more precise. One cannot simply note that
meaning is normative in some sense or other, and then conclude without
further argument that no naturalistic theory of meaning can be correct.
For there are normative facts about meaning, facts both extrinsic and
intrinsic to meaning, that are compatible with cp-COV. And if the
semantic sense of 'ought' is partially captured by the 'ought' of
idealization, then cp-COV provides some explanation of the normativity of
meaning. So the meaning naturalist's opponent must say something
substantive about the sense in which meaning is normative, and-then argue
that naturalistic theories cannot capture that particular sense of
hormativi ty.
5. And indeed, we do not yet haue a reply to (all of) Kripke's worries.
- 341 -
Norms
Chapter Seven
The burden of proof lies with the party who claims that a certain
type of theory cannot be given. But by itself, a shifting of the burden
of proof is an unsatisfying result. On the other hand, I can't prove that
there exists a true naturalistic theory of meaning. Nor can I prove that
there is no peculiarly semantic sense of 'ought' that cp-COV does not
capture. So I propose to continue by looking briefly at several somewhat
vague ideas 'in the air" concerning why meaning is normative, or how this
normativity is manifested. I will suggest that cp-COV actually fits
rather well with these ideas; and in any case, they provide no reason for
rejecting cp-COV.
7.1.-3 Meanings as Rules
One reason for thinking there is a special kind of normativity associated
with meaning is the idea that meaning is proper use. Given a broad enough
understanding of 'use', I suppose I would grant that meaning is proper
use. Indeed, one might think that op-COV tells us what proper use is:
the "idealized" or *normal tokening of symbols. The "proper use. picture
of meaning is of further interest, though, because it is often associated
with the idea that meanings serve as rules which guide our use of symbols.
This in turn. suggests that meanings play a "regulative" role with respedt
to the use of symbols. Meanings determine rules, which determine how we
ought to use symbols, even though our behavior doesn't always conform to
the rules.
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The defender of cp-COU can grant that there is something right about
this picture, because there are well-known analogies between rules and
laws.6  If my use of symbols is law-qoverned, and if representations have
their meanings in virtue of bearing lawlike-relations to representeds,
then my use of symbols is regulated in the way it is because of the
meanings of those symbols. Had the meanings been different, the symbol
use would have been regulated differently. And as long as the laws in
question are cp-generalizations, my symbol-using behavior will not always
constitute *normal instances of the lawjs. That is, my behavior will not
always conform to the "rule."
Drawing this analogy between rules, and laws might prove problematic
for the meaning naturalist if error was typically the result of choosing
not to follow some rule regulating the proper use of symbols. For then it
might be hard to mtintain that the production of erroneous symbol
tokenings was geuernrrd by the same cp-generalizations that govern the
production of correct symbol takenrngs. But errors do not typically, if
ever, result from choos!in to kdlSbory" Some rule. ,. :ed, when spe•evrs
decide to "flout thre rules" gouerning tne use.of certain symbol tokens, we
typically do not say the speaker nas erred. In such cases, we take the
speaker to be jesting, or speaking ironically, or telling a fib, or simply
being obstreperous. Moreover, agents typically can't decide to form a
6. See Chomsky [19803 for a discussion of these issues in the context of
linguistic theory.
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false belief. (Try believing-- not merely entertaining the thought--
that grass is yellow, for example.) So "choosing to flout the rules"
governing the production of beliefs doesn't even seem to be a
possibility.7
Another aspect of the rule-following picture of meaning concerns the
relation that holds between past intentions to use symbols in a certain
way and future behavior. Kripke claims that dispositional theories of
meaning give a
descriptive account of this relation: if '+' meant addition,
then I will answer '125'. But this is not the proper account
of the relation...Computational error, finiteness of my
capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be
disposed to answer as I should, but if so, I have not acted in
accordance with my intentions. The relation of meaning and
intention to future action is normative not descriptive
(p.37).
The defender of cp-CCIV will agree that the crudest dispositional theory of
meaning (s means that p, if s-tokens are produced if and only if p) is
incorrect; for we are disposed to make mistakes. But the fact that we
are disposed to make mistakes is consistent with cp-COV. Nor does t-he
defender of cp-COU merely predict what future symbol-using behavior will
be like. Rather, he asserts what idealized symbol-using behavior is like,
7. This is one of the advantages in holding that a meaning applies in the
first instance to beliefs.
8. Note that you can't give a crude dispositional account of gene
reproduction either, because genetic systemsr are disposed to produce
occasional mutants. But the existence of mutants is consistent with
the claim that ep, genes replicate so that daughter genes have the same
causal powers with respect to traits as parent genes.
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and thereby establishes what symbol-using behavior ought to be like in a
certain sense (viz. the 'ought' of idealization).
Kripke's remarks suggest another route that the opponent of meaning
naturalism might take, which I will address below in section 7.3.
Considerations of justification with respect to symbol use will be the
main topic there. But first, I want to discuss briefly the connections
between cp-COV and a feature of meaning often held to be intimately
related to its normative character.
7. 2 The Soci al Characte=r of Meaning
Burge's thought experiments show that, at least in some cases, the meaning
of one's thoughts and utterea expressions can depend, at least to some
extent, on the "cornmunity" of symbol users of which one is a part.
Putnam's discussions of deference and the "division of linguistic labor"
also suggest that what I mean by my terms. may depend on what various other
speakers, to whom I bear certain social relations, mean by their terms.
Even if Wittgensteiniar. "privste language' arguments fail to show that
individuals cannot havte determinate thoughts in 'the absence of some
commnunity, they still suggest that the cormr•unity plays some role with
respect to fixing the content of an individual's thoughts. One might well
appeal to linguistic co•nunities in trying to limit the indeterminacy of
meaning. For while appeal to cp clauses may help with respect to
explaining how different agents can have beliefs with the same content,
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appeal to social factors that (partially) determine the content of each
agent's thoughts would help still more.
At the end of last chapter, I said a little about why 'meaning
socialism" is compatible with "meaning naturalism" in general, and with
covariation theories in particular. The basic idea was that cp-COV
remains neutral as to what mediates the covariation between
representations and representeds. It matters not whether cognitive
mechanisms, social institutions, or some combination of both do the
mediating. All that matters for meaning, according to cp-COV, is that
covariation between representations and representeds be mediated somehow.
I want to press this point here. For the considerations just mentioned
drive us to the claim that meaning is, at least to some degree, a social*
phenomenon; and we want our theory of meaning to accommodate this fact.
Philosophers can, I think, reasonably disagree concerning the degree to
which meaning is social; and I take it to be a point in cp-COV's favor
that it is compatible with different positions on this issue. But more
importantly, I want to show that the defender of cp-COV has considerable
resources available, once we allow that an agent's cognitive mechanism
(individualistically described) is not the only thing that can mediate
covariation relations between the agent's symbols and properties in her
environment.
A more direct reason for discussing the social character of meaning
is that one might think a normatiuity argument against cp-COW is lurking
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here, In particular, the existence of patterns of deference among
speakers of a language suggests that meaning is normative. For in
deferring, I seem to admit (at least implicitly) that I ought to use the
terms in question as others use them. I can't tell an elm from a beech;
so I will defer to others, e.g. botanists, with respect to the proper
application of the terms 'elm' and 'beech'; similarly for terms like
'arthritis' or 'superstring'. But again, not only will I defer, there is
a sense in which I ouoht to defer and use terms as others do. One might
think that CD-COV is unable to account for the practice of deference
and/or the normative facts that accompany this practice.
7.2.1 Discrimination and Deference
We can begin by noting that, given cp-COU, the most obuious (and perhaps
only) explanation of the fact that I mean elf by 'elm' makes reference to
symbol users other than myself. And with one exception that I will note
below, I will assume that what is true of my verbal 'elm'-tokens is true
of my mental 'ELM'-tokens. Suppose, for simplicity, that my dispositions
to produce 'elm' and 'beech'-tokens (and 'ELM' and 'BEECH'-tokeris) in the
presence of various trees are the only dispositions relevant to
distinguishing (i) the hypothesis that by 'elm' I mean elr, from (ii) the
hypothesis that by 'elm' I mean elm-or-beech; and suppose that I were not
disposed to de'er to others with respect to my use of 'elm'-tokens. That
is, suppose I produce uvarious tokens in the presence of various trees, but
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I am not disposed to change my mind if others say things like, 'No, that's
a beech."
There are two possible cases here: Either I would have no
dispositions relevant to distinguishing (i) from (ii), for I might never
say or believe that some tree is an elm as opposed to a beech; or I would
be disposed to make what would amount to guesses concerning whether some
tree was an elm or beech. Either way, my 'elm'-tokens would not cp-covary
with elms; nor would my 'beech'-tokens cp-covary with beeches. For
suppose I had some relevant dispositions, There would seem to be no
reason for saying that 'elm'-tokenings in the presence of beeches were the
result of poor lighting, false background beliefs, or any other
interfering factor. I can't tell elms from beeches; so it looks like
there could be cases in whicrh nothing "went wrong," except that I uttered
'elm' in the presence of a beech. But if 'elm'-tokens produced in the
presence of beeches are not tve result of ceteris failing to be paribus
with respect to the proauction of 'elrr'-toKens, then such tokenings are
not mista.es according to cp-COV. My 'elm'-tokens would mean elm-or-
beech.
Before saying what the defender of cp-COV can say by way of avoiding
this conclusion, we shoula note that this might be the intuitively correct
conclusion in certain cases. Suppose there were a society, none of whose
members distinguishec between elms and beeches; say they all applied the
term 'beelm' (cr) to both, types of tree. We would say that 'beelm' meant
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elm-or-beech. Similarly, suppose an otherwise perfect duplicate of me
located in New Jersey was disposed not to defer in his use of 'elm' and
applied it (cp) to both kinds of trees. It might be plausible to hold
that my near-duplicate's term meant elm-or-beech. This is not to deny
that it might -tbe plausible to hold that my near-duplicate's term meant
elm. I suspect it will depend on the details of the example and the
context. And in general, there may be a certain context relativity with
respect to which "that-clause' best captures the content of an agent's
thought when such social considerations are relevant.
It is important to note that context relativity does not in itself
tell against cp-COU. Indeed, one might nope that an equal degree of
context relativity will arise with respect to the question of which cp-
qeneralizations best characterize an agent's dispositions. If so, this
would be a point in cp-COV-'s favor. We will also want to distinguish, at
least logically, contents from content attributions. It may be that we
characterize my near-duplicate's mental states by attributing to him
beliefs about elms (albeit with a disclaimer about how he fails to
distinguish elms from beeches).. But it doesn't follow, at least
immediately, that my near-duplicate has elm-thoughts (although he does
sometimes have thoughts that are about elms).
Even granting these points, however, there is still clear intuitive
pressure to say 'that (at least for most purposes) my 'elm'-tokens (and
'ELM'-tokens) do not mean elm-or-beech; they mean elm. I can, it seemns,
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have elm-thoughts in the absence of an intrinsic capacity to distinguish
elms from beeches, even cp. This far. is. apparently related somehow to
the fact that I am disposed to defer to others with respect to elms and
beeches. So if cp-COV is to be plausibleg we need some reason for
preferring (a) the hypothesis that my 'elm'-tokens.cp-covary with elms, to
(b) the hypothesis that my 'elm'-tokens cp-covary with elms-or-beeches;
and the reason for preferring (a) to (b) despite my botanical ignorance
should have something to do with my disposition to defer. Again, the key
idea here is that cp-COU is neutral with respect to what mediates the
covariation relation between symbols and properties. The task is to
explain how a covariation theory, according to which meaning is intimately
related to discri•inatory capacities, can account for the meaning of my
terms if I lack the rilevant discriminatory capacities. But this task
will not appear intractable, if we bear in mind that the limits of my
skull co not determine the limits of what can mediate relations between
representations in my, skull and aspects .f the external world. While the
limits of my svull ma', demarcate the discriminatory capacities that are
mine in some sense, they need not demarcate the discriminatory capacities
that I have access to.
To take a trivial case, co-COu is not committed to assigning meanings
to my mental states on the basis of what symbols I (who am nearsighted)
would produce without my contact lenses. We saw in the last chapter how
cloud chambers could figure in mediating the relation between electrons
and the 'electron' (or 'ELECTRON') tokens of scientists. The situation
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would be no different, I submit, if instead of cloud chambers, there were
(relatively honest) agents born with cloud chambers in their heads, and
who scientists just asked about electrons. And while there may be no
walking talk;ng electron-detectors, there are walking talking elm-
detectors, e.g. botanists.
As long as there are agents whose 'elm'-tokens do cp-covary with
elms, I can "tap in" to this covariation by deferring to such agents with
respect to my use of 'elm'-tokers. If covariation between symbols and
properties can be mediated by our cognitive mechanisms and pieces of
apparatus we build to aid our limited senses, I see no reason to deny tnat
we can use other agents as 0-detectors for various properties 0. This is
not to say there is no important difference between my own cognitive
mechanisms and those of other agents with respect to the meanings of my
terms. I do not come to have another agent's dispositions-- e.g. the
disposition to (cp) distinguish elms from beeches-- by deferring to her,
any more than a physicist is able to see electrons after builCing a cloud
chamber. I do not carr• another's expertise with me. But I can make use
of another's dispositions by deferring in particular cases to an agent who
can tell me whether some tree is an elm or beech. And wnat I can carry
with rae is the disposition in virtue of which I would (cp) defer to such
agents,
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7.2.2 Deference and Error.
We now need to see howj accounting for dispositions to defer can help with
respect to the choice between (a) the hypothesis that my 'elm'-tokens
cp-covary with elms, to (b) the hypothesis that my 'elm'-tokens cp-covary
with elms-or-beeches. If (b) were correct, it would follow that ceteris
is not paribus when I defer to someone who can distinguish elms from
beeches and say (or believe), in the presence of a beech, "That's no elm.'
It would also follow that ceteris is paribus when I say, in the presence
of a beech, "That's an elr,' despite the fact that I. am disposed to
retract m, claim if someone I would defer to said otherwise. This would
amount to savinr that my, dlsposition to defer is an interfering factor
with respect to tne *ro',nal production of 'elm'-tokens. But there is no
reason to th:nk this is the case, For the only means I have of
distinguishinr elms from beeches is by deferring to another. Hence, we
ha-e reason to reject the hypothesis that cp, my 'elm"-tokerns covary with
the property of being an elm-or-beech.
There is clearly something right about this suggestion that the
couvariation relation betwener my symrbol-tokenirngs and properties in my
environment is rnediated, at least in part, by the cognitive mechanisms of
agents to whom I defer with respect to the use of my symbols. Put the
details of how cp-COU should incorporate this suggestion are not
completely clear. This is not the place to develop-a full theory a
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deference, but we want to know that cp-COV's appeal to deference is not
hopeless. Since error is always the bane of the covariation semanticist,
it will be useful to consider briefly how error might arise with respect
to my elm/beech beli efs.
In broad terms, there are two possible cases of error: I might
actually defer, but still be in error; or I. might act on my own and make
a mistake. For each of these, there are two subcases: Suppose I defer
(1). I mright actually defer to someone who can tell elms from beeches cp;
ano she might be mistaken in this particular case (Ia). Or I might defer
to someone who cannot tell elms from beeches, even cp; and she might be
mistaten in this particular case (lb). Suppose I act on my own (2). That
is, suppose I produce an 'elm' or 'beech' token in the presence of some
tree, but not because another agent has done so. I might believe that I
can distinguish elms from beeches when I can't (2a). Or I may be aware of
my ignorance, but make a guess anywau (2b).
Consider case (1a). Here it seems that we have a case in which I
"inherit" the error of the person to wihom I defer, call her Ethel. By
hypothesis, Ethel's 'elm'-tokens cp-covary with elms. She made a mistake,
so ceteris was not paribuc .with respect to her use of 'elrt'-tokens. But
given this, we need not look far for an explanation of what went wrc.ng
with respect to the production of my 'elm'-tokens. For whatever explains
why Ethel ient wrong-- say, poor lighting or some other interfering
factor-- will explain why I went wrong. I will, no doubt, make more
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mistakes than Ethel. But this is consistent with the claim that my 'elm'-
tokens and hers alike cp-covary with elms. It's just that for me, there
will be more cases in which ceteris is not paribus. This is because I try
to make my 'elm'-tokens cp-couary with elms by imitating Ethel (and others
to whom I defer). But this imitation will be imperfect. So I will, by
and large, "inheritr the mistakes of those to whom I defer and add
mistakes of my own, due to imperfect correlation between expert and non-
expert 'elm'-tokens.. We might sa,. that the "chain" between elms and my
'elm'-tokens is "longer'- than the correspondinq chain for Ethel; in fact,
the former has the latter as.  part. So there is more opportunity for
something to "go wrong" with resDect to my 'elm'-tokenings.9
Case (lb) is interestinS, and I will come back to it momentarily.
But first consider case .2a), in winicr, I believe that I can distinguish
elms from beeches when I can't. In this case, I have a false belief that
figures in the production of my 'elm'-tokens. As long as the argument I
gave in the last charter is satisfactory, the defenoer of cp-CDOV can
appeal to false c.llate.ai beliefs- to e•clain wrat went wrong with respect
9. Similarly, there is more chance for somethinQ to go wrong, i.e. for
ceteris not to be raribus, witlh respect to the production of
"theoretical" beliefs. lke, 'there's an electron in the chamber,' than
for "observational" beliefs like, 'something rea is before me.' It's
possible (though unliVelv) that the cases in which I say 'There's an
elm," aespite Ethel s savirng, "There's a beech," are the very caseE in
which Ethel is mistaken. So it is. pcssitle for me to be right about
elms more often than Ethel. I mentor. this to be clear that cp-COU is
not committed to the claim that what the persons to whom I defer
actuallyiv say Is. not constitutive of the meaning of my 'elm'Mtokens.
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to the tokening of some symbol; and he can do this while still
maintaininq that cp-COU is a naturalistic theory of meaning. Iri case
(2a), it seems clear that what explains my mistake is my false belief that
I can distinguish elms from beeches.
Case (2b) should strike us as odd, and it is. In this case, I do not
believe that I can distinguish elms from beeches; but nonetheless, I
assent to claims like, "That's an elm, and hence no beech." Like
Socrates, I am aware of my ignorance: but unlike Socrates, I still say
something foolish. Here I think it is crucially important to distinguish
verbal 'elm'-tokens from mental 'ELM'-tokens, and similarly, to
distinguish assertions from Deliefs. I may say that some tree is an elm
without believirng that I car, aistinguish elms from beeches. But unless I
am the victim of some kind of pathologq, I can't believe it. And if I am
the victirr of some kino of Oathologuq say if some neurological glitch
results in an 'EL'1'-token tbeirn• in my tbelief box. then ceteris is not
paribus. Since cp-COJ' is, in the first instance, a theory of content for
beliefs, case (2b) cannot arise as a potential counterexample to cp-COV.
I am appealing here to the following principle: If I do not believe that
I can distinguish F's from G's, then (cp), I cannot believe that something
is F as opposed to G, unless my belief is the result of deference. I
don't have an argument for this principle. But it strikes me as being
correct. And case (2b) presents a difficulty for cp-COV only if this
principle is false.
- 355-
No rms
Chapter Seven
That leaves case (lb), in which I defer to someone who cannot (cp)
distinguish beeches from elms. There are two replies the defender of cp-
COV might make to this type of case. First, one might hold that I made a
"second order" error by picking the wrong person to defer to. There is
something to this. For we don't defer to just anyone. We typically have
principled, if not infallible, methods for finding "experts" in various
domains. As long as we can generally detect agents who can generally
detect properties, there may well be a plausible response to case (lb)
along these lines available to the defender of cp-COV. But there is a
second possible reply as well.
The person to whom I defer is either ignorant of her own ignorance,
or she is a charlatan who knows that she cannot tell elms from beeches.
If the former, then the case is like (2a). The person to whom I defer has
a false collateral belief that explains why she made a mistake, and
perhaps this can also explain why I made the mistake. Suppose the person
to whom I defer is a charlatan. Then for reasons just discussed, she
says that the tree is an elmrr (or beech), but doesn't believe it. This
case seems no different than if a generally reliable and honest elm-
detector lies to me: The person to whom I defer says such and such, but
she doesn't believe it. But when I use another agent as a detector for
some property, I am not interested in what the agent says per se. I am
interested in what the agent believes with respect to the property in
question, and I take what she says to be an indication of what she
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believes. 10 Given that I am interested in what the agent to whom I defer
believes, it is clear where the error is. I make a mistake when I infer
from what the agent says to what the agent believes. Other things equal,
agents do say what they believe. But for various reasons, other things
might not be equal; and these various reasons may also explain why I
erred in a particular case of deferral.
7.2.3 Deference and Normativity
It is worth noting that the meaning of my terms is not completely
determined by my dispositions to defer, except in a limiting case in which
the only disposition I have to use some symbol is my disposition to defer
with respect to the use of that symbol. But typically, I will have other
dispositions with respect to the use of symbols. And as we saw in the
last cnapter, one has to tave account of all a symbols-users dispositions
to use some symbol in determining what the symbol cp-covuaries with.
Moreover, in many cases (the elm-beech example included) deference will be
important with respect to making certain discriminations that the agent
himself cannot make. I know, for example, that elms and beeches are
different kinds of trees that I cannot distinguish. So I must make use of
10. One might imagine cases in which I "defer" to another by saying the
opposite of what she says, because I believe that she is reliably
mistaken in some domain, or that she is a reliable liar in some
domain. But even in such cases, I take what she says to be an
indication of what she believes, and then act accordingly.
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another agent to determine if something is an elm as opposed to a beech.
But there is more to being an elm than not being a beech. There are lots
of non-beeches that are also non-elms. I don't need any help
distinguishing elms from accordions. Given an accordion, I can say
(reliably and with confidence), OThat's no elm.' Such dispositions are
relevant to the meaning of my 'elm' and 'ELM'-tokens.
One last point about the practice of deference: With respect to the
use of many symbols, any competent speaker of a language is just about as
good as any other, barring pathology. Terms like 'table'i 'friendly',
'building', 'dirt', etc. fall into this category. Even here, deference to
one another can play a useful role. For it can serve as a check on error,
and a check to ensure that we are cp-covarying with the same properties,
to the degree this is Dossible. In the limiting case in which each member
of a group of symbol users is disposed to defer (cp) to all the others,
the picture that emerges is one -in which all the members of the community
"share" a common set of cp-dispositions. This would not eliminate
indeterminacy of meaning; but it might ensure that the symbols used by
all members of the community had meanings that were equally determinate.
This limiting case is certainly not actual. We do not all defer to one
another. But this may or may not be a useful idealization to make in
studying meaning. I do not wish to 'iddress this issue here, except to
point out that cp-COU seems to be compatible with any degree of
"publicity" of meaning one would want to argue for,
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This point about publicity and community brings us back to the issue
of normativity. Not only is cp-COV consistent with the practice of
linguistic deference, it can offer some explanation of this practices Ne
use other members of our community to mediate the covariation relation
between our symbol tokenings and the instantiation of properties in our
environment. Of course, deferring to botanists with respect to the
difference between elms and beeches is only one example of linguistic
deference. Competent speakers of English are also typically disposed to
defer the Unabridged Oxford English Dictionary with respect to the meaning
5f many terms. But cp-COV can account for this deference in much the same
way. The OED, together with my disposition to alter my behavior in
certain ways after reading entries int it, plays a continuing role in
shaping the relation my symbol tokens bear to properties in my.
environment. And given this account of the practice of deference, we can
now say something about the sense in which speakers ought to defer in
their use of symbols to other agents, dictionaries, or in accordance with
other social institutions.
First, given that (co) I do defer to other agents, we can say that I
ought to defer, where the 'ought' is that of idealization. This sense of
'ought' has already been discussed. But there is also an episternic sense
in which (cp) I ought to defer. Asking why I ought to defer to someone
who can (cp) distinguish elms from beeches, if asked whether there is an
elm or beech before me, is much like asking why I ought to open my eyes,.
if asked whether there is a cat or dog before me: Other things being
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equal, I ought to use the cognitive resources open to me; and this is t
case, I suggest, whether or not the cognitive mechanisms are my own. I
have a better chance of being right about elms if I defer to others, jus
as I have a better chance of being right about cats if I look rather tha
guess.11 Similarly, the scientist ought (in this same epistemic sense)
"defer to" the streak on her photographic plate with respect to the
detection of electrons in her cloud chamber. For she has a much better
chance of being right if she follows this procedure rather than if she
looks carefully for the electron herself.
Of course, if I have good reason to believe that a particular exper
is lying, or under the influence of hallucinogens, then I ought not defe
to him. But these "exceptions" themselves suggest that the general
maxim-- that one ought to defer to experts-- does indeed invoke an
"epistemic ought." For where the epistemic primacy of the expert over
non-expert is called in question, so is the claim that the non-expert
ought to defer. Similarly, i ought not "trust" the reports of my
perceptual systems when I have reason to believe that my perceptual
systems are subject to illusion in the prevailing conditions. Of course
cp-COV doesn't explain wh_•, qua epistemic agent, I ought to do (cp) that
11. If I am totally ignorant with respect to elms and beeches, my chance
of getting it right is no worse if I just toss a coin. So as long a
others aren't out to deceive me and some agents know more than I do,
my chances of getting it right are improved even if I defer to a
random person on the street. But tyPically we somethinqgabout who te
defer to.
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which gives me the best chance of forming true beliefs. But this
normative fact has to do with the nature of epistemic agents, not with
semantics. That is, this normative fact is extrinsic to meaning. So I
don't see how it presents any difficulty for a semantic theory like cp-
CO. 12
It was important, we saw, to appeal to my disposition to defer in
explaining why my 'elm'-tokens mean elm according to cp-COV. But given
that my 'elm'-tokens do mean elg, I ought to defer (cp) to those who can
distinguish elms from beeches; since they are (cp) in a better epistemic
position vis-a-vis elms than 1. They are (cp) more reliable detectors of
elms than 1. So qua epistemic agent, I ought to defer to them. One might
object, however, that this explains why I should defer (cp) in particular
cases, given that I alread" have a disposition to defer. One-might want
an explanation of why I should defer in the first place. The obvious
reply is that I must defer if I am to succeed in speaking the same
language as those around me. Of course, one can ask why I should speak
the same language as those around me? Practical reasons abound. But more
importantly, in claiming that I ought to apply my 'elm'-tokens to elms
(and not beeches), one has already presupposed that I am a speaker of
English. If I speak a language in which 'elm' meant beech, then I ought
not apply my 'elm'-tokens to elms; unless of course, I am trying to speak
12. In 7.4 below, I discuss a closely related sense of normativity that
cp-COV explains in virtue of its being an 'ideal detection" theory of
meani ng.
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English. So if I am trying to speak the same language as those around me,
I ought to defer. But we have no reason to think that this fact is
inconsistent with cp-COV.
7. 3 Just i f i catory Norms
It might be objected that accounting for the normativity of meaning is not
the task of explaining some sense in which the sentence, 'Speakers ought
to use symbols in a certain way,' is true. One might argue that the real
issue is one of justification. This brings us back to discussion of
Kripke [1982),
Kripf.e poses multiple challenges to meaning naturalism, in general
and to cp-COV in particular. First, he is skeptical that any non-
question-Degging account of cp-generalizations can be given. Chapter five
is a reply to this kind of objection to cp-COV. Second, Kripke thinks
that dispositional theories will, in general, be unable to provide an
adequate account of error, Chapter six is meant to reply to this worry.
One can (and perhaps should) read the Kripke-Wittgenstein puzzle as
presenting a new kind of global skepticism. But in this guise, it will
not present a worry peculiar to intentional psychology. There may,
hroweuer, be a different reading of the puzzle which provides an argument
against cp-COV that is not, mutatis mutandis, an argument against a theory
of anything. There is, I think, such an argument; and it is based on
considerations of normativity,
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For any given symbol type, I will have actually used tokens of the
type in only finitely many situations. But the meaning of a symbol
determines its correct use in infinitely many situations, some of which
are novel situations that I will actually encounter.13 When I use symbols
in novel situations, however, I am not making a leap of faith. I am not
guessing about how to extend my past use to include some new situation.
Nor am I merely reacting, without any justification, to some stimulus.
For example, I often apply the term 'table' in novel situations, say in
the home of a new acquaintance. But I am usually justified in doing so.
Or, returning to Kripke's plus/quus problem, I often respond to novel
arithmetic queries with some justification.
Kripke asks how, according to dispositional theories of meaning,
responding with '125' to the query '67 + 58' can be anything other than a
"mere jack-in-the-box unjustified arbitrary response." Theories like cp-
COV "immediately ought to appear to be misdirected, off target (p.23),'
according to Kripke, because such theories do-not tell speakers how they
ought to apply terms in the present so as to conform with their past
intentions concerning the application of those terms. To intend to use
symbols in a certain way is, I take it, to mean something by those
symbols. For again, meanings determine the correct and incorrect
applications of symbols; and so the meaning of a symbol "tells me how to
13. Boghossian (1989) makes this poinrt quite clearly. This is not to deny
the possibility of some novel situations in which it would be
indeterminate as to whether a symbol would be correctly applied.
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90 on" applying the symbol. In associating my former 'plus'-tokens with a
certain meaning, I determined what would be the correct responses to
countless mathematical queries. Perhaps I will, cp, give the response
determined by my past intentions to be the correct response (e.g., '125').
But, Kripke points out, the question of justification still remains.
My response of '125' to the novel mathematical situation seems to be
justified, not merely because it is correct (surely correct responses can
be unjustified); but because in making the response, I seem to be
"guided" by the very thing (viz. the meanving of 'plus') that determines
what the correct response is. But hot., one might ask, can a dispositional
theory, of meaning figure in a iustification of dispositions to use
symnbols? The challence facinq the naturalist is to account for this
justificatory, and hence normative, relation that meanings bear to symbol
use. In this section, I argue that- the defender of cp-COt can meet this
challenge.14
14. In what follows, I will often make use of Kripýe's non-mathematical
exarntle (involirng the rreanin of 'table') to avoid certain features
peculiar to the meaning of mathematical terms. The puzzle is not
supposed to hand on thes.e features. Kripke himself notes that nothing
hangs on the eyarrcle and shows how the skeptical paradox can be raised
for 'table' as easily, as for 'plus'.
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7.3.1 A Metaphysical Worry about Meaning
The Kripkean skeptic actually poses (at least) two questions, one
justificatory, another metaphysical. Befo!,, turning directly to the
question of justification, we should back up a little, and be clear on how
the defender of cp-COV can respond to the metaphysical wotry: In virtue
of what, if anything, do I presently mean by my terms what I meant by
those terms in the past? This concern is no.t unconnected to the concern
about justification. For if I oo not ne,i mean by my terms iAhat I meant by
thern in the past, then I do not now use terms (except perhaps
accidentally) in accordance with my past intentions to 'go orn" using those
terms in a certain L,.1:.); and s,; my present usage would not be justified
by my past intentions. fMoreoer, the Kripkean skeptic ultimately, suggests
that
... nc fact atbout mu ra st history-- nothing that was ever in my
mind, or in m'., e•,tern~l behavior-- establishes that I meant
plus rather than auus...eut if this is. correct, there can of
course be rno fac. about which function I meant, and if there
can be no act about !,hich function I meant in the past, there
can be none in the present either (p. 13).1
We will do well, therefore, to begin wzith the metaphysical question.
15. As Kripke goes on to note, in formnulating the skeptical puzzle, we
suppose that in tre Dresent twe mear, 'plus' by plus; we question only
whether this is what we meant by 'plus' in the past. The conclusion
that there is no fact which determines the meaninq of 'plus' in 'the
present is derived only after the puzzle has been intelligibly
formulated with respect to past 'plus'-tokens.
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The Kripkean skeptic suggests that at least uome of the symbol
tokenings that I would presently count as correct would, according to my
past intentions to use those symbols, count as incorrect. He suggests
that I may have somehow misunderstood or failed to carry out my past
intentions. The challenge is to cite some fact, in virtue of which we can
say that the skeptical hypothesis is false. If I were now to go to the
Eiffel tower and see a table there, I would say, "There's a table." The
Kripkean skeptic raises the possibility that in the past I meant tabair by
'table', where a tabair is anythinq that is a table, unless found near the
Eiffel tower; and because of some insane frenzy, I now mistakenly deny
that 'table' meant tabair. Of course, appeal to a frenzy is just a device
to suogest that the "tabair-hPpothesis" is compatible with all the non-
intentional facts. 16 And if tebair is what I meant by 'table' in the.
past, then appl,,inQ tre term "tab.e' to a table found near the Eiffel
Tower would be an incorrect use of 'table' as I intended to use that term
in the past.
It is important to bear in mind that the skepticism raised is not
merely epistemological. The hypothesis that in the past I meant tabair by
'table' may be consistent with all the available evidence. But the
Kripkean skeptic is not raising the familiar point that there will be
bizarre skeptical hypotheses logically consistent with what we know about
16. Cf. appeals to demons or vats in formulating skepticism about the
external world.
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a given domain. Putting the point in terms of a skeptical hypothesis
about what, for all I know, I might have meant is merely illustrative. As
Kripke sometimes puts it, his skeptic claims that not even God could tell
whether I meant table or tabair by 'table'. For the skeptic suggests that
there is no fact (for even God to see) which would determine whether I
meant table, tabair, or any of infinitely many alternatives consistent
with my past behavior. The skeptic begins by noting that multiple
intentional hypotheses are consistent with the known non-intentional
facts, moves to the clairm that no non-intentional fact would resolve the
underdetermination, and reaches the metaphysical conclusion of
indeterminacy.
The non-intentional fact that the defender of cp-CCV) will cite in
favor of the claim that I meant table b, 'table' is that, in the past, my
'table'-tokens cp-cov.aried with tables. In the last chapter, I discussed
how indeterminacy might arise according to cp-COV, if there are equally
good competing hypotheses concerning what tokens of a symbol type cp-
covary with. There is, h.owever, no reason-- certainly no a priori
reason-- to think that it was indeterminate as to whether my former
'table'-tokens cg-covaried with tables or tabairs. And as long as (i) in
the past my 'table'-tokens cp-covaried with tables, and (ii) such tokens
cp-covary with tables now, I mean by 'table' now what I meant in the past.
According to cp-COV, s-tokens produced prior to time t have the same
meaning as s-tokens produced after time t, just in case s-tokens cp-covary
with the same property before and after t, My present use of s-tokens
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conforms to my past intentions, and I "go on in the same way,' if my use
of s-tokens is still governed by the same cp-generalization. The word
'table' on my lips now means what it meant in the past if my 'table'-
tokens now cp-covary with what they cp-covaried with in the past.17
One might object that the defender of cp-COV merely exchanges (i) the
problem of choosing between competing hypotheses about the meaning of
symbols tokened in the past, for (ii) the problem of choosing between
competing hypotheses about which cp-generalization governed the production
of such symbols. Perhaps, then, the skeptic can reformulate his
hypothesis as follows: In the past, roy 'table'-tokens cp-covaried with
tabairs; so when I now apply the term table to something near the Eiffel
Tower, I fail to go on in the same way.
We cannot rule out this hypothesis a priori. It's not inconceivable
that in the past, my 'table'-tokens cp-covaried with tabairs. But there
are several points to note here. First, at least part of the Kripkean
skeptic's challenge is. to say what possible fact could determine that I
meant table by 'table' in the past; and cp-COV provides a plausible
17. Kripke raises two objections to this response to the metaphysical
question. The one concerning 3ustification will be discussed below.
His other objection has to do with the interpretation of cp clauses,
and it has already been discussed (in chapter four). Kripke thinks
the only non-intentional way the dispositionalist can cash out the
appeal to cp clauses is by appealing to counterfactuals about what
would be the case if we lived longer, had larger brains, etc. And he
notes that we can hlve no confidence in the truth of such
counterfactuals. But as we saw, this is the wrong way to explicate
cp-generali zation!.
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candidate. Second, it is possible that I did mean tabair by 'table',.
Kripke himself notes, 'Ridiculous and fantastic though it is, the
skeptic's hypothesis is not logically impossible....although the
hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to be a priori impossible (p.9)." So
the possibility of the corresponding hypothesis about ce-covariation being
true is hardly evidence against cp-COV. Third, even if the "tabair
hypothesis" about cp-covariation is consistent with all the available
evidence, it would hardly be surprising to find that epistemrological
skepticism can be raised with respect to what I mean by my terms in the
past. As noted above, however, the Kripkean skeptic intends to raise a
deeper problem about meanings than this. The challenge was to cite a fact
in virtue of which my current 'table'-tokens have the same meaning as my
former 'table'-tokens. But as long as all these tok-i,-s do cp-covary with
tables, there is no problem for cp-COV. To presen; a difficulty for cp-
COV along these lines, the skeptic would need to argue that there is no
fact of the matter concerning whether my past 'table'-tokens cp-covaried
with tables or tabairs.
Moreover, we have reason to prefer the "table hypothesis." Consider
the relevant counterfactuals.18 Suppose I had seen a table near the
Eiffel Tower at some time in my past. I suspect I would have said (and
18. One might have general skeptical doubts about counterfactual claims.
But such doubts will hardly be peculiar to the intentional. One must,
as Kripke tries to, argue that intentional counterfactuals are
irreducibly intentional. But this is just the point that the defender
of cp-COV wants to reply to.
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thought), "There's a table." Given a 'table'-token produced in the
absence of a tabair, and the hypothesis that (cp) 'table'-tokens covari
with tabairs, it would follow that ceteris was not paribus with respect
the production of my 'table'-tokens. But what, if anything, would have
explained w my putatively *abnormal 'table'-token was produced in
absence of a tabair? What interfering factor could have been cited? 1
nothing could haue explained such putatively *abnormal instances, then
hypothesized generalization in question
("cp, 'table'-tokens covaried with tabairs") is false. And we have no
reason to beliete that the proximity of the Eiffel Tower affects the
*rnormal production of 'table'-tokens. That is why, I suggest, we have no
reason to believe that 'table'-tokens (past or present) 'p-covary with
tabairs as opposed to tables., Our earlier discussion of Kepler's vs.
Schmepler's law applies here. We have reason to prefer the former, even
though both are logically consistent with the actual data. So the
objection to cp-CO) cannot be merely that there is a Scfrepler-esque
alternative to it.
Let us expano the skeptical hypothesis, though. Perhaps I am
mistaken not only about my past intentions to use symbols, but about my
past dispositions as well. Perhaps if presented with a table near the
Eiffel Tower in the past, I would have said. "That's no table." But
suppose I go now to the Eiffel Tower and say, "There's a table." Either
(i) ceteris is not paribus with respect to the production of my present
'table'-tokens, or (ii) my 'table'-tokens no longer cp-covary with what
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they used to. If (i), then again.we must ask what explains the putative
*abnormal instance and/or how the proximity of the Eiffel Tower is
relevant to the *normal production of 'table'-tokens. If (ii), then the
meaning of my term 'table' has indeed changed according to cp-COV. But if
(ii), then perhaps I no longer use 'table'-tokens in accordance with my
past intentions either. In motivating his hypothesis, Kripke's skeptic
suggests that "under the influence of some insane frenzy, or a bout of
LSD, I have come to misinterpret my own previous usage (p.9)." If such a
hypothesis were true, my tokens might well cp-covary with different
properties than they used to. To present a difficulty for cp-COV along
these lines, one would need a skeptical scenario in which the symbol user
intuitively does not apply terms in accord with his prior intentions, even
though the terms cp-covary with the same properties they used to cp-covary
with. But I doubt that such a scenario will be forthcoming. 19
The skeptic might, ho•.ever, try to maintain his challenge in a
different way,. He might suggest that in the past, by 'table' I meant
schrrable; where a schmable is (i) anything that was a table up until time
t or (ii) anything that is a table, except those near the Eiffel Tower,
after time t; and time t is the present. The skeptic can grant that, in
the past, all the dispositional facts about my use accorded with the
hypothesis that my 'table'-token cp-covary with tables. But since time t
19. If one were provided, I would take it as a direct counterexample to
cp-COU.
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had not arrived yet, my dispositions were also consistent with the claim
that my 'table'-tokens cp-covary with schmables. If I am to conform with
my past intentions, so the skeptic might claim, my 'table'-tokens should
keep cp-covarying with schmables, i.e. those tables which are (now) not
near the Eiffel Tower.
In this form, the skeptic's hypothesis is even more reminiscent of
Goodman's new riddle of irduction and the "grue problem." If indeed
Kripke's puzzle just is. a restatement of Goodman's puzzle with respect to
the intentional, then perhaps we should have invoked the methodological
maxim, '"If it's a problem for biology, it's not a problem for intentional
psk'chology." For the grue problem can be raised in biology (and physics);
so the fact that it can be raised for cp-CR' shows neither that cp-COV is
especially problematic nor that cp-COY fails to be naturalistic. I
suspect, however, that Kripke is not merely applying Goodman's puzzle to
semantics. For he doesn't claim that certain theories of physical or
biological phenomena "irrnmediately ought to appear misdirected, off
target," because the availability of grue-like hypotheses shows all such
theories to be uodustified. Moreover, we are looking for an argument that
would show there is somethinq special about the semantic that marks it off
from domains ina which naturalistic theories of the sort offered in the
"hard sciences' are appropriate. In any case, it will certainly be more
satis.fying if we can make a reply to Kripke that does not depend solely on
invoking the methodological maxim above; and we can.
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The hypothesis that my 'table'-tokens now cp-covary with schmables
faces difficulties similar to those faced by the hypothesis that such
tokens used to cp-covary with tabairs. If my 'table'-tokens now cp-covary
with schmables (i.e. tables not near the Eiffel Tower, for time t has
past), then current 'table'-tokenings near the Eiffel Tower are *abnormal.
But again, what explains the *abnormality? If there is no interfering
factor that can be cited, then the hypothesis that my 'table'-tokens cp-
covary with schmables is false. Intuitively, what is wrong about the
various skeptical hypotheses concerning the meaning of 'table', is that
the meaning of 'table' has nothing to do with the Eiffel Tower. On the
plausible assumptions that the Eiffel Tower neither (i) has anything to do
with the *normal production of 'table'-tokens, nor (ii) can it explain the
production of *abnorrnal 'table'-tokens, cp-COV thus captures and offers
some explanation of wwy the alternative hypotheses about the meaning of
'table' Seem so bizarre.
7.3.2 Reliabilist Justifications
The defender of cp-COV thus has a response to the metaphysical question:
In virtue of what do I now mean by my terms what I meant by them in the
past? I mean now by 'table' what I meant in the past, if the production
of my present 'table'-tokens is governed by the same cp-generalization
that governed the production of my past 'table'-tokens. We must now ask
how this response provides the basis of a justification for my present use
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of terms, since it is (or at least was) my intention that those terms be
used in a certain way. That is, how does the fact that my 'table'-tokens
now ep-covary with the same things that they used to cp-covary with figure
in a justification of my "going on" in applying the term 'table' as I do?
It is important to bear in mind that one can use symbols correctly,
e.g. aoply 'table'-tokens to tables, without being justified in the use of
such symbols. Even the jack-in-the-box making utterances at random might
say, "There's a table," in the presence of a table. Using Kripke's
terminology, I can presently act in accordance with my past intentions to
use the word 'table' in a certain waly, without my present use of the word
'table' being justified. Justification requires something more: that my
past intentions, which determine how I ought to use symbols presently,
somehow quide my present use. That is to say, if my present symbol-using
behavior is iv. be justified, the very fact which determines whether my
present use is correct must somehow be implicated in my use.
There is nothing peculiar to the semantic in this p.eture of
justification. A plausible idea concerning the justification of belief is
that my belief that p is justified, if p was. somehow responsible for the
production of my belief. In fact, this idea suggests a line of response
for the meaning naturalizst to Kripke's worries about the justificatory
role of meaning. The defender of cp-COV can, I think, respond to the
Kripkean skeptic bv paralleling certain "reliabilist" responses to the
Cartesian skeptic. The justification for my present use of symbols would
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consist, roughly, in (i) my symbols bearing the same cp-covariation
relations to properties and states of affairs they bore to those
properties and states of affairs in the past, and (ii) the fact that (i)
is not accidental. On this view, my past intentions *guide" my present
use of symbols, in that (a) my past (cp) dispositions determine what my
past intentions were, and (b) my present (cp) dispositions to use symbols
"track" my past dispositions.
Let me begin to unpack this response to the Kripkean skeptic by
(briefly) sketching a reliabilist response to a more familiar skeptice
The Cartesian skeptic does not seriously assert that there is an evil
demon. But he uses the demon hypothesis to question how knowledge is
possible. The skeptic may grant, for example, that there is a table
before me; or, at least he doesn't deny this. But the skeptic asks how I
can know that there is a table before me, iuern that all my evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that there is an evil demon deceiving me?
Even if my belief that there is a table before me is true, knowledge
requires more than true belief. As we trometimes say, the Cartesian
skeptic denies that beliefs of a certain sort are ever justified.
The reliabilist responds that knowledge is possible if belief.-forming
mechanisms 'track the facts." According to this suggestion, I know there
is a table before me if (roughly): (i) my belief that there is a table
before me is true; moreover, (ii) had the table been there, I would t bwe
believed it was there; and (iii) had the table been absent, I would not
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have believed there was a table before me. If there were an evil demon
regularly deceiving us, our belief forming mechanisms might not track the
facts. But if there were an evil demon,.knowledge might not be
possible. 2 0 As it stands, however, we suppose there is no evil demon.
And the mere logical possibility of the demon hypothesis does not rule out
knowledge, according to the reliabilist, because mere logical
possibilities do not keep belief forming mechanisms from tracking the
facts. The basic idea is simple: True beliefs constitute knowledge if
the production of true beliefs was no accident. And true belief
production is non-accidental if the presence or absence of the belief in
question is reliably connected to the facts as sketched above. Various
refinements would be needed to protect this theory against
counterexamrples. But my purpose here is only to convey the general form
of a reliabilist response to skepticism.
Let me make one further point about this "fact-tracking" theory,
which we be relevant below. It follows from this theory of knowledge that
we don't know that the demon hypothesis is false; because our belief that
there is no demon doesn't track the relevant fact. Were there a demon,
20. I say 'might' because various "reference-based" responses to
skepticism, e.g. Putnarrm [1975], have the consequence that we would
still have knowledge (though perhaps not the knowledge we "thought" we
had, in some Cartesian sense of 'thought'). Note that given (i), (ii)
is a "semi-factual" (since the antecedent of the subjunctive
conditional is true), while (iii) is a regular counterfactual. The
simple reliabilist theory offered is the first pass at a theory of
knowledge offered by Nozick [1981]. There are, of course, different
versions of reliabilism. See, e.g. Goldman [1986) or Swain (1981].
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everything would appear as it does now, and presumably, we would believe
that there was no demon. So the counterfactual claim, "Had there been a
demon, I would have believed it," is false. But far from being absurd,
the conclusion that we don't know the demon hypothesis to be false
actually fits rather nicely with our intuitive sense that the demon
hypothesis is more than logically possible. And importantly, I can still
know that there is a table before me according to the "fact-tracking*
reliabilist. For my table-belief does track the facts. Cashing out the
relevant counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds: In the 'close
possible worlds' in which the table is there, I believe it; in the close
possible worlds in which there is no table, I don't believe there is
one.21
The defender of cr-CL.J can hold that my current application of
'table' to tables is not "a mere jack-in-the-box unjustified and arbitrarp
21. Some disclaimers: I am not endorsing possible worlds analyses of the
counterfactual clairm. "Hao there been no table, I woulan't have
believed there was," nor of the somni-factual claim, 'Had there been a
table before me, I would have belieued it.' But the possible worlds
metaphor, together with talk of 'close" possible worlds, is at least
useful in trying to understand what these claims amount to. Nor are
these brief remarks offered as a defense of reliabilist responses to
Cartesian skepticism. A oroper treatment of this issue would have to
include, inter alia, a discussion of whether I can know there is a
table before me, know that the existence of the table entails the
denial of the demon hypothesis, yet not know the denial of the demon
hypothesis. Also, Goldman (1986] understands Nozick's theory as a
"pure subjunctive" theory which depends only on the possible world in
which p is false, not a range of such possible worlds. I've
understood Nozick's theory in a way that makes it more like Gol&ran's
own "relevant alternatives" theory.
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response," because my current use of sumbols "tracks" my past use. This
notion of tracking can be cashed out, at least to a first approximation,
for the case of 'table' as follows: (i) the same ep-generalization
governs past and present 'table'-tokenings; moreover, (ii) had my former
'table'-tokens cp-covaried with tables, my present 'table'-tokens would
have cp-covaried with tablc.s as well; and (iii) had my former 'table'-
tokens cp-covaried with something other than tables, my present 'table'-
tokens would have cp-couaried with this something else as well. As long
as (ii) and (iii) are true, the truth of (i) is not accidental. So when I
now apply 'table'-toKens to tables (cp), my behavior as hardly arbitrary.
I do so because that is what I did in the past.
The defender of cp-COV can grant, with Kripke, that the meaning of
past 'table'-tokens determines the correct use of table'-tokens in the
present. For according to cp-CCVJ, past "table'-tokens had their meaning
in virtue of cp-couaruvirg with tables, and my present disposition to use
'tarle'-tokens tracks this fact in the sense just described. So my
Dresent use of 'table'-toerns is reliably connected to the fact that
determines whether my present use is correct, viz. the fact that my
'table'-tokens meant table. Thus, when conjoined with i is notion of
"tracking one's past use," cp-CLV can provide the sort of justification
for my present use of symbols that the Kripkean skeptic demands. For we
can distinguish me from the jack-in-the-box that merely happens to use
some 'table'-token in accordance with the meaning of 'table' without avny
justification.
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Putting skeptical hypotheses aside, it's no accident that the same
cp-gcneralization governs the production of both past and present 'table'-
tokens. This fac. just reflects a sort of cognitive stability over time.
But then it's no accident or arbitrary response when I use a symbol as I
w•vld have (cp) Lsed the symbol in the past, And so, it's no accident
when my present symbol-using behavior conforms to my "past intentions."
For according to cp-COC, mt) past intentions were to go on producing
syrmbols in those conditions in which I produced them ceteris paribus.
It may be useful here to consider what would be the case if something
like Kripke-s skeptical scenaio were true. Suppose I have just taken a
mino altering drug, or that a nefarious neuro-surgeon has just performed
an operation on me, with the result that I am presently disposed to apply
tre term 'table' (cp) to cats.22 I think we would be inclined to say that
I no longer aprplied the term 'table' in accordance with my past
intentions. For mir past in:-intor:ns were, intuitively, to go on applying
'table'-tokens to tables. But if I had just ttken such a drug, the
production of mry oresent 'taCle'-tokerns would, bvy hypothesis, no longer be
governed by the %.ame ep-generalization that governed the production of my
past 'table tokens, So my. present use would hardly track my past use-
2L. Remnember tr•at arnring the dispositions which rmust be affected to break
the ^p-ccuvariatiro relation are my dispositions to defer to other
s•~eakers and/or iictionaries.,
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We might even suppose (i) that which property the drug causes my
'tablt'-tokens to cp-covary with is essentially a random matter, but (ii)
the drug happened to cause my 'table'-tokens to cp-covary with tables. If
this were the case, my present use would not track my past use. For it
would be "an accident" that the same generalization governed the
production of past and preser.t 'table'-tokens. Anci so, according to the
"use-tracking" su3gestion, my present use of 'table'-tokens would not be
justified. But this seems to be the intuitively correct conclusion. For
if I only accidentally conformed to my past intentions concerning the use
of 'table'-tokens, then I would indeed be like the jack-in-the-box.
It may be that I don't know Kripke's skeptical hypothesis to be
false. That is, I may; not know th;at my present use tracks my past use.
For it might be that, had my present use failed to track my past use, I
would not have noticed. But again, this seems to comport with our
intuitive sense that Kripke's skepticaL scenario is not impossible. And
again, the Kripiearn skeptic intends to raise more than epistermological
skepticism abuut the semantic. So for th? purposes of responding to the
Kripkean skeptic's demand for justificationt it is enough that my present.
use of symbols track my past use in the sense described. Whether or not I
know this obtains may show something interesting about my epistemological
situation, but it shows r,,;thing about my semantic situation.
One might object to ray response to the Kripkean skeptic along the
following lines: All the talk about a skeptical hypothesis and conforming
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to past intentions is merely illustrative. The real point is that,
intuitively, the very thing which determines whether my use of symbols is
correct (viz. the meaning of the symbols) seems to be what guides my use
of symbols. The talk of justification comes in as a way of emphasizing
this point. So at bottom, what the naturalist has to account for is the
intuitive sense in which meanings of guide the use of symbols. I like
this way of stating the problem, because (i) it s so simple, and (ii) the
naturalist's response is so clear.
The naturalist thinks that smprnbols have meanings in virtue of bearing
some naturalistic relation to instantiations of properties. But in those
cases in which symbol use is justified, i.e. in those cases in which
correct use of symbols was not accidental, the instantiation of the
relevant property does seem to be what leads to the symbol user to produce
the symbol. When i correctly and justifiably say (or think), "There's a
table," the presence of the table is, presumably, what led nme to make the
utterance (or form the thought). The very heart of covariation semantics
is the idea that normally, the world serues as our guide in the use of
symbols. For meanings are things in the environment, viz. properties and
states of affairs. Of course, the covariation semanticist has to face the
problem of accounting for false beliefs. Sut we've already seen what the
defender of cp-COU can say on this score. Moreover, if you think that
meaning guides correct use, you have to say something about how incorrect
use is possible, regardless of your particular theory of meaning. So the
intuition that meanirngs are somrehow responsible for the production of
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symbols seems to me both on the right track and perfectly consistent with
cp-COV.23
7.3.3 Meaning Externalism and the First Person
Kripke sometimes writes as though a constraint on responses to his skeptic
is that what justifies my use of symbols be something that is in me.24
Even now as I write, I feel confident that there is something
in my mind-- the mearing that I attach to the 'plus' sign--
that instructs me what I ought to do in all future cases (p.
22).
If this is a legitimate constraint, then the response to the Kripkean
skeptic offered above is unacceptable. For in talking of reliabilism,
"tracking" past use, and the instantiation of properties, I clearly made
reference to facts external tc mre. This should come as no surprise,
however. For one cannot insist both that (i) meanings be what justifies
symbol use and (ivi: wha.t ;ustifies s•;mbol use be insioe the head of symrbol
users. For from (i) anr (ii) it would follow. that rmeanings are in the
head, a thesis that Putnam and Surge should hae disabused us of by now.
Rather, since meaning is determined-- at least in part-- by factors
external to symbol users, then if meanings are what justify symbol use, we
should expect factors external to symbol users to be relevant to the
23. I'm indebted to SEe Dwver here for m.aking this point explicit.
24. See Horwich [1984].
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justification of symbol use. In short, if meaning and justification go
together in the wa , Krzpke suggests, then externalism about meaning and
externalist justifications of symbol use should go together as well.
There is a potential worry here concerning first person authority
with respect to the meaning of mental states, One might argue that if the
meanings of my thoughts were determined in part bV factors external to me,
it would not be possible for me to know the meanings of my thoughts
without doing a great deal of emrnirical investigation conicerning these
external factors. I clearly do not perform such investigations. Equally
clearly, I know the meanings of at least many of my thoughts. Hence, one
might conclude, externalisr about meaning must be mistaken. The first
thing to note about this argurrent is, that even if correct, it presents a
general pro;lem for meaning egternalisrn, not just naturalistic theories
that are also externalist. The second trinq to note is that we have very
strong reason to think that rrearing externalism is correct; so we
therefore have reason to think the argumernt above is misquided, and that
first person autrhority, about the meaning of mental states is consistent
with externalist theories of meaning, includ3ng cp-COV.
Moreover. the meaning externalist has a response available to the
argument above. I will not address this issue at any length here, for it
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has been dealt with elsewhere. 25  Roughly, the idea is that I can know
meaning of a thought T by forming a second thought T' whose content is
parasitic on the content of T. The meaning externalist can then go on
account for the content of T. and hence T', by appealing to her favorit
externalist theory of meaning, say cp-COV. Consider the public lanSJag
case. Any competent speaker of English knows that 'water' means water.
But one need not adopt disquotational or "redundancy" theories of truth
and reference to explain this fact, Consider the expression, "'water'
means water,' which is composed of three sub-expressions. The meaning
tt.P- leftmost sub-expression is parasitic on the meaning of the rightmos
sub-exp r ession. (We can, as meaning externalists, suppose that the
rightmost sub-expression has its meaning in virtue of bearing some
relation to water.) One is assured of uttering a truth in saying,
"'water' means water," because one mentions the expression one goes on
u-e. Similarly, one can be assureo that in saying, "Water is wetp one
has saic something about water. For one has used the expression 'water
which means water.
The same idea can be apolieo to mental states. Burge [19883 argue
that when thinking (with first person authority) that one is thinking t
P,
25. See Burge (1988) and Davidson (1984b, 1987, 1988]; see also Stalna
[1969]. But see Loar [1987] and Boghossian [1989] who dissent, at
least somewhat.
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one is not taking one's thought (or thinking) that p merely as
an object. One is thinking that p in the very event of
thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking it. It is thought
and thought about in the same mental act (p.654).
To think I am thinking about tables is to form a "second order" thought
which is about some "first order" thought. But I cannot form the second
order thought without thereby forna;ng the first order thought; and-- this
is the crucial point-- what my second order thought is determined by the
content of my first order thought. The knowledge associated with first
person authority turns out to be less substantive than certain Cartesian
intuitions might suggest. But as Surge points out, this is the correct
conclusion. His twin-earth example may best serve our purposes here.
Suppose Oscar lives on earth until time He is then switched back
and forth between earth and twin earth, so that he gradually spends more
of his time, ano eventually all of it, on twin-earth. Oscar may think to
himself every day of his life, "Water is wet." When thinking this
thought, Oscar can alw,.as say, with first person authority, SI am now
thinking about water.• And he can always be right. But his thoughts, at
some point, stop being about water; and they come to be about twin-water.
Hence, what Oscar thinks about can change without him noticing; external
factors are indeed relevant to the content of Oscar's thoughts; and this
is all consistent with Oscar knowing the content of his thoughts.26
26. What the defender of cp-COV will say about twin-earth cases in general
should be pretty obvious. Here on earth, 'water'-tokens cp-covary
with water; on twin-earth, 'water'-tokens cp-covary with twin-water.
What is "semantically similar" about Oscar and twin-Oscar is the
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During the period in which Oscar is being switched back and forth,
there is a sense in which Oscar will not know what he is thinking about;
even though he can truly say, "I arn thinking about water.' For Osca7 will
not know whether his term 'water' refers to water or twin-water. This is
not to say that Oscar must alwaps know which substance |i which in order
to know what he is thinking about. By hypothesis, we could not
distinguish water from twin-water. Nonetheless, it is plausible to hold
that we know our thouqhts are about water. But in Oscar's peculiar
situation, he doesn't know which substance he is referring to; though he
can say truly , I'm referring to water." This is just to sav that
relevant alternatives. are releuant to knowledge claims.27 Suppose, for
example, that kno&'ledqe is relablc- indication. We mav be reliable
indicators of water, since there is no t win-water around. On the other
hand, Osc.ar mak, tbe . reliable irfilcator of neither water nor twin-water
ourinrg the period in which he is being swiltched back and forth. And
reogrdless of the account of knowledge one favors, Oscar may not satisfu
the sufficient conditions, for knciledge during his period of trans-world
tratel. Ir this sense, Oscar mat not know which thing he is thinking
following: Put them in the same environment, and their symbols will
cp-covary with the same properties ano states of affairs.
27. See Goldman [1986).
- 386 -
No rms
Chapter Seven
about. But the knowledqe Oucar lacks is not knowledge he needs to assert,
with first person authority, 'I am thinking about water.'28
More importantly, the knowledge Oscar lacks is not knowledge that
Oscar coi;ld have with Cartesian certainty, at least not given his
unfortunate circumstances. We know this, because Oscar's contingent
circumstances are relevant to whether he has this knowledge. So the
Kripkean skeptic, with his. Cartesian intuitions that meanings are rules in
our heads which tell us how to go on, cannot argue against the externalist
reply to him by Insisting that Oscar (or we) have such knowledge because
of first person authority. In short, neither meaning externalism, nor the
phenomenon of first persor authority, nor the conjunction of the two tell
against the response to Kriphe's skeptic offered in this section.
7 . 4 A Sat i s f ac:r t no c )c_ -- r -kA :-oun't ?
We must now, ask rhow if a satisfactory response to Hume's Problem has been
provided. Are we contlineced that the normativity of mearinq does. not show
naturalistic theories of rremerir.n like cp-CCFJ to be hopeless. I have
presented a series of considerations that lead us to sat that meaning is
normative. And I haee arqued that not only is cp-COV consistent with
these considerations, it proolde. a basis for evpianation of various
senses in which meaning is ncrratio,e. In addition to the discussion of
28. Cf. Evans [1982].
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Kripke's worries about the justificatory role of meaning, I emphasized
that an "ought' of idealization" is associated with all cp-
generalizations. This 'ought' is, in turn, associated with our intuitive
notion of 'normal functioning." When ep-generalizations have *abnormal
instances, we often speak of things having "gone wrong.' Moreover, in the
last chapter, I argued that cp-COV can handle the disjunction problem.
And in so far as the disjunction problem is associated with the problem of
error, this is a further point in cp-COVJ's favor with respect to
normativity; for error is a normative notion.
One might clair, that I have still failed to capture the important
sense in which meaning is normative-- the peculiarly semantic sense of
'ought'-- ard that this sense of normativity will be the one that no
naturalistic theort, can capture. This is, of course, possible. But I do
think that enou.•h senses of norrrmati-lt3, have been captured and been shown
to be at least consistenrt itr, co-COl', that there is no longer a
presumption that co-COU is inconsistent with normative facts about symbol
use. This conclusion, together witr the current absence of a sound
argument against cp-C'OUV basec on normativuity, may be the best that the
meaning naturalist can hope for with respect to Hume's Problem. I want to
conclude this chapter, though, by considering one last sense of
normrnatiuity that cp-CKOU may be able to account for. I have said
throughout the last several chaters that cp-COU is a theory similar in
spirit to the "T isconsin Serranti:. of Star~pe [1977], Dretske [1981,
19881, and Fodor [1981]. That is. cp-COV is a version of ideal detection W
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semantics. And it may be that, by their very nature, ideal detection
theories of meaning capture a kind of epistemic normativity.
Suppose the following theory was rights
!5-tokens have p as their meaning, given optimal conditions for
the production of I-tokens, I-tokens are produced when and
only when p.29
We could then say that one ought to apply I-tokens when and only when p
obtains, because that is how one would apply 3-tokens in the best possible
epistemic situation. For suppose conditions were optimal. Then the world
would not, es.it so often does, conspire against agents with respect to
the production of beliefs. Observation conditions would be as good as
they could be; illusion-provoking factors would, to the degree possible,
be absent; and so on.
Surely there is a sense in which one ought to do what one would do in
the best possible epistemic situation. There is a sense in wnich (cp) a
doctor ought to Co at time t what he would do at t if he knew all the
relevant Information. We sometimes (try to) excuse ourselves from past
mistakes by sating, "I wouldn't have...if I had known...' And of course,
one ought to believe what one would believe in the best possible epistemic
situation; for in such a situation, one would have the best chance of
forming true beliefs. Thus, optimality condition theories of mnlning
capture a certain sense of episternic normativity associated with symbol
29. Note that such a theory would have a distinctly verificationist
flauor. See Fodor [1981] for discussion.
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use. This is not surprising, since such theories appeal to optimal
conditions.
We have reason to believe that cp-COU can capture this kind of
episternic norrmativity. For were optimality conditions to obtain, ceteris
would be paribus with respect to the production of beliefs. So the
defender of cp-CCIV can hold that one ought to form s-tokens as they are
*normally formed, because one thereby produces s-tokens as one would
produce them in the episternically best possible situation. But we also
want to distinguish cp-COV from other optimality theories. For cp-COV is
not committed to the clairem that "optimal" conditions actually obtain; and
he is certainly not conwititted to the claim that mental states have content
in virtue of bearing relations to some (perhaps nomologically impossible)
episterroicall id1yllic situation. Moreover, by exchanging talk of optimal
conditions obtaining for talk of ceteris being paribus, the defender of
cp-COV eschew's the responsibility of srelling out some exceptionless
conditions in which an agent would form the belief that p when p.
Nonetheless, in trling to trderstand the normatiiti' issue, considering
such an episterroicaily idkollic situation can be quite useful. If such
considerations are objectionable, we can constrain the notion of
optirnality and consider the eoisternicallv best nomologically possible
situation. I think the intuition that one ought to do what one would do
in the epistemricallu, best possible situation survives, even if the natlon
of possib~ ity, in question is constraineo by natural laws. And again, the
defender of cp-COL' can hold that one ought to form s-tokens as they are
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*normally formed, because one thereby produces s-tokens as one would
produce them in the epastemically best nomologically possible situation.
There are, of course, many situations in which ceteris would be
paribus for the production of beliefs other than the "epistemic Nirvana"
in which all optimality conditions obtain. So the defender of cp-COU need
not hold that such a situation is possible for there to be a situation in
which ceteris is paribus. Various interfering factors might "cancel out.'
Moreover, we must bear in mind that conditions don't have to be perfect
for ceteris to be paribus. For example, aviators distinguish many grades
of visibility. Whern the weather is poor and the visibility is a mere -ive
miles, observationr conditions are not ideal, in that they could be (and
often are) much better. But ever on a cloudy day, ceteris can be paribus
with respect to the production of beliefs about nearby, middle-sizeo
objects resultin? from visual Inouts. As long as observation conditions
are not so bad trat the" explair. why *abnormal tokens occurred, ceteris
can still be paribus. But when ceteris is paribus, my, production of
tokens is no different thar, it would be in an epistemfically better
situation. So if I produce a 'DOG'-token on a cloudy daý in the presence
of a dog, it can still be the case that I ought to have produced a 'DOG'-
token, in the sense that I would haue done the samr,e in the best
(nomologically) possible epistemic position. When ceteris is paribus, I
produce symbols as I ought to in this epistemic sense; and so in any
particular case, 1 ought to produce symbols as I do when ceteris is
paribus. Hence, cp-CO' accounts for another kind of meaning normativity.
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In short, there are lots of situations in which my epistemic position
is not as good as it could be, but it is good enough for the purposes at
hand, In such cases, I form beliefs as I ought to in the sense being
discussed here. For in such circumstances, my epistemic position is not
so bad that there is a difference between what I actually do and what I
would do in the best (nomologically) possible epistemic position. On the
other hand, if my epistemic position is bad enough to effect a difference
between what I actually do and what I would do cp, then I do not produce
symbols as I ought to in the sense discussed. But none of this should be
surprising. For after all, epistemology has something to do with
detecting facts, and cp-CO)J i•as designed to be a version of ideal
detection semantics. The onl!' "new twist" is how the notion of "ideal'
gets cashed out. So it's no surprise that, as an ideal detection theory,
cp-COV captures a sense of normativty, associated with ideal detection.
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Chap t e r 8
Conclusi ons: Li ui ng wi th Anom aly
(4i sconsi n Style)
The third principle is that there are no
strict deterministic laws on the basis of
which mental events can be predicted and
explained (the Anomalism of the Mental).
---Davidson, "Mental Events."
Throughout this thesis, I have avoided explicit discussion of Davidson and
"Anomalous Monism." 1 This is because a proper treatment of the
Davidsonian position here would require a great deal of detailed exegesi·s
and a review of a sizabJe secondary literature, tasks that would have led
away from the central points of discussion here. I will not provide such
a treatment now; for this is a concluding chapter, But it may still be
warthwhile to make a few remarks about Davidson's picture which I take to
be untendentious (the remarks, that is).. For doing so will make explicit
1. See especially Davidson E1970a, 1973a, 1974a]. See also McLaughlin
[1985].
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some of what ep-CCVI says "implicitly" about the relation between the
mental and the physical.
Davidson [1970a] offers three'principles which result in an "apparent
contradiction" about mental events.
The Principle of Causal Interaction: Some mental events
interact causally with physical events.
The Nomological Character of Causality: Events related as
cause and effect fall under strict laws.
The Anorralisrr of the Mental: There are no strict laws on the
basis of which mental events cart be predicted and explained.
Davidson holds that these principles are compatible given Anomalous
Monism: Mental events are identical to physical events; relations of
identity and causality hold amorng events; but events instantiate laws
only under descriptions: hence, a token mental event and a token physical
event can be related as cause and effect (i..e., the events can have
descriptions that instantiate a laiw); but there need not be strict
ps.cyrcio-physical or ps.,choloq, al laws, for events may not instantiate laws
under psychological descriptions: and in fact, there are no strict
psv.hc:-prs,.ical or psychological laws. Thus, The Principle of Causal
Interaction, The Nomrological Character of Causality, and The Anomalism of
the Mental are preserved.
Th- defender of ep-COM will agree that there are no strict laws
9overninq mental phenorrnenA. .Any lat•ws: of intentional psychologv will, like
those of evolutionary biology, be cp-generalizations. Similarly for any
psycho-physical laws there hapoen to be., Bit the defender of cp-COV will
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disagree with Davidson if, as etymology suggests, mental anomalism entails
that the mental is anomalogical in character. -From the fact that any
putative generalizations governing the mental will face anomalies (i.e.
*abnormal instances), Davidson infers that there are no (serious) laws
governing the mental. For he says:
By a serious law, I mean ... a law that, while it may have
provisos limiting its application, allows us to determine in
advance whether or not the conditions of application are
satisfied. It is a mistake to compare a truism like, 'If a
man wants to eat an acorn omelette, then he generally will if
the opportunity exists and no other desire overrides,' with a
law that says how fast a body will fall in a vacuum. It is an
error, because in the latter case, but not the former, we can
tell in advance whether the condition holds, and we know what
allowance to make if it doesn't (p. 233).
There may be differences between the intentional generalization
Davidson cites and la4ws in the "hard sciences." But if the arguments I
presented in chapter four are correct, then any differences do not stema
from the fact that given "serious' laws, we can determine in advance if
the conditions in which the law has no *abnormal instances have been met.
The fact that a putative cp-generalization G can not be completed-- much
less completed at the level of the science to which G belongs-- cannot be
an objection to counting G as a law, on pain of holding that no special
science that does not strictly reduce to physics states laws. But even if
one is willing to bite this bullet, one cannot thereby show that there is
anything peculiar about the mental. Moreover, if cp-generalizations are
laws, not only can there be psychological laws, there can (at least in
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principle) be psycho-physical laws.2 Indeed, ep-COV states a putative
psycho-physical law. These will not be strict laws, to be sure; but
strict laws are rare, perhaps non-existent.
If we think of laws as expressing nomological relations between
properties, then the claim that there can be true lawlike cp-
generalizations should be easy to accept. For the relevant relation may
hold between properties, even if that relation is "interfered with" in
particular cases by various independent factors. The account of cp-
generalizations given in chapter five, then, is rather natural. For it
suggests that cp-generalizations be characterized in terms of their being
(undefeated) interfering factor explanations for all possible *abnormal
instances of the generalization. On the other hand, if we think of laws
as linguistic things, the account should still be acceptable. For
presumably we will also hold that explanations are linguistic things. And
events that (under some description) instantiate an *abnormal instance of
a cp-generalization may also (unaer the same or different descriptions)
instantiate an explanation that reconciles the *abnormal instance with the
cp-generalization. We will be open to this possibility, as long as we do
not insist a priori that all laws strict. There is no reason to insist on
this point, and various conrsiderations tell against it.
2. See Kim (1985] for a discussion of Davidson's position on psycho-
physical laws.
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Once we allow that laws need not be strict, we open up the
possibility that the intentional properties of the mental arise from the
lawful relations that mental.symbols bear to properties in the
environment. There are, however, two related difficulties f.acing this
proposal. First, mistakes are possible; but how can error be
accommodated if meaning arises from law-governed processes? Second,
meaning is normative; but how can natural laws give rise to normativity?
The response to each question makes use of the fact that the laws in
question are not strict. Mistakes are possible; because even where
processes are law-governed, *abnormal instances are possible. And errors
just are *abnormal instances of cp-generalizations governing the
production of symbols. WHe can also account for the (intrinsic)
normativity of rreaning by noting that there is an 'ought' of idealization.
Symbols ought, in this sense, to tokened as they *normally are tokened.
Given cp-COV, this is to say that symbols ought to be tokened in
accordance with their mneanings. We also saw at the end of the last
chapter that there is an epistemic sense of normativity associated with
versions of ideal aetection semantics as well. Finally, I argued that,
together with a dose of reliabilism, cp-COV provides the basis for a reply
to the Kripke-Wittgenstein puzzle.
The responses to the "disjunction problem" and "Hume's problem"
offered here are very much in the spirit "Wisconsin Semantics;" for the
view is that j is the belief that p, if 3-tokens are "normally' produced
if and only if p. But there are two distinctive features of ep-COV that I
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would emphasize. First, the defender of cp-COV can say something
substantive about what 'normal' means: 'normal' means *normal. As a
result, and unlike function-based theories of meaning, defense of cp-COV
does not depend on developing an antecedent (robust) notion of function.
Instead, the defender of cp-COV tries to naturalize meaning by showing
that (i) intentional generalizations are no more problematic than other
cp-generalizations, and (ii) that the ep-generalizations appealed to are
legitimate and naturalistic. Thus, the defender of cp-COV will end up
doing a lot of philosophy of science. But else should a naturalistically
minded philosopher of psychology expect?
Moreover, from cp-COV and the fact that cp-generalizations cannot be
completed, it follows that "normal" conditions for the production of
beliefs cannot be spelled out independently. But this does not show that
cp-COV fails to provide a statement of some lawlike connection between
representation and represented. This important fact about cp-
generalizations serves to distinguish cp-COV from other versions of
Wisconsin Semantics. It also serves, I hope, to make ep-COV an
improvement on those other versions.
All of this has been by way of defending, at least partially, the
idea that thoughts bear some natural relation to that which they are
thoughts of. I began this thesis with a quote from Hobbes.
Concerning the Thoughts of man....they are every one a
Representation or Apparance, of some quality, or other
Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an
Object. Which Object woreth on the Eyes, Eares, and other
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parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth
diversity of Apparences ([1651], p.1).
I will end with the same quote, and suggest that the representation
relation is a natural one, viz. cp-covariation.
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Be i eV ing in Con tent
I present here a very brief summary of what I take to be the major
considerations in favor of the claim that mental states have intentional
properties. They all have to do with explanations and capturing
generalizations..
Humans and other animals exhibit complex behaviors, e.g. walking
tow•rds the refrigerator, The ornl, explanations.we have of such behaviors
appeal to (i) the rationalit 1, at least in a minimal. form, of the agent in
question; and (ii) intentional states-- like the belief that the turkey is
in the fridge, and the desire for a turkey sand.sich. So i0so facto, our
best explanrations of many behauiors appeal to intentional states. The
fact that our best eyplanations of a large class of phenomena appeal to
content bearing mental states gives us reason to think that there are such
things.
It must be emphasized that specific content attributions are not
explanatory danglers. The contents matter. We could not plausibly
e'plain Fred's refrigerator-directed behavior by attributing to him the
belief that the number three is in the refrigerator along with the desire
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for a number three sandwich. Indeed, unless Fred's situation is very
unusual, we could collect considerable evidence against this explanation.
One could, for example, observe Fred's behavior after asking Fred about
his beliefs or after telling him that the turkey is on the dining room
table. The problem of saying in virtue of what Fred's mental states are
about turkey, as opposed to the number three, is an instance of the
problem of (specific) content. 3
Fodor often points out that it would be a practical impossibility to
* predict where I will be in the future without attributing intentional
states to me and assuming that these states will influence my behavior in
very particular ways. But if I utter the words, "I11 be on the 3PM
flight on the 25th," you can predict with surprising accuracy where I will
be on the 25th at 3PM. Such predictions will appeal not only to my
beliefs, but my beliefs about your beliefs, etc. There are several points
to be made here.
First, not only is intentional explanation the only game in town when
it comes to complex behavior; it's also a pretty good game. One of the
appeals of Newtonian mechanics is that i-t allows astronomers to make
3. 1 an not claiming 'that for every case in which there are two competing
intentional explanations, there is a fact of the matter concerning
which is correct. The point is only that intentional explanations can
account for behavior in some sense, but still be mistaken. Of course,
one might offer a theory according to which the content -of a mental
state depends on how it figures in a complete description of all an
agent's (possible) behavior. But this is just to give a particular
sort of answer to the problem of (specific) content.
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reliable predictions about where the planets will be at certain times.
But the behavior of the ordinary infant is vastly more complicated than
that of Jupiter. Appeal to intentional states allows us to make
reasonable, informed, well-supported predictions about an extremely
complex range of phenomena. Second, intentional psychology isn't a mere
post facto method of explaining behavior. For it allows us to make such
predictions. Third, intentional explanation seems to work, because there
are interesting generalizations about behavior which can be stated within
the intentional idiom. Asking me where I'll be on the 25th is a good
means of predicting where I'll be on the 25th, because there seem to be
nomic relations between what I believe I will do and what I actually do,
and further nomic relations between what I believe and what I say. These
are qeneralizations to be captured; and importantly, these
generalizations range over contents. They hold, for example, between what
I believe and what I say. And evidence that a class of entities, in this
case contents, figures in nomic regularities is ipso facto evidence that
the entities in question exist.
Of course, the generalization, "If S believes that p, S will say that
p," is not exceptionless. In general, statements of intentional
generalizations will have to contain ceteris paribus (cp) clauses. But I
argue in chapter four and Appendix C that this is the norm. Given that
intentional generalizations are ceteris paribus generalizations, Rey
[forthcoming] points to a wide range of empirically verifiable
regularities that can be explained quite nicely given the generalizations
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of intentional psychology, but are otherwise utterly mystifying. For
example, on standardized test questions, many people often blacken in the
same circle type.4 Here's an explanation of this fact, People know they
are being asked to answer questions; they want to answer the questions
correctly; many of them know the answer is such and such; they know that
blackening in a certain circle will indicate that their answer to the
question is such and such; if people believe that doi.ng p will bring
about q, and if they want q, then ceteris paribus they will do p. Non-
intentional explanations of the statistical regularity are not to be had.
Note also that the intentional psychologist is committed to certain
counterfactual claims; e.g., had the (correct) second and (incorrect)
third choices been reversed, then people would have blackened circle 'C'
instead of 'B'. These claims can be tested. If there is evicential
support for the counterfactual claims, tris is a further regularity to be
explained. Rey's standardized tests paradigrrm can be broadly expanded,
since psychologists could collect data exhibiting regularities
corresponding to each bit of knowledge that subjects share. That would be
a great deal of (scientifically respectable) data which would be explained
by the postulation of intentional states, and for which we would have no
non-intentional explanation whatever.
Giving up intentional explanations of behavior carries a heavy
explanatory burden. For if one gives up intentional psychology, one has
4. The deviation 'from chance is statistically significant, p (( .01.
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to say something about the behavior for which one could o-therwise offer
some explanation. Simply retreating to the claim that intentional
psychology can offer 0rationalizing," but not causal, explanations of
behavior is unsatisfactory. Intentional explanations are, or at least can
be, offered as causal explanations. In rejecting this construal of
intentional psychology, one thereby inherits the burden of offering
alternative plausible causal explanations of behavior which account for
the relevant generalizations. But no such alternatives are available.
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An Appeal to ( DarYwin s) Au thor i ty
In A, I criticized certain Panglossian assumptions about evolutionary
biology. And I simply want to point out that, wherever these ideas come
from, it is not from Darwin, For there is a tendency in some quarters to
raise the principle of natural selection, to almost religious status, with
Darwin serving as high priest. Another reason for including this appendix
is that it provides another part of the defense of appeal to ceteris
paribus (cp) clauses in sciences. Darwin clearly saw evolution as the
result of many influences; and he realized that this would place limits
on how natural selection would manifest itself. 5  If appeal to authority
were ever legitimate, an appeal to Darwin on the subject of natural
selection would be a prime candidate. But I do not intend merely to
appeal to authority here. For whatever reason, appealing to cp clauses
has ring of "bad science." In chapter four, I tried to argue that this is
not the case. And the reason I want to appeal to Darwin is quite simple:
If The Origin of Species is an example of bad science, I have no idea what
counts as good science. If we grant, as I think we must, that Darwin's
5. See Gould (1977, 19793.
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work and the modern theory that grew out of it constitutes good science,
then we must also grant that good science can state cp-generalizations.
In this appendix, I will simply point out some relevant passages in the
Orisin. 6 In Appendix C, I will offer a more general discussion of the
role of ep clauses in (contemporary) evolutionary theory.
That Darwin accepted the existence of non-selective causes of
evolution is clear. In the last sentence of the introduction to the
Origin, he says, "Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has
been the main but not exclusive means of modification.' The conclusion of
Chapter One is that natural selection is the "Predominant Power" of
evolution. But Darwin also notes that "Variability is governed by many
unknown laws...the final result. is thus rendered infinitely complex (p.
43).'
One of the alternative 'means of modification" he often discusses is
correlation of features. Speaking of breeders-- who Darwin often uses by
way of analogy to natural selection-- he savs that if man
.... qoes on selecting, and thus augmenting, any peculiarity, he
will almost certainly unconsciously modify other parts of the
structure, owing to the mysterious laws of the correlation of
growth (p. 12).
Or again later,
... there are many unknown laws of correlation of growth,
which, when one part of the organisation is modified through
variation, and that modifications are accumulated by natural
6. All references will be to Darwin [1859].
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selection for the good of the being, will cause other
modifications, often of the most unexpected Nature (p. 85).
As an example, Darwin notes that changes in the larval stages of certain
insects (which are useful in solving certain problems facing larvae) may
be linked to changes in the adult stages, or vice versa (p. 86).
Darwin also notes that certain observed traits may well have no use
at all, e.g. "...the tuft of hair on the breast of the turkey-cock, which
can hardly be useful or ornamental to this bird (p. 90)." He did not take
such examples to show his principle of Natural Selection to be false, but
rather to indicate that there must be non-selective causes of
"modification." And he seems most confident that laws of correlation are
often responsible.
[A] useful modification of one part will often have entailed
on other parts diversified changes of no direct use (p. 199).
Because of this, Darwin explicitly warns against jumping to the
conclusion that a modification must have been selected for. For example:
The sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been advanced
as a beautiful adaptation for aiding parturition, and no doubt
they facilitate, or may be indispensable for this act; but as
sutures occur in the skulls of young birds and reptiles, which
have only to escape from a broken egg, we may infer that this
structure has arisen from the laws of growth, and has been
taken advantage of in the parturition of the higher animals
(p. 197).
Many other examples of correlation are given on pp. 143-50. Darwin's
favorite concerns the difference between inner and outer flowers in
certain (Compositous and UIkrbelliferous) plants. This difference is often
accompanied by a difference in the shape of inner and outer seeds. Darwin
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cites some possible selection explanations for the difference in flower
shapes. But he claims that the difference in seed structure could not be
advantageous to the plant. Nonetheless,
[I]n the Umbelliferae these differences are of such apparent
importance...that the elder De Candolle founded his main
divisions of the order on analogous differences. Hence we see
that modifications of structure, viewed by systematists as of
high value, may be wholly due to unknown laws of correlated
growth, and without being, as far as we can see, of the
slightest service to the species (p. 146).
And again he later warns that
[W]e may sometimes attribute importance to characteristics
which are really of very little importance, and which
originated from quite secondary causes, independent of natural
selection (p. 196).
Darwin was unaware of Mendelian genetics, and hence the underlying
mechanism which both controlled traits and was heritable. It is clear
that at least much of what Darwin called "correlation" would now be
explained as the result of Pieiotropy. But Darwin's recognition of non-
selective causes of euolution does not even stop at what we would call
Pielotropy. He notes-- citing the fishes swirmbladder as an example-- that
"an organ constructed for one purpose, namely flotation, may be converted
into one for a wholly different purpose, namely respiration (p. 190)."
Darwin also allows that'a smnall part of evolution may be do to "[m]ere
chance, as we might call it." Although this, in Darwin's view, could
never alone account for the varieties among species, it might
... cause one variety to differ in some character from its
parents, and the offspring of this variety again to differ
from its parent in the very same character and in a greater
degree (p. 111).
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Darwin also makes reference to the effects of disuse on traits (e.g.,
pp. 134 ff.). He suggests that flightless birds may have lost the ability
to fly because they have not (for generations), made use of their wings.
Or again, that the reduction in size of mole's eyes was due, at least
partially, to the effects of disuse, perhaps in combination with natural
selection. Given our knowledge of Mendelian genetics, such appeals to
"disuse" sound unpalatably Lamarckian. But my point is not that Darwin's
explanation was correct. My point is rather that Darwin recognized
certain anomalies for his theory, and sought some explanation of them. He
knew that natural selection could not explain all the observed
modification of species. So he postulated non-selective mechanisms of
evolution. Yet another quasi-Lamarckian proposal involved the possibility
of the "conditions of life" affecting features of species. For example,
species in colder cliffatesoften have longer hair. And some individuals
have longer hair than others. Darwin suggested that
When a variation is of the slightest use to being, we cannot
tell how much to attribute to the accumulative action of
natural selection, and how much to attribute to the conditions
of life (p.. 133).
Again, I do wish to defend all of Darwin's non-selective explanations of
evolution, but merely to point out .that he was willing to countenance
them.
Given the possibility of these other causes of evolution, it follows
that natural selection need not lead to actual evolution, for other causes
might be operating simultaneously. Darwin appears to have recognized this
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fact perfectly well; for he almost always talks of what selection will
tend to do, rather than saying simply'what selection will do. And he
explicitly says that intercrossing of varieties can "retard natural
selection (p. 102-3).' In the summary to chapter four, he says:
But if variations useful to any organic being do occur,
assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best
chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from
the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce
offspring similarly characterized. This principle of
preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural
Selection (p. 127, underlining mine).
Just before, he speaks of how the combination of variation of selection
tend to act (p. 116). And at the beginning of chapter three we are told
that:
Owing to this struggle for life, anty variation, however slight
and from whatever ca'sse proceeding, if it be in any degree
profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely
complex relations to other organic beings and to external
nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and
will generally be inherited by its offspring (p.61).
I see no reason to give Darwin's talk of tehdencies a deflationary "merely
statistical" reading, rather than a reading according to which natural
selection is a cause of evolution.7
In the conclusions to the Origin, Darwin thinks that a consequence of
taking his principle of natural selection seriously is that
A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will be opened,
on the causes and laws of variation, on correlation of growth,
on the effects of use and disuse, on the direct action of
external conditions, and so forth (p. 486).
?7. Sgee Sober (1984a] on this point.
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This quote reminds one of Feynman's remark that, if we have confidence in
a law, it can suggest other phenomena when things appear to go wrong. The
principle of natural selection points to and requires an understanding of
non-selective processes of evolution; because the principle of natural
selection is not exceptionless, and some explanation has to be given for
its exceptions.
Finally, in the very last paragraph of the Origin, Darwin explicitly
mentions a number of alternative causes previously discussed.
...these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each
other,' and dependent on each other in so complex a manner,
have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws,
taken in the largest sense, being Growth and Reproduction;
Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction;
Variability from the direct and indirect action of the
external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio
of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as
a consequence to Natural Selection...(pp. 489-50).
I take this as clear evidence that Darwin had no intention of stating.a
principle that was supposed to be exceptionless.
411 -
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Ceter i s Par i bus General i zat ions in
the Theor-y of Evolu tion
In this last Appendix, I rehearse arguments presented in chapters four and
five, but within the context of evolutionary biology. Mayr [1985] claims
that "with respect to more complex biological systems, we can hardly ever
make a generalization that does not have exceptions (p.49)." According to
Sober and Lewontin [1982], "[T]o say that there is selection for some
(genotypic or phenotypic) trait X is to say that X causes differential
reproductive success (ceteris paribus); where the M. modifier coveys "the
fact that selection for X can fail to bring about greater reproductive
success for objects that have Y, if countervailing forces act (pp. 159-60,
including n, 1)." Lewontin (1980] says of judgments that a given trait is
an adaptation that they hold only 9e; and "since all things are never
equal, the final judgment...will depend on the net effect (of the trait)
on the entire organism (p.246)." Dobzhansky [1937] held that genetic
drift (discussed in 3.1.1 above and section three below) was a major
evolutionary force; and while he later weakened his position on this
matter, he remained an important advocate of the claim that the effects of
drift are non-negligible. And significant drift can result in exceptions
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to the 'rule' that the fittest genotypes in a population will be the
genotypes reproduced most often. If the likes of (Darwin,) Mayr,
Lewontin, and Dobzhansky think that generalizations in evolutionary
biology are not'exceptionless, then this claim deserves to be taken
seriously.
C.1 L The Modlern Syn thesi s
The first thing we need to know is which phenomena, evolutionary biology
seeks to explain. 8 The answer may seem obvious, viz. instances of
evolution, But we must be clear about what evolution is. Not
surprisingly, this is a matter to be decided at least partly by intra-
theoretic considerations. It is commron practice to characterize evolution
as a change in gene frequencies in a population. Suppose there are two
genes, say B and b, which can be present at a given locus. And suppose
the distribution of these two genes in a given population in generation a
is 50-50. Let G' be the daughter generation of G. Then any distribution
of the genes B and b in generation G' other than 50-50 will count as
evolution. This may come as a surprise; since we usually think of
evolution as consisting in a change .in phenotypes-- like an increase in.
8. In what follows, I will often draw on Sober's excellent [1984a)
discussion of evolutionary theory. Unless otherwise noted, page
references in this section will be to Sober [1984a]. Readers
unfamiliar with the essentials of Darwin's theory and Mendelian
genetics (the "Modern Synthesis") may wish to refer to chapter one of
Sober's book.
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the length of legs-- across generations. But to say that evolution is a
change in gene frequencies is not to say that phenotypic change is merely
an epiphenomenon. Nor does it follow that genes are what "really"
interest biologists. On the contrary, evolutionary biologists are very
interested in changes of phenotype. But these are seen as possible causes
or effects of evolution (p.29).
Evolution is clearly not sufficient for phenotypic change. The
proportion of recessive genes in a population might decrease with no
corresponding change in phenotypes. And while a change in phenotypes may-
be (prima facie) evidence that evolution has occurred, phenotypic change
is not sufficient for evolution either. An increase in the mean height of
individuals in a population may be due to better diet. Phenotypic changes
can even be cau.sed by changes at the genetic level without evolution
occurring. Suppose the genotype BE typically results in .a phenotype of
brown hair; bb typically results in blonde hair; and Bb typically
results in green hair. The distribution of genes in generation G might be
50-50, because every member of the population is a green-haired
heterozygote. In G' the distribution might be 50-50, with half the
population being homozygous for B and half being homozygous for h. There
would be a dramatic change in phenotypes across generations, but no
evolutionr'; 9
9. Two caveats are in order here. At least for present purposes, I will
assume that gene frequencies are computed per capita. Blonde-haired
organisms might be (accidentally or not) bigger than the others, and
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Darwin's great insight, the principle of natural selection, can be
formulated rather neatly as follows: If (i) organisms possessing a
property P are better able to survive and reproduce than organisms
possessing an alternative property P', and (ii) P and P' are heritable,
then (iii) the proportion of organisms in the population having P will
increase. Darwin did not know about Mendelian genetics, but we can
translate (ii) as (ii*) P and P' are controlled by (or in a degenerate
case just are) gene complexes g and 9', respectively. If (i) and (ii*),
then (iii*) the proportion of organisms in the population having (and
hence P) will increase. And (iii*) implies that (iv) evolution will
occur, and this evolution will be "in the direction of'" (and hence P).
Combining Darwin and Mendel, if (i) and (ii), then (iii*) and (iv). But,
as Sober points out:
[A] ceteris paribus clause needs to be added here: heritable
variation in fitness will result in evolution only on the'
assumption that no counteracting forces cancel its
effects...But as a first approximation, the conditional claim
that if there is heritable variation in fitness, then there
will be evolution (if nothing interferes) seems to be
remarkably straightforward (pp. 27-28).
thus have more copies of the allele in question. The fact that the
sheer number of tl genes would have increased from 6 to 6' in the
example above would not count as evolution, since each organism gets
counted only once. Second. we can talk about evolution occurring.
between parent and (irrirediate) daughter generations. As a result,
small perturbations in gene frequencies will count as evolution, even
if they never amount to anything over geological time. Thus, the term
'evolution' will cover many more changes than such grand occurrences as
the ernergence of tne opposable thumb (p. 31).
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If Sober is right, then nothing less than the centerpiece of
evolutionary biology is a ep-generalization. Sober is right. There can
be *abnormal instances of the principle'of natural selection: cases in
which a heritable trait T increases the fitness of an organism, but the
proportion of organisms in the population having T (as opposed to some
competitor of T) does not increase. Note that Sober speaks of
"counteracting forces" that can "cancel" or "interfere" in making this
point. But why is Sober convinced that natural selection results in
evolution only cp? We have already seen the answer to this question in
chapter three above. In criticizing Panglossianismg I pointed out that
there were possible causes of evolution other than natural selection; and
when events are the result of many causes, we should expect
generalizations over such events to hold only cp.
C. 2 Non-Select i ve Evolu ti on :
P.1 eMi o tropy
In 3.1.1, I discussed the possibillty of "neighbor traits." When a given
gene is replicated, sometimes a nearby gene is .copied as well. There may
also be other constraints on the reproduction of genes, because of which
..the presence of distinct genotypes become nomologically related. In any
such case, selection for a phenotypic trait controlled by some subset of a
group of "linked" genes will result in the selection of each member gene
in the group. I will use the term 'Pleiotropy' (with a capital 'P'), to
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include any case in which a number of linked genes control a number of
phenotypic traits which are thereby linked as well. 1 0
To see how Pleiotropy might result in an *abnormal instance of the
principle of nattural selection, suppose that (i) certain organisms in a
population have a gene g which controls a slightly useful phenotypic trait
T, and (ii) the competitor of a at the locus in question controls an
alternative trait which is selectively inert. The proportion of organisms
having . and T should increase in the population. But suppose also that
(iii) q is linked to some other gene *'; (iv) s' controls a phenotypic
trait T', which is very deleterious; and (v) the competitor of a' at its
locus is inert. In such a case, the proportion of organisms in the
population having q and T will decrease. 4
One might deny that, in the example described, the principle of
natural selection has as a consequence that the proportion of organisms
having q will increase, ceteris paribus. One might think that, because of
the link between a and g', the presence of a does not increase the
organism's chance of survival. This is a controversial claim, but it also
turns out to be irrelevant for present purposes. The phenotypic trait T.
10. The control of multiple phenotypic traits by a single gene is usually
i called 'pleiotropy' (small 'p'). Thus, pleiotropy is a special case
of Pleiotropy, with the number of linked genes being one.
11. Though, of course, this claim holds only cp as well. The gene •g might
also be linked to g" whicr controls a very useful trait. For the
example, however, suppose that g is linked only to g', and that any
further interference cancels out.
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contributes to fitness, and T is heritable. So according to the principle
of natural selection, the proportion of organisms having T should
increase. (And since, in the population, organisms with T also have g,
the percentage of . should increase as well.) A possible response is to
hold that T does not contribute to fitness in this case; because g
controls T, 3 is linked to g', and a' controls the deleterious trait T'.
But again, the fact that g is linked to g' is a non sequitur with respect
to the. contribution of T to fitness. Suppose that T is the ability' to run
a little faster than other members of the species, and T' is a decrease in
egg production. It would be perverse to deny that running faster
contributes to fitness on the grounds that a decrease in egg production
decreases fitness. It is important to distinguish (i) the contribution to
fitness made by phenotypic traits from (ii) the contribution to fitness
made by the underlying genetic causes of those traits. Being able to run
faster can make an organism fitter, even if the overall contribution to
fitness made by the underlying genetic cause of this ability is negative.
In the quote cited at the beginning of this section, Lewontin reminds
us that traits like beinq able to run faster may, despite appearances, not
be adaptations. Perhaps organisms at the front of the herd will be in the
most danger. So because an organism can run faster, it may get itself
into trouble that it wouldn't have otherwise gotten into. If organisms
experienced a decrease in egg production because they could run faster,
then being able to run faster would merely appear to be an adaptation.
(This would be the case if organisms run faster because they can; and
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running faster results in trauma to the ovaries.) But I am assuming for
my example that a controls a genuine adaptation, i.e. a phenotypic trait
whose overall effect is to contribute to the organism's fitness, though
one whose effect is "outweighed" by some other deleterious trait. This
seems perfectly possible. The overall effect of being able to run faster
may well be to increase fitness, while the overall effect of the cluster
of linked genes underlying this ability is to decrease fitness.
It is important not to be misled by reasoning as follows:
The organism has T only because it has s; so if it didn't
have T, it wouldn't have a; if it didn't have g, it wouldn't
have 3' either; the organism would be fitter without 31'
therefore, the organism would be fitter if it did not have T.
Perhaps the counterfactuals, "If the organism did not have T, then it
would not have 3'," and "If the organism, did not have 9!', then it would be
fitter," are true on some readings. I am dubious. Because I doubt that
we can talk sensibly about the same organismrr having a different genetic
structure. But even if these two counterfactuals are true, it does not
follow that the organism would be fitter if it were not able to run
faster. That is just false. There is nothing especially• strange going on
here. Counterfactual conditionals often fail to preserve transitivity.
What can and should be granted is that organisrns without .* will be fitter
(cp) than those with q, given the available options. But it doesn't
follow that T, the trait controlled by q, doesn't contribute to fitness.
And given that T is a heritable trait which does contribute to fitness,
the principle of natural selection tells us that cp, the percentage of
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organisms having T will increase in the population. So the case described
is an *abnormal instance of this principle. Therefore, ceteris must not
paribus. But this conclusion should be thoroughly unsurprising, since I
explicitly introduced interfering factors into the example.
There is one other possible response to my example. One might claim
that selection occurs only at the genetic level, i.e. that selection is
always selection for having some gene.12 And one might also claim that
when genes are "linked," they should be treated as a single gene for the
purposes of selection. This response avoids the possibility of *abnormal
instances of the principle of natural selection which are due to
Pleiotropy. But it does so crv fiat. It seems to me that at least one
point in the "units of selection" controversy has been resolved: Darwin
was right about there being selection for having certain phenotypic
traits. This is not to say there cannot be selection for genotypic
traits. But it strikes me as Dizarre to deny either (i) that properties
like being able to run faster contribute to fitness or (ii) that such
properties can be selected for because they contribute to fitness. I
cannot say much else at this point without entering into a long digression
about (a) selection for genes vs. (b) selection of genes because of
selection for phenotypic traits.13
12. See, e.g., Dawkins [1976].
S13. I refer the interested reader to Sober [1984a]. See Sober (1984b3 for
I1:· essays on the "units of selection dispute."
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Even if one maintains a very restrictive view of what gets selected
for, however, the example involving Pleiotropy can be restated without
supposing that the beneficial and deleterious genes are nomologicallv
linked. It might just happen that the useful genes wind up organisms
which are otherwise very unfit. The useful genes will not increase their
proportion in the population, because they will be "trapped" in organisms
which don't stay alive long enough to reproduce. We can explain such
*abnormal instances of the principle of natural selection, but they are
*abnormal instances nonetheless. And there are still other reasons for
thinking that the principle of natural selection holds only cp.
C . 3 Non -- selec t i ve Fo r ces : Chance
Another possible cause of evolution that I discussed in 3.1.1 was genetic
drift, which we can think of as analogous to "sampling error" in
statistics. Consider the members of generation G who contribute genetic
material to zygotes, some of which will survive to form the next
generation of adults G'. Count a parent in G once for each zygote to
which it contributes genetic material. We have, then, a set of G-parents
with twice as many members as the set of G-zygotes. Each zygote is
composed of two gametes, and each gamete contains half of. some G-parent's
full complement of genes (i.e. one of the two genes at each locus). Each
G-parent will have many gametes, but can 'contribute only one gamete to a
particular zygote. So it is effectively a coin-toss as' to which of two
genes a heterozygous G-parent will contribute to a G-zygote. There is no
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guarantee that the distribution of a large number of coin tosses will come
out 50-50. In fact, a perfectly even distribution of heads and tails is
very unlikely. Similarly, it is unlikely that the distribution of genes
in the G-parents will be exactly the same as the distribution in the G-
zygotes. The distribution of genes B and b might be 50-50 in a given
generation. But there will almost certainly be some drift in the
direction of B or b from one generation to the next. The possibility of
an *abnormal instance of the principle of natural selection arises,
because selective pressure in favor of b may be cancelled out by drift in
the direction of B.
For our purposes, we can also count the effects of mutation under the
heading of "chance.h This is not to say that mutations occur at random,
or that the phenomenon of mutation is analogous to phenomenon observed in
the "slit experiments" in physics. It is just to say that the fitness of
a genotype is irrelevant to the likelihood of it mutating; and so with
respect to the effects of natural selection on evolution, the effects of
mutation on evolution may as well be chance effects. The effect of
mutation on evolution is straightforward. If qene b mutates more often
than its competitor gene , the proportion of organisms having _ (and the
trait it controls) as opposed to B (and the trait it controls) will tend
to decrease in the population. But if having the phenotypic trait that b
controls is selectively advantageous, the "net result" of selection and
mutation with respect to evolution will depend on the strength of the
selective pressure and the rate of mutation. So if the rates of mutation
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for two competitor genes differ enough, the result may be an *abnormal
instance of the principle of natural selection.14
Yet another possible cause of evolution is mass extinction. That is,
large portions of a species may be extinguished for reasons (earthquakes,
ice ages, etc.) that have nothing do with how well adapted to their niche
the individuals were. But the point applies equally well on a smaller
scale. Some members of generation G might be struck by lightning. These
individuals never become 6-parents. Suppose that- the members of 6 who
died for reasons that had nothing to do with their fitness were of either
genotype bb or genotype BB. If more bb organisms than Bj organisms are
removed from the population in this way, then the proportion of gene b in
the population may decrease even if having the phenotypic trait which b
controls is selectively advantageous.
To recall, the principle of natural selection is the following:
If organisms possessing a property P are better able to
survive and reproduce than orqanisms possessing an alternative.
property P', and if P and P' are heritable, then the
proportion of organisms in the population having P will
increase.
We might say that this principle makes the idealizing assumption that
deaths "due to chance" wili strike all genotypes (and phenotypes) in the
same. proportion. This is perfectly reasonable assumption to make. "In
the long run," the actual number of such deaths will approach.this ideal
14. See Dobzhansky [1949] (chapter eight) for a detailed discussion of
genetic drift, and drift-mutation interaction.
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very closely in most populations. For example, the odds are that drift
will play a small role in the evolution of most populations. So
idealizing away from drift is perfectly reasonable thing to do. But
idealizing assumptions are typically false. In actual (finite)
populations, drift will almost always have some effect on evolution. 1 5
Similarly, the effect of mutation on evolution may be small, but it
is not nothing. Nor will lightning strike members of differing genotypes
in exactly the same proportion, I am not arguing here that the principle
of natural selection will have many dramatic *abnormal instances. I only
want to point out that, like the other laws. considered in chapters four
and five, it can have *abnormal instances. These can be broadly
classified into two groups: those involving Pleiotropy and those
involving chance. Note, however, that we cannot not specify what counts
as chance independently of the principle of natural selection. For recall
that "random" in this contact means random with respect to selection. So
again, we see that the conditions in which ceteris is paribus cannot be
specified independently of the op-generalization itself.
One might wonder at this point, if any coherent theory is possible,
given all these possible interacting causes of evolution. There is. The
biologist lays down a set of cp-generalizations, each of which can be
15. Even if we idealize away from finite populations, there is no logical
guarantee that drift would have no effect. It is logically possible
that an infinite number of (fair) coin tosses should distribute 60-40,
or even all heads. Seevan Fraassen [1977] and Skyrms [1980].
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true. Then, .to the degree she is able, she describes what happens when
the various possible causes of evolution interact. Sober calls such a
theory a 'theory of forces." To explain the role of Darwin's principle of
natural selection in such a theory, I must first say something about what
Sober calls the "zero-force law" for evolutionary biology.
C.,4 A Theory o f Forc&es
The Hardy-Weinberg law of population genetics describes the relationship
which holds between (a) the distributions of genes in the gamete pool and
(b) the distribution of genotypes in zygotes that (some of) those gametes
form. Consider again our earlier example of the genes controlling hair
color. There were three possible genotypes: Bj, bb, and Bb. Let f(x) be
the frequency of gene x in the gamete pool; and suppose, for
simplification, that f(x) in the sperm pool equals f(x) in the egg pool.
Thus, f(s) + f(b) = 1, where values for either variable can be taken from
either the sperm or egg pool. The Hardy-Weinberg law tells us that given
random combination of gametes, the proportion of the genotypes BB, bb, and
Bb in the zygote pool will be
(f_())Z, (f(L)), and 2(f(B))(f(b)), respectively.
Given this proportion of genotypes in the zygote pool, the ratio of
gene B to gene b will be 2(f(B)) t + 2f()f((b) : 2(f(b)) a + 2f(Bg)f(b).
Some simple algebra will show that this ratio is always the. same as the
ratio of B to b in the gamete pool. Intuitively, this is because the
Si i • ~425-
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Hardy-Weinberg law simply describes the effects on the distribution of
genotypes given a "shuffling' of the gene pool via random mating. This
.consequence is of interest; because if the ratio of B to b remains
constant across generations, there is no evolution. As it stands,
however, the Hardy-Weinberg law does not describe the ratio of genes
across generations. It only describes the transition from gametes to
zygotes on the assumption that (i) the combination of gametes is random.
But on the further assumptions that (ii) the distribution of genes in the
zygote pool will be the same as the distribution of genes in the adult
population which results from those zygotes, and (iii) the distribution of
genes in the adult population will be the same as the distribution of
genes in the next gamete pool those adults produce, then the Hardy-
Weinberg law is a description of the frequencies of alternative genes
across generations. The values of f(B) and f(_) remain the same no matter
how many times the Hardy-Weinberg law is applied. So it follows from the
conjunction of (i-iii) and the Hardy-Weinberg law that there will be no
evolution.frorr generation to generation.
This is why Sober calls the Hardy-Weinberg law the "zero force law"
of evolutionary biology. It ignores all the evolutionary forces. In this
sense, the Hardy-Weinberg la,) is analogous to Newton's law: A body in
motion tends to stay in motion; a body at rest tends to stay at rest. Of
course, assumptions (i-iii) above are strong idealizing assumptions, which
are usually not even approximated in actual populations. For in actual
populations, there are typically many forces of evolution at work.
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characterized as a change in gene frequencies, it turns out (rather
nicely) that *abnormal instances of the Hardy-Weinberg law are instances
of evolution, and are to be explained by citing forces of evolution. Of
course, ceteris will almost never be paribus. Actual populations will be
finite in number. So drift will almost. surely have some effect (p. 25).
There will always be differential fitness among members of the population,
so selective pressure will have an effect. Competitor genes sometimes
mutate at different rates, etc. These evolutionary forces will very
rarely, if ever, cancel one another out with the result that actual
distributions of genes are exactly those determined by the Hardy-Weinberg
law. But this is the right result. For in actual populations, there is
almost always evolution.
Given this "zero-force" law, the biologist can state various
"singleton laws" which describe the effect on evolution of a single
euolutionary force. But since such l.awlike statements ignore all but one
of the possible causes of evolution, they can describe actual changes in
the distribution of genes only ep as well. The principle of natural
selection is one of these singleton laws:
Ceteris paribus, if organisms possessing a property P are
better able to survive and reproduce than organisms possessing
an alternative property P', and if P and P' are heritable,
then the proportion of organisms in the population having P
will increase.
But ceteris may not be paribus. There may be significant drift,
Pleiotropy, or a high rate of mutation, with the result that the
proportion of organisms having P does not increase.
!i
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(Analogously, no body will stay in motion or remain at rest forever,
because there are physical forces at work in the actual world.)
The frequency of genes may not remain constant in the transition from
gametes to zygotes. That is, there may be genetic drift. Or the
distribution of genes in the zygote pool may differ from the distribution
of genes among those organisms that survive to adulthood. That is, (ii)
may be false, because some force of evolution, perhaps selection, has been
at work. If (iii) is false-- i.e., if the distribution of genes in adults
differs from the distribution in the gametes those adults produce-- we can
infer that some evolutionary force has been at work, perhaps mutation. So
if there is a change in the distribution of genes across generations, the
Hardy-Weinberg laa tells us that some force of evolution has been at work.
As Sober points out, however, if no change in gene distribution occurs, we
cannot assume that no evolutionary forces were at work. Again, this is
because-evolutionary forces may cancel out.
Various forces may have been present and canceled (sic) out
each other. For example, there may be a balance between
mutation and selection; if A mutates into a more readily than
a mutates into A, but A is selectively advantageous, the net
result may be conformity to the Hardy-Weinberg ratios. Change
implies a force, but the absence of change does not imply the
absence of force (pp. 34-35).
Construed as a description of gene distributions across generations,
we can think of the Hardy-Weinberg law as containing a very big cp clause.
Anym deviations from its description of gene frequencies are to be
explained by various forces of evolution. Because evolution. is
· I : °
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C.5 InterferencQe Explanations vs.
Co u n t eir f a t u •l s
It is, I hope, obvious what I want to say about the cp clauses attached to
the Hardy-Weinberg law and the principle of natural selection: They
express commitments to explaining away *abnormal instances of the relevant
generalizations by citing factors (i.e. causes of evolution) ignoredi
given *abnormal instances of the generalization in question, some
"interference explanation" must be undefeated in the sense characterized
in B and C above; and given *normal instances of the generalization, any
interference must be "cancelled out" by further interference as described
in section B above. These claims seem quite plausible in the context of
evolutionary theory.
Consider the principle of natural selection. We have seen that it
can h*ae *abnormal instances. We car, explain these instances by citing
drift, mutation, Pleiotropy, lightning strikes, etc. 16  But the
interference explanations must be also be unaefeated. Suppose we cite
drift in the direction of gene B to explain why evolution in the direction
of b fails to occur given selective pressure in favor of b. Further
interference that quasi-explains evolution in the direction of b given the
selective pressure and drift must be accompanied by still further
16. We might discover still other possible causes of evolution which could
also explain *abnormal instances of the principle of natural
selection. But remember that epistemology is not in question.
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interference which could explain why there would not be evolution in the
direction of b after all. The converse is also true,. Suppose again that
there is strong drift in the direction of gene g, evolution in the
direction of b occurs anyway, but the strong drift quasi-explains why
selective pressure in favor of b does not lead to evolution in the'
direction of b. Then there must be further interference. The mutation
rate of f might be higher than that of b, for example; and this might
explain why there would be evolution in the direction of b after all.
The situation with respect to the (cp-modified) Hardy-Weinberg law is
similar, except that there are almost no *normal instances of this lawlike
statement. There is a stronq temptation to say, however2 that the Hardy-
Weinberg tells us wnat would happen in the absence of any evolutionary
forces. Similarly, one might think that the principle of natural
selection should be understood as saying what would happen if selection
were the only evolutionary force at work. This temptation must be
resisted. I have argued against such counterfactual analyses of ep-
generalizations already. But it will be worth going through the arguments
one last time here.
If we understand the Hardy-Weinberg law as making claims about what
would happen in the absence of evolutionary forces, Cartwright's worries
about the explanatory worth of cp-generalizations remain. How can the
Hardy-Weinberg law figure in explanations of actual phenomena if ceteris
is never patibus with respect to that la~w. Moreover, it seems bizarre to
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say that the truth of some law of evolutionary biology is true in virtue
of what would happen if there were no evolution. But worse, the
supposition that there are no evolutionary forces at work seems to be
incoherent when applied to any actual population in which organisms die..
If there were no evolutionary forces, there would be no selective
pressure; and so all the organisms in a population would be of equal
fitness. Thus, all deaths in the population would'have to occur for
reasons having nothing to do with fitness, e.g. lightning strikes. But
such deaths are possible causes of evolution. It might happen that all
such deaths are distributed evenly over genotypes (and/or phenotypes).
But that is not to say that no forces of evolution were at work. It.is
just to say that lots of minor factors (like lightning strikes, drownings,
etc.) cancelled out. These factors are sources of interference with
respect to the principle of natural selection. They happen to be of no
theoretical-interest to biolo9ists. Nonetheless, they can cause
evolution. So if members of a population die, then some (possibly
theoretically uninteresting) euolutionary forces were at work after all.
The counterfactual analysis looks equally bad when we turn to the
principle of natural selection. If we understand this cp-generalization
counterfactually, the apparent result is the following lawlike.statements
If organisms having property P are better able to survive and
reproduce than organisms having an alternative trait P', and
if P and P' are heritable, and if there were no drift, no
Plelotropy, no mutation, etc., then the proportion of
organisms having P would have increased in the populatron.
*1 I
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Again, there are problems concerning the explanatory role of this law.
But the statement above is not yet restrictive enough to be true. The
proportion of organisms having P will be sure to increase only if the
other properties these organisms happen to have do not make them less fit
on the whole than organisms having P'. So some further clause must be
added to the antecedent of the statement above, e.g. "and if the organisms
had the same fitness except for having P or P'." But now we have the same
problem as above: We are asked to imagine a situation in which having P
vs. P' is the only cause of evolution; but as long as organisms are
dying, there will be other evolutionary forces at work.
Moreover, it seems ueru strange to say that the principle of natural
selection is true in virtue of what would happen if there were no
mutations. For mutation is the cause of at least some of the differences
in fitness among organisms on which selection acts. It seems much better
to adoot the account according to which actual *abnormal instances are
explained, rather than giving cp-generalizations a ceteris .absentibus
reading.
Sooer also rejects the idea of givihg "ceteris absentibus" readings
to cp-generalizations an evolutionary biology. Because while this idea
si eems to apply straightforwardly to the physics of billiard
balls, it needs to modified somewhat in order to apply to many
standard models in population genetics. In these models...the
outcome of an evolutionary process depends on the relative
Smagnitudes of various forces, not on their absolute values.
In such cases, what is required for the model's predictions to
'- hold true is not that all other forces be absent but that
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their net value (if opposite in sign) must be less than the
one described in the model (p. 28, n.14).
In a particular case, the principle of natural selection may have as a
consequence, "then evolution in the direction of gene b occurs.'
Evolution in the direction of b, therefore, will count as a *normal
instance. And this will be the case, even if there are small effects on
the net change in gene frequencies due to drift or mutation. We do not
want such small effects, which do not result in *abnormal instances of the
principle of natural selection, to keep us from applying that principle
and making qualitative claims about the direction of evolution in a
population. The presence of interference can perhaps explain *abnormal
instances.of a generalization;. it does not make a generalization
inapplicable. Moreover, ceteris absentibus readings do. not account for
the possibility of factors interacting and cancelling out in numerous
complex ways. But an adequate account of cp-generalizations in
evolutionary biology, must account for this possibility.
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